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PREFACE 
Giovanni Carlo Bruno 
Fulvio Maria Palombino 
Daniele Amoroso
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) were adopted unanimously by the world leaders during the 
United Nations (UN) Summit on 25-27 September 2015, and they officially came 
into force on 1st January 2016. 
The Agenda clearly recognizes the positive contribution made by migrants for 
inclusive growth and sustainable development, and, for the first time, migration is 
included in the global development framework. Sustainable Development Goal 10 
– Reduce inequality within and among countries – aims, inter alia, at facilitating
“orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including
through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.
On 19 September 2016, at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, the New 
York Declaration was adopted, a plan for addressing large movements of refugees 
and migrants. It is affirmed that “Since earliest times, humanity has been on the 
move. Some people move in search of new economic opportunities and horizons. 
Others move to escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity, persecution, terror-
ism, or human rights violations and abuses. Still others do so in response to the ad-
verse effects of climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be linked to 
climate change), or other environmental factors. Many move, indeed, for a combi-
nation of these reasons” (para. 1) 
On the link between migration and development, the UN Member States recog-
nize that “Migrants can make positive and profound contributions to economical 
and social development in their host societies and to global wealth creation. They 
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can help to respond to demographic trends, labour shortages and other challenges 
in host societies, and add fresh skills and dynamism to the latter’s economy. We 
recognize the development benefits of migration to countries of origin, including 
though the development of diasporas in economic development and reconstruction” 
(para. 46). It goes on to affirm that all the aspects of migrations should be integrat-
ed into global, regional and national sustainable development plans, respecting the 
needs and the rights of the vulnerable people involved in migration flows. 
 
When the call for papers for ‘Migration and Development: some reflections on 
current legal issues” was published, we underlined that the attention of scholars, in 
the discussion concerning the increased migratory flows, focused more on the ques-
tions regarding admission and / or rejection of migrants on the territory of receiving 
countries than on the general topic of the contribution of migrants to the financial, 
social and cultural development of societies (of origin, transit, or destination). 
 
The volume does not cover all the aspects of the multi-faceted, complex relation 
between migratory flows and development (of people, society, and countries). Our 
goal has been to open discussion among experts, scholars and policy-makers, on the 
problematic questions, outcomes, implications and achievements on this issue.   
The first four contributions of the volume set the stage for the research by offer-
ing a general exposition on M&D-related legal issues. The volume opens, signifi-
cantly enough, with a historical inquiry on the relation between migration, integra-
tion and development in the Mediterranean area. In her contribution (“Should Eu-
rope be Looking into Turkey’s Byzantine Past to Discover its Own Future?”), 
Francesca Galgano, an expert of Roman Law, invites us to look at the Byzantine 
experience - where “the concepts of globalization and multiethnic society were re-
ality” (p. 3) - to draw important lessons on the way the European Union (but the 
same is valid for other countries of destination) should cope with the manifold eco-
nomic, cultural and social issues raised by migratory flows. 
The contribution by Francesco Luigi Gatta (“The EU Development Policy and Its 
Impact on Migration”) provides the reader with precious background by expounding 
on EU’s M&D policies. As the author points out, the EU, not being “a military pow-
er”, has to rely “on its diplomatic means, financial capacity and political influence in 
order to foster dialogue and cooperation with third countries” (p. 12). To this end, the 
EU set up a wide array of institutional and legal tools to promote development in 
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third countries. In the last decade, the EU’s approach to development issues has been 
progressively widened so as to include also the M&D nexus. This has resulted in a 
number of practical actions and measures which are critically analysed by Gatta, who 
- while acknowledging the merits of recent reforms in EU policies - underscores the 
persisting preeminence of the “economic dimension” at the expense of “the human 
and social indicators of development, such as overall quality of life, primary educa-
tion, health care, [and] employment” (p. 44). 
The investigation by Stefano Montaldo (“Regular Migrants’ Integration be-
tween European Law and National Legal Orders: a Key Condition for Individual 
and Social Development”) supplements the previous contribution, by examining 
another crucial element in the M&D dynamics: integration. This is an area where 
EU and national policies “often lock swords and pursue different goals” (p. 49). In-
stead of promoting the positive attitude to integration fostered by EU institutions, 
in particular, Member States conceive of integration conditions as a “managerial” 
tool “for the selection of migrants deserving a chance” (ibid.) - a situation which 
may hinder the achievement of M&D objectives established at the EU level. On the 
basis of a careful analysis of EU legislation and case law, therefore, the author ar-
gues that national integration policies are to be deemed compatible with EU law 
“only if they facilitate integration”, are proportionate and do not “undermine the ef-
fectiveness of relevant EU Directives” (p. 69). 
In “Migration and Development: The Case of People Displaced by Develop-
ment and States’ Obligation to Respect Their Human Rights”, Laura Messina casts 
a different light on the relation between migration and development. Here, in fact, 
migration is not seen - as is usual - as a driver for development, but as a negative 
consequence of development projects. On this assumption, Messina carries out a 
detailed examination of the protection afforded by international human rights law 
to development-displaced persons, having particular regard to “four core rights” 
(the right to property, the right to respect for private life and home, the right to ad-
equate housing and the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence), as 
well as to the emerging “right not to be displaced” (p. 91).  
Building on this background analysis, the ensuing papers are devoted to more 
specific legal issues. A first set of contributions is focused on migrant workers’ 
rights. Notably, Fulvia Staiano (“The Undesirable Worker Fiction: Demand-Based 
Labour Migration Schemes and Migrant Workers’ Socio-Economic Rights”) offers 
a critical examination of labour migration schemes currently adopted in EU Mem-
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x G.C. Bruno, F.M. Palombino, D. Amoroso 
 
 
ber States, by taking the Italian and Irish legal orders as case studies. As shown by 
the author, the inadequacy of these schemes ends up pushing migrant workers “into 
unregulated and informal employment” (p. 96), with inevitable repercussions on 
the enjoyment of the socio-economic rights protected at the international, EU, and 
domestic levels. Interestingly, her review of Italian and Irish case law highlights 
how domestic courts, while striving to afford adequate protection to irregular mi-
grant workers, shy away from relying on supranational sources, and prefer to resort 
to “an extensive interpretation of [domestic] immigration law” (p. 116). This is 
caused by the overall lack, at the international and European levels, of hard-law 
sources - a gap that, Staiano concludes, needs to be filled.  
While still lingering on workers’ rights, the piece by Beatrice Gornati (“Limits 
to the Implementation of International Law Instruments on Labour Migration: a 
Focus on ILO’s Praxis”) in some way zooms out, by providing a thorough descrip-
tion of the relevant standards laid down by the International Labour Organization, 
with particular regard to three core aspects, namely the protection of migrant work-
ers, the employment of refugees, and the phenomenon of forced labour. This analy-
sis leads the author to note that, although ILO’s has been particularly “prolific in 
recent years” (p. 144), the status of implementation of its (binding and non-
binding) standards is far from satisfactory.  
The second set of contributions concerns, on the other hand, the protection of 
asylum seekers. The adoption by the Danish Parliament of the much controversial 
“Jewellery Law” offers Salvatore Fabio Nicolosi the opportunity to reflect on do-
mestic legislations envisaging the obligation of asylum seekers to contribute from 
their own assets and income to the cost of their reception (“‘Asylum Payers’: Ques-
tioning the Asylum Seekers’ Obligation to Contribute to the Costs of their Recep-
tion under International and European Law”). Nicolosi argues that this practice is 
not only highly problematic under international law (Refugee Convention, ECHR) 
and EU law (Reception Directive), but it is also questionable “from an economic 
perspective”, to the extent that it overlooks, first, “that refugees will more than 
likely use their own assets within the host State” and, second, that there is an un-
bridgeable gap between the economic value of asylum seekers’ assets and “the 
enormous costs that States face in order to maintain an efficient asylum system 
with adequate reception facilities” (p. 168). 
Elena Gualco’s contribution focuses on the protection of a particular category 
of asylum seekers, namely unaccompanied minors (“Unaccompanied Minors Seek-
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ing for Protection in the European Union: Will a Fair and Adequate Asylum Sys-
tem Ever See the Light?”). In Gualco’s view, this choice is particularly suitable for 
an M&D analysis, since minors - unlike adult migrants - are expected to grow up, 
live and work in the country where they have found asylum, so contributing far 
more significantly to the latter’s development (p. 177). Her research unveils the 
(many) shortcomings of the current Common European Asylum System and the 
overall inadequacy of the recent reform proposals set forth by the European Com-
mission. According to the author, a real improvement could be achieved only 
through the adoption of a legal and institutional framework that ensures “the uni-
form accommodation of migrants” among Member States and common rules on the 
protection of asylum seekers’ rights (p. 190). 
The last two papers pinpoint two complementary, and equally worrisome, facets 
of EU policy on M&D, which appear to be paradigmatic of a general attitude of in-
dustrialized countries: on the one hand, the endeavour to attract highly qualified 
workers from less developed States, at the risk of further undermining the latter’s 
economic growth; on the other hand, the “instrumentalization” of development co-
operation to the control of migratory flows (mainly of unskilled workers) from 
non-industrialized countries.  
In particular, Alessandro Rosanò provides an in-depth analysis of the Blue Card 
Directive, which affords a preferential treatment (e.g. in relation to family reunifi-
cation) to non-EU highly skilled citizens wishing to work and live in the European 
Union (“Something Old, Something New, Something Balanced, Something Blue: 
the EU Blue Card Directive, Brain drain, and the Economic Development of the 
EU and the Sending Countries”). He brings to the limelight the fact that neither the 
Blue Card Directive nor the revision proposal put forth by the Juncker Commission 
contains sufficient safeguards against brain drain and suggests that a revised Di-
rective should include a provision obliging Member States to reject an application 
for an EU Blue Card, whenever this is required to ensure ethical recruitment in sec-
tors suffering from a lack of qualified workers in the countries of origin (p. 212). 
Finally, Martina Guidi (“More Development of Third States and Less Migration 
towards the EU Member States: Is This a New Dual Aim of the EU Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements?”) describes how a broad notion of “development coop-
eration” (which encompasses also migration issues) has recently made its way in 
the practice of EU institutions, including the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion. As the author points out, this shift in EU policy has been “leading to the devel-
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opment aid serving migration control and readmission objectives” (p. 239) instead 
of pursuing the reduction and eradication of poverty in less developed countries. 
Against this trend, Guidi makes the case for avoiding “lane invasions” and keeping 
development cooperation and migration control separate (p. 241). 
 
 
The present volume represents the first result of the scientific cooperation on 
the issue of Migration and Development between the Law Department of the Uni-
versity of Naples Federico II and the Institute for Research on Innovation and Ser-
vices for Development (IRISS) of the National Research Council of Italy. We 
would therefore like to thank the Director of the Law Department, Prof. Lucio De 
Giovanni, and the Director of IRISS, Dr. Alfonso Morvillo, for setting up the insti-
tutional framework of this cooperation by signing a formal agreement between the 
two institutions. 
We would also like to thank the colleagues who enthusiastically replied to the 
call for papers we launched on January 2016 and made the publication of this vol-
ume actually possible. 
We are particularly grateful to Alessandra Viviani, Lucia Aleni, Francesca Ca-
pone, Flavia Rolando, and Javier Belda Iniesta, who reviewed the draft contribu-
tions and helped us to improve their (already high) quality.   
Finally, a special thanks goes to Angela Petrillo for the graphic design of the 
covers, and to Fulvia Staiano for her valuable editorial assistance. 
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I. 
SHOULD EUROPE BE LOOKING INTO  
TURKEY’S BYZANTINE PAST TO DISCOVER  
ITS OWN FUTURE? 
 
Francesca Galgano* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Europe’s Utopia was Born in Ancient Roman Times. – 3. Ro-
man and Byzantine Empires were Successful in “Globalization”. – 4. New Awareness of 
Citizenship Based on Ancient Mediterranean Community. – 5. Conclusions: History Could 
Teach Us About Europe’s Future.  
 
 
1. – Introduction 
The recent Brexit-referendum, and the attempted Turkish coup together with 
the latest wave of refugees fleeing across the Mediterranean Sea, force everyone, 
especially European citizens, to pause for thought.  
Europe is clearly no longer a mirage for those geographically – both physically 
and politically – decentralised countries, such as Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, 
which, not so many years ago, all knocked on the EU’s door, when the media ex-
alted its advantages: the reality of freedom of movement for people, goods and cap-
ital and the single common currency... On the other hand, one can find Turkey – 
 
*
 The author wishes to thank the two anonymous referees of this volume, for reading the manuscript and 
providing useful comments. However, errors and omissions in the article are the sole responsibility of the 
author.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Francesca Galgano 
 
 
which for numerous years has been endeavouring to become a Member State, while 
its repeatedly refused admission has been due to the alleged non-compliance to Eu-
ropean democratic standards, synthesized in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, which was signed in Nice in 2000. 
However it seems that the current situation is in turmoil. Europe appears to be 
dull, its cultural sparkle to have vanished along with its potential of attraction.  In 
particular towards its closest neighboring countries, that previously coveted EU 
membership, and now no longer seem to be willing to be a part of the Union. Tur-
key1 – more than ever in the light of the failed attempt to topple Erdogan’s regime 
– appears more eager to be incorporated into the Russian sphere of influence, 
showing disdain for the respect of the fundamental human rights more proper of 
European democracies whilst threatening to disregard, even, the most basic ones. 
Europe’s utopian bubble seems to have burst2! 
People seem to have easily forgotten that Europe, as “Utopia”, imposed itself 
immediately after the Second World War pushing countries decimated by cata-
strophic events towards a systematic reflection on an idea, already appeared in the 
works of Machiavelli and Voltaire. That “Utopia” insisted on building up a new 
awareness of European Citizenship that, thanks to the modern emerging democ-
racies backed by peace and integration – would be able to contribute to the over-
coming of each and every nationalistic and ethnic particularism. Nowadays we do 
take for granted the values and liberties which, however, our forefathers have so 
long fought for: this appears almost trivially blatant especially if we look at the 
 
1
 Orhan Pamuk, Nobel prize awarded writer, spoke about it in 2012 during his Sonning Prize ac-
ceptance speech: he described to the audience his own impressions of neighbouring Europe as a child 
growing up in Istanbul, from where European countries seemed full of bright lights, new technology, 
progress and wellbeing, “a beacon of civilization”. In the years leading up to that speech, he had noticed 
with a certain melancholy, that Europe did not shine as it did before, especially in a moment in which 
Turkey was living an economic boom. It seemed that Istanbul was young and vibrant, in comparison with 
an older and more conservative Europe, where he had the foresight to imagine the barriers being erected 
to exclude who, according to its canons, did not fit in. He regretted, therefore, the lack of the French 
Revolution democratic values of liberté, égalité, fraternité, especially concerning religious creeds. It re-
vealed itself to be an empty promise. In just a few years the situation appears today, completely reversed: 
Erdogan’s threats to fundamental human rights sounds as a challenge to Europe. 
2
 Among recent entries, see ZIELONKA, Is the EU Doomed?, Oxford, 2014. Surely the times are gone of 
economic supremacy (that began in the sixteenth century) in which, by the early nineteenth century, Europe 
enjoyed in the global context, thanks to the combination of political and economic decisions undertaken by 
individual States with the possession of material resources. Today the voices of historians (such as Geert 
Mak) and many economists cry out to a future disintegration if there is not a rapid change of course.   
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extreme simplification in terms of free movement among the Member States, the 
use of passports stating European Union and a single currency. 
This paper aims to draw attention on Europe’s, and especially Turkey’s past, in 
relation to the West during the Byzantine millennium after the so-called fall of the 
Roman Empire (5th century – 1453 A.D.). 
2. – Europe’s Utopia was Born in Ancient Roman Times 
The Union of Europe (or States of Europe) is not a 20th century idea nor it was 
born in recent history: it comes from the ancient past3. First of all it was an idea da-
ting back to the Roman Empire, both Western and, to some extent, Eastern 
throughout the Byzantine Millennium (500 A.D. until 1453 A.D.), during which 
the concepts of globalization and multiethnic society were reality. The Roman legal 
experience – as a matter of fact – unified the globalized citizens of the Empire, ex-
pressing the will of a population to produce a worldly order-enforcing system. 
It is undeniable that the history of Europe is closely intertwined with that of its 
Eastern neighbours, such as Turkey, whose different religion is not likely to im-
pinge on its affinity to a common cultural denominator4. Today’s Turkish Islamic 
State began to take shape in the fourteenth century, more precisely starting from 
1453 when Constantinople, the last Byzantine Empire stronghold (in the true sense 
of the word), yielded to Mehmed II’s assault: hitherto the Eastern Byzantine Em-
pire had been predominantly Christian.  
It is not our task to assess Turkey’s political entrance opportunities in Europe, 
but rather to reflect on its and our own past, when the European continent was able 
to dialogue with the (Middle) Eastern world.  
Therefore, it would be first appropriate to distinguish the Byzantine world from 
the Ottoman Empire5, which connotes the historical events of the last few centuries. 
The Empire of the Romaei, as the inhabitants used to refer to themselves, inherited 
from the ancient Western Roman Empire a powerful cultural and legal background, 
 
3
 Herodotus already set out Europe, as an entity (although yet to be properly geographically defined) 
which was climatically, politically and economically independent from Asia.  
4
 See “Laudato si”, the second encyclical of Pope Francis. This encyclical has the subtitle “On Care 
For Our Common Home”, in which he shares with the Patriarch Bartholomew their common duty to save 
the planet.  
5
 On the difficult relationship between modern Turkey and Europe, see ROGAN, The Great War of 
the Middle East: The fall of the Ottomans, New York, 2015.  
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which they were very proud of. The most significant of the Western cultural herit-
age came back to Europe through the Byzantine Empire: e.g. codes, daily uses 
(such as that of the fork) or techniques (such as silk manufacturing) even up to cir-
culation of Plato and Aristotle’s philosophical works. The Sultan himself, who 
eventually conquered Constantinople in 1453 A.D. – permanently incorporating it 
into the Ottoman Empire – was a profound enthusiast of the Western ideology, 
which he had studied in its original language. Exchanges of goods, dialogues 
among craftsmen, circulation of codes were common between East and West ac-
cording to ancient Byzantine customs.  
The late Roman history saw the birth of a Modern Europe concept emerging in 
the social consciousness of populations, with its own features: the spread of Chris-
tianity, the birth of national identities, the development of a high philosophical 
thought, which, thanks to Cassiodorus and Boethius, were preparatory first to the 
Humanism and later to the Renaissance. However, this did not mean that the pro-
cess was alien to what was happening in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean 
sphere. A comparison between modern Turkey’s and Western Media standards 
does not appear easy to make (e.g. see the different perspective regarding the al-
leged Armenian genocide); on the other hand, Turkey’s human rights records have 
led to resistance pressures to Turkey’s possible entrance, wielded by both Member 
States (see Austria) and States that were about to be accepted into the Union (such 
as Hungary, Serbia and Albania), which appear to see Turkey to still display visible 
traces of the Ottoman domination. Religious differences have done nothing but 
widen the gap, especially after the recent terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic 
fundamental groups against Western societies in their everyday life (Paris, London, 
Madrid to mention the most newsworthy), which have fuelled racism, discrimina-
tion and non-acceptance towards Islamism. 
Thus, it is opportune to distinguish between what was the Byzantine Millenni-
um and what followed, i.e. the Ottoman Empire. 
3. – Roman and Byzantine Empires were Successful in “Globalization”  
Some territories (according to ancient canons) geographically located on the 
“European” continent, such as the Adriatic coast, belonged for centuries to the 
Byzantines, who defended them, when necessary with the help of the Venetians 
and the Hungarians, against the Normans, the Franks and other so-called Barbarian 
(as any non-Romaea population) invaders. 
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The Via Egnatia, which led directly from Durres to Thessaloniki, and then onto 
Constantinople – a fundamental commercial and military artery that crossed the 
Balkans from East to West – was customarily crossed by pilgrims and merchants, 
joining the Byzantine Empire with the Italian regions abutting the Adriatic Sea and 
which still bear – in the toponymy, in the dialects, in the local declination of some 
legal institutions (i.e. marriage) – traces of strong Byzantine influence. This influ-
ence, however, has remained solid, even after the withdrawal of the Byzantines. 
The physical boundaries were in short more fluid than the modern, conceptual 
ones, which were to become rigid once again in the deforming Eurocentric recon-
structive perspective adopted in post-War Europe6. The sphere of Constantinople’s 
influence over broad areas, such as the Balkans (Albania, Serbia, Dalmatia, Croa-
tia, not to mention Russia and Bulgaria) was significant and no less incisive than 
that of the Western Roman Empire.  
This depended also on the fact that the Byzantine Basileia (that is, the imperial 
absolute power) considered itself to be superior to all populations, including the 
Western Romans, as it had a divine mandate to govern the world: its empire was 
naturally multiethnic due to its composition of different languages and customs. 
Moreover a Byzantine ethnicity did not exist: this adjective (“Byzantine”) meant a 
cultural belonging, which was certainly not only of ancestry by birth.  
The Byzantines practiced racism and intolerance towards certain populations, 
such as Slavs and Russians7: in this regard, it is enlightening to read the eleventh 
book of Emperor Maurice’s Stratēgikon8, a manual of war written in the late sixth 
century, in which the author, after examining the composition of the army and mili-
tary tactics, describes aspects of character of one’s supposed enemies, to be able to 
adapt one’s war strategies: Persians (“perverse, hypocritical and servile, but at the 
same time obedient and patriotic”); Scythians Avari (“the most treacherous and cun-
ning”), Huns among the principal, all “superstitious, false, unfair ... treacherous.” 
 
6
 Modern Europeans physical and political boundaries were drawn up immediately after World War 
II, creating territorial areas (modern Nations) ethnically compact, but artificial. See on this topic, 
CINGOLANI, “L’Europa e la crisi delle identità”, Aspenia, 2015, p. 30 ff.  
7
 In particular see KEKAUMENOS, Stratēgikon. Raccomandazioni e consigli di un galantuomo, 
(SPADARO ed.), Alessandria, 1998 (Greek text with facing Italian translation), p. 65 ff., which gathers the 
precepts of military strategy aimed at the strategist, based on the anthropological character of his enemy. 
8
 EMPEROR MAURICE, Stratēgikon. Manuale di arte militare dell’impero Romano d’Oriente, 
(CASCARINO ed.), Rimini, 2006, p. 121 ff. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Francesca Galgano 
 
 
Undoubtedly worth mentioning is the strong hostility towards the Latins by 
Byzantines which was accented at the end of the Comneni dynasty, also as a reac-
tion to the pro-Latin policy of Manuel I (1143-1180), when a cousin of his, An-
dronicus I Comnenus, usurped the throne, concocting a riot: this was motivated by 
nationalism against the West and against the trade privileges (such as immunity 
from custom taxes), granted especially to the Genoeses and Pisans, who literally 
ended up being slaughtered by the rioting mob. 
At the same time during the Fourth Crusade, for example, the Byzantines them-
selves endured looting and violence, with a particular racial fury, inflicted by the 
Latins who settled on the throne of Constantinople in 12049, described in pages 
written by the historian Nicetas Choniates. 
However the main oppression in relation to the Byzantines was enacted by the 
Arabians. Certainly their advancement, unstoppable from the seventh century on-
wards, was the main cause of oppression against them, as it eroded literally all of 
their Eastern territories (from Syria, Crete, and Cyprus to Egypt, Sicily, Spain, and 
Libya). Despite the fact that these territories had passed into the hands of the Ara-
bians, the trade routes in the Mediterranean Sea still continued to function, and in 
some cases the peaceful coexistence went also beyond trade, as for Crete and Cy-
prus, with a singular sharing10 of government functions. In Persia, the Nestorian-
Christian communities thrived for centuries dedicating themselves to the study of 
Scriptures in the famous school of Nisibis, near the boundary. Even after falling 
under the Islamic Empire, the Nestorian-Christians continued to retain widespread 
support, especially as they studied and translated many manuals (e.g. medicine, 
philosophy, astrology) from Syriac and ancient Greek languages. 
Despite outbreaks of intolerance and lack of integration (that emerged in the fi-
nal stages of the Millennium), the Byzantine society may well be defined inclusive: 
it welcomed the whole community of foreigners, regulating access through the con-
 
9
 NICETAE CHONIATAE, Historia, (VAN DIETEN ed.), Berlin-New York, 1975, lib. VII. 
10
 After the Arabian expansion into Europe during the VII and VIII century, which was halted by 
Charles Martel (near Poitiers in 733), Christians and Muslims lived side by side: the Christian élite con-
tinued to manage ecclesiastic activities, even in Upper Egypt and today’s Iraq, which eventually fell un-
der the rule of Persia. Evidence of this can be seen in the life and work of John of Damascus, a Syrian 
monk who was born and raised in Damascus. After this region came under Arab-Muslim occupation in 
the late 7th century AD, the court retained its large complement of Christian civil servants, John’s grand-
father among them. With the passing of time, it became more and more difficult for Christians to retain 
their high level positions, although these restrictions were not applied at a lower and local administration.  
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trol of business activities and releasing some sort of residency permit, whose intent 
was to numerically handle the ethnic composition of the population of Constanti-
nople and the Empire. In the so-called Prefect book, (‛Eπαρχικòν βιβλίoν written 
under Emperor Leo VI, between 911 and 91211), commercial activities carried out 
in the city by the “corporations”, foreign traders and merchants were recorded, and 
so were those who had to declare such activities when leaving the Empire. 
Immigration was considered as a resource12 for a political war crisis or natural 
emergencies: in these cases foreigners were forcibly displaced in order to repopu-
late uninhabited or ravaged areas which had suffered from famine or war. These 
measures were usually motivated by the intention of strengthening financially or 
militarily some “issues” near the boundaries (e.g. with Bulgaria), while – perhaps – 
purging groups of heretics who were sent into a type of exile. 
Entire populations such as the Armenians, even if Christianised since the fourth 
century, were always divided between the Western Byzantine boundary and the Ori-
ental Persian one, which provided thousands of soldiers, famous for their heroic ded-
ication. Foreigners such as Slavs, Bulgarians, Pechenegs, even Franks, and above all 
Armenians, Greeks, Varangians, and Latins, had become a necessary resource to 
swell the ranks of the Byzantine army13, decimated by the long-lasting wars. This 
problem became more and more impellent, from the eleventh century onwards, alt-
hough some Emperors began to promise considerable privileges, granting to foreign-
ers even a better arrangement in comparison with native soldiers of the same rank14. 
Kekaumenos shows traces of this, when he deeply criticized these decisions; as Nice-
tas Choniates did with regard to policy choices by Manuel Komnenos15. 
 
 
11
 For some details of this important document, see recently TROIANOS, Οι Πηγéς του Βυζαντινοú 
∆ικαíου, 3rd ed., Athens, 2011. 
12
 As Alexis Comnenus, who even resorted to recruiting nomadic people such as the Cumans, sta-
tioned to the north of the Danube, to where they returned after the victorious campaign against the 
Pechenegs. 
13
 The barbarian contingent was added, divided into Federati (erratic bands driven by their tribal 
chieftains, then classified and armed by the Roman officers) and Symmachoi (troops provided by allies). 
Ever-greater numbers hordes of real mercenaries (the so-called Bucellarii) arrived to join. See EMPEROR 
MAURICE, cit. supra note 8, p. 8 ff.  
14
 See NICETAE CHONIATAE, cit. supra note 9, lib. II, who considered excessive the economic gratifi-
cation of the soldiers, especially Barbarians, that while enrolling in the army, were not assessed in their 
attitude to fight, nor in their technical preparation. This probably produced a lack of professionalism and 
discipline in battle and thus resulting in the fall of the Romaei’s  army. 
15
 KEKAUMENOS, cit. supra note 7, e.g. at p. 124 ff. 
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4. – New awareness of citizenship based on ancient Mediterranean 
community 
Its geographical location, situated in the Mediterranean basin, placed the Byz-
antine Empire within our (European) history: suspended in the middle of the West-
ern world fragmented for centuries in Barbarian kingdoms and the Eastern Russian 
steppes, it was a sort of natural cushion which slowed down the advance of Islam, 
which began in the seventh century. In a certain sense shielding the Western Ro-
man cultural heritage to which it belonged: this allowed the modern European na-
tions to develop. A project launched in 2008 by the French President Sarkozy to 
create a Mediterranean Union, which subsequently has become the Union for the 
Mediterranean sea, seems today shipwrecked, along with the poor migrants from 
North Africa and Syria, especially in its ideological preface: this Mediterranean 
identity is not easily recognizable and registers a conflict that appears more and 
more irreconcilable. 
The koiné represented by the Mediterranean Sea (which previously linked to-
gether the European and Byzantine worlds, and today the West with the Middle 
East), however, is a fact which cannot be ignored. The “idea” itself of a cultural be-
longing can be a salvation in dramatic events: Predrag Matvejević, author of the 
famous diary-novel Mediterranean, has often said he was “literally saved” by the 
“evanescent theme of the Mediterranean”16, during his seventeen years of asylum 
and exile, due to the Balkan wars. The diaphragm of the Mediterranean rendered 
closer certainly different (and in some cases) conflicting political realities, even 
managing to represent in the past few decades (when the system entered a crisis of 
the modern territorial jurisdictions) a kind of archetypical free zone.  
In ancient Constantinople students were taught great Latin and Greek classics; 
the Fathers of the Church studied pagan philosophers’ writings. The great Arabian 
travellers, who grew up with the Greek paideia, spread the Eastern science of Indi-
an, Chinese and Persian cartographers, astronomers and geographers. Moreover, 
Greek Orthodox Christianity was practiced long beyond the first Arabian conquest, 
tolerated by the Umayyads in the enormous territory of ancient Syria for example, 
and in the cultural centres which were found in the great monasteries.  
 
16
 MATVEJEVIĆ, Mediterranean: A Cultural Landscape, (HEIM transl.), Berkeley/Los Ange-
les/London, 1999. 
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The late Christian-Roman law continued to be then applied in the territories, 
which had already fallen under Arabian domination: the so-called Syro-Roman 
Book – an oriental compilation, written in Greek between the fifth and sixth centu-
ries, perhaps for didactic purposes – was translated also into Syriac (in the eighth 
century) and then in Arabic (in the tenth century) and used as a compilation of rules 
of conduct, which referred to private law relationships within the Christian com-
munity submitted to Islamic control.  
In particular, responsibility was granted to the Patriarch of Constantinople, even 
in judicial proceedings of his own people, as long as there were no points of disa-
greement between the Christian religion and the “then” Islamic Law.  
The Πρόχειρος νόµος17 was translated from Greek to Arabic to be then applied 
by the Melkite community in Alexandria during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
as it was recognised as their own personal and official religious law, especially in 
family matters. 
5. – Conclusions: History Could Teach Us About Europe’s Future  
Diffidence, inability to recognize roots18 that are commonly felt, inability to 
share also cultural values and, as of late, recurrence of racial intolerance, too: all of 
these appear to connote today’s European Union. What people expected from the 
end of the dualism caused by the Cold War seems to have been lost in a very dis-
tant past. Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, European citizens 
had the vision of new opportunities for dialogue. The “Alliance of Civilizations” of 
1995, evoked by Zapatero in 2005, at the Barcelona process on the Mediterranean, 
“turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and coopera-
tion guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” – today sounds hollow19. 
Compared to its original issue in 1985, the current Schengen Agreement crisis 
 
17
 See ̓Ο Πρόχειρος νόµος, (VON LIGENTHAL cur.), in ZEPOS and ZEPOS (eds.), Ius Graecoromanum, 
vol. II, rist. Aalen, 1962, p. 108 ff.  
18
 Regarding the debate on Europe’s common roots see also GALGANO, Significato di un gesto. Il 
battesimo di Agostino e le origini dell’Europa moderna, in Scritti in onore di Michele Scudiero, vol. II, 
Napoli, 2008, p. 999 ff. 
19
 Founding act of a comprehensive partnership between the European Union and twelve countries of 
the southern Mediterranean basin, among which features also Turkey. The partnership should have had 
the purpose of “making the Mediterranean Sea a common area of peace, stability and prosperity through 
the reinforcement of political and security dialogue, economic and financial cooperation, social and cul-
tural development”. 
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shows the fragility of a shipwrecked project due to radical and unpredictable 
changes. The inability to structure a strong European identity, which should not – 
and this is the most critical point – refuse nationalistic autonomy, nor its citizens’ 
identities. The Western European universalistic model has certainly revealed de-
fects, which might have the possibility of being corrected if there were constructive 
dialogue among different cultures, enhancing and not denying the differences as 
well as protecting identities of each population in their everyday life. Even if the 
transnational global market model is still strong, the idea of nation-state that de-
mands its own autonomy in its decision-making, appears once again “protagonist”, 
especially in the guarantees of fundamental freedom.  
For an historian it becomes very clear that the road to a “United” Europe lies 
primarily in the knowledge of its past. Erich Auerbach, who had lived in Istanbul 
for many years, at the end of his life stated that “European civilization is near the 
limit of its existence; its own history, limited to it, seems closed; its unity seems al-
ready about to go under, working on another and wider unity ... it seems that the 
time has come where we must grope for grasping yet again that historical unity 
with a view to its living existence and living consciousness”20. 
Certainly, what is happening undermines the European identity as a whole and 
that of each individual Member State, which appear still trustees of democratic val-
ues and altruism, but having no qualms about raising new barriers, ideological or 
physical, revealing intolerance for the ideas expressed by Islam. It seems clear, 
even more so in the present climate that a European identity cannot exist solely in 
terms of economics.  
After the last great era of universal unification with the fall of the Western Ro-
man Empire, it appears now preliminary to any project to profoundly update the 
idea of integration with respect to its original mode, which goes back a long way. It 
would be desirable indeed that the European social model should recognize and 
then convey the need to promote meaningful integration, nourished by tolerance 
toward diversity expressing the cultures of other countries and especially real soli-
darity, established on values and ideas in which people could recognize themselves 
as European citizens. The most delicate task to rebuild unity would in actual fact be 
 
20
 AUERBACH, Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter, 
Bern, 1958, here cited from the Italian edition, that I myself have translated (Lingua letteraria e pubblico 
nella tarda antichità latina e nel Medioevo, Milan, 1960, p. 14). 
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first and foremost the intellectual values and ideas, as well as (or even beforehand) 
political on institutional reforms, having to prospect new mandatory methods of in-
tegration for foreigners, who do not evaluate only objective criteria of race and 
blood (ius sanguinis or soli), but rather subjective cultural sharing21.  
 
 
 
 
21
 Europe is the subject of philosophical reflection between current political and historical recon-
struction in the recent publication by ESPOSITO, Da fuori. Una filosofia per l’Europa, Turin, 2016. 
  
 
BRUNO, PALOMBINO, AMOROSO (eds.) Migration and Development: Some Reflections on Current Legal Questions, 
Rome, CNR Edizioni, 2016, ISBN 978 88 8080 230 3, pp. 13-45. 
II.  
THE EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ITS IMPACT 
ON MIGRATION 
 
Francesco Luigi Gatta* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The EU Development Policy in General. – 2.1. Evolution of 
EU Development Policy. – 2.2. The Current Legal Framework at the Basis of the EU De-
velopment Policy. – 2.3. Institutional Framework. – 3. Migration and Development Policy. 
– 3.1. The Migration–Development Nexus. – 3.2. The Conceptualization of Migration and 
Development Policy at the EU Level. – 3.3. Practical Actions and Measures to Address 
Migration and Development. – 3.4. The most Recent European Approach to Migration and 
Development. – 4. Concluding Remarks.    
 
 
1. – Introduction 
 
During the past decades the European Union (“EU”) has progressively gained a 
leading role with regard to development policy and commitment to eradicate pov-
erty worldwide. Reaching this role of protagonist on the international scene has 
been possible through the exercise of the EU’s “soft power”: as it is not a military 
power – at least in an unitary and monolithic sense – the EU can count on its dip-
 
*
 The author wishes to thank the two anonymous referees of this volume, for reading the manuscript and 
providing useful comments. However, errors and omissions in the article are the sole responsibility of the 
author. 
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lomatic means, financial capacity and political influence in order to foster dialogue 
and cooperation with third countries.  
The EU, indeed, by taking this leading role has responded, so to say, to a sort of 
natural vocation: a propensity to spread its influence, mediation and assistance to 
other countries that has been cultivated and developed through the decades, espe-
cially with regard to development cooperation and humanitarian aid. This idea was 
already present in Robert Schuman’s vision of Europe: in his famous declaration, 
delivered on 9 May 19501, one of the “founding fathers” of the European construc-
tion, in addition to the suggestion to pool resources in order to avoid conflicts and 
to foster prosperity and cooperation, affirmed: 
“This production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or excep-
tion, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful 
achievements. With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of 
one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent”. 
Today, more than sixty years later, the EU is deeply committed in development 
cooperation policies, being the world’s largest aid donor and the focal point of an 
extensive network of connections and political influences all over the world2. These 
are the results of a gained awareness about the crucial relevance of the various de-
velopment actions and policies in terms of their positive impact on different socio-
economic aspects in third countries. The importance of EU’s development, cooper-
ation and aid policies seems to be clearly understood and supported by European 
citizens themselves, who have proved to be conscious and aware of the EU’s role 
in this framework. 
This is confirmed by the recent statistical data collected and analyzed by the 
European Commission through the Eurobarometer3. Indeed, according to the statis-
 
1
 Nowadays, every 9 May, we celebrate Europe Day because of this declaration, which lays the 
foundations for the peace and unity that we can now enjoy in the European Union and which is consid-
ered as the first step into the European integration process.  
2
 The EU – together with its Member States – is the biggest global donor of official development aid. 
According to official statistics, the EU’s contribution in 2014 amounted to over 58 billion euros. For 
more detailed information and data, see European Commission, “2015 Annual Report on the European 
Union’s Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2014”, 24 November 
2015, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/2015-annual-report-web_en.pdf>. 
3
 European Commission, “The European Year for Development – Citizens’ View on Development, 
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tics, the average Europeans believe that development policy should be one of the 
EU’s main priorities (69%), given that – in their opinion – development policy it-
self is in the EU’s own interest (80%)4. Moreover, interestingly, data also show that 
a vast majority of European citizens (73%) think that development represents a 
way to tackle irregular migration and this is particularly remarkable, considering 
that 2015 was a critical year with the escalating refugee crisis and the huge migra-
tory pressure against the EU’s territory. 
These data, therefore, suggest the growing awareness about the relationship be-
tween development and migration and their capacity to potentially influence each 
other. The decisive point, indeed, is the consideration of the migratory phenome-
non not in negative terms as a threat but, on the contrary, as a powerful develop-
ment vehicle and as a positive opportunity. In this sense, the promotion of an order-
ly, safe and responsible mobility of people represents an important goal that could 
lead to positive results in both the countries of origin and destination.    
This is the fundamental idea that characterizes the recent and current debate on 
migration and development. Indeed, the interaction between these two elements has 
been recognized as a matter of interest at the international level, becoming gradual-
ly a crucial issue to be discussed within relevant initiatives and consultative pro-
cesses, including the ones launched within the United Nations (“UN”) context5. 
The migration and development interrelation, moreover, is at the basis of the activi-
ty of different international players involved in the area of migration and migrants’ 
human rights protection, including, for example, the International Organisation for 
Migration (“IOM”). According to its Constitution, indeed, “migration may stimu-
 
Cooperation and Aid”, February 2016, Special Eurobarometer 441, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/sp441-devco-report-final_en.pdf>. 
4
 Id.. 
5
 The migration and development nexus has been part of the UN General Assembly’s discussions 
since the second half of the 1990s. Later on, starting from the early 2000s and especially under the im-
pulse of the then UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan, the inter-linkage between migration and develop-
ment has been subject to a number of specific initiatives, including the decisions to establish the Global 
Commission on International Migration in 2005 and to organize a High-Level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development in 2006. Other initiatives include the appointment of a Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary General for Migration and the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and De-
velopment aiming, inter alia, specifically at investigating and promoting the dialogue on the migration-
development nexus.  
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late the creation of new economic opportunities in receiving countries and […] a 
relationship exists between migration and the economic, social and cultural condi-
tions in developing countries”6. 
However, if, on the one hand, the migration and development nexus has been posi-
tively acknowledged at the international level, with a number of initiatives, studies and 
discussions, it is also true, on the other hand, that the different approaches and views 
have made it difficult to convene to an effective form of cooperation and action. As a 
consequence, various forms of dialogue and collaboration have been launched at the 
regional and/or inter-regional level, involving a smaller number of participants and fo-
cusing the cooperative process on more specific issues and targets.  
Among the different regional contexts, the European one, under the impulse 
and the guidance of the EU’s institutions, has proven to be particularly adequate 
and suitable for the cooperation in the field of development policies specifically 
linked with migration. Considering also the peculiar history of certain European 
countries and their traditional aptitude to relate themselves with third country na-
tionals and their respective countries of origin, the EU framework offers a signifi-
cant example of the growing attention devoted to the migration and development 
nexus and of the different concrete actions taken in order to promote the beneficial 
effects of this relationship. 
This paper intends to address the EU’s migration and development policy, in 
particular by analyzing the different strategies and actions put in place by the Euro-
pean institutions and the Member states in order to foster the potential positive syn-
ergy between migration and development. In order to do so, the work is divided in 
two main parts: the first one aims at presenting the EU development policy in gen-
eral, particularly clarifying the relevant guiding principles and the legal-
institutional framework in which the EU has built and elaborated its development 
policy during the years. The second part focuses specifically on the migration and 
development nexus as it has been managed by the EU, in particular through the 
analysis of the strategies, the practical measures and the various key initiatives 
aimed at promoting the coherence between the two policy areas. 
 
6
 Preamble of the IOM’s Constitution. Full text is available on the Organisation’s official website, at: 
<https://www.iom.int/constitution>.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU Development Policy and Its Impact on Migration 17 
 
 
2. – The EU Development Policy in General  
2.1. – Evolution of EU Development Policy 
The origins of the EU development policy are strictly related to the historical 
experience of the European colonialism. Indeed, Europe’s relations with develop-
ing countries were progressively established and later expanded upon the basis of 
previous colonial connections. In particular, the specific issue of the relationships 
with third countries emerged already in the context of the second post-war recon-
struction and in the framework of the legal-political process of the European inte-
gration. The decade following the end of the Second World War was characterized 
by tension, conflicts and a growing pressure coming from the colonies in search of 
independence and autonomy7. This delicate period, in particular, showed to Euro-
pean States the need to reshape the existing relations with their colonies, especially 
highlighting the necessity to move towards a new approach.  
This was, in fact, one of the questions on the table in the framework of the ne-
gotiations and discussions on the way to the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, which 
established the European Economic Community (“EEC”) and set the first basis for 
the relations between Member States and third countries8. The Treaty, in particular, 
dedicated a specific series of dispositions (Part IV, Articles 131-136) to the rela-
tionship between the Member States and the “non-European countries and territo-
ries which have special relations” with them. The guiding principle at the basis of 
these relations was Europe’s commitment to responsibly support and promote the 
growth and the development of these countries.   
Already in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, indeed, the Contracting Parties 
agreed “to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and 
… to ensure the development of their prosperity”. This fundamental objective was fur-
 
7
 The period between 1953 and 1956 was particularly delicate with the outbreak of the Algerian war 
in 1954 and other episodes of tensions between France, Tunisia and Morocco on the one hand, and be-
tween Belgium and Congo on the other. The following years also were particularly complex with regard 
to the relations between European and African countries. Between 1956 and 1960, in particular, there 
was a considerable redefinition of the political geography of the African continent, with twenty-three 
countries of sub-Saharan area gaining independence and becoming new States and autonomous actors on 
the international scene.  
8
 For an overview of the different positions expressed by the European States during the negotiations 
for the Treaty of Rome, see MOLD, EU Development Policy in a Changing World. Challenges for the 21st 
Century, Amsterdam, 2007, para. 2.  
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ther reaffirmed in the first part of the Treaty, which referred to the essential principles 
that shall rule and guide the Community’s action. According to Article 3, indeed, one 
of the main tasks was “the association of the overseas countries and territories in order 
to increase trade and to promote jointly economic and social development” (Article 
3(k)). In order to achieve these objectives, the discipline introduced by the Treaty was 
based essentially on three main principles: association, non-discrimination in trade ac-
cess for all the Member States and solidarity with regard to the collective share of bur-
dens of the financial assistance to the third associated countries.  
The principle of association – as opposed to the one of assimilation – created 
the essential basis for a connection between the EEC (and not just the single colo-
nizer States) and the overseas countries and territories9. Indeed, according to Arti-
cle 131, “the purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic rela-
tions between them and the Community as a whole”; also clarifying that “associa-
tion shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of 
these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cul-
tural development to which they aspire”. 
The principle of non-discriminatory trade access constituted the second relevant 
element of the legal framework of the relations with the non-European countries. In 
this sense, it played a central role in the establishment of a sort of a free trade area 
between the EEC and the former colonies, with advantages for all the participants 
under the same treatment rule10. Lastly, the Treaty of Rome also introduced the prin-
ciple of solidarity with regard to the financial assistance to be provided to third asso-
ciated countries, stating that “the Member States shall contribute to the investments 
required for the progressive development of these countries and territories” (Article 
132(3)). For this purpose, in particular, a common instrument was introduced in or-
der to manage and share, in a collective and supportive way, the burdens of the assis-
tance in favour of third countries: the European Development Fund (“EDF”)11.       
 
9
 The principle of association was realized and put into effect through a series of association agree-
ments between the Community and third countries. The first Convention associating French-speaking 
overseas countries and territories was signed on 25 March 1957 for a period of five years. 
10
 For this purpose the Treaty set a series of dispositions regulating some relevant aspects of the trade 
relations between Member States and associated Overseas countries, including the right of establishment 
of companies and firms (Art. 132), customs and duties on imports and industrial production of goods 
(Arts. 133 and 134 respectively), freedom of movement of workers (Art. 135). 
11
 Although the contributions coming from European Member States in favour of associated third 
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The Treaty of Rome, ultimately, introduced the first common provisions in or-
der to guide and rule the relations between Member States and other specific coun-
tries, associated on the basis of pre-existing links and historical connections, in this 
sense, “Europeanising the former exclusive relations between colonisers and colo-
nised”12. Therefore, this policy can be seen and considered as the first phase of a 
European common approach to development and assistance in favour of third coun-
tries. At a later time, however, with the progression of the European integration 
process and the growing political and economic weight gained by the Community, 
this approach based on Europe’s colonial history was progressively abandoned.  
Indeed, unlike the initial phase, the new European approach was no longer spe-
cifically limited to the (ex) colonies and only built upon previous, historical and 
traditional connections but, on the contrary, it typified itself for a much broader 
dimension and character. In this sense, the extension and the strengthening of the 
European presence at the international level in the field of cooperation and devel-
opment were to be understood in the light of the increased economic and political 
power of the Community, which now aspired to a stronger role.  
The progression of the European development policy, however, gained rele-
vance not only from a geographical point of view and, hence, in terms of world-
wide expansion and engagement with other countries besides the previous colonies. 
Indeed, during the 1970s and 1980s the European development policy advanced 
and improved also – and especially – from a qualitative perspective, increasing its 
degree of specialization, developing the interaction between the competent institu-
tions, intensifying the dialogue and the capacity to adopt proper actions and strate-
gies, harmonizing national practices and fostering the cooperation between Mem-
ber States through the exchange of information, mutual assistance and a common 
planning and analysis process.  
 
countries were arranged separately and outside the Community budget, they were centrally administered 
by the Community’s institutions. The Fund, introduced with the Treaty of Rome, was launched and made 
operative in 1959, providing technical and financial assistance for the period of six years (1959 – 1964). 
The EDF was later reformed and strengthened, becoming the main instrument for providing Community 
aid for development cooperation in the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and Overseas countries and 
territories. The current EDF (the 11th since its creation) covers the period 2014 – 2020 and amounts to 
30.5 billion euros.  
12
 See MOLD, cit. supra note 8, p. 33 and FRISCH, The European Union’s Development Policy. A Per-
sonal View of 50 Years of Development Policy, European Centre for Development Policy Management, 
Maastricht, 2008, Policy Management Report 51, para 1.2.  
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In parallel, the European development policy evolved and grew also from a quan-
titative point of view: the weight of the economic assistance was significantly in-
creased, the budget and the resources destined to development programmes raised 
exponentially together with a proliferation and a diversification of the various finan-
cial means made available for development and aid purposes. Moreover, the Europe-
an Investment Bank (“EIB”) was authorized to intervene with loans and other finan-
cial instruments in order to integrate and complete the actions of the EDF. The tools 
of the economic assistance, in particular, became structured on the basis of different 
parameters, including the geographical area of destination of the resources, the par-
ticular regional characteristics and peculiarities, given thematic targets and specific 
needs and goals13. 
The European development policy, therefore, advanced and kept evolving in ac-
cordance with the general provisions contained in the Treaty of Rome and through 
the creation of a diffused network of contractual cooperation. The Community, in-
deed, according to Article 238 of the Treaty14, concluded several ad hoc international 
agreements covering aspects like trade, industrial, financial and technical cooperation 
and assistance15. Although development policy became, step by step, a solid and rel-
evant component of the Community’s external activity, an essential step towards a 
better-defined and shaped common policy was made only with the “Dutch treaties” 
adopted during the 1990s. These texts, indeed, introduced a more organized and 
structured discipline, laying down a specific legal framework, identifying the general 
principles and the main objectives to be achieved and, therefore, creating a proper 
 
13
 One of the main sectors in which the Community operated in this period was the food aid, which 
represented the first form of assistance not linked to specific countries. In particular, after having signed 
the International Food Aid Convention in 1967, the Community during the years progressively increased 
its commitment to worldwide cooperation in this sector, with the food aid accounting for a substantial 
proportion (some 25%) of the Community’s total aid up to the 1980s. 
14
 Art. 238(1) of the Treaty of Rome states: “The Community may conclude with a third country, a 
union of States or an international organisation agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal 
rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures”. 
15
 Several international agreements establishing financial, technical and trade cooperation between 
the EEC and the associated countries were signed and periodically renewed. These, among others, in-
clude: the Yaoundé Conventions (the first signed on 20 July 1963 and valid for the period 1964 – 1969, 
the second signed on 29 July 1969 and valid for the period 1971-1975), the Arusha Agreement (signed on 
24 September 1969), the Lomé Conventions (the first one signed on 28 February 1975 and later succeed-
ed by others entered into force in 1980, 1985 and 1990). 
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constitutional basis for a common European development and cooperation policy16. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, in particular, on the one hand, finally provided this 
policy with a specific legal basis and discipline (Title XVII, Articles 130(u)-
130(y))17 and, on the other, with the regulation of the Common Foreign and Securi-
ty policy (“CFSP”), it also clarified the need for a coherent integration of the de-
velopment policy within the EU’s external relationships and actions18. That meant, 
in other terms, the consideration of development policy not as an isolated and sepa-
rate sector but, on the contrary, as a cross-cutting task, which produces intersec-
tions and interactions with other relevant areas. As direct consequence, therefore, 
the Treaty expressed awareness about the necessity to coordinate and harmonize 
the measures taken in the various related sectors in order to make them comply, as 
far as possible, with the basic goals and principles of the development policy.  
In this regard, specifically, the objectives of the EU’s development policy were 
enshrined in Article 130(u), which, before enouncing the essential goals to be 
achieved, clarified that both Member States and the Community have to commit 
themselves in this regard and added also that the policy of the latter, in particular, is 
complementary to the national ones. Moreover, Community and Member States’ 
actions shall comply and “take account” of the objectives agreed at the internation-
al level, in the UN context or within other competent international organizations 
(Article 130(u)(3)). Once again, therefore, the accent was put on coherence and co-
ordination, to be pursued among the European actions and relevant policies, but al-
so between the various actors involved both inside and outside the EU’s context19. 
The objectives of the European development policy established by the Treaty 
were: a) the promotion of sustainable economic and social development of the de-
 
16
 On this specific subject, among others, in particular see HOEBINK, The Treaty of Maastricht and 
Europe’s Development Co-operation, Amsterdam, 2005 also available online at: <http://ecdpm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/2004-Treaty-Maastricht-Europe-Development-Cooperation.pdf>.  
17
 Later, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, Title XX, Arts. 177-180. 
18
 Art. C(2) of the Treaty states: “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external 
activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development poli-
cies”. Whereas development and cooperation were inserted within the so-called “first pillar”, being hence 
part of the Community’s policies and responsibilities, the CFSP fell under the so-called “second pillar”, 
characterized by the intergovernmental method. 
19
 Article 130(x) further insisted on this point by stating: “The Community and the Member States 
shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid pro-
grammes, including in international organizations and during international conferences. They may under-
take joint action”. 
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veloping countries; b) their smooth and gradual integration into the world econo-
my; c) the campaign against poverty. These specific goals, moreover, had to be un-
derstood and pursued in light of an overall guiding principle, which defined the 
Community’s mission: contributing to “the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights 
and fundamental freedom” (Article 130(u)(2)). 
Besides the establishment of a proper legal basis for the development policy 
and the definition of its main objectives, equally relevant was the recognition of 
certain general principles and their formal translation into an explicit and legal dis-
cipline. In this sense, the Treaty set the basic principles that shall guide and rule all 
the development policies and actions put into practice by the Community and the 
Member States. These were the so-called “four Cs”: Cooperation, Complementari-
ty, Coherence and Consistency.    
With regard to the first one, as already highlighted, the Treaty insisted particu-
larly on it, witnessing the reached awareness about the necessity to coordinate and 
organize the development policy and its connections with other relevant sectors. 
Cooperation, in particular, can assume different forms in practice, being possible at 
various levels (national, regional/inter-regional, global), involving different players 
(Member States and national authorities, European institutions, international organ-
izations, private actors, etc.) and regarding more inter-linked sectors (e.g. agricul-
ture, migration, employment, etc.) and contents (strategies, specific actions, pro-
jects). Finally coordination can be achieved, or strengthened in its intensity, 
through different forms such as consultation processes, dialogue, collaboration 
agreements and so on. 
The principle of complementarity explained itself with the consideration of the 
development cooperation policy as a shared competence between the Community 
and the Member States. Therefore, both shall cooperate in order to achieve the 
common objectives. In this sense, the European institutions have pointed out the 
importance of an increased level of cooperation on different occasions20, especially 
 
20
 See Communication from Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on comple-
mentarity between the development policies and actions of the Union and the Member States, [COM(95) 
160 final], 3 May 1995; Council Resolution on complementarity between the development policies and 
actions of the Union and the Member States, Brussels, 1 June 1995; Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Council and the European Parliament on Complementarity between Community and Member 
State Policies on Development Cooperation, 6 May 1999, [COM(1999) 218]; Resolution of the Council 
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highlighting the necessity for the Community and the Member States to act togeth-
er through common approaches and strategies.  
In doing so, according to the “other C” represented by the principle of coher-
ence, European institutions and Member States shall also guarantee and pursue co-
herence in their action, which means an obligation to consider the impact and the 
potential repercussions of their other policies on the objectives of the common de-
velopment policy. Coherence in development policy is possible, therefore, only 
through a common effort in order, on the one hand, to organize and harmonize the 
plurality of policies and programmes and, on the other, to coordinate all the actors 
involved at the different levels of intervention.  
Finally, the principle of consistency, enunciated in Article C of the Maastricht 
Treaty, implied that all the EU’s various external policies should not contradict one 
another. Moreover, they should also be treated on an equal footing and no single policy 
area should be pursued at the expense of another. The “four Cs” principles were inter-
related and came very close to one another, being equally relevant for the achievement 
of the objectives set by the Treaty. They represented, however, just a general frame-
work to guide the action of the EU and of the Member States. The common develop-
ment policy, indeed, in order to be tangibly and effectively implemented, needed con-
crete measures, which would be progressively elaborated and put in practice by the Eu-
ropean institutions in the years following the Treaty of Amsterdam.     
2.2. – The Current Legal Framework at the Basis of the EU Development Policy 
After the significant innovations introduced by the Treaties of Maastricht and 
Amsterdam in the 1990s, the European development policy was able to progress 
further and define its shape and characteristics. However, the new provisions, alt-
hough surely relevant, characterized themselves for general, abstract and program-
matic features, laying down more general principles and objectives rather than spe-
cific implementing tools. In this sense, the necessity for more effective action in 
order to translate these objectives and principles into tangible results was felt and 
expressed by the European institutions already during the 1990s.  
Once the general legal framework was settled, indeed, the institutions began to 
intensify their activity in order to make the common development policy more ef-
 
on complementarity between Community’s and Member States Development policies, Brussels, 21 May 
1999, (8435/99). 
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fective and incisive. The European Commission, already in a Communication real-
ized in 199221, expressed its views on the new discipline introduced by the Treaty 
of Maastricht, pointing out the possible shortcomings and the future steps to be 
done. Similarly, the Council, in a Declaration released later in the same year22, 
called for more “effectiveness in achieving objectives”, underlining that “first and 
foremost, coordination must be implemented between the Commission and the 
Member States, in order to obtain a genuine convergence of the efforts of each in 
terms of dialogue, objectives and instruments”23. 
On this premise, along with the process of internal legal and institutional ad-
justment, the EU intensified the dialogue on development policies also at the global 
level, taking an active part into the debates and the various international initiatives, 
especially in the framework of the global goals identified and agreed with the Mil-
lennium Declaration24. Moreover – as it will be highlighted in the second section 
with specific regard to migration – the EU increased the process of specialization 
of its development policy in relation to the different areas of intervention, trying to 
coherently combine them with one another25.  
 
21
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on develop-
ment cooperation policy in the run-up to 2000,[SEC (92) 915 final], 15 May 1992. 
22
 Declaration of the Council and of representatives of governments of Member States meeting in the 
Council on aspects of development, Brussels, 18 November 1992. 
23
 Ibid., para. D, point 23. 
24
 The Millennium Declaration (General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN 
Doc. A/RES/55/2, 2000) was adopted on occasion of the Millennium Summit, held from 6 to 8 Septem-
ber 2000 at the UN Headquarters in New York. With the mentioned document, the international commu-
nity committed itself to a global mission aimed at definitely reducing extreme poverty worldwide, in par-
ticular, through the achievement of eight Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”), namely: eradicat-
ing poverty and hunger in the world, achieving universal primary education, strengthening gender equali-
ty, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseas-
es, ensuring environmental sustainability, developing a global partnership for development. In this 
framework the EU made specific commitments to achieve these goals. In this regard, in particular, see the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee – Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals – The European 
Union’s contribution, [COM(2005) 132 final], of 12 April 2005. For the European contribution to global 
sustainable development and other forms of collaboration and dialogue at the international level, see also 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a global partnership for sustainable de-
velopment, [COM(2002) 82 final], 21 February 2002. 
25
 Particularly significant in this process was the European Consensus on Development, a policy 
statement of 2006 made jointly by the three main European institutions (Commission, Parliament and 
Council) in order to identify shared values, goals, principles, commitments and strategies to be imple-
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In this search of the right mix of strategies, tools and resources in order to be ef-
fective and efficient in the fight against poverty in the context of sustainable devel-
opment policy, the Treaty of Lisbon – signed in 2007 and entered into force in 
2009 – has given an important contribution. The new discipline (Articles 208-211) 
is contained in the first chapter of a specific title (Title III “Cooperation with third 
countries and humanitarian aid”), which is one component of the part five of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) dedicated to the Un-
ion’s external action26. 
Above all, the reform does not really touch the provisions on development co-
operation, which, in substance, have not been changed since Maastricht; however 
the Lisbon Treaty gives greater coherence and relevance to the EU’s external ac-
tion, organizing and putting in order its various aspects and components. Among 
them, development cooperation gains more visibility, being considered as an inde-
pendent and specific policy of the external dimension of the European activity.  
In other words, the Lisbon Treaty takes into account and reflects the policy real-
ity that the EU’s external activity has developed along different but parallel tracks, 
as a result of several years of experience of Community life and interaction with 
the rest of the world. In light of this homogeneous and uniform conception, all the 
various elements falling within the “umbrella” of the EU’s external action (includ-
ing, therefore, development cooperation) shall be implemented in accordance with 
the same common principles and objectives, indeed:  
“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to ad-
vance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
 
mented by the EU and the national governments of the Member States. The statement presents a shared 
vision to guide the EU's activities in the field of development cooperation, which includes basic goals 
such as the reduction of worldwide poverty, the promotion of democratic values and the sustainable de-
velopment. For the full text of the statement, see Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives 
of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission on the development policy of the European Union entitled “The European Consensus” (OJ 
C 46 of 24.2.2006). 
26
 Part V of the TFEU on the Union’s external action is structured as follows: Title I – General provi-
sions on the Union’s external action; Title II – Common commercial policy; Title III – Cooperation with 
third countries and humanitarian aid; Title IV – Restrictive measures; Title V – International agreements; 
Title VI – The Union's relations with international organizations and third countries; Title VII – Solidari-
ty clause. 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equal-
ity and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and interna-
tional law”27. 
Furthermore, among the specific goals to be achieved in the context of the Eu-
ropean external action, the Union shall also “foster the sustainable economic, social 
and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of 
eradicating poverty”28. Therefore, eradicating poverty – which is the essential goal 
of development policies – becomes now an overall objective of the EU’s external 
action in general, with the consequence that all its components shall coherently aim 
at pursuing it. The “four Cs” principles, moreover, are maintained and confirmed29. 
In particular, regarding complementarity and cooperation, the new text appears to 
be more balanced in relation to the interaction between the Union and the Member 
States: according to the first paragraph of Article 208 TFEU, their respective poli-
cies “complement and reinforce one another”, whereas, before, the task of the 
Community was to complement the policy of the Member States30.  
Ultimately, rather than the strictly normative and formal profile, which remains 
substantially confirmed, the Lisbon reform involves more the institutional frame-
work. The real innovations, indeed, are more institutional in nature, having the ob-
jective to guarantee a concrete effect of the development policy and the other areas 
of EU’s external action. Indeed, in order to obtain tangible results, it becomes cru-
cial to create an efficient institutional and administrative structure, which can trans-
late the principles of EU development policy into practice.   
2.3. – Institutional Framework 
The EU’s concrete presence on the international scene is guaranteed through a 
very complex and articulated institutional system, which actively involves a num-
 
27
 Art. 21(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”). 
28
 Art. 21(2) (d) TEU. 
29
 In this regard see VAN REISEN, “Coherence and Consistency in the EU’s External Policies: Negoti-
ations towards an External Action Service”, European External Policy Advisors, December 2007, Brief-
ing Paper 7, available at: <http://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/EEPA_Briefing_Paper_7.pdf>. 
30
 With regard to the respective competences, Art. 4(4) TFEU clarifies that “[i]n the areas of devel-
opment cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and 
conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States 
being prevented from exercising theirs”. 
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ber of bodies and organisms. These are organized in a manner that should enable 
the effective implementation of the various programmes, policies and strategies 
both at the European and at the international level. For this purpose, first of all, the 
main European institutions are involved in development policy.  
The European Parliament has a significant role in this sense, especially after the 
increase of its competences and powers in the law-making process and in the con-
trol over the budget31. Indeed, the fact of sharing these relevant competences with 
the Council, places both institutions on an equal footing, consequently making de-
velopment one of the very few foreign policy areas in which Parliament holds such 
significant powers. Furthermore, in addition to these relevant competences in the 
fields of regulation, budget and expenditure scrutiny, the Parliament plays an active 
role with regard to development policy, both ex ante and ex post. 
On the one hand, indeed, the Parliament – which can count on a specific Com-
mittee on Development – stimulates the debate and the analysis of the priorities and 
of the most significant political issues, promoting initiatives and fostering the dia-
logue with relevant partners both at the intra- and the extra-EU level. In this regard, 
in particular, the Africa Caribbean Pacific – European Union Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly represents a positive example of productive dialogue and cooperation: 
by bringing together regularly the elected representatives of the European Parlia-
ment and the ones of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (“ACP countries”), 
it fosters a cooperative interaction between the parties involved and produces their 
joint commitments in order to promote the fundamental objectives of the develop-
ment policy32. 
 
31
 The Treaty of Lisbon establishes the European Parliament and the Council as the joint budgetary 
authority of the EU. In the field of international cooperation, in particular, the Parliament’s Development 
Committee follows budgetary deliberations and makes concrete suggestions concerning the budget lines 
falling within its remit. However, the Parliament has no formal budgetary powers over the EDF, as the 
overall amount and distribution are negotiated at intergovernmental level between the Council and the 
Commission, with only advisory input from the Parliament.  
32
 The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly is a democratic, parliamentary institution, which aims 
to promote and defend common values of the humanity, including peace, democracy, human rights pro-
tection and sustainable development. The Assembly gathers 78 representatives of the ACP states and 78 
of the European Parliament, meeting alternately in an ACP country and an EU country, whereas plenary 
sessions take place twice a year. Under the direction of two co-presidents elected by the Assembly, the 
works are carried out within three standing committees, established in 2003: the Committee on Political 
Affairs, the Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade and the Committee on Social Af-
fairs and the Environment. Tasks and activities of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly include, 
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 On the other hand, the European Parliament also carries out an important con-
trol and monitoring role over policy implementation. Although, historically, its 
control over the implementation of development policy has been relatively scarce, 
the Parliament has gained a more relevant position, obtaining the right to question 
the Commission and even object to implementing decisions whenever it finds that 
proposals promote causes other than development and/or if it considers that the 
Commission is exceeding its jurisdiction. Control is also carried out through other 
forms, including the careful examination of periodical reports and documents re-
garding multiannual programmes and actions, and the regular discussion of policies 
and strategies with the Commission, in both formal and informal settings.  
The Council, on its side, is also a relevant presence in the framework of the Eu-
ropean development policy. First of all, it shares with the Parliament the compe-
tence in the legislative process and in the budgetary control; moreover, it has also a 
relevant role in policy implementation: indeed, according to Article 209 TFEU, the 
Council and the Parliament “acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure, shall adopt the measures necessary for the implementation of development 
cooperation policy”. Finally, especially in the Foreign Affairs setting, the Council 
has a crucial role in the context of the EU’s external relations and in the manage-
ment of development matters, also having competence to make international and 
association agreements with third countries.  
The third main institution – the European Commission – plays also a vital role 
in the context of the EU development policy. It has, indeed, a decisive position in 
the definition of the various policies according to the main priorities and needs, 
programming both general and sectorial actions and strategies and carefully moni-
toring their implementation. In order to do so, the Commission can count on a spe-
cific and proper internal administrative structure. In this regard, the Directorate-
General for International Cooperation and Development (“DG DEVCO”) is a key 
player, having the responsibility to design and elaborate the European development 
and international cooperation policy in close cooperation with the Member States. 
DG DEVCO, in this sense, fosters the interaction and collaboration between the 
EU and the national governments in the framework of the multiannual program-
 
inter alia, organization of fact-finding missions, draft of periodic reports, collection and analysis of data, 
convening of meetings with economic and social partners, including Non Governmental Organizations 
(“NGOs”) and other international organizations. 
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ming of the external aid instruments and in order to define form and entity of na-
tional assistance33.  
The results of this planning and preparatory activity are then projected outside 
the EU in the framework of the relations with several other international players. 
DG DEVCO, therefore, ensures also the external representation of the EU in the 
field of development cooperation, fostering the dialogue with a number of relevant 
subjects, including competent international organizations, non-state actors and do-
nors, third countries. Dialogue and interaction at international level are carried out 
in order to better formulate the different thematic development policies in accord-
ance with the specific needs of the beneficiaries partner countries: the form and the 
entity of the development assistance provided, indeed, vary depending on the geo-
graphical area it covers.  
A crucial element of the EU development policy – as already pointed out – is the 
coherence between the various thematic areas, which have an impact on external ac-
tion. Indeed, many of the EU’s foreign programmes are organized by different divi-
sions of the European Commission. Therefore, in order to facilitate and help ensure a 
consistent approach, the DG DEVCO works closely with other Commission ser-
vices34 and, especially, with the European External Action Service (“EEAS”).  
The EEAS, in particular, introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon35 and headed by 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has a 
key task in ensuring that all the different activities that the EU performs abroad are 
consistent in order to guarantee a comprehensive approach for the EU’s foreign 
 
33
 For a better and more detailed insight of the tasks and competences of the DG DEVCO, see Euro-
pean Commission, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, Main missions 
of DEVCO Directorates & Units, December 2015, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mission-statement-december-2015_en.pdf>.  
34
 These include, for example, the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotia-
tions (“DG NEAR”), the Directorate-General for Climate Action (“DG CLIMA”), the Directorate-
general for Migration and Home Affairs (“DG HOME”), and the Directorate-General for European Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (“DG ECHO”). 
35
 Established with the Treaty of Lisbon, the EEAS was officially launched and became operative on 
1 January 2011 on the basis of the Council Decision, of 26 July 2010, establishing the organization and 
functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU). With regard to the internal organi-
zational structure, the EEAS, in particular, has five departments covering different areas of the world: 
Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and Central Asia, the Greater Middle East and the Americas. Separate de-
partments, moreover, cover global and multilateral issues (including development), response to crises, 
administrative and financial matters. 
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policy. For this purpose, it is essential to establish, carry on and maintain an effi-
cient system of political relations at the international level; the EEAS does so by 
conducting negotiations in accordance with a given mandate, maintaining political 
dialogue, administering development aid, overseeing and serving EU interests and 
building cultural contacts.  
In the framework of its tasks and mandate, the EEAS is responsible for the run-
ning of a very articulated diplomatic system, consisting of about 140 EU Delega-
tions, services and offices, which operate and represent the Union all over the 
world36. These delegations, in particular, being directly “on the ground”, play a key 
role in the implementation of the EU’s foreign policies, especially through the 
analysis and the report on the policies and their progressive developments.  
The institutional framework is completed by a number of other European bodies 
and organisms, which are also involved, with various forms and titles, in development 
policy. These include, among others, the European Investment Bank (“EIB”) and the 
European Court of Auditors (“ECA”). The latter, being the audit authority of the EU’s 
finances, verifies and examines the proper use of resources and the budgetary man-
agement of the different EU’s policies, including therefore – and in particular, as the 
Court’s 2016 work programme highlights37 – development policy. In this regard, in 
particular, a special focus is put on the EDF and on the other thematic funds and finan-
cial means specifically devoted to development cooperation programmes. 
The EIB, as the EU’s bank owned by Member States, plays a relevant role in 
the implementation of EU policies. Working and interacting closely with the Euro-
pean institutions, it provides financial expertise for sustainable investments, which 
contribute to furthering EU policy objectives. Although its major focus of interven-
tion is on Europe, the EIB also sustains the EU’s external activity, including coop-
eration development policies, through loans and other financial means in favour of 
the partner countries38. 
 
36
 The EU can count on 139 delegations, offices and services, which are spread all around the world. 
These are organized and structured in a complex way, including bilateral delegations (responsible for EU 
relations with a single country or a particular group of countries), regional delegations, multilateral dele-
gations (responsible for the interaction with international organizations and other international actors) 
and representation offices.  
37
 According to the ECA’s work programme for 2016, audit control over development policy is con-
sidered as one of the “high priority tasks”. See European Court of Auditors, 2016 Work Programme, p. 3, 
available at: <http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/WP2016/WP2016_EN.pdf>.  
38
 Although the vast majority (about 90 %) of the lending is attributed to promoters in the EU coun-
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Finally, the European institutional machinery involved in development issues and 
policies is connected and interlinked with several other players and stakeholders out-
side the EU. These include private actors and donors, civil society and NGOs, inter-
national organizations such as the UN, the World Bank (“WB”) and others.  
3. – Migration and Development Policy  
3.1. – The Migration–Development Nexus 
Migration and development (“M&D”) currently represent a peculiar relevant 
area of research and policy-making, which has progressively gained prominent im-
portance during the years. The M&D discourse, in particular, has begun to attract 
international attention in the 1990s, becoming a significant topic of discussion be-
tween national governments39. The topic has steadily gained more and more rele-
vance also on the agenda of international organizations such as the IOM and the 
UN, which, through their initiatives and activities, have given the debate on M&D 
an important momentum40.  
 
tries in order to support the continued integration of the Union, the EIB’s activity takes place also outside 
the Union. In this sense, EIB lending is governed by a series of mandates from the EU in support of Eu-
ropean development and cooperation policies in partner countries located all over the world. 
39
 The International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in 1994, represents a 
milestone in the definition of the M&D policy at the global level. Gathering together 179 governments, 
the conference resulted in the adoption of a 20-year Comprehensive Programme of Action containing 
common strategies and visions on international migration, including a specific focus on the linkage be-
tween international migration and development (Chapter X of the Programme). The agreed recommenda-
tions contained in the Programme encourage the cooperation and the dialogue between countries of 
origin and destination of the migratory flows in order to foster and maximise the potential positive effects 
of migration.  
40
 For some UN initiatives in the framework of M&D, see supra note 5. Particularly relevant is also 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, General Assembly, Transforming our 
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution A/RES/70/1, Seventieth session, 25 
September 2015). The Agenda, built on the previous established Millennium Development Goals, sets 17 
Sustainable Development Goals in order to mobilize efforts to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities 
and manage various issues including, inter alia, climate change, health, education, sustainable growth 
and development. In this framework, the M&D linkage is also taken into account, indeed, according to 
point no. 29 of the Agenda:  
“We recognize the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable devel-
opment. We also recognize that international migration is a multi-dimensional reality of major rele-
vance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent 
and comprehensive responses. We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular 
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The starting point of the reflections and debates is the existing linkage between 
migration and development and the crucial question concerns the way they can in-
fluence one another. In this sense, the discussions within the research community 
and among the policymakers have evolved, following different theories, orienta-
tions and tendencies. In general, opinions regarding the M&D nexus have fluctuat-
ed between a positive (migration, potentially, can produce a positive impact on de-
velopment) and a negative consideration (growing migration is a clear manifesta-
tion of development failure), alternating – to use a sharp metaphorical image – like 
a pendulum between positive/optimistic and negative/pessimistic views41.  
In the recent years, however, the positive orientation appears to be prevalent, 
based on the fundamental assumption that migration – under the condition of its ef-
ficient and proper management – can determine a beneficial interaction with devel-
opment, potentially contributing to favourable and positive outcomes both for the 
countries of origin and destination of the migratory flows. This belief is clearly and 
strongly present in the UN’s approach, as recently confirmed in the International 
Migration Report 2015 released by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
of the United Nations Secretariat. According to the mentioned document, indeed, 
“when supported by appropriate policies, migration can contribute to inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth and development in both home and host communi-
ties”42. Therefore, the Organization:  
“recognises the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable 
development. It further recognises that international migration is a multi-dimensional reali-
ty of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, 
which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. International cooperation is critical 
to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the 
humane treatment of migrants and refugees”43. 
The focus on the M&D nexus has contributed to the evolution of the various 
 
migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless 
of migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons”. 
41
 See DE HAAS, “The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Pol-
icy”, International Migration, 2012, p. 8 ff. 
42
 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International 
Migration Report 2015: Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/375), 2016, p. 2.  
43
 Ibid. 
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policies and approaches adopted in order to tackle migration issues. In particular, 
the awareness about the potential positive impact of migration has led to a new 
room for cooperation between States, fostering collaborative processes at different 
levels (bilateral, regional, global) and widening the circle of participants in the dia-
logue, including various non-State actors, civil society and migrant associations, 
private investors, international organizations and local authorities. 
Migration, in other terms, has become a crosscutting issue, which is able to pro-
duce repercussions on different areas. Therefore, national and supranational authori-
ties, having understood that the phenomenon can no longer be managed alone, have 
started to launch or reinforce their migration policies, acting together and developing 
new processes of cooperation. The intense contacts between migration policies and 
other inter-related sectors, together with the increased number of players involved, 
has brought to the concept of policy coherence, that is to say, the necessity to man-
age, organize and coordinate the various actions in a consistent and effective way. 
This concept, in particular, is strongly present in the framework of the EU policy.      
3.2. – The Conceptualization of Migration and Development Policy at the EU 
Level 
European countries have progressively gained awareness about the opportunity 
(better, the necessity) to establish a collaborative dialogue with countries of origin 
and transit of migratory flows, understanding all the shortcomings of an individual 
and limited approach. The importance of a multilateral and comprehensive ap-
proach to migration, together with the need to extend the consultative processes in 
order to encompass crucial aspects like development and cooperation policies, 
emerged for the first time during the 1990s.  
Indeed, the first significant and official reference to the M&D nexus dates back to 
the European Council held in Tampere (Finland), on 15-16 October 1999. After the 
substantial treaty reform and the entry into force of the new legal-institutional 
framework – which, as already said44, brought considerable changes to the European 
architecture also with regard to migration policy – Member States proceeded to cast 
the first stone on the way to the establishment of a European common migration pol-
icy. In this sense, as clearly emerged from the conclusions of the Tampere European 
Council, the connection and the interaction between migration and development 
 
44
 See supra, para. 2.1. 
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were identified as one of the crucial elements of the European common policy45.  
The basic idea, in particular, was that the common policy should address the root 
causes of the migratory phenomenon in order to reduce the pressure of the flows to-
wards Europe. For this purpose, action should be taken in order to manage the so-
called “push factors” (such as extreme poverty, war and political instability), which 
give impulse to considerable migratory movements towards EU Member States. 
This overall approach was supported by common consent by all European institu-
tions: on the occasion of the European Council of Seville in 2002, indeed, it was reaf-
firmed that “closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance 
and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the coun-
tries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flows”46. This 
need to promote the social and economic development of the regions from which mi-
grants originate was reiterated also by the Council at the end of the same year47. 
This general vision was also shared by the Commission, which, in its Commu-
nication of 2002 entitled “Integrating Migration Issues into the European Union’s 
Relation with Third Countries”, addressed migration as “a major strategic priority 
for the European Union”48, confirming that “development policy also tries to pre-
vent and reduce forced migration”49. Furthermore, in the mentioned document, the 
Commission tried for the first time to analyze and clarify the links between migra-
tion and development, suggesting a number of key initiatives in order to promote 
the coherence between the two policy areas. 
 
 
45
 See Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, in particular point 
10, which states:  
“The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, hu-
man rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires com-
bating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consoli-
dating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights (...) Partnership with third countries 
concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-
development”.  
46
 Seville European Council, 21-22 June 2002, Presidency Conclusions, point 33.  
47
 Council of the European Union, Draft Council conclusions on intensified cooperation on the man-
agement of migration flows with third countries, 13894/02, 14 November 2002, para. 8. 
48
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – “Integrating 
Migration Issues into the European Union’s Relation with Third Countries” [COM(2002) 703 final], 3 
December 2002, p. 4. 
49
 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Besides general recommendations and guidelines, such as taking an active part 
in the global debate on M&D, exchanging information and data or identifying best 
practices to be applied at the EU level, the Commission addressed some concrete 
aspects of the M&D nexus, especially with regard to work-related issues: migrant 
remittances50, the question of the so-called “brain drain” and the circulation of 
skilled labours, highlighting, in particular, “the important developmental potential” 
of these elements51. These matters, however, were treated with a general approach, 
more in programmatic and descriptive terms, rather than with specific measures or 
actions to be taken. This suggested still a sort of on-going process of conceptualiza-
tion of the M&D nexus, aimed at investigating the reciprocal influence of the two 
policies and at examining their characteristics and implications, in order to identify 
the right ways to effectively address and coordinate them.   
This can be considered, in other words, as an initial phase of preliminary study 
and analysis, necessary for the EU and its Member States to identify the main pri-
orities and to draw up appropriate programmes and strategies. The main focus, 
moreover, appeared to be put more on the intention to contrast and reduce the mi-
gratory pressure, rather than fostering the potential positive synergy between mi-
gration and development. The Commission itself, in the mentioned Communica-
tion, admitted that “migration is a new field of action for the Community coopera-
tion and development programmes”52 and it also considered that the M&D nexus, 
being “a relatively new trend”53, needed to be carefully elaborated in order to set 
the proper measures to address it.  
3.3. – Practical Actions and Measures to Address Migration and Development  
In parallel with the progressive definition of the EU policy, the issue of M&D 
remained high on the global policy agenda. Several initiatives and consultative 
 
50
 In the definition given by the Commission itself in a later Communication, remittances are broadly 
intended as “all financial transfers from migrants to beneficiaries in their countries of origin”. See Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – “Migration and Development: some concrete ori-
entations”  [COM(2005) 390 final], 1 September 2005, note 7. 
51
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – “Integrating 
Migration Issues into the European Union’s Relation with Third Countries” [COM(2002) 703 final], 3 
December 2002, p. 15.  
52
 Ibid., p. 18.   
53
 Ibid., p. 4. 
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processes were carried out, with the M&D nexus representing one of the central is-
sues of the debate at the international level: the topic, for example, was carefully 
examined by the Global Commission on international migration (“GCIM”) in its 
report released in October 200554, and the UN General Assembly planned to hold a 
“High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development”. 
In this framework of active debate, the effective and real European engagement 
with M&D issues started in 2005, with the definition of certain specific priorities and 
areas of intervention. The European Parliament, initially, addressed the M&D issues 
and the need to elaborate a common policy in the public hearing “Migration, integra-
tion and development: towards a European policy?” held in March 200555. Besides 
discussions and dialogue, however, two following documents set concrete actions to 
be taken: the Global Approach to Migration (“GAM”)56 and the Commission’s 
Communication “Migration and Development: some concrete orientations”57. 
With the mentioned Communication, the Commission intended “to make a first 
contribution to the global debate on the links between migration and develop-
ment”58, and, in this regard, it proved to have a pretty clear awareness of the intense 
relationship between mobility of people and socio-economic development. Migra-
tion was recognized as an integral part of development processes, therefore, the 
main objective appeared to be the optimization of its potential positive impact on 
the countries involved in the migratory movements. The Commission, hence, iden-
tified a series of practical orientations “for improving the impact of migration on 
development”59, which were included in the context of four main priority areas: re-
 
54
 Global Commission on International Migration, Report “Migration in an Interconnected World: 
New Directions for Actions”, October 2005, available at: 
<http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migrationresources/reports/gcim-complete-report-2005.pdf>.  
55
 See European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and Committee 
on Development, Public Hearing: “Migration, integration and development: towards a European poli-
cy?”, 14-15 March 2005 (OJ\559814EN.doc). 
56
 Council of the European Union, Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa 
and the Mediterranean, 15744/05, 13 December 2005.  
57
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions – “Migration and Development: 
Some concrete orientations” [COM(2005) 390 final], 1 September 2005. 
58
 Ibid., p. 11. 
59
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions – “Migration and Development: 
Some concrete orientations” [COM(2005) 390 final], 1 September 2005, p. 3. 
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mittances, diaspora, circular migration and brain circulation, and brain drain. 
With regard to remittances, the Commission gave strong consideration to the 
migrants’ economic contributions and to the flows of financial resources they gen-
erate, especially considering them as a positive and strong vehicle for development 
in the countries of origin. This represents, therefore, an essential area of interven-
tion, indeed, as stated also by the IOM, “remittances represent the most direct link 
between migration and development”60. On the basis of this premise, one of the 
crucial challenges associated with remittances is how to maximize their potential 
development impact for countries of origin, countries of destination and for indi-
vidual migrants themselves. For this purpose, the Commission identified two spe-
cific areas of policy intervention in order to give greater value to remittances, 
namely making the economic transfers cheaper, faster and safer and enhancing 
their development impact in recipient countries. 
With regard to the first mentioned policy action, the Commission identified es-
sential and precise measures to be taken in order to improve and facilitate the mi-
grants’ financial transfers. First of all, the collection of data and information was 
vital. The Commission, indeed, primarily clarified the need to study and understand 
the phenomenon of the remittances, especially with regard to aspects such as the 
entity of the flows, their directions and destinations, the financial channels and the 
other means used for the transfers.  
Furthermore, another identified action consisted in the creation of a transparent, 
uniform and clear legal framework. Indeed, the diversity and the not homogenous 
character of the regulations on remittance services considerably hamper the possi-
bility to make money transfers and all the related operations. The Commission, 
therefore, highlighted the need to build a proper financial and economic infrastruc-
ture, based on clear and harmonized rules and invoked, for this purpose, the in-
volvement of relevant stakeholders such as the World Bank or the EIB.  
With regard to the second action to be taken in relation to remittances in order 
to improve their positive impact in migrants’ countries of origin, the Commission 
envisaged a series of specific solutions, including financial intermediation in the 
 
60
 International Organisation for Migration, IOM and Remittances, 2009, p. 1. On the topic of remit-
tances in general, see also International Organisation for Migration, “Migration, Diaspora and Develop-
ment”, Focus on Migration, no. 2, 18th edition, July 2012, available at:  
<https://diaspora.iom.int/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/focus-on-migration.pdf>.  
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developing countries, partnership and cooperation between micro-finance and 
mainstream financial institutions, systems of collective remittances and co-funding 
schemes to be put into place initially through pilot projects. 
The second priority area of intervention identified by the Commission’s Com-
munication was “diasporas as actors of home country development”. Although 
there is not a single and legally accepted definition, the concept of  “diaspora”, in 
general, implies the basic idea of populations or groups of people, living abroad in 
one place, while still maintaining relations with their homelands61. In this sense, di-
asporas can assume different characters from country to country, generating diverse 
and specific realities (people settled in a host country on a permanent basis or just 
for a period of time, labour migrants, dual citizens, particular ethnic diasporas, sec-
ond-generation groups becoming citizens of the host country, etc.). The basic and 
common idea, however, is that these connections that people maintain individually 
or collectively with their homelands can have an important development potential, 
in particular involving areas such as business creation, trade links, investments, 
remittances, skills circulations, exchange of experiences and even impacts on social 
and cultural roles of men and women in the home society.  
The Commission, sharing the view on the positive role of diasporas, primarily 
highlighted the necessity to map the existing connections, identify the already ac-
tive organizations and associations, and then creating specific databases where 
members of diasporas can register themselves in order to facilitate better links and 
contacts. Moreover, particular initiatives and actions shall be encouraged also and 
in particular with regard to young people, by organizing youth exchange schemes 
focused on migrant communities. 
The further issue of circular migration and brain circulation was tackled by the 
Commission in line with the previous orientation expressed in its Green Paper on 
 
61
 According to the IOM’s Glossary on Migration, “Diasporas are broadly defined as individuals and 
members or networks, associations and communities, who have left their country of origin, but maintain 
links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers 
based abroad temporarily, expatriates with the nationality of the host country, dual nationals, and second-
/third- generation migrants”. International Organisation for Migration, Glossary on Migration, 2011, In-
ternational Migration Law no. 25. On the topic of diasporas see also International Organisation for Mi-
gration, Migration Policy Institute, “Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A 
Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries”, 2012, available at: 
<http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/diaspora_handbook_en_for_web_28may2013.pdf>. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU Development Policy and Its Impact on Migration 39 
 
 
Economic Migration62 released at the beginning of 2005 and later addressed again 
in another specific Communication of 200763. The main challenge is represented by 
the cooperation with third countries and by the adoption of proper measures in or-
der to facilitate legal migration, movement and circulation of experiences, skills 
and qualified brains, together with the cultural and socio-economic integration of 
migrant workers returning back in their home society. By fostering transfers of rel-
evant skills and competences to third countries and by encouraging their reintegra-
tion into the local society and economy, circular migration can contribute positive-
ly to development. 
With this purpose, specific measures and initiatives were presented in the 
Commission’s Communication in order to stimulate the brain circulation, including 
temporary employment, seasonal work, assisted return programmes, mobility part-
nerships and short-term visa policies. Further and complementary actions were 
identified in a system of transferability of social security rights, in the recognition 
of qualifications and – particularly relying on communication technologies – in the 
creation of networking and information platforms for foreign researchers or other 
professionals, in order to keep or improve their contacts and connections.  
The last main intervention area for EU M&D policy dealt with the need of miti-
gating the adverse effect of brain drain. The Commission admitted that “there is no 
uniform and simple policy response to this formidable challenge”64, also pointing 
out that, given that the impact of the phenomenon of the brain drain varies from 
country to country, “policy responses therefore need to be tailored to the specific 
needs and challenges of each affected country”65.  
For this purpose the Commission found essential, above all, to establish part-
nerships and forms of cooperation with third countries in order to proceed to the 
necessary preliminary assessments of the country’s or region’s specific problems 
and needs. In this sense, in the Commission’s vision, collaboration should be di-
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 European Commission, Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration 
[COM(2005) 811 final], 11 January 2005. 
63
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on “Circular Migration and Mobility 
Partnerships between European Union and Third Countries” [COM(2007) 248 final], 16 May 2007. 
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Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions – “Migration and Development: 
Some concrete orientations” [COM(2005) 390 final], 1 September 2005, p. 8. 
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rectly established between subjects such as universities, scientific institutions and 
research centres, hospitals, associations of professionals and technicians. This 
would help to study the phenomenon and its potential repercussions, improving the 
knowledge of the specific situations of labour markets in terms of shortag-
es/excesses of skills in order to, ultimately, identify the correct response. At other 
levels, on the one hand, the Commission encouraged EU Member States to develop 
mechanisms to limit active recruitment in cases where it would have significantly 
negative repercussions for targeted developing countries and, on the other, suggest-
ed a global approach to recruitment policies, with discussions and debates to be 
carried out in international fora. 
These orientations presented by the Commission in its Communication of 2005 
were shared and reaffirmed by the Council in the GAM, released at the end of the 
same year. The document – as its title tells – presented the EU’s global approach to 
migration, setting out policies and strategies to be followed in the various areas relat-
ed to migration, including the fight against illegal migration and human trafficking, 
borders control and maritime surveillance, protection of refugees and asylum seek-
ers, cooperation with third countries in light of the promotion of the M&D nexus. 
In this regard, in particular, the GAM insisted on the valorization of remittanc-
es, on the one hand, reiterating the need to improve data collection on remittance 
flows and, on the other, recommending the rapid creation of cheaper and more easi-
ly available remittance services. Furthermore, more efforts were invoked to support 
African States to facilitate members of diasporas to contribute to their home coun-
tries and to mitigate the impact of brain drain and skill losses in vulnerable sectors. 
In general, the actions and strategies put forward by the European institutions in 
this period seemed to be characterized by a prevailing focus on the economical as-
pects of development. The predominant interest, in contrast with the previous ori-
entation, was no longer prevention, containment or reduction of migratory pressure 
but, on the contrary, the optimization of the potential positive impact of migration 
in relation with economic development. As it has been very well said, the EU 
seemed to have progressively shifted from a “More Development for Less Migra-
tion” logic to a logic of “Better Migration for More Development”66.  
 
66
 See PASTORE, “More Development for less Migration” or “better Migration for more Develop-
ment”? Shifting Priorities in the European Debate”, Migraction Europa Special Issue, Cespi, December 
2003, p. 3. 
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The basic idea, in other terms, was that migration can be an effective and pow-
erful development mechanism, which can bring to positive outcomes such as high-
er productivity, better allocation of production factors, more qualified employment 
and economic growth and, definitely, to significant advantages for all, in accord-
ance to a “triple wins” logic: for the countries of origin, the receiving host societies 
and the migrants themselves67.  
This overall approach was confirmed by the European institutions during the 
years following the adoption of the GAM. The European Parliament, for example, 
in a Resolution of 2007, referring to the relations between the EU and the third 
countries of the Mediterranean area, affirmed that “sustainable development must 
be at the heart of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership”68, also highlighting the im-
portance of the synergies and connections between migration, markets and work-
ers. The Commission also, in a Communication of 2006 on the status of implemen-
tation of the GAM, shared this view, reiterating that, in the framework of the EU’s 
M&D agenda, “the prime challenge is to tackle the main push factors for migra-
tion: poverty and the lack of job opportunities”69.  
Ultimately, during this years of definition of the EU’s M&D policy, the focus 
was mainly put on the economic dimension of the development process, with an 
accent put more or even exclusively on economic aspects rather than on a human 
understanding of the phenomenon, therefore, basically ignoring social and cultural 
elements. Moreover, despite the idea of mutual advantages and the “triple wins” 
concept, the attention was mainly attracted by countries of origin and their situa-
tions whereas, on the contrary, the receiving countries received much less consid-
eration in terms of positive effects of the M&D nexus. This approach, however, 
was reviewed in 2011.  
 
67
 The reference to the “triple wins” was present in the Declaration of the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan delivered on the occasion of the High-Level Dialogue of the General Assembly on International 
Migration and Development, held in New York on 14 September 2006. The full text of the declaration is 
available at: <http://www.un.org/migration/sg-speech.html>.  
68
 European Parliament Resolution of 15 March 2007 on Euro-Mediterranean Relations 
(P6_TA(2007)0075), letter C.  
69
 The accent was put once again on the objective “to further enhance the impact of remittances on 
development policies” and, therefore, on the identification of proper solutions such as data collection, 
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proach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy [COM(2006) 735 
final], 30 November 2006, p. 5. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Francesco Luigi Gatta 
 
 
3.4. – The Most Recent European Approach to Migration and Development 
The GAM has been revised in 2011, becoming the Global Approach to Migra-
tion and Mobility (“GAMM”)70. On the explicit premise that “migration is now 
firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda”71, the Commission lays 
down a renewed policy framework to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on mi-
gration issues with key strategic partners, defining clear priorities embedded in the 
EU’s overall external action. Among the identified priorities, in particular, the 
agenda includes also the policy area of development cooperation and the M&D 
nexus, which are readdressed with new ideas and orientations72. 
The GAMM, in particular, puts forward a renewed approach to the M&D nex-
us, broadening its understanding and extending the EU’s approach through the in-
clusion of the component of mobility, which encompasses also other phenomena 
and types of movement such as forced migration and short-term or non permanent 
forms of mobility. Another significant new element is the acknowledgment of the 
importance of the inter- and intra-regional migratory flows, which opens and wid-
ens the focus beyond the EU area and attracts the attention also on internal and re-
gional migration, with a specific accent on the issue of regional labour mobility. 
The basic idea, indeed, is that development processes often rely on mobility, 
which stimulates and produces circular movements and transfers of social, financial 
and human capital. At the same time, development fosters mobility, providing re-
sources and opportunities for people to migrate. Built on these premises, the overall 
approach appears to be more balanced, the focus, indeed, is not only on the eco-
nomic dimension of the M&D link but also other relevant elements related to de-
velopment are taken into account. These include, in particular, the repercussions 
and the social “costs” of migration in home countries with special regard to certain 
areas, such as environment and climate change, agriculture and rural population, 
 
70
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility, [COM(2011) 743 final], 18 November 2011 and its accompanying document Commission 
Staff Working Paper – Migration and Development, [SEC(2011) 1335 final], 18 November 2011.  
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 Ibid., p. 2. 
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health, education, housing and so on73. 
The Commission puts the accent on these profiles also in its Agenda for 
Change74, where a more migrant-centred approach is promoted and highlighted as a 
necessary new key element of the revised European M&D policy. The issue of mi-
grants’ rights, therefore, makes explicitly its way in the M&D discourse: migration 
and individuals are considered not purely and primarily as economic elements but 
relevance is also given to their human rights and needs, especially in light of the 
consideration of the social consequences of migration75. 
The increased consideration of the social dimension of development is another 
central element of the new approach. Indeed, more emphasis is put on the social 
aspects related to the M&D nexus, with a greater attention devoted to relevant ele-
ments both for the countries of origin (family ties, children care, labour force, edu-
cation, etc.) and for those of destination (employment, social security, professional 
formation, portability and recognition of titles and qualifications, social services, 
etc.). Particular consideration is also given to the issue of the socio-economic inte-
gration of migrants into the host societies and to the measures and tools to be used 
for this purpose76. With regard to the integration of third-country nationals, moreo-
ver, their active involvement in the social and cultural life of the host societies is 
seen as a key factor. Therefore, besides measures aimed at fostering an effective in-
tegration into the labour market or the recognitions of relevant qualifications, the 
new M&D approach particularly intends to enhance the role of diasporas, promot-
ing the dialogue between migrant groups and the local authorities. 
The widening of the new European M&D approach implies a multidimensional 
 
73
 The GAMM affirms (p. 19) that “successful mainstreaming of migration in development thinking 
requires making it an integral part of a whole range of sectorial policies”; therefore bridges are built be-
tween migration and a number of other areas, broadening the understanding of the M&D nexus.  
74
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Increasing the impact of EU De-
velopment Policy: an Agenda for Change, [COM(2011) 637 final], 13 October 2011. 
75
 The Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the GAMM, in particular, puts special em-
phasis on vulnerable subjects involved in the migratory phenomenon, including unaccompanied minors, 
asylum seekers, victims of trafficking or violence, women and internally displaced persons.  
76
 The issue of the integration of migrants in the receiving countries, with a particular focus on their 
socio-cultural rights, is specifically addressed in the Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions – European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals [COM(2011) 455 final], 20 
July 2011.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 Francesco Luigi Gatta 
 
 
focus, with several crosscutting elements and intersections between international 
and domestic policies. The concept of policy coherence, therefore, is crucial, as 
highlighted by the Commission in its Communication of 2013 “Maximising the 
Development Impact of Migration”77 as well as in the report on the implementation 
of the GAMM realized in 201478. The importance of a multifocal approach of the 
development policy with regard to migration has been further confirmed in the re-
cent European Agenda on Migration, put forward by the Commission in 201579. 
4. – Concluding Remarks 
Although the M&D nexus has been positively acknowledged and, by common 
consent, the potential positive interaction between the two policies has been af-
firmed and recognized, sometimes the presence of different and conflicting visions 
on the exact nature of this inter-linkage and on the specific priorities have ham-
pered policy coherence in the field of development cooperation. Moreover, the 
M&D nexus has been understood mainly in economic terms, putting the accent on 
migrants as resources or factors for productivity, therefore, focusing on traditional 
themes such as remittances, diasporas, circular migration and brain drain, but sub-
stantially ignoring other important elements. 
The revision of the GAM and its widening into the GAMM has led to a positive 
change in the understanding of the M&D, in particular, by considering also the so-
cial dimension of development and related sectors such as education, health, em-
ployment, agriculture and so on. However, despite the launch of positive coopera-
tion initiatives with third countries, the main goal seems to make M&D policy as 
an instrument to reduce poverty and to increase economic growth. The economic 
dimension, in other words, appears to be still preeminent, with less consideration of 
the human and social indicators of development, such as overall quality of life, 
 
77
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Maximising the Development Im-
pact of Migration. The EU contribution for the UN High-level Dialogue and next steps towards broaden-
ing the development-migration nexus [COM(2013) 292 final], 21 May 2013. 
78
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Report on the implementation of the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility 2012-2013 [COM(2014) 96 final], 21 February 2014. 
79
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European Agenda on Migration, 
[COM(2015) 240 final], 13 May 2015.  
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primary education, health care, employment and so on. 
In addition to that, in the EU, especially with the crucial issues of the refugee 
crisis, development cooperation policy is subordinated to migration interests, the 
migration itself currently being considered more as a challenge or even as a threat, 
rather than an opportunity. On the contrary, a migrant-centred approach should be 
guaranteed and enhanced, with more attention on human rights, especially with re-
gard to the most vulnerable categories of migrants such as unaccompanied minors, 
asylum seekers and victims of trafficking. 
The emphasis on border control and security – witnessed especially by the huge 
increase of the European resources destined to these sectors – risks to seriously un-
dermine the achievement of the EU’s relevant development objectives. Therefore, a 
rethinking of the priorities would be desirable, particularly in order to improve the 
positive synergy between migration and development and, above all, to guarantee 
the safeguard and the respect of the migrants’ fundamental human rights. 
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1. – Introduction: the Strategic Importance of Regular Migrants' 
Integration in the EU 
Migration policies are often seen as “dramatic stories of consolidation of pow-
er”, where opposing values and interests inevitably collide1. Consequently, the nar-
ratives of and on migration flows are often imbued with “political messianism”2, 
which fosters a defensive and identitarian approach to the phenomenon3. A survey 
carried out in 2015 by Eurobarometer highlighted that, after a 14-point increase 
since autumn 20144, immigration has become the main concern in the Member 
States and candidate countries. It is perceived as far more alarming than terrorism, 
public order, public finances and the economic situation of the EU in general5. 
However, the hiatus “we/the others” smoothes over the complexity of the chal-
lenges that the EU and its Member States are confronted with. While the public de-
bate is pressed by the urgency of irregular migration and daily functioning of the 
Common European Asylum System, a long-term issue faces the Member States, 
namely social and economic integration of third-country nationals regularly settled 
in Europe. More than 20 million regular third-country nationals are estimated to re-
side in the Member States. That means 4% of the EU’s overall population. In addi-
tion, statistics show a clear trend towards the increase and stabilization of their 
presence6. This remark is mirrored by the fact that family reasons are the main ve-
hicle for regular migration towards Europe. In 2014, they were the main grounds 
for issuing a residence permit in 18 Member States, whereas in 7 countries they ac-
counted for more than 50% of all first permits issued7. Eurostat surveys also con-
 
1
 MCNAMARA, The Politics of Everyday Europe: Constructing Authority in the European Union, Ox-
ford, 2015, p. 125. 
2
 WEILER, “Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration”, in DICKSON and 
ELEFTHERIADIS (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford, 2012, p. 137 ff. 
3
 RODOTÀ, Il diritto di avere diritti, Roma/Bari, 2012, p. 4. 
4
 Eurobarometer standard 81, Spring 2014, available at: 
<http://http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_first_en.pdf>. 
5
 Eurobarometer standard 83, Spring 2015, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf>. 
6
 Eurostat migration and migrant population statistics 2016, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics>. 
7
 Eurostat residence permit statistics, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics>. 680,025 permits were issued for family reasons, 
while 572,414 and 476,817 were respectively grounded on paid work and study purposes. The statistics 
concerning the previous years confirm this trend. 
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firm that more than 7.5 million long-term residents are settled in the EU and that 
their number steadily increases over time8. 
Even the recent massive inflow of international protection seekers raises con-
cerns on the integration of individuals involved. On one hand, besides providing 
for their immediate needs, the Member States will be faced with the long-term 
challenge of their social inclusion. In this perspective and in order to facilitate the 
integration process, the programmes on relocation of asylum seekers allow the 
States of relocation to express preferences on the applicants’ qualifications and 
characteristics. Member States can take into account factors such as language skills 
or family, cultural and social ties, in order to maximize international protection 
seekers’ chances of future social and economic inclusion9. On the other hand, re-
cent measures on relocation and resettlement have unveiled the deficiencies and 
absence of comprehensive strategies in Member States with less experience of re-
ceiving migrants and related integration issues10. 
Integration strategies for regular migrants are, therefore, a common denomina-
tor within the various branches of migration policy. They are also essential to the 
full effectiveness of any policy initiative in this domain, at both EU and national 
levels11. The acts adopted by the EU in this field recognize that legal migration 
 
8
 See long-term residents statistics by citizenship on 31 December of each year, available at: 
<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_reslong&lang=en>. The number of long-
term residents has continuously and gradually increased from 1.2 millions in 2008 to more than 7.5 in 
2015. 
9
 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, OJ L239 of 15 September 2015, 
p.146, recital 28; Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ 248 of 24 Septem-
ber 2015, p. 80, recital 34. However, some Member States have expressed long or constraining lists of 
preferences for the profile of the applicants to be relocated, thereby negatively affecting the system of 
relocation. See Commissionʼs reports on relocation and resettlement: [COM (2016) 165 final], 16 March 
2016; [COM (2016) 222 final], 12 April 2016; and [COM(2016)360 final], 18 May 2016. 
10
 Communication from the Commission, [COM(2016) 377 final], 7 June 2016, Action plan on the 
integration of third country nationals. The European Parliament has called for full participation and early 
integration of all third country nationals, including refugees as well: see European Parliament Resolution 
2015/2095/INI of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU ap-
proach to migration. 
11
 It has been underlined that the core factors influencing integration policies are utility and security: 
CARMEL, “European Union migration governance: utility, security and integration”, in CARMEL, CERAMI 
and PAPADOPOULOS (eds.), Migration and welfare in the new Europe. Social protection and the challeng-
es of integration, Bristol, 2011, p. 49 ff. 
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plays an important role in enhancing a knowledge-based economy in Europe, ad-
vancing economic development12. In fact, integration exceeds the individual dimen-
sion and becomes a pre-condition for social inclusion and cohesion, a decisive fac-
tor for the economic development of host societies as a whole, especially in times 
of economic crisis and demographic decrease13. In this context, recent surveys con-
cerning indicators of immigration integration show that third country nationals 
have greater difficulties than EU citizens in terms of access to education, employ-
ment and social inclusion outcomes such as decent housing14. Additionally, com-
pared to host country nationals, they are more at risk of social exclusion and pov-
erty, even when they are in employment15. 
As pointed out by the European Commission, a failure to release the potential 
of regular migrants “would represent a massive waste of resources”, both for the 
individuals concerned and for the host societies16. Research demonstrates that in-
vesting in early integration in both the education system and labour market has sig-
nificant social and economic impact, which ranges from easier access to essential 
services to a positive fiscal net contribution17. In the words of the Commission, in-
tegration policies can contribute to making Europe “a more prosperous, cohesive 
 
12
 See for instance the Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16 of 23 January 2004, p. 44, recital 4. 
13
 PONZO et al., “Is the Economic Crisis in Southern Europe Turning into a Migrant Integration Cri-
sis?”, Politiche Sociali, 2015, p. 59 ff. See also the Eurostat births and fertility statistics from 1961 to 
2014, which confirm the negative trend of EU’s population growth, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics>. 
14
 See Eurostat migrants’ integration statistics 2016, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migrant_integration_statistics_-_overview> and the indicators of immigration integra-
tion 2015 developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Indicators-of-Immigrant-Integration-2015.pdf>. 
15
 In 2014, 49% of third-country nationals were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, compared with 
22% among host-country nationals. 18.2 % of the young non-EU-born population faced severe material 
deprivation. Third-country nationals were more likely to live in an overcrowded household than the na-
tive-born population. 
16
 European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Institutional Pa-
per 33 of 26 July 2016, An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis: A Macroeconomic Assessment of the 
EU, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip033_en.pdf>. 
17
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in 
OECD Countries”, in International Migration Outlook, 2013, p. 125, available at: 
<http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/sites/default/files/Liebig_and_Mo_2013.pdf>. See also KING and 
LULLE, “Research on Migration. Facing Realities and Maximizing Opportunities. A Policy Review”, Eu-
ropean Commission Research and Innovation Paper of June 2016, available at: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/ki-04-15-841_en_n.pdf>. 
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and inclusive society”18. Regular migrants’ integration is seen as a two-ways pro-
cess of accommodation, whereby both the third-country nationals and host societies 
can benefit from the social and economic inclusion of incomers. Despite the ab-
sence of a clear definition of the concept of integration, a minimum common de-
nominator is represented by the enhancement of the opportunities of removing ma-
terial and immaterial barriers to access to labour market and essential public ser-
vices in the host State. Such minimum goal is in fact a necessary pre-condition of 
the full enjoyment of fundamental individual rights and for a gradual increase of 
the – personal and collective – quality of life. This is precisely the meaning of inte-
gration this paper builds upon, since the fulfillment of basic integration require-
ments can prove essential to foster social and economic development.  
In the complex European scenario, EU and national integration policies are 
deeply intertwined but often lock swords and pursue different goals. The European 
legal order promotes a positive attitude towards integration issues, whereas the 
Member States often perceive them as “managerial” tools for the selection of mi-
grants deserving a chance. This background has favoured the gradual emergence of 
various forms of integration conditionality, both in national legislations and EU 
secondary law. Language and civic education exams, job training and residence 
conditions are the most common examples. At first sight, these measures are in-
tended to endow the migrants with the necessary tools for a successful integration 
process. However, the failure to fulfill such integration requirements may result in 
a restriction of the rights provided by either EU or national law, such as family re-
unification or certain social assistance benefits. Therefore, the coherence of these 
conditions with the objective of facilitating regular migrant integration is often 
questionable, as well as their compatibility with the general principles of non-
discrimination and proportionality. 
In this context, this paper analyses the European Union’s approach to integra-
tion challenges regarding regular migrants and to integration conditionality, in par-
ticular. The next paragraph focuses on the role the EU is entitled to play in this 
domain and the objectives it pursues, in light of the vertical division of competenc-
es with the Member States. Paragraph 3 analyses European policy initiatives and 
soft-law instruments concerning integration requirements, while paragraph 4 con-
siders hard-law conditionality measures and Court of Justice case law concerning 
 
18
 Communication [COM(2016) 377 final], cit. supra note 10, p. 2. 
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their interpretation. Lastly, paragraph 5 analyses to what extent integration policies 
can be qualified as an overriding reason in the public interest, capable of justifying 
derogations from EU law. 
The paper supports the view that integration conditionality is an effective tool 
for fostering social cohesion and economic development. However, the resort to 
conditionality measures must be carefully assessed in light of the objectives pur-
sued by the Treaties and EU legal order general principles. In fact, conditionality 
must not amount to a leeway allowing for forms of control over (and selection of) 
migration flows. 
2. – Integration Policies and the Vertical Division of Competences: EU 
and Member States Locking Swords 
Migration policy is a domain of shared competence between the EU and the 
Member States. However, the EU has gradually expanded its influence over time, 
so that limited aspects of this field are now left to national sovereignty19. Integra-
tion policy can be listed among these sectors, since the Member States have always 
tried to maintain a prominent role. Even before the Maastricht Treaty, the Court of 
Justice ruled out any attempt by the Community to encroach on this Member 
Statesʼ secret garden. In Germany and others v. Commission20, the Court acknowl-
edged that EC labour and social policies could have a spillover effect on the legal 
regime of third-country nationals, concerning their approach to the employment 
market and working conditions. However, it pointed out their “extremely tenuous” 
link with integration21 and the Community was prevented from adopting any bind-
ing rule in this domain. 
On the occasion of the 1997 Amsterdam reform of the Treaties, the Commis-
sion urged the States to endow the EC with greater powers. It deemed integration 
issues a necessary complement of the rising EC migration policy. The negotiations 
 
19
 For instance, the granting and withdrawing of the national citizenship is left to the Member States. 
However, these competences have to be exercised paying due respect for the general principles of the EU 
legal order and ensuring the full effectiveness of the rights deriving from the EU citizenship, which the 
Court describes as the fundamental status of the individual in the EU. Case C-135/08, Rottmann, ECR, 
2010, I-1449, paras. 43-46. 
20
 Joined Cases 281/85, 283/85, 285/85 and 287/85, Germany and others v. Commission, ECR, 1987, 
3203, para. 22. 
21
 See Germany and others v. Commission, cit. supra, note 20, paras. 23-24. 
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apparently dismissed the Commissionʼs expectations. In fact, Article 63(3) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (“TEC”) limited the Communityʼs 
competence on regular migration to the adoption of directives concerning the con-
ditions of entry and residence in the Member States. However, paragraph 4 further 
provided that these measures could not “prevent any Member State from maintain-
ing or introducing in the areas concerned national provisions which are compatible 
with this Treaty and with international agreements”. These nebulous clauses were 
soon subject to diverging interpretations. On one hand, they were considered wide 
enough to enable the EU to adopt secondary acts concerning social and economic 
integration of regular migrants. On the other hand, they were seen as keys locking 
the Member Statesʼ exclusive competence on integration policies22. 
The uncertainty caused by the “opposing driving forces underlying migration 
policy”23 led to a solution of compromise. In light of these legal bases, the Commu-
nity adopted a series of secondary acts concerning regular migration, which list 
third-country nationalsʼ integration into host societies among their main objec-
tives24. Integration of third-country nationals regularly residing in the Member 
States is deemed a key element in promoting economic development and social co-
hesion, which are further fundamental objectives of the EU25. On the other hand, 
the States prevented the Community from adopting binding rules specifically and 
solely focused on integration policy. Since Article 63 TEC did not make any refer-
ence to this domain, any Community initiative would have breached the principle 
of conferral of competences.  
The wording of the Treaty left many questions unanswered. Therefore, the 
Member States took the opportunity of the Lisbon Treaty negotiations to call for a 
more precise codification of the limits imposed to the intervention of the EU26. 
 
22
 GEDDES, Immigration and European Integration. Beyond Fortress Europe?, Manchester, 2008, p. 
178. 
23
 CORNELISSE, “Whatʼs wrong with Schengen? Border Disputes and the Nature of Integration in the 
Area without Internal Borders”, Community Market Law Review, 2015, p. 741 ff. 
24
 See for instance Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reuni-
fication, OJ L 251 of 3 October 2003, p. 251, recitals 3 and 4. This fundamental purpose has been 
acknowledged by the Court of Justice as well. See Case C-502/10, Singh, ECR, 2012, I-636, para. 45. 
25
 Art. 3 of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”). 
26
 This trend also applies to other competences of the EU. The importance given to the principle of 
conferral of competences by the Member States during the negotiations of the Lisbon has been described 
as an “obsession”. See ROSSI, “Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer Separation of Competences 
Between EU and Member States?”, in BIONDI, EECKOUT and RIPLEY (eds.), The EU Law after Lisbon, Ox-
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Former Article 63 TEC underwent a significant reform and became Article 79 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which is currently 
the main legal basis for any European initiative concerning regular and irregular 
migration. Paragraph 4 now directly refers to integration, as it allows the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure, to “establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of 
Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals 
residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonization of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States”27. It follows that integration policy is an example 
of complementary competence, in light of Article 6 TFEU. This means that the EU 
is entitled to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, 
but it can neither impose the direction of national policy choices nor modify exist-
ing national legislations28. 
Consequently, the Member States develop their own integration policies and the 
legal scenario is highly fragmented29. This is a major problem, since the challenge 
of integration exceeds national borders and is common to all Member States. Dif-
ferent approaches to a common concern can hamper the effectiveness of national 
policies. Moreover, as integration is one of the objectives of EU migration policy 
and is closely connected to further aims pursued by the Treaties, the full effective-
ness of European law is at stake as well30. 
These are the reasons why, despite locking swords on the text of the relevant 
primary legal bases, Member States and the EU have committed themselves to de-
veloping coherent strategies on the subject. In 1999, the Tampere European Coun-
cil led to the launch of the first multiannual programme on a comprehensive ap-
proach to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice31. With a view to paving the 
 
ford, 2012, p. 85; CRAIG, “Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration”, ELR, 2004, 
p. 333. 
27
 Another Treaty provision of a certain – indirect but remarkable – importance for the integration of 
third country nationals is Art. 19(2) TFEU, according to which the European legislators can adopt 
measures to support national efforts to counter sex, racial, ethnical and religious discriminations. 
28
 SCHÜTZE, An Introduction to European Law, Cambridge, 2012, p. 82. 
29
 PAPADOPOULOS, “Immigration and the variety of migrant integration regimes in the European Un-
ion”, in CARMEL, CERAMI and PAPADOPOULOS (eds.), cit. supra note 11, p. 23 ff. 
30
 PORCHIA, “L’effettività del diritto dell’Unione tra tutela del singolo e salvaguardia 
dell’ordinamento”, in LEANZA et al. (eds.), Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Tesauro, Napoli, 2014, p. 2311 ff. 
31
 Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99. 
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way for a European policy on immigration and integration, the European Council 
identified four main priorities. The so-called Tampere milestones included: the ex-
tension of the scope of application the principle of equality to regular non-EU mi-
grants; the development of a more vigorous integration policy for third country na-
tionals; the establishment of a status as near as possible to EU citizenship for long-
term residents; the approximation of national legislation concerning the conditions 
for admission and residence. 
The programme received wide support across the political arena and civil socie-
ty, but its implementation soon proved to be difficult, due to the opposition of some 
Member States32. In order to avoid intergovernmental stumbling blocks, a twofold 
strategy was agreed. First, the coordination of national integration policies would 
have been ensured by a series of soft-law instruments supervised by the Commis-
sion. In parallel, the Council was asked to adopt binding rules concerning the legal 
regime of regular migrants, taking the Tampere milestones into due account. 
3. – Integration of Regular Migrants and EU Soft-Law and Policy 
Initiatives: Between Incentives and Conditionality 
In 2002, the Justice and Home Affairs (“JHA”) Council urged the national au-
thorities to improve the exchange of information and identify best practices, there-
by allowing for future cross-fertilization of national legal orders. That spur repre-
sented the first step of an EU framework on integration, a comprehensive set of 
policy initiatives and soft-law instruments33 coordinated and monitored by the 
Commission34. The first output was the establishment of a network of national con-
tact points, tasked with the duties to promote information exchange and dissemi-
nate best practices35. The discussion platform for EU integration policies has been 
 
32
 Reservations on the outcomes of the Tampere Programme were limited to the undemocratic nature 
of the related decision-making processes, which were to a large extent inspired by an intergovernmental 
approach. See BUNYAN, “The Story of Tampere: an Undemocratic Process Excluding Civil Society”, 
available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/aug/tampere.pdf>. 
33
 Scholars have highlighted the innovative model of governance the framework is based on. It has 
been described as a quasi-Open Method of Coordination. CARRERA, “Integration of Immigrants in EU 
Law and Policy: Challenges to Rule of Law, Exceptions to Inclusion”, in AZOULAI and DE VRIES (eds.), 
EU Migration Law. Legal Complexities and Political Rationale, Oxford, 2014, p. 149 ff., p. 161. 
34
 PAPAGIANNI, Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law, Leiden-Boston, 2006, pp. 
176-180. 
35
 The meetings of the network are chaired by the Commission and national representatives are se-
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widely criticized, due to the lack of a true political commitment on the part of the 
Member States36. Civil society organizations have represented the silent engine of 
the network, so far. In particular, they have played a key role in the preparation and 
drafting of the Handbook on integration for policy makers and practitioners37. The 
Handbook gathers studies, best practices and national legal solutions to the chal-
lenge of integrating third country nationals. In the same vein, the Commission has 
set up a European integration forum and a European website on integration, both 
aimed at strengthening the network between the various actors, such as civil society 
organizations, national experts, ministries and NGOs38. 
The 2004 Hague Program, the second multiannual program for the AFSJ, called 
for a clearer definition of the principles guiding the European agenda on integra-
tion. In response to this request, the JHA Council of 19 November 2004 unani-
mously adopted the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy39, 
non-binding guidelines intended to orient Member States policies40. According to 
the Basic Principles, integration is a two-way process of accommodation, which 
requires the engagement of both the host society and the migrant. Education and 
employment are among the key aspects of the integration process, as they make the 
migrantsʼ contribution to the host society visible and facilitate access to public in-
stitutions and interaction with EU citizens. The Basic Principles also pay close at-
tention to conditionality of integration, as a means of facilitating social inclusion. 
 
lected by each Member State, including UK, Denmark and Ireland. Norway participates in the capacity of 
observer. 
36
 BLOCK and BONJOUR, “Fortress Europe or Europe of rights? The Europeanisation of family inte-
gration policies in France, Germany and the Netherlands”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 
2013, p. 203 ff. 
37
 European Commission, Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, Handbook on Integra-
tion for Policy-Makers and Practitioners, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/docs/handbook_integration/docl_12892_168517401_en.pdf>. 
38
 The website on integration is: <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration>. 
39
 The text of the Principles is available at: <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/common-
basic-principles_en.pdf>. 
40
 It is important to remark that the EU has also planned specific financial support in favour of na-
tional integration policies. See, for instance, Council Decision 2007/435/EC of 25 June 2007, establishing 
the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the 
general programme “Solidarity and management of migration flows”, OJ L 168 of 28 June 2007, p. 18. 
See also the Commissionʼs Communication on the results achieved and on qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of implementation of the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals for the pe-
riod 2007-2009 [COM(2011) 847 final], 5 December 2011. 
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In fact, Principle 2 points out that integration implies respecting the EU’s basic 
values41. Moreover, Principle 4 clarifies that “basic knowledge of the host societyʼs 
language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration” and that “ena-
bling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integra-
tion”42. In particular, according to Principle 9, this basic knowledge allows mi-
grants to take an active part in the democratic and decision-making processes at lo-
cal level, thereby influencing the direction of integration policies43. 
Conditionality of integration is, therefore, a major concern in the process of mu-
tual accommodation, as it is intended to provide migrants with the necessary tools 
for easier interaction in the host society. Its importance was confirmed by the first 
integration agenda of 200544, where the Commission acknowledged that integration 
conditionality takes various shapes at national level and is often represented by 
language and civic education exams. From this point of view, the agenda empha-
sized two innovative aspects. First, the Commission underlined the essential role of 
the host country, required to make every necessary effort to encourage and support 
the third-country nationals’ integration. In particular, national authorities were 
urged to arrange and disseminate training materials and organize language and civ-
ic education courses, even in the migrantsʼ countries of origin, so as to fill the 
“knowledge divide” that migrants often suffer from. Secondly, and interestingly, 
the Commission highlighted that civic integration exams should also include ques-
tions on the foundations of the European Union and the integration process. 
The 2009-2014 Stockholm Program once again listed integration among the 
priorities of EU migration policy, with a view to strengthening the chances of so-
 
41
 This is particularly interesting, since Art. 2 TEU clarifies the main values the EU is founded on: 
the process of integration must take into due account the values shared by the Member States at European 
level. 
42
 The Basic Principles also build on the Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European 
Council of 19 and 20 June 2003. See, in particular, para. 28: “The European Council deems it necessary 
to elaborate a comprehensive and multidimensional policy on the integration of legally residing third 
country nationals who, according to and in order to implement the conclusions of the European Council 
of Tampere, should be granted rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens”. 
43
 BONJOUR and VINK, “When Europeanisation backfires: the normalisation of European migration 
policies”, Acta Politica, 2013, p. 389 ff. 
44
 Communication from the Commission – “A common agenda for integration. Framework for the 
integration of third-country nationals in the European Union”, [COM(2005) 389 final], 1 September 
2005. 
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cial inclusion of regular migrants and enhance public security45. In this context, the 
Commission proposed the preparation of European modules for migrant integra-
tion, a set of “building blocks” which Member States may draw upon when plan-
ning their own integration policies46. In fact, the modules collect experiences at na-
tional level and identify joint practices on the main aspects of the integration pro-
cess. They provide national authorities with quality standards and negotiated rec-
ommendations based on existing evidence of the best approaches. From this point 
of view, specific attention is paid to the indicators, targets and best practices con-
cerning language or civic education courses and exams. In fact, Module 1 stresses 
that basic knowledge of the receiving society’s language, history and institutions is 
indispensable to integration47. 
Lastly, following the current massive inflows of migrants and the challenges 
brought by resettlement of refugee programmes, the Commission has recently issued a 
new action plan concerning the integration of third-country nationals48. Since providing 
support to migrants at the earliest stage possible paves the way for successful integra-
tion, the Commission calls for increased attention for pre-departure and pre-arrival 
measures, involving both migrants and receiving societies. In this vein, language and 
job-related training are deemed a priority, as they facilitate access to better job oppor-
tunities. Moreover, the action plan underlines the long-term benefits for both migrants 
and receiving societies of the acquisition of language skills, which enhances migrantsʼ 
autonomy in contemporary complex societies49. In the Commission’s view, invest-
ments on early integration measures are a powerful lever with a positive impact in the 
long run, in terms of increased social cohesion and economic development. 
 
45
 Council of the European Union, Stockholm Programme of 3 March 2010, an open and secure Eu-
rope serving and protecting citizens. 
46
 The final report was published in April 2014 and is available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-
integration/index.cfm?action=media.download&uuid=FC5F04DC-E798-1B57-7A5A978B8370D5AF>. 
47
 The final report on the modules was adopted on 3 April 2014 and can be downloaded via the EU 
website on integration at: <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/european-modules-on-
migrant-integration---final-report>. 
48
 Communication [COM(2016) 377 final], cit. supra note 10. 
49
 This reflects the sociological theories on the daily challenges that the members of modern and 
complex societies are confronted with, in terms of democratic participation, awareness of rights and du-
ties, knowledge of the functioning of a social system. The migrants themselves contribute to increase the 
complexity of host societies. GSIR, “Social Interactions between Immigrants and Host Country Popula-
tions: a Country of Origin Perspective”, INTERACT Research Report 2014/2, available at: 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31243/INTERACT_RR_2014_02.pdf?sequence=1>. 
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4. – Integration Conditionality in EU Secondary Law: Fostering Social 
Cohesion or Immigration Control? 
4.1. The Objectives of EU Secondary Law on Regular Migration and the 
Clauses on Integration Conditionality 
The second aspect of the strategy designed by the Tampere Programme was fo-
cused on the adoption of common rules regarding the legal regime of regular mi-
grants. The implementation of the Tampere political mandate encountered many 
obstacles, as the lack of political will was coupled by the need to reach unanimity 
within the Council. In particular, due to the opposition of some Member States, the 
Commission was forced to withdraw its 2001 proposal for a Directive on the condi-
tions of entry and residence for paid and self-employed migrant workers50. Other 
proposed Directives also underwent exhausting negotiations51. The efforts made led 
to the adoption of a set of important secondary acts on various categories of regular 
migrants, such as Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residents, Directive 
2003/86/EC on family reunification, Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, 
unremunerated training or voluntary service and Directive 2009/50/EC on highly-
qualified employment. 
As a whole, these acts acknowledge the strategic importance of regular migra-
tion for the social and economic development of the EU and share the objective of 
helping them settle in the EU. Directive 2003/109/EC also provides that long-term 
residents should enjoy equality of treatment with Member State citizens in a wide 
range of economic and social matters, as “a genuine instrument for integration”52. 
Accordingly, Directive 2003/86/EC states that family reunification “helps to create 
sociocultural stability”, facilitating the integration of third country nationals and 
thereby promoting economic and social cohesion53.  
 
50
 Communication from the Commission concerning a proposal for a Council Directive on the condi-
tions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-
employed economic activities, [COM(2001)386 final], 11 July 2001. 
51
 For instance, Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residents and Directive 2003/86/EC on family 
reunification were eventually adopted after respectively five and four years of harsh and non-transparent 
debates within the Council. 
52
 Directive 2003/109/EC, cit. supra, note 12, recital 12. See also Case C-571/10, Kamberaj, ECR, 
2012, I-233. 
53
 See in particular recital 4. 
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The wording of these Directives, however, reflects the Member States’ primary 
role in integration policies. In fact, besides general clauses on their objectives, they 
address integration of regular migrants from the perspective of conditionality. Fol-
lowing a joint proposal put forward by Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, they 
include provisions allowing Member States to impose a duty of integration on mi-
grants. In light of Article 5(2) of the long-term residents Directive, Member States 
may require third-country nationals to comply with “integration conditions”, in ac-
cordance with national law. Likewise, Article 15, concerning the conditions for res-
idence in another Member State, allows national authorities to require them to 
comply with integration measures. These further requirements are not necessary if 
the migrants have already complied with integration conditions under Article 5(2) 
in another Member State. In the same vein, Article 7(2) of the 2003/86/EC Di-
rective stipulates that Member States may require third-country nationals wanting 
to exercise their right to family reunification to comply with integration measures, 
in accordance with national law54. A specific regime is awarded to refugees, benefi-
ciaries of subsidiary protection55 and their family members, to whom integration 
measures may only be applied once the person concerned has been granted family 
reunification56. The same favourable condition for family reunification applies to 
family members of highly qualified migrants and migrants residing in the EU in the 
framework of intra-corporate transfers57. 
 
 
54
 Another provision has to mentioned, for the sake of completeness: Art. 4, in fact, states that 
“where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently from the rest of his/her family, the Mem-
ber State may, before authorizing entry and residence under this Directive, verify whether he or she 
meets a condition for integration provided for by its existing legislation at the date of the implementation 
of this Directive“. This provision has lost its importance, since it merely allowed Member States to intro-
duce this exception until the expiration of the deadline for the implementation of the Directive. Not a sin-
gle Member State implemented this provision, which has then to be considered a contrario an express 
prohibition to impose integration conditions to minors. 
55
 In light of Art. 33 of Directive 2011/95, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection should in principle 
benefit from the same regime as refugees. 
56
 See Art. 7(2), last sentence, of Directive 2003/86/EC. 
57
 See respectively Art. 15(3) of the Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, in OJ 
L 155 of 18 June 2009, p. 17, and Art. 19(3) of the Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the 
framework of an intra-corporate transfer, in OJ L 157 of 27 May 2014, p. 1. 
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4.2. – Integration Conditions and Measures: the Risk of Deviating from the 
Objective of Facilitating Integration 
The Directives introduce a summa divisio between conditions and measures of 
integration. At first sight, such conditions and measures seem to be intended to as-
sess migrantsʼ capability or willingness to comply with pre-determined integration 
standards. However, a deeper analysis of the legal implications of a failure to fulfill 
the requirements is needed. In particular, it has to be clarified whether such failure 
could restrict the rights conferred by EU law, precluding family reunification or the 
acquisition of the status of long-term residents. Such consequences would be re-
grettable, because one of the main purposes of the Directives under consideration is 
to reinforce regular migrants’ chances of social and economic integration. Since 
these forms of conditionality can result in a stumbling block to integration, they 
can deprive the Directives of their effectiveness. At the same time, this is a domain 
of exclusive national competence. Even though Member States are required to re-
spect the general principles of the EU legal order, they are also entitled to follow 
their own objectives and political priorities. 
Scholars have warned of the risks of unilateral deviations of integration policies 
that are of exclusive benefit to the Member States58. In fact, according to part of le-
gal literature, this normative approach highlights an evident shift in the notion of 
integration59. In the 1970s, the promotion of social and economic inclusion was 
conceived as a means to enhance mobility through the Member States. The guaran-
tee of equal treatment in the host State, the respect of the right to family life and 
stringent limits to repatriation were intended to boost social inclusion. Integration 
in turn ensured the effectiveness of the free movement of persons, which is an es-
sential component of the internal market and one of the Treaties’ primary objec-
tives. It was therefore conceived in a positive – and not “impositive” – perspective, 
since it represented the natural complement to the legal regime provided for EU 
workers, later on extended to all EU citizens.  
Integration clauses provided by EU secondary law on regular migration serve the 
 
58
 CAGGIANO, “Lʼintegrazione dei migranti fra soft-law e atti legislativi: competenze dellʼUnione 
europea e politiche nazionali”, in ID. (ed.), I percorsi giuridici per lʼintegrazione. Migranti e titolari di 
protezione internazionale tra diritto dellʼUnione e ordinamento italiano, Torino, 2015, p. 27 ff., p. 38. 
59
 CARRERA, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Immigration, Integration 
and Citizenship in the EU, Leiden/Boston, 2009, pp. 166-195. 
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opposite purpose, which is to allow Member States to maintain a certain margin of 
control over migration flows60. From this point of view, one of their main objectives 
is to enable forms of selection of third-country nationals, based on the assessment of 
their chances of integration in the host society61. The Member Statesʼ unconcealed 
ambitions of control and security show the identitarian side of integration measures 
and conditions62 and the risk of “managerial effects”63 on incoming regular migrants. 
These concerns are further fuelled by the fact that none of the Directives in 
question provides a clear definition of the concepts of integration conditions and 
measures. Wide and fuzzy notions amplify the national authoritiesʼ discretionary 
powers and the heterogeneity of internal implementation laws, to the detriment of a 
coherent approach to integration policies64. This is why the Commission, through 
the afore-mentioned soft-law instruments, has tried to orient Member Statesʼ initia-
tives on this subject. 
4.3. Meaning and Implications of Integration Conditions and Measures 
Scholars have proposed a wide range of interpretations of the integration claus-
es. According to a minority opinion, they merely confirm the vertical distribution 
of powers between the EU and Member States. Consequently, they are pleonastic 
and devoid of effects65. However, this approach does not take into account that EU 
secondary law has to be read in accordance with the effet utile doctrine66. Moreover, 
national laws implementing the clauses must be carefully scrutinized in light of the 
general principles of the EU legal order67, so as to avoid undue deviations from EU 
law objectives. 
 
60
 CARRERA, cit. supra note 33, p. 154. 
61
 JESSE, “Integration Measures, Integration Exams and Immigration Control: P and S and K and A”, 
CMLR, 2016, 1065. 
62
 JOPPKE and MORAWSKA (eds.), Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Na-
tion-States, Basingstoke, 2003; BAUBÖCK et al. (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Polices and 
Trends in 15 European Countries, Amsterdam, 2006. 
63
 KOSTAKOPOULOU, CARRERA and JESSE, “Doing and Deserving: Competing Frames of Integration 
in the EU”, in GUILD, GROENENDIJK and CARRERA (eds.), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizen-
ship and Integration in the EU, Burlington, 2009, p. 167. 
64
 See in general KRÁL, “On the Choice of Method of Transposition of EU Directives”, ELR, 2016, 
p. 220. 
65
 CAGGIANO, cit. supra, note 58, p. 54. 
66
 See for instance case C-329/11, Achughbabian, ECR, 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:807, para. 33. 
67
 Case C-438/05, Finnish Seamenʼs Union v. Viking, ECR, 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772. 
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A second view builds on the dividing line between conditions and measures68. 
Only conditions are deemed to introduce compulsory criteria, so a failure to com-
ply with them can preclude enjoying the rights conferred by the Directives. It also 
entitles national authorities to exercise their sanctioning powers, for instance by 
imposing a pecuniary sanction on the migrant concerned. Integration measures, on 
the other hand, would represent an incentive for the migrantsʼ direct and active in-
volvement in their social integration process. As such, neither binding obligations 
stem from them, nor the Member States could sanction their violation.  
The meaning of integration conditions and measures became a matter of analy-
sis for Advocates General and the Court of Justice in a series of cases concerning 
the compatibility of certain national integration exams with EU law. According to 
Advocate General Szpunar in P and S, integration measures are not additional 
mandatory criteria imposed on third-country nationals, but tools to enhance their 
chances of integration69. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility of im-
posing a penalty in the form of a fine on a person who “persistently refuses to ful-
fill the obligations imposed … as part of integration measures”70. In his opinion in 
Dogan71, Advocate General Mengozzi upheld this approach, although reaching dif-
ferent conclusions. The summa divisio between conditions and measures is formal-
ly correct, but has no practical effects, since the latter notion is broad enough to en-
compass “obligations to reach a result”72. Lastly, in K and A73, Advocate General 
Kokott expressed the view that the words “condition” under Article 5 of Directive 
2003/109/EC and “measure” provided in Article 7 of Directive 2003/86/EC actual-
 
68
 GROENENDIJK, “Legal Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law”, European Journal of Migra-
tion and Law, 2004, p. 111. The author underlines that conditionality has turned the rationale of integra-
tion upside down. Rights are not tools for integration, rather rewards for the fulfillment of integration 
conditions and measures.  
69
 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar delivered on 28 January 2015, Case C-579/13, P and S. 
70
 Ibid., para. 104. In any case, these sanctions must be proportional to the offence and also take ac-
count of the reasons why such action is considered undesirable. 
71
 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 30 April 2014. 
72
 Ibid., para. 56. The Advocate General refers to Art. 7(2) of the Directive 2003/86/EC, but his rea-
soning appears to apply to the notion of integration measure per se. The Court found that there was no 
need to answer to the preliminary questions directly regarding the compatibility with this Directive of 
integration tests imposed in Germany (Case C-138/13, Dogan, 10 July 2014). For a note on the judgment 
see BRIBOSIA and GANTY, “Arrêt Dogan: quelle légalité pour les tests dʼintégration civique?”, Journal de 
droit européen, 2014, p. 378. 
73
 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 19 March 2015, Case C-153/14, K and A. 
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ly share the same meaning. In fact, the distinction between the two concepts in Di-
rective 2003/109/EC is due to the fact that the migrants involved can move freely 
within the EU. Then, it only aims at ensuring that long-term residents, who have 
already satisfied an integration condition in one Member State, are not required to 
take further integration tests in another Member State. The family reunification Di-
rective concerns first entry of family members into the EU and the measures are 
listed among the requirements for family reunification. The Member States are en-
titled to verify whether these criteria for the exercise of the right to family reunifi-
cation have been satisfactorily complied with. According to Advocate General Ko-
kott, this means that the notion of measure, for the purposes of the 2003/86/EC Di-
rective, has to be interpreted autonomously and is close to the concept of condition 
provided by Article 5 of Directive 2003/109/EC. Consequently, it allows national 
authorities to impose compulsory integration requirements as a pre-condition for 
family reunification. It follows, as a rule, that the migrant can be required to fulfill 
an integration measure in advance, before entry into the territory of the host Mem-
ber State. This is confirmed by reading a contrario Article 7(2), which rules out in-
tegration prior to family reunification only for refugees. In practice, the destination 
Member State can make family reunification dependent upon the fulfillment of cer-
tain requirements, such as the successful completion of language and civic educa-
tion exams, which the migrant can be required to take in the country of origin74. 
4.4. – The Court of Justice and the Criteria for the Compatibility of Integration 
Conditions and Measures with EU Law 
Placed between autonomous interpretation and the Directivesʼ objective of fos-
tering inclusion, the notions of condition and measure of integration can have a 
significantly adverse impact on the individuals concerned. Therefore, the Court of 
Justice has been asked to strike a balance between the restrictions to the rights con-
ferred by the Directives and the need to support a positive attitude towards integra-
tion policies. 
In its recent case law, the Court has endorsed the view expressed by Advocate 
 
74
 According to some authors, this is not only due to the wording of Art. 79(4) TFEU. National civic 
integration exams could be considered a specific implication of the protection of national identities, en-
shrined in Art. 4(2) TEU. ORGAD, The Cultural Defence of Nations. A Liberal Theory of Majority Rights, 
Oxford, 2015, p. 3. 
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General Kokott: the conditions under Article 5 of 2003/109/EC Directive and the 
measures mentioned in Article 7 of the family reunification Directive have similar 
meanings and effects. Both clauses actually permit the Member States to require 
third-country nationals to comply with integration criteria imposed by national 
laws75. This applies in particular to integration tests. According to the Court, acquir-
ing basic knowledge of the language and social organization is “undeniably useful 
for establishing connections with the host Member State”76. It facilitates relations 
with the host Member State’s nationals and encourages the development of social 
networks, whereby favouring access to vocational training opportunities and the la-
bour market77. Therefore, the Directives allow national authorities to make the issue 
of a long-term residence or entry permit for family reunification contingent upon 
the fulfillment of predetermined integration criteria.  
However, the discretionary powers reserved to national authorities is not unlim-
ited. The Court has underlined elsewhere that, as a general rule, the exercise of na-
tional competences cannot obstruct the effectiveness of the EU regime on regular 
migration78. Therefore, the conditions and measures of integration are compatible 
with EU law only if they contribute to enhancing the chances of integration of 
third-country nationals permanently settled in Europe. Their content, nature and 
practical implementation have to be oriented to this fundamental concern. 
It follows that national laws implementing the Directives must primarily tend to the 
issue of the long-term resident permit and the authorization of family reunification. 
Any deviations from this major objective, including those deriving from a failure to 
fulfill integration conditions or measures, must be interpreted narrowly and strictly.  
 
75
 This statement draws a dividing line between the EU citizens’ regime for the issue of a permanent 
residence permit and the rules on the long-term residence permit. According to the case law of the Court, 
the former cannot be subject to integration requirements, while the latter can be conditioned. From this 
point of view, therefore, long-term residents are not granted the same treatment as EU citizens. Joined 
Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10, Ziolkowski and Szeja, ECR, 2011, I-14035. 
76
 Case C-153/14, K and A, 9 July 2015, para. 54. 
77
 The Court of Justice uses the concept of integration of a person in a host Member States in various 
subjects, trying to follow a coherent approach. See for instance the case law concerning the execution of 
a European arrest warrant, namely case Case C-42/11, Lopes da Silva, 5 September 2012, para. 58, where 
the Court lists family, economic and social connections among the criteria for assessing the degree of in-
tegration of an individual. 
78
 Case C-578/08, Chakroun, ECR, 2010, I-1839, para. 43. The judgment refers to the family reunifi-
cation Directive, but the reasoning of the Court can be extended to the whole domain of regular migra-
tion. 
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Second, integration requirements must comply with the principle of proportion-
ality. It means that they must be limited to what is strictly necessary and adequate 
in light of the objective of facilitating the start of a long integration process. As far 
as integration exams are concerned, the tests cannot be too selective, as they must 
only verify the basics of the language and civic education of the host country. This 
is particularly important in the event of pre-departure exams, which the Court con-
siders per se compatible with EU law. In such cases, which primarily affect mi-
grants seeking family reunification, the proportionality test on exam contents and 
the methods used to evaluate the third-country nationalsʼ knowledge should be par-
ticularly stringent. It is in fact almost contradictory to require migrants to fulfill an 
integration requirement before they arrive in the host society79. A contradiction that 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has recently criti-
cised, in a report focused on the Dutch integration policy80. A similar concern was 
expressed by the European Committee of Social Rights, according to which the 
German legal order unduly obstructs family reunification – and therefore breaches 
Article 19(6) of the European Social Charter – by making reunification conditional 
upon documented evidence of sufficient German linguistic skills81. 
Third, integration requirements cannot be absolute. A failure to pass a test cannot 
automatically prevent the enjoyment of the rights conferred by the EU legal order, es-
pecially where the migrants have made every effort to achieve this objective. By the 
same token, the fulfillment of integration criteria must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into due account the case’s circumstances and each migrant’s personal 
situation82. Consequently, national legislations must include exemptions from the duty 
of integration – the so-called hardship clauses – where the migrantʼs situation makes 
complying with these requirements either impossible or excessively difficult83. From 
 
79
 The need for a stricter proportionality test also derives from the fact that at the time the Directive 
2003/86/EC was adopted and implemented at national level the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
had no binding value, while nowadays its provisions – and in particular Art. 7 on the right to family life – 
are to be considered EU primary law. 
80
 Report of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Sixty-Fifth Session, 31 
October 2013, Supplement No. 18 (A/65/18). 
81
 European Social Charter Committee Report, 13 February 2013, Concerning Conclusions XIX-4 
(2011) of the 1961 European Social Charter, p. 80. 
82
 The individual approach is also urged, for instance, by Art. 17 of the family reunification Di-
rective. 
83
 Case C-155/11 PPU, Imran, ECR, 2011, I-5095. 
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this point of view, Member States have to take into consideration factors such as men-
tal or physical disabilities, severe diseases, education and training levels, illiteracy, dif-
ferent cultural background of the third country of origin, age. 
Conversely, the Member States must make any necessary effort to guide mi-
grants towards successful completion of their integration process. Therefore, the 
case law of the Court confirms that national authorities have to arrange preparatory 
courses and materials, including in the migrantʼs mother tongue. These training op-
portunities and the examinations themselves must also be easily accessible, in prac-
tical and financial terms. For instance, the Court has censored the courses and ex-
amination fees in the Netherlands as they were considered to be an excessive ob-
stacle to the enjoyment of the rights provided by Directives 2003/109/EC and 
2003/86/EC84. 
5. – Integration Policies as an Overriding Reason in the Public Interest 
Justifying Derogations from EU Law 
As seen in the previous paragraphs, integration conditionality measures includ-
ed in EU secondary acts are comparable to Trojan horses through which the Mem-
ber States have tried to preserve wide margins of discretion and control on regular 
migration. However, they are not the unique source of limits to the rights granted 
by EU law. In fact, since integration policy falls under the competence of Member 
States, national authorities are entitled to introduce forms of integration condition-
ality additional to those referred to in EU secondary law. 
From a negative perspective, they can make the enjoyment of a certain right con-
ditional upon fulfilling a certain integration requirement. In such cases, measures and 
conditions facilitating integration are only means to pursuing further goals, such as 
an effective organization of the welfare system or rationalization of managing public 
 
84
 It is worth underlining that in the P and S judgment also the financial sanction imposed to the 
third-country nationals concerned was considered manifestly disproportionate. Its amount was considered 
an excessive burden placed on the migrants and an obstacle to the successful completion of the test. From 
this point of view, the Court has built on its case law on the costs for the issue of resident permits for 
third-country nationals. It had in fact already found excessive amounts to be evidently disproportioned if 
compared to the burdens imposed to EU citizens for the issue of similar documents. See Case C-508/10, 
Commission v. The Netherlands, 26 April 2012. It has to be pointed out that, in the aftermath of the 
judgment in K and A (cit. supra note 76), the Dutch Government has considerably lowered down the fees 
for integration exams and reparation materials. 
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finances. From a positive point of view, Member States can also justify a derogation 
from EU law with the need to enhance the chances of integration of regular migrants 
residing there. Integration becomes the main objective of national policy choices, on 
the basis of which a Member State can even try to justify a deviation from the obliga-
tions imposed by the European legal order. Practices at national and local levels cov-
er a wide range of situations, including residence conditions, a stay of a certain dura-
tion or demonstration of close personal ties. Whatever the case, integration condi-
tionality once again exceeds the merely individual dimension and can have a remark-
able systemic impact at social and legal levels. 
In this respect, the Court of Justice has recently acknowledged that the objec-
tive of ensuring successful integration of third-country nationals in a Member State 
may constitute an overriding reason in the public interest85. This is a duty that the 
Court has paid to the vertical division of competences between the European Union 
and Member States. In fact, it implies that national authorities can expect to invoke 
the achievement of such objective as a justification for a failure to comply with EU 
law. Of course, they have to respect the general principles of the EU legal order 
and their conduct must be proportionate and suitable to the objective pursued86. 
However, this is further demonstration of the influence of integration conditionality 
on the effectiveness of migration policy as a whole. In fact, the Court provides na-
tional authorities with incentives to resort to such fundamental aims not only as a 
source of duties to migrants, but also and as a way out of obligations stemming 
from the European legal order. 
For this reason, the Court has once again tried to set out appropriate boundaries 
to the Member States’ discretionary power. In Alo and Osso87, for instance, the 
Court was asked to establish whether a residence condition imposed by a German 
law on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection recipients of social assistance is com-
patible with Directive 2011/95/EU88. Theoretically, the imposition of a condition of 
residence amounts to a violation of the freedom of movement. The freedom to 
 
85
 Case C-561/14, Genc, 12 April 2016, paras. 55-56. 
86
 In general, Case 120/78, Rewe Zentral (Cassis de Dijon), ECR, 1979, 649. 
87
 Joined Cases C-443/14 and C-444/14, Alo and Osso, 1 March 2016. 
88
 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 2011 on stand-
ards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted, OJ L 337 of 20 December 2011, p. 9. 
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choose oneʼs place of residence is in fact a corollary of a fundamental pillar of the 
EU legal order89, which is in turn an indispensable condition for the free develop-
ment of a person90. From this point of view, the Court stressed the importance of 
the principle of equality91. As a matter of fact, in light of Article 33 of the Directive, 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection cannot in principle be subject to more restric-
tive rules than those applicable to refugees and other categories of regular migrants. 
If the situation of a beneficiary of subsidiary protection is objectively comparable 
to that of other legally resident third-country nationals, as the objective of a full in-
tegration is concerned, the Member State must ensure the same treatment. Other-
wise, a residence condition represents per se a justified restriction to the freedom of 
movement, as long as it is justified by the need to facilitate social inclusion in the 
host Member State. 
As for integration exams, national judicial authorities are entrusted with a key 
role. In fact, the Court of Justice calls for a case-by-case assessment, in light of 
each migrant’s individual situation. It is then for national courts to determine 
whether a refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary protection faces greater difficulties 
than other regular migrants concerning the successful completion of the integration 
process. Bearing in mind the recent massive inflows of international protection 
seekers, the Court’s finding is even more important and contributes to making the 
national authoritiesʼ task more difficult. 
However, the Court of Justice assesses the compatibility of the residence condition 
only on the basis of the principle of equality, but fails to provide the referring court 
with any guidance on the criteria for the (strict) proportionality test. From this point of 
view, the Court departs from its precedents on integration exams, where it has repeat-
edly underlined the close link between the respect of the principle of proportionality 
 
89
 See, on the specific implications of the notion of freedom of movement under Art. 33 of Directive 
2011/95/EU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalòn delivered on 6 October 2015, Joined Cases C-
443/14 and C-444/14, Alo and Osso, paras. 49-53. See also Art. 26 of the Convention relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951), entered into force on 22 April 1954, in light of which the free-
dom of movement includes the right to choose the place of residence in the State that has granted that 
protection. 
90
 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27 of 2 November 1999 on Freedom 
of Movement, Article 12, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9. 
91
 In fact, Directive 2011/95/EU has to a large extent removed the differences between the rights 
conferred to refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. See the Opinion of Advocate General 
Bot delivered on 4 September 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida. 
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and the achievement of the objectives pursued by EU secondary law on regular migra-
tion. There, it provided something more than a mere guidance for national judges, 
since it listed a set of strict and “tangible” criteria that such integration conditions and 
measures have to meet. A similar approach would help national courts to better identi-
fy the limits of national integration policies, in light of the full effectiveness of EU mi-
gration law. In fact, factors such as the social and economic context of the area in-
volved or the duration and territorial scope of the residence condition can have a sig-
nificant impact on migrants’ freedom of movement. Consequently, they inevitably in-
fluence the balance between the objective of ensuring the successful integration of 
third-country nationals – along with the protection of the rights conferred by the EU 
legal order – and the exercise of national exclusive competences. 
6. – Concluding Remarks 
The analysis highlights a certain degree of inconsistency between visions of integra-
tion policies and reality. EU institution statements, their programmes and action plans 
uphold a positive approach to such long-term challenges. EU soft-law instruments 
overtly reflect such attitude and strive for the de facto Europeanization of the domain. 
Common problems would need common – or at least coordinated – solutions. 
However, integration conditionality provisions introduced in EU secondary leg-
islation after fierce lobbying by the Member States protect national prerogatives 
and expectations of control on regular migration flows. In fact, they allow for re-
strictions of the rights conferred by the EU legal order, running counter to the ob-
jective of facilitating integration. 
Article 79(4) TFEU also refers to promoting integration of third-country na-
tionals in the host Member States as an action by the Member States to be encour-
aged and supported. On one hand, this reflects the EU’s complementary role in this 
domain. On the other, integration is a key factor in promoting social and economic 
cohesion, as well as being a fundamental European Union objective set out in the 
Treaties. Consequently, the objective of achieving successful integration can con-
stitute an overriding reason in the public interest, justifying derogations from EU 
law at national level. 
Such twofold divide between policy objectives and legal realism can obstruct 
the effectiveness of EU law, as integration is deeply intertwined with several as-
pects of European migration policy. The recent massive inflows of international 
protection seekers further amplify such concern. They urge the EU and Member 
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States to address the challenge of rapidly involving them in the education system 
and/or labour market, as a powerful lever for their long-term social inclusion. 
In fact, the link between the successful completion of the integration process 
and other EU objectives, in particular social cohesion and economic development, 
is close and clearly confirmed by EU soft and hard law. Being conscious of such 
challenges, the Court of Justice has tried to bring back integration conditionality to 
its foremost objective and align it with EU law general principles and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Integration conditions and measures are in fact 
compatible with EU law only if they facilitate integration92. They also have to pass 
a strict proportionality test and must not undermine the effectiveness of relevant 
EU Directives. In both cases, the assessment must be individualized, taking into 
due account the applicant’s situation and avoiding automatic restrictions to the 
rights conferred by EU law. 
Consequently, the Court has placed severe limits on Member States concerning 
abuse of integration conditionality. In principle, they cannot resort to selective in-
tegration requirements as a means of migration control anymore. However, it re-
mains to see how national authorities will react, especially in times of massive mi-
gration inflows and related widespread concerns among EU citizens. In such a con-
text, policy choices on immigration are an emblem of national sovereignty and the 
Member States’ ambitions of security and control. Sovereignty however suffers 
under the pressure of truly European challenges, which require limited national 
discretionary power and increased coordination and coherence. 
 
 
92
 See for instance case K and A, cit. supra note 76, paras. 52 and 57. 
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of Residence. – 3.5. The Right Not to Be Arbitrarily Displaced. – 4. Conclusions.  
 
1. – The Issue of Development-Induced Displacement 
An inconvenient kind of forced migration occurs when people are forcibly dis-
placed as a result of development.    
Development-induced displacement (“DID”) refers to the forced displacement 
of persons and whole communities to make way for development projects of all 
kinds, including the construction of dams and other hydrological plants as well as 
infrastructure, plans for urban renewal or “beautification” of cities or for agricul-
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tural expansion, the preparation of mega-events like the Olympic Games or large 
international conferences, conservation projects such as reserve games or national 
parks, and activities of exploration and exploitation of natural resources such as 
mining and oil extraction1. 
While development should be pursued with the view to improving the socio-
economic conditions within a country and eradicating inequality and poverty for 
the benefit of the society and all its members, the reality is that it may harm some 
people by displacing them.  
Displacement is always a disruptive and painful experience. It obliges affected 
people to move to an unfamiliar environment and re-establish a new life there. Peo-
ple evicted from their lands and homes in the name of a supposedly greater economic 
good, usually with no possibility of return, face serious risks of impoverishment.  
These risks have been identified in eight typical interlinked and recurrent pro-
cesses, according to which displacement leads to: landlessness, joblessness, home-
lessness, marginalization, increased morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to 
common property, and social disarticulation2. Essentially, displaced people are de-
prived of their homes, their livelihoods, and their community ties, which all impact 
on their life conditions and result in increased social and economic vulnerability 
and disempowerment. If not properly dealt with, these processes converge into im-
poverishment3. Moreover, often it is already vulnerable communities such as indig-
enous peoples and minorities that are affected, as well as, from a gender perspec-
tive, women who disproportionately see their conditions worsening due to a lack of 
 
1
 See e.g. MOREL, “Protection Against Development-Induced Displacement in International Law”, in 
SATIROGLU, CHOI (eds.), Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement, New Perspectives on 
Persisting Problems, New York, 2015, p. 142 ff., p. 142; ID., “Displaced in the Name of Sports: Human 
Rights Law Comes to the Rescue”, Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, 2012, p. 229 ff., pp. 
237-238; TERMINSKI, Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement, Causes, Consequences, and 
Socio-Legal Context, Stuttgart, 2015, pp. 83-178. 
2
 CERNEA, “Understanding and Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement”, in MCDOWELL 
(ed.), Understanding Impoverishment, The Consequences of Development-Induced Displacement, New 
York-Oxford, 1996, p. 13 ff., pp. 13-22. 
3
 Few examples of successful cases where resettlement in another area has led to the improvement of 
life conditions of displaced people have been reported. These cases have been characterized by compre-
hensive planning, a significant participation of the affected people, a commitment to job creation as a ve-
hicle of income restoration, and a high degree of flexibility. DE WET, “Risk, Complexity and Local Initia-
tive in Forced Resettlement Outcomes”, in DE WET (ed.), Development-Induced Displacement, Problems, 
Policies and People, New York-Oxford, 2006, p. 180 ff., pp. 193-198.  
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security of tenure, gender bias, violence, and discriminatory inheritance laws. Re-
settlement plans, when foreseen, have frequently proven insufficient in restoring 
the livelihoods of displaced people, mainly due to careless planning, poor imple-
mentation, lack of capacity and funding4. 
The consequences suffered by people displaced in the name of development can 
thus be as dire as those of people displaced by conflicts, persecution and natural 
disasters, and raise concerns about respect for their human rights. People displaced 
by development projects generally remain in their own country and are included in 
the category of Internally Displaced Persons (“IDPs”)5.  
Notwithstanding this categorization, those millions people who are victims of 
DID appear to remain relatively unnoticed.  
It is thought that at least 15 million people worldwide are uprooted every year 
by development projects, although it is difficult to estimate the global number, and 
due to under-reporting and hidden displacement the number of 15 million people is 
still considered to be a significant underestimate6.  
Explanations for the reasons why DID generally attract less attention can be put 
forward.   
 
4
 On impoverishment related to DID see e.g. MCDOWELL (ed.), Understanding Impoverishment, The 
Consequences of Development-Induced Displacement, New York-Oxford, 1996; DE WET (ed.), Devel-
opment-Induced Displacement, Problems, Policies and People, New York-Oxford, 2006; BENNETT and 
MCDOWELL, Displaced: The Human Cost of Development and Resettlement, New York, 2012; MEHTA 
(ed.), Displaced by Development, Confronting Marginalisation and Gender Injustice, New Delhi, 2009; 
KOTHARI, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Ad-
equate Standard of Living, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/48 (2004), paras. 39-65.  
5
 See Principle 6 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement specifically referring to dis-
placement by development projects. DENG, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998), pp. 6-7. See also Art. 1(2) of the London Declaration of International 
Law Principles on IDPs adopted in 2000 by the International Law Association. Development-induced 
displaced people distinguish from refugees, as it is an internal displacement but they are also distin-
guished from economic migrants or migrant workers, who migrate because of extreme poverty or other 
economic problems and where the element of coercion is less direct and clear. MOONEY, “The Concept of 
Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concerns”, Refu-
gee Survey Quarterly, 2005, p. 9 ff., pp. 12-13; KÄLIN, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: 
Annotations, 2nd ed., Washington DC, 2008, p. 4; BARUTCISKI, “International Law and Development-
induced Displacement and Resettlement”, in DE WET (ed.), Development-Induced Displacement, Prob-
lems, Policies and People, New York-Oxford, 2006, p. 71 ff., pp. 72-74. 
6
 MCDOWELL, “Development Created Population Displacement”, in FIDDIAN-QASMIYEH et al. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford, 2014, p. 331 ff., p. 334; 
TERMINSKI, cit. supra note 1, p. 32. 
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The annual number of 15 million is considered to potentially eclipse the number 
of refugees and IDPs in conflict situations and divert resources from those situations, 
with the humanitarian world already facing challenges in financing its operations in 
disaster and conflict induced displacement. In addition to resources constraints, there 
is the concern that including people displaced by development among the globally 
displaced in need of humanitarian protection would confuse public understanding 
and reduce public sympathy for those fleeing from armed conflict7.  
Finally, the lack of interest in DID can be explained by the fact that develop-
ment can be considered “a good cause” for justifying displacement, which is never 
the case for persecution, conflicts and natural disasters8.  
In fact, development pursued in the general public interest, that is for the well-
being of the country, can well be a legitimate justification for restricting the human 
rights of affected people. The human rights that are most directly involved will be 
examined below in turn, along with the conditions to be satisfied for their lawful 
restriction under international human rights law (“IHRL”). The purpose of the pre-
sent article is indeed to analyse the topic through the lens of IHRL and identify the 
constraints it poses on States’ possibilities to carry out lawfully the displacement of 
part of their population.    
Before this is done, the following section will first give a brief account of the 
international provisions and guidelines that have been adopted and that specifically 
deal with DID.  
2. – Specific International Provisions and Guidelines on DID 
Normative instruments containing standards on protection against DID and its 
negative effects have been elaborated at the international and regional levels. These 
are mostly non binding, soft law instruments.  
At the United Nations level studies considering the human rights implications 
of DID have been conducted and comprehensive guidelines have been prepared on 
the basis of IHRL since the late 1990s. 
According to these documents, States must pursue only the public interest in 
development plans, that is the general welfare with a view to facilitating the en-
 
7
 MCDOWELL, cit. supra note 6, p. 341. 
8
 MOREL, “Protection Against Development-Induced Displacement in International Law”, cit. supra 
note 1, p. 143. 
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joyment of human rights, without discrimination of any sort, particularly without 
development being used as a pretext to disguise discrimination or other human 
rights violations. Only those measures that are established by law, and which are 
necessary and proportional to the public interest being pursued, can be undertaken. 
All possible alternatives need to be considered, with the meaningful, fully informed 
participation of the people affected, including to some extent the consent of these 
people. Displacement is considered to be permissible only when compelling and 
overriding public interests justify and require it, and in the absence of alternative 
viable options to avoid it. Importantly, the right to an effective remedy and to ac-
cess to justice have to be guaranteed in order for affected people to have the neces-
sity and proportionality of a measure reviewed by a competent, independent tribu-
nal. The right to full and fair compensation likewise needs to be ensured, along 
with safe and suitable resettlement in comparable areas and rehabilitation measures 
to enable displaced people to improve, or at least restore their living conditions at 
levels comparable to those before the displacement. Special consideration is to be 
given to women and the most vulnerable, including minorities and indigenous peo-
ple with particular attachment to their lands9.  
Similar are the obligations prescribed by the only legally binding provisions 
specific to the matter adopted in the African regional context. They are included in 
the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in 
Africa10 and the 2006 Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to IDPs, adopted 
by the Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes together 
 
9
 See AL-KHASAWNEH, Human Rights and Population Transfer, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23 
(1997), paras. 11, 51, 68; The Practice of Forced Evictions: Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on 
Development-Based Displacement, Expert Seminar on Forced Eviction, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7 
(1997); DENG, cit. supra note 5, Principles 6-9; KÄLIN, cit. supra note 5, pp. 32-33; KOTHARI, Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/18 
(2007); DE SCHUTTER, Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of Minimum Principles and 
Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (2009), Principles 1-2. 
The practice of forced evictions and their impact on affected vulnerable population, including and in par-
ticular forced evictions undertaken for development purposes have been object of a number of UN publi-
cations, with the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing notably at the forefront of address-
ing this issue. See e.g. Forced Evictions, Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 25, Rev. 1, 2014 and recent cases 
reported to the Special Rapporteur, Communications Report of Special Procedures, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/30/27 (2015), pp. 18, and 41; Communications Report of Special Procedures, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/28/85 (2015), pp. 65, 67, and 75. 
10
 Kampala Convention. 
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with the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region11. 
Again, displacement caused by development projects that is not strictly neces-
sary and proportionate to the public interest and thus not justified by compelling 
and overriding public interests is considered a prohibited kind of arbitrary dis-
placement. States must ensure that all feasible development alternatives are ex-
plored, with full information and consultation of people likely to be displaced, in 
order to avoid DID altogether whenever possible. Prior to undertaking any devel-
opment projects, socio-economic and environmental impact assessments must be 
carried out. Where displacement cannot be avoided, States must take all necessary 
measures to minimize it and mitigate its adverse effects, including through the pro-
vision of adequate and habitable sites of relocation with effective participation of 
displaced people and proper accommodation to the greatest practicable extent. 
States must ensure that the displacement takes place in satisfactory conditions of 
safety, nutrition, health, and hygiene. Adequate compensation must be guaranteed 
and legal remedies made available. States also have a particular obligation to pro-
tect against displacement those who have a special attachment to or are particularly 
dependent on their lands, such as indigenous people, minorities and peasants12.      
Turning to lending agencies, in 1980 the World Bank adopted its first Opera-
tional Policy on Involuntary Resettlement, which has been an influential bench-
 
11
 IDPs Protocol to the Great Lakes Pact. 
12
 See Art. 10 of the Kampala Convention and Art. 5 of the IDPs Protocol to the Great Lakes. See al-
so Arts. 4(5), 11(5), 12(1) and (2) of the Kampala Convention and Art. 4(1)(c) and (d) of the IDPs Proto-
col to the Great Lakes and the Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons to the Great Lakes 
Pact, also applying to people displaced by development projects. Interestingly, the IDPs Protocol to the 
Great Lakes Pact, under Art. 1(5), includes a second definition expressly specifying that IDPs are also 
persons displaced by development projects. Moreover, Art. 5 of the IDPs Protocol to the Great Lakes is a 
more detailed and more strongly formulated provision compared to Art. 10 of the Kampala Convention. 
Under the first, States are also obliged to obtain, “as far as possible”, the free and informed consent of 
those to be displaced prior to undertaking their displacement. For a comparison and also previous, more 
detailed draft of the Kampala Convention see e.g. DUCHATELLIER and PHUONG, “The African Contribu-
tion to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: A Commentary on the 2009 Kampala Conven-
tion”, in CHETAIL and BAULOZ (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, Chelten-
ham and Northampton, 2014, p. 650 ff., pp. 655-659; ZORZI GIUSTINIANI, “New Hopes and Challenges 
for the Protection of IDPs in Africa: The Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Inter-
nally Displaced Persons in Africa”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 2011, p. 347 ff., p. 
356; MARU, The Kampala Convention and Its Contributions to International Law: Legal Analyses and 
Interpretations of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Dis-
placed Persons, The Hague, 2014, pp. 148-156 and 177-182.   
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mark for other regional development banks and international financial institutions 
that later adopted similar policies13. The World Bank has been prompted to adopt 
safeguards policies by the criticism related to the projects it was financing and the 
serious impact these projects were having on the human rights of affected popula-
tions and the environment. These are self-imposed limitations with which the 
World Bank’s conduct has to be in accordance.  
Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement (“OP 4.12”) has a specific 
focus on the restoration and rehabilitation of conditions of people in order to face 
the impoverishment risks and thus minimize adverse effects of displacement and 
resettlement when the latter cannot be avoided14. OP 4.12 is also based on the as-
sumption that all viable alternative project designs need to be explored in order to 
avoid displacement and resettlement, if possible. If not, resettlement activities are 
to be conceived and implemented as sustainable development programs, with suffi-
cient investment resources to enable displaced persons to share in project benefits, 
including their meaningful consultation and participation in the planning and im-
plementation of the programs. Displaced people need to be assisted in their efforts 
to improve their livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore them15. 
Prompt and effective compensation at full replacement costs for losses of assets is 
to be provided, along with assistance during relocation and residential housing, or 
housing sites, or even agricultural sites with at least comparable properties to the 
old site. In new resettlement sites, infrastructure and public services are to be pro-
vided as necessary to improve or maintain accessibility and levels of services for 
displaced persons and host communities alike, with the provision of alternative or 
similar resources to compensate for the loss of access to community resources, 
such as fishing or grazing areas. If necessary, to assist displaced people in restoring 
 
13
 For a comparison between policies, see the recent study prepared at the World Bank: HIMBERG, 
Comparative Review of Multilateral Development Bank Safeguards Systems, Washington DC, 2015, pp. 
21-22 and 86-106. 
14
 See OP 4.12, para. 1, affirming that: “Bank experience indicates that involuntary resettlement un-
der development projects, if unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social, and environmental 
risks: production systems are dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive assets or 
income sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their productive skills may be less 
applicable and the competition for resources greater; community institutions and social networks are 
weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mu-
tual help are diminished or lost. This policy includes safeguards to address and mitigate these impover-
ishment risks” (ff omitted). 
15
 See OP 4.12, para. 2. 
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their livelihoods they are to be offered support after displacement in terms of de-
velopment assistance such as land preparation, credit facilities, training, or job op-
portunities, for the time needed to restore their livelihoods. Appropriate and acces-
sible grievances mechanisms have to be established. Particular attention needs to 
be paid to the special needs of vulnerable groups among those displaced, such as 
those below the poverty line, the landless, the elderly, women and children, indige-
nous peoples, ethnic minorities, and others who may not be protected through na-
tional land compensation. Land-based resettlement strategies are to be preferred for 
displaced persons whose livelihoods are land-based, such as indigenous peoples, 
while existing social and cultural institutions of displaced persons are to be gener-
ally preserved, if possible. Otherwise, new community organization needs to be 
made according to the displaced people’s choices16.  
The underlying idea is always that displacement should be avoided, but where 
this is not possible, an adequate resettlement plan needs to be devised so that the 
negative consequences and harmful impact of it are properly tackled and displace-
ment does not result in impoverishment for the affected population.  
The same can be said of the Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Dis-
placement and Resettlement in Development Projects, adopted in 1992 by the Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. They are similar and 
equally conceived as a useful and practical tool of best practices for envisaging a 
sound resettlement plan to ensure that displaced people can benefit and have devel-
opment opportunities from the project when displacement is unavoidable17.  
 
16
 See OP 4.12, paras. 4, 6, 8-9, 13. See also Operational Policy 4.10 that is expressly dedicated to 
indigenous peoples, especially see paras. 20-21. Unfortunately, as the World Bank itself recently 
acknowledged, OP 4.12 is not regularly carefully and fully implemented and ranks third with regard to 
most frequent policy violations brought up in the requests before the Inspection Panel. See Social Devel-
opment Department Involuntary Resettlement Portfolio Review Phase I. Inventory of Bank-financed Pro-
jects Triggering the Involuntary Resettlement Policy (1990–2010), The World Bank, Washington DC, 
2012, p. 18. The World Bank’s policies are undergoing a process of revision that has put the Bank under 
the pressure of international NGOs and human rights scholars that have urged it to finally embrace the 
human rights discourse. The Bank has been especially asked to explicitly establish that only in excep-
tional circumstances, namely the promotion of the general welfare and in a manner consistent with IHRL, 
displacement and resettlement is permissible. See ROLNIK, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing as a Component to the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-
discrimination in this Context on Her Mission to the World Bank, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/46/Add.3 (2013), 
paras. 19-76; ALSTON, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, UN 
Doc. A/70/274 (2015).         
17
 These guidelines particularly stress that in every case the alternative to refrain from carrying out the 
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Finally, the United Nations Development Programme has also adopted its So-
cial and Environmental Standards in 2014, which are explicitly human rights based. 
According to Standard 5 on displacement and resettlement, “... in exceptional cir-
cumstances and where avoidance is not possible, displacement may occur only 
with full justification, appropriate forms of legal protection and compensation, and 
according to the following requirements”18. As for the previous instruments, the 
mentioned requirements aim at countering adverse effects and enhancing or restor-
ing displaced people’s livelihoods through accurate resettlement plans. Additional-
ly, however, Standard 5 expressly includes the prohibition of forced evictions, lim-
iting lawful evictions to those allowed by law, carried out in accordance with 
IHRL, undertaken for the purpose of promoting the general welfare, reasonable and 
proportional, regulated to ensure due process standards, as well as including full 
and fair compensation and rehabilitation19.         
3. – The Protection Afforded by International Human Rights Law 
DID seriously affects the human rights of the people that have to be displaced. 
In particular, their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their life and home, as speci-
fied by the right to property, the right to respect for private and family life and 
home and the right to adequate housing, are firstly affected. Additionally, dis-
placement entails a direct interference with these people’s right to freedom of 
movement and choice of residence. On the basis of these well-established rights, a 
“right not to be arbitrarily displaced” is then considered to be emerging.  
As already stated, development cannot serve to disguise discrimination and vio-
lations of human rights with regard to specific groups of persons. Since displaced 
people are often already vulnerable people (the poorest, minority groups or indige-
nous peoples and women), it is worth stressing that first and foremost these people 
need to be protected against discrimination. The right to equality and non-
discrimination implies that DID is not undertaken in a discriminatory manner in 
that it directly or indirectly targets specific groups. This right has been considered a 
 
project, that is, the non-action alternative, should be seriously considered. See Guidelines for Aid Agencies 
on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Development Projects, OECD, Paris, 1992, p. 6. 
18
 See Social and Environmental Standards, Standard 5: Displacement and Resettlement, UNDP, 
2014, p. 30, para. 1. 
19
 Ibid., p. 31, para. 6. For all detailed requirements see: ibid., pp. 31-35, paras. 6-11. 
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fundamental rule of IHRL, as all human beings are entitled to the full enjoyment of 
human rights, without distinction of any sort20. As the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) has affirmed: “[i]ndividuals and groups of 
individuals must not be arbitrarily treated on account of belonging to a certain eco-
nomic or social group or strata within society”21. Furthermore, in respect of proper-
ty status as a prohibited grounds of discrimination, which is to be broadly con-
ceived as to include real and personal property or the lack of it, the CESCR has re-
called that “...Covenant rights, such as access to water services and protection from 
forced eviction, should not be made conditional on a person’s land tenure status, 
such as living in an informal settlement”22.  
3.1.  – The Right to Property 
Displaced people are entitled to the enjoyment of their possessions and to com-
pensation in the event of deprivation. The human right to property23 indeed protects 
the continued possession and peaceful enjoyment of property. It therefore provides 
protection in cases of DID where the deprivation of property is involved, including 
property destruction. Moreover, the concept of property within the human rights 
conventions is autonomous from the meaning given to property under national leg-
islation. It is indeed wider, as developed in the jurisprudence of the relevant human 
rights courts and bodies24.  
Generally, to lawfully deprive people of their possessions three conditions need 
to be satisfied, namely: a condition of legality; a condition of legitimacy; and a 
condition of proportionality. A deprivation of property is thus lawful when it is in 
accordance with the law, justified in the public interest, and provided it is a neces-
 
20
 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), para. 15. 
21
 General Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2, 
para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN doc. E/C.12/GC/20 
(2009), para. 35. 
22
 Ibid., para. 25 (emphasis added). 
23
 See Art. 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 14 of the Af-
rican Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Art. 31 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights.  
24
 On this right, see e.g. MOREL, The Right not to Be Displaced in International Law, Antwerp-
Cambridge, 2014, pp. 176-201; KÄLIN and KÜNZLI, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, Ox-
ford, 2009, pp. 434-439; BARTOLE, DE SENA and ZAGREBELSKY, Commentario breve alla Convenzione Eu-
ropea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, Padova, 2012, pp. 791-812. 
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sary and proportional measure. Adequate compensation is part of the right to prop-
erty and is material to the assessment of whether the proportionality condition has 
been respected and, as a result, the individuals’ interests in continuing to enjoy 
their possessions on one side and the general interest pursued on the other have 
been fairly balanced.      
What is noteworthy from the contribution of the jurisprudence of the human 
rights courts is, first of all, that the social importance of the individuals’ interests 
involved has been taken into account25. In the Lallement case, the European Court 
of Human Rights considered the compensation awarded as non appropriate and the 
applicant, a French farmer, was found to have borne an excessive and dispropor-
tionate burden, since the expropriation concerned a piece of land that was part of 
his “outil de travail”, and being deprived of it meant that the applicant would be 
prevented from continuing his work under acceptable conditions and from provid-
ing his family with an adequate living. The compensation was thus deemed insuffi-
cient and not reasonable because it did not cover the loss of his “outil de travail” 
and did not allow him to re-establish his source of livelihood. The Court even af-
firmed that in cases of expropriation such as this compensation should as far as 
possible consist of the offer of land in return26. In the Velikovi and Others case, as 
in previous cases concerning transition towards democracy in Czech Republic27, 
again in the assessment of adequate compensation and proportionality test the same 
Court took into account the practical realities in which the applicants found them-
selves, specifically the serious housing problems they faced, as they had no other 
place to live in and endured additional hardship after having lost their property.28 
 
25
 DE SENA, “Economic and Non-Economic Values in the Case Law of the European Courts of Hu-
man Rights”, in DUPUY, FRANCIONI and PETERSMANN (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment 
Law and Arbitration, Oxford, 2009, p. 208 ff., p. 216; BARTOLE, DE SENA and ZAGREBELSKY, cit. supra 
note 24, pp. 801-802. 
26
 Lallement v. France, Application No. 46044/99, Judgment of 11 April 2002, paras. 18-24. 
27
 See e.g., Pincová and Pinc v. Czech Republic, Application No. 36548/97, Judgment of 5 Novem-
ber 2002, paras. 61-64. 
28
 Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria, Application Nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 
51362/99, 53367/99, 60036/00, 73465/01, and 194/02, Judgment of 17 March 2007, paras. 223-225. It is 
to be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has specified that Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights does not guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances. 
Legitimate objectives in the public interest, such as those pursued in measures of economic reforms or 
measures designed to achieve greater social justice, like in the context of a change of political or econom-
ic regime or a country’s transition towards a democratic regime, can result in a below market value com-
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Secondly, in the international jurisprudence, the right to property has been in-
terpreted so that protection has been extended to cases where individuals do not 
have formal legal title to their land and home.  
That is the case of indigenous communities that usually do not formally own 
their ancestral lands, and if they do, they do not own them individually. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in particular has developed important jurispru-
dence on indigenous peoples’ land rights and has recognized the traditional com-
munal possession and use of the land by indigenous peoples as a form of property 
protected under Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights29.  
Indigenous peoples enjoy a special relationship with their lands that needs to be 
safeguarded for their physical and cultural survival. In the Saramaka People case 
concerning logging and mining activities, the Inter-American Court recognized the 
Saramaka people’s right to own the land they had traditionally used and occupied 
communally, including the natural resources they had traditionally used within 
their territory and that were necessary for their survival, development and continua-
tion of way of life. However, indigenous peoples’ property rights may be also re-
stricted insofar as the restriction is previously established by law, necessary, pro-
portional, with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective, and, additionally, it 
does not deny their survival as a people, that is, such a restriction may not amount 
to a denial of their traditions and customs in a way that endangers their survival. In 
this regard, the State must comply with three safeguards. Firstly, it must ensure the 
effective participation of the people, in conformity with their customs and tradi-
tions regarding any development, investment, exploration or extraction plan within 
their territory; secondly, it must guarantee that they will receive a reasonable bene-
fit from any such plan, which is inherent to their right to just compensation; and 
thirdly, it must ensure that no concession will be issued, unless and until a prior en-
vironmental and social impact assessment by an independent and technically com-
 
pensation being considered proportional, whereas a total lack of compensation may be justifiable only in 
exceptional circumstances. All that provided however that the individuals concerned do not have to bear 
a disproportionate and excessive burden against the general demands, which is to be ascertained on a 
case-by-case basis. See e.g., Scordino v. Italy, Application No. 36813/97, Judgment of 29 March 2006, 
paras. 95-99. KÄLIN, KÜNZLI, cit. supra note 24, pp. 435-436; BARTOLE, DE SENA and ZAGREBELSKY, cit. 
supra note 24, pp. 800-803.   
29
 For an overview, see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 56/09 (2010), paras. 55-189.   
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petent entity is carried out. Effective participation requires the State to actively 
consult with the people in good faith from the early stages of a plan, accepting and 
disseminating information, and particularly with regard to major development or 
investment project that may have a profound impact on the territory and their prop-
erty rights, the Court added that the State had a duty not only to consult with the 
Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior and informed consent30.  
Drawing on relevant international case law, including the Saramaka case, the 
African Commission also adopted similar reasoning in the Endorois case, where 
Endorois people had been evicted from their ancestral land and prevented from ac-
cessing it when the State created a game reserve. The African Commission consid-
ered that, given their traditional possession, the State had the duty to recognize the 
right to property of members of the Endorois community within the framework of a 
communal property system, and the duty to establish the mechanisms necessary to 
give domestic legal effect to such a right. Although property rights under Article 14 
of the African Charter may be restricted, the Commission found that the State had 
unlawfully evicted the Endorois from their ancestral land and destroyed their pos-
sessions in the pursuit of creating a game reserve, because their upheaval and dis-
placement from their motherland and the denial of their property rights over it was 
disproportionate to any public need served by the game reserve. The Commission 
considered that even though the game reserve had been a legitimate aim and served 
a public need it could have been accomplished by alternative means proportionate 
to the need. Indeed, the Endorois were willing to collaborate with the government 
in a way that respected their property rights, even if a game reserve was being cre-
ated. No effective participation had however been allowed to the Endorois people, 
no prior environmental and social impact assessment had been carried out, and no 
reasonable benefit-sharing had been guaranteed to and enjoyed by the Endorois, 
who had not been compensated and had been relegated to semi-arid lands where 
they could not practice their pastoral life and were living in precarious conditions31.   
In addition to the specific case of indigenous peoples, the situation of those liv-
ing in informal settlements has also been taken into account. The European Court 
 
30
 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment of 28 November 2007, paras. 77-158.   
31
 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on be-
half of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, Decision of 4 February 2010, paras. 174-238. For similar 
case-law of the Human Rights Committee also, see JOSEPH and CASTAN, The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013, pp. 849-858. 
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of Human Rights has considered Article 1 of Protocol 1 to be applicable in cases 
where applicants were illegally settled. In the Ӧneryildiz case, the applicant used to 
live in a slum that had developed around a rubbish tip without authorization, where 
a methane explosion killed his relatives and destroyed his dwelling and belongings. 
The applicant’s dwelling had been erected in breach of the town-planning regula-
tions, without conforming to the relevant technical standards and on a land that be-
longed to the State. Yet, the State’s authorities had tolerated it, they had let them 
live there undisturbed, and had even levied council tax and provided them with 
public services for which they had been charged. Therefore, the Court considered 
that the State’s authorities had de facto acknowledged that the applicant and his 
close relatives had a proprietary interest in their dwelling and movable goods, 
which were deemed to constitute “possessions” falling within the meaning of Arti-
cle 1 of Protocol 1, to which protection has been extended32.  
Notwithstanding the broad interpretation adopted by human rights bodies, the 
right to property is considered to provide rather weak protection, since many vul-
nerable displaced people lack property ownership33. However, in addition to the 
contribution of the case law discussed above, it is worth mentioning the effort at 
the United Nations level to urge States to confer and strengthen legal security of 
tenure upon vulnerable people lacking it in order to empower and reduce the inse-
curity suffered by these people34.  
 
 
32
 Ӧneryildiz v. Turkey, Application No. 48939/99, Judgment of 30 November 2004, paras. 124-129. 
BARTOLE, DE SENA and ZAGREBELSKY, cit. supra note 24, pp. 794-795. In the case at hand, the Court 
found the violation of Art. 1 of Protocol 1 because the Turkish authorities had not fulfilled their positive 
obligation to take measures to protect the applicant’s proprietary interests. ibid., paras. 133-138. Howev-
er, often slums are let to grow consistently, with States’ authorities tolerating the illegal occupation of the 
land for years, even providing services and requiring the payment of taxes until they decide that, maybe 
for purposes of urban renewal or for a particular major event happening or other concealed discriminato-
ry reasons, the area needs to be cleared and people are evicted, even violently, and all their belongings 
are destroyed, with no safeguards at all on account of their illegal condition. See e.g., Forced Evictions: 
Global Crisis, Global Solutions, UN-Habitat, 2011, pp. 36-45.   
33
 MOREL, cit. supra note 1, p. 150. 
34
 See e.g., KOTHARI, cit. supra note 9, para. 25; ROLNIK, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Ade-
quate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-
Discrimination in this Context, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/46 (2012), paras. 44-69; DE SCHUTTER, cit. supra 
note 9, paras. 23-26; ID., The Right to Food, UN Doc. A/65/281 (2010), paras. 40-41. See also infra Sec-
tion 3.3.  
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3.2.  – The Right to Respect for Private Life and Home 
DID clearly entails an interference with individuals’ right to the enjoyment of 
their private and family life and the enjoyment of their home.  
The Human Rights Committee has expressly stated in its Concluding Observa-
tions on Kenya that the forcible eviction of thousands of inhabitants from informal 
settlements in Nairobi and elsewhere in the country without prior consultation and 
notification of concerned population constitutes an arbitrary interference, especially 
with their right to have private and family life and home respected. It recommend-
ed the adoption of transparent laws, policies and procedures for conducting evic-
tions to ensure that they are undertaken only when the affected population has been 
consulted and appropriate resettlement arrangements have been made35.     
The right to respect for private and family life and home36 protects the individual 
private sphere from unwarranted and unreasonable intrusions, allowing for the shap-
ing of one’s life and identity according to one’s own aspirations and wishes. It pro-
tects the right to live together within the family in a place of refuge where one can 
develop private and family life and enjoy it without fear of disturbance. Besides, the 
right to have one’s home respected protects the personal freedom of the person living 
in his or her home regardless of legal title, that is, regardless of whether the person is 
the owner, tenant, subtenant or even squatter. However, individuals’ enjoyment of 
this right can be subjected to limitations provided that the three conditions of legality, 
legitimacy, and proportionality are satisfied, as for the right to property discussed 
above. Restrictions to this right have to be in accordance with the law, justified by a 
legitimate purpose, and be a necessary and proportionate measure in relation to the 
purpose sought to be achieved. Again, the individual interests and the competing 
public interests pursued need to be fairly balanced, and the individual interests need 
to be taken in due consideration and given due respect.37  
 
35
 See Concluding Observations on Kenya, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/83/KEN (2005), para. 22 and Con-
cluding Observations on Kenya, UN Doc. CCPR/C/KEN/CO/3 (2012), para. 21. 
36
 See Art. 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 17 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 11 of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, and Art. 21 of the Arab Charter.  
37
 On the right, see JOSEPH, CASTAN, cit. supra note 31, pp. 533-561; KÄLIN and KÜNZLI, cit. supra 
note 24, pp. 381-400; BARTOLE, DE SENA and ZAGREBELSKY, cit. supra note 24, pp. 297-355; NOWAK, 
U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary, 2nd ed., Kehl am Rhein, 2005, pp. 
378-405; MOREL, cit. supra note 24, pp. 143-176.   
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The European Court of Human Rights has taken several elements into consider-
ation. In the Winterstein et autres case, as in the previous similar Yordanova and 
Others case, the Court considered first of all whether procedural safeguards were 
available to individuals, since the loss of one’s home is a most extreme form of in-
terference with the right to respect for one’s home, which is a right of central im-
portance to individuals. The Court considered therefore whether the proportionality 
of the measure, namely eviction orders justified by conservation purposes of the 
landscape in the first case and by the improvement of the urban environment in the 
interest of economic well-being and of the protection of the health and rights of 
others in the second, had been determined by an independent tribunal which had 
adequately examined the situation of the individuals concerned, notwithstanding 
that under domestic law those individuals had no right of occupation. Interference 
with one’s home is indeed a matter of fact, regardless of the lawfulness of occupa-
tion. However, in the proportionality assessment the Court has considered that if 
the home was lawfully established this factor itself weighs against the legitimacy of 
requiring the individual to move. On the contrary, if the establishment of the home 
in a particular place was unlawful, the position of the individual objecting to an or-
der to move is less strong. Nevertheless, the consequences of the individual’s re-
moval need to be considered, particularly if individuals face the risk of being left 
without shelter. If no alternative accommodation is available, the interference is 
obviously deemed to be more serious. If it is available, the more suitable the alter-
native accommodation is, the less serious is the interference. The evaluation of the 
suitability of alternative accommodation involves the consideration of the particu-
lar needs of the person concerned, that is, his or her family requirements and finan-
cial resources on one side and the rights of the local community on the other. 
Whether individuals belong to a vulnerable minority is another particular aspect to 
be taken into account, and it requires that special consideration be given to their 
needs and to their different lifestyles that are also protected under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Additionally, the Court has considered 
whether an entire community and a long period of time were involved, namely 
whether individuals had developed a community life with strong links with the 
place. In both cases, national authorities had tolerated for years the unlawful occu-
pation of municipal land by the applicants, French travellers living in caravans in 
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the first case and Bulgarian Roma in the second, allowing them to build a close 
community there38.  
Thus, despite the fact that Article 8 does not normally entail a right to be pro-
vided with a home, with all the above aspects to be considered in the proportionali-
ty assessment, the Court has however recognized its social implication and value, 
influenced by the social right to adequate housing39.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the same Court considered the extremely difficult 
and unhealthy living conditions experienced for years by a community following 
the destruction of their houses and displacement from their villages, together with 
the discrimination they were subjected to, not only as a violation of Article 8, but 
also as a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention, amounting to “degrad-
ing treatment”40.    
3.3.  – The Right to Adequate Housing  
The right to adequate housing is usually the most invoked right in cases of 
forced evictions and displacement, including DID41. It refers to everyone’s “... right 
to a secure place to live in peace and dignity, which includes the right not to be 
evicted unlawfully, arbitrarily or on a discriminatory basis from one’s home, land 
or community”42.  
 
38
 Winterstein et autres c. France, Application No. 27013/07, Judgment of 17 October 2013, paras. 
141-167; Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 25446/06, Judgment of 24 April 2012, pa-
ras. 101-144. 
39
 REMICHE, “Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria: The Influence of the Social Right to Adequate 
Housing on the Interpretation of the Civil Rights to Respect for One’s Home”, Human Rights Law Re-
view, 2012, p. 787 ff., pp. 794-800. Showing the mutually reinforcing character of the two rights, the 
CESCR affirmed that the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s private 
and family life, as well as home complements the right not to be forcefully evicted without adequate pro-
tection and constitutes a very important dimension in defining the right to adequate housing: General 
Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), UN Doc. E/1992/23 
(1991), para. 9; General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, 
UN Doc. E/1998/22 (1997), para. 8.   
40
 Moldovan and Others v. Romania, Application Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, Judgment No. 2 of 
12 July 2005, paras. 102-114. In context of violence and conflict, the international case law has recog-
nized the totally unjustified destruction of homes as a violation of the right to respect for private life and 
home and as amounting to “inhuman treatment”. See MOREL, cit. supra note 24, pp. 151-158; European 
Court of Human Rights, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, Application No. 12/1997/796/998-999, Judgment of 
24 April 1998, paras. 77-78.  
41
 MOREL, cit. supra note 1, pp. 145-146. 
42
 Prohibition of Forced Eviction, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/28 (2004), third preambular para-
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A key condition for its realization, as well as one of the components of the right 
to adequate housing identified by the CESCR is legal security of tenure, meaning a 
degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced evic-
tion to all persons, regardless of the type of tenure43. The CESCR firstly considered 
that “... instances of forced eviction are prima facie incompatible with the require-
ments of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional circum-
stances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of international law”44. Sub-
sequently, it defined forced evictions as  
“... the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families 
and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision 
of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection. The prohibition on forced 
evictions does not, however, apply to evictions carried out by force in accordance with the 
law and in conformity with the provisions of the International Covenants on Human 
Rights”45. 
The CESCR expressly mentioned that instances of forced eviction occur in the 
name of development46. While the right to housing may be subjected to limita-
tions47, the CESCR has however specified States’ obligations. States must refrain 
 
graph. Also, CESCR, General Comment No. 4, cit. supra note 39, para. 7. For the right to adequate hous-
ing, see Art. 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 11(1) of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 31 of the Revised European Social Charter, and Art. 
38 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights. 
43
 General Comment No. 4, cit. supra note 39, para. 8(a), specifying that “[t]enure takes a variety of 
forms, including rental (public and private) accommodation, cooperative housing, lease, own-
er-occupation, emergency housing and informal settlements, including occupation of land or property” 
(emphasis added). HOHMANN, The Right to Housing: Law, Concept, Possibilities, Oxford and Portland, 
2013, p. 21, saying that “[l]egal security of tenure can be considered the cornerstone of the right to hous-
ing”; MOREL, “Protection Against Development-Induced Displacement in International Law”, cit. supra 
note 1, p. 146. 
44
 General Comment No. 4, cit. supra note 39, para. 18. 
45
 General Comment No. 7, cit. supra note 39, para. 3. 
46
 Ibid., para. 7. For CESCR’s concerns for practice of forced evictions without adequate safeguards 
in its Concluding Observations on States’ periodic reports also, see e.g., SAUL, KINLEY, MOWBRAY, The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases and Materials, 
Oxford, 2014, pp. 946-951. 
47
 Ibid., para. 5: “... Even in situations where it may be necessary to impose limitations on such a 
right, full compliance with article 4 of the Covenant is required so that any limitations imposed must be 
‘determined by law only insofar as this may be compatible with the nature of these [i.e. economic, social 
and cultural] rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society’”. 
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from forcibly evicting individuals and ensure that law is enforced against their 
agents or third parties that engage in forced evictions. They must adopt adequate 
legislation against forced evictions for an effective system of protection48. An evic-
tion must be provided for by the law, justified by the promotion of the general wel-
fare, and be a reasonable and proportionate measure. Hence, States must explore all 
feasible alternatives in consultation with affected persons, no form of discrimina-
tion must be involved for the protection of vulnerable groups, adequate compensa-
tion for any affected property must be provided, and all legal recourses and reme-
dies must be made available. Appropriate procedural guarantees and due process 
are especially essential, and the CESCR particularly considers: timely information 
on the proposed eviction; genuine consultation with those affected; prior adequate 
and reasonable notice; identification of all persons carrying out the eviction, at the 
presence of government officials; no eviction in particularly bad weather or at night 
unless the affected persons consent otherwise; and provision of legal remedies and 
where possible, legal aid to those in need of it49. Importantly,  
“Evictions should not result in individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable to 
the violation of other human rights. Where those affected are unable to provide for them-
selves, the State party must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available 
resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive 
land, as the case may be, is available”50.  
In the European context, the European Committee of Social Rights (“ECSR”) 
has also specified that a condition of adequate housing is secure tenure supported 
by the law, which means protection from forced eviction51.  
Similar to the CESCR, the ECSR has also affirmed that legal protection must 
include an obligation to consult with affected persons to find alternative solutions 
to eviction and the obligation to establish a reasonable notice period. Evictions 
must be justified. Evictions carried out at night or during winter must be prohibited 
 
48
 Ibid, paras. 8-9.  
49
 Ibid., paras. 10-15. 
50
 Ibid., para. 16.  
51
 See e.g., Conclusions 2003, Vol. 1 (Bulgaria, France, Italy), 2003, p. 221; European Roma Rights 
Centre v. Bulgaria, Decision of 18 October 2006, paras. 16 and 34, which concerns the violation of Art. 
16 of the Revised European Social Charter providing for family housing. According to the ECSR, Art. 16 
partially overlaps with Art. 31, specifically the notions of adequate housing and forced eviction are con-
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by law, as they must be carried out in conditions that respect the dignity of the per-
sons concerned. Legal remedies, including legal aid to those in need to seek redress 
from the courts, must be provided. States must make sure that alternative accom-
modation is available: authorities must adopt measures to re-house or financially 
assist the persons concerned. In respect to the situation of illegal occupation of a 
site or dwelling, while this may justify the eviction of the illegal occupants, the 
ECSR nevertheless specified that the criteria of illegal occupation must not be un-
duly wide and the above-mentioned safeguards must be respected52. Additionally, 
the ECSR considered whether the State’s authorities had de facto tolerated the ac-
tions of illegal occupants, as in the case of Roma families whose illegal settlements 
had existed for many years and the provision of public services, like electricity, had 
been ensured and inhabitants had been charged for it. Particularly, the ECSR af-
firmed that the State’s authorities “...must strike the balance between the general 
interest and the fundamental rights of the individuals, in the particular case the 
right to housing and its corollary of not making individuals becoming homeless”53: 
the State must ensure that persons evicted are not rendered homeless54.  
Finally, while the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not ex-
plicitly contain it, the African Commission has remarkably inferred a right to hous-
ing from the combined effect of the rights to health, property and family provided 
in Articles 14, 16 and 18(1) of the Charter. In the SERAC and CESR case concern-
ing oil production operations that caused environmental degradation and contami-
nation resulting in health problems for the Ogoni population, the African Commis-
sion affirmed that the combination of those provisions “... forbids the wanton de-
struction of shelter because when housing is destroyed, property, health, and family 
life are adversely affected” and that “... reads into the Charter a right to shelter or 
housing which the Nigerian Government has apparently violated”55. Indeed, in re-
sponse to the campaign of the population to oppose the destruction of their envi-
ronment, the security forces of the government engaged in conduct in complete 
violation of the rights of the Ogoni by attacking, burning, and destroying several 
 
52
 Conclusions 2003, cit. supra note 51, p. 231; European Roma Rights Centre v. Bulgaria, cit. supra 
note 51, paras. 51-52. 
53
 European Roma Rights Centre v. Bulgaria, cit. supra note 51, para. 54. 
54
 Ibid., para. 57. 
55
 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social 
Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, Decision of 27 October 2001, para. 60. 
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Ogoni villages and homes which rendered thousands of them homeless. Security 
forces also obstructed, harassed, beat, and in some cases, even shot and killed inno-
cent citizens who attempted to return to and rebuild their homes56. The African 
Commission added that “[t]he particular violation by the Nigerian Government of 
the right to adequate housing as implicitly protected in the Charter also encom-
passes the right to protection against forced evictions ...” and concluded that “[t]he 
conduct of the Nigerian government clearly demonstrates a violation of this right 
enjoyed by the Ogonis as a collective right”57. 
3.4.  – The Right to Freedom of Movement and Choice of Residence 
The right to freedom of movement and choice of one’s residence58 is considered 
one of the most basic and fundamental human rights. It provides for the right of 
every person lawfully present in the territory of a State to move freely and choose 
his or her place of residence within the whole territory of that State, subject only to 
those limitations envisaged by the law, justified for legitimate purposes, necessary 
and proportionate. Significantly, it implies the right not to move, that is, the right to 
remain in the place and residence of one’s choice. Thus, it includes protection 
against forced displacement59.  
In the Yanomami Community case, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights found the violation of several human rights of Yanomami Indians, including 
the right to residence and movement contained in Article VIII of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The Yanomamis had been displaced 
from their ancestral territory due to the construction of a highway passing through 
their land after the adoption of a government plan for the development of the Ama-
zon region and the exploitation of its vast natural resources. The discovery of rich 
 
56
 Ibid., paras. 61-62. 
57
 Ibid., para. 63. 
58
 See Art. 13(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 12 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2 of Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights; 
Art. 22 of the American Convention of Human Rights, Art. 12 of the African Charter of Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights, and Arts. 26 and 27 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights.  
59
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement (article 12), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999), paras. 1-7 and 11-18; MOREL, cit. supra note 24, pp. 104-142; 
KÄLIN and KÜNZLI, cit. supra note 24, pp. 488-489. Citizens of a State are lawfully within the territory of 
that State. Whether an alien is lawfully in the territory of a State is a matter of domestic law, but still in 
accordance with IHRL.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 Laura Messina 
 
 
mineral deposits further attracted mining companies and independent prospectors 
which worsened their displacement and had devastating physical and psychological 
consequences on them, while an agricultural development project aimed at benefit-
ing them had had the opposite result of further loss of their lands60.    
3.5.  – The Right not to Be Arbitrarily Displaced  
It is argued that a “right not to be displaced” is emerging in international law.  
It is the right of every person to be protected against being displaced from his or 
her home or places of habitual residence in an arbitrary way, so in violation of do-
mestic law, in the absence of a legitimate aim, and when not necessary and propor-
tional to that aim. It is indeed a qualified right, that may be subjected to limitations 
provided that the conditions of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality 
seen above are however respected.  
It extends to any kind of displacement, including DID. In the context of DID 
specifically, it would thus protect people from being forcibly displaced, when their 
displacement represents an unnecessary and excessive measure compared to the le-
gitimate development aim sought to be achieved.   
The right not to be arbitrarily displaced is considered to be already implicitly 
recognized in international law. It is indeed derived from other, well-established 
human rights, particularly the right to adequate housing, freedom of movement, 
and private life seen above which are directly interfered with by forced displace-
ment. It is therefore implicitly grounded in hard law. On the other hand, it has been 
explicitly recognized only in soft law instruments61. Scholars have argued that the 
right not to be arbitrarily displaced should be expressly recognized in an interna-
tional legally binding instrument dedicated to displacement, including DID. It is 
contended that such an instrument would strengthen the protection of persons from 
forced displacement because it would no longer be necessary to resort to the other 
 
60
 Yanomami Community v. Brazil, Decision of 5 March 1985, paras. 2-3 (“background”), and 2, 10-
12 (“considering”). 
61
 Except for Art. 4(4) of the Kampala Convention, which explicitly mentions this right. For soft law 
instruments, see DENG, cit. supra note 5, Principle 6(1); PINHEIRO, Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (2005), Principle 5(1); 
Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, Un Doc. A/RES/66/165 (2012), eighth pre-
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human rights in such situations. It would pressure and make clear to State and non-
State actors involved that arbitrary displacement is a gross violation of IHRL, and 
as such strictly prohibited. It would equally raise awareness and encourage re-
newed efforts in its prevention, as well as empower affected people with a direct 
and stronger legal basis in pleading their cases62.  
4. – Conclusions 
States may legitimately take steps to promote their economic development, but 
not at the expense of people’s human rights.  
The analysis above shows that IHRL provides substantive and procedural safe-
guards in the context of DID. While it does not prohibit evictions necessitated by 
development projects in general terms, as the rights examined are not absolute and 
may be restricted for a legitimate purpose, such as the pursuit of development for 
the well-being of the country, evictions must still be a necessary and proportionate 
measure. This implies that all feasible and less intrusive alternatives need to have 
been adequately considered, along with the situation of the individuals concerned. 
Specifically, the availability of adequate alternative housing, the presence of a long 
established community, the special attachment or dependence on the land as source 
of livelihood, and access to justice are elements that need to be weighed against the 
proportionality of a removal measure. IHRL thus affords protection against DID 
leading to impoverishment.   
While the analysis has been limited to those four core rights that are automati-
cally interfered with, a far broader range of human rights may be implicated in 
DID. When people are evicted with violence and intimidation or they are met with 
violence while resisting, the right to security of the person, even the right to life 
and freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment may be 
involved. Their right to information and participation, freedom of expression and 
association are also frequently concerned. When they live in precarious conditions 
as a consequence of their displacement, the enjoyment of many socio-economic 
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 See, MOREL, cit. supra note 24; STAVROPOULOU, “The Right Not to Be Displaced”, American 
University Journal of International Law and Policy, 1994, p. 689 ff.; ID., “The Question of a Right Not to 
Be Displaced”, ASIL, 1996, p. 549 ff.; MOREL, STAVROPOULOU, DURIEUX, “The History and Status of 
the Right Not to Be Displaced”, Forced Migration Review, 2012, p. 5 ff.; SIMONS, “The Emergence of a 
Norm Against Arbitrary Forced Relocation”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 2002, p. 95 ff.; 
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rights is then evidently affected. In other words, DID is a true human rights issue, 
and as such is deserving of attention. 
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1. – Introduction 
Across Europe, EU Member States regulate labour migration flows by estab-
lishing limitations to the entry and stay of third-country national migrant workers. 
Many Member States, in particular, have crafted their labour migration law and 
policy on the grounds of labour market demands for said workers. Ideally, such 
systems pursue the objective of admitting on the national territory only as many 
workers as the domestic labour market is capable of absorbing. Moreover, these 
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programmes also embrace the idea that third-country national workers may be al-
lowed to carry out employment in the host country only in so far as the same posi-
tions cannot be filled by national or EU workers. Labour migration from non-EU 
countries, then, is only welcome when it fulfils specific (and ideally temporary) la-
bour market needs. 
EU Member States pursue these policy goals through a variety of measures. 
The most common one consists in the adoption of preliminary labour market needs 
tests, which determine the unavailability of national or EU workers in certain areas 
or professions. The identification of these shortages is imposed as a precondition 
for issuing a residence and work permit to a third-country national worker. Such 
models are adopted, among other countries, by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom1. A peculi-
ar variation of the described system is adopted in Ireland. In addition to enforcing a 
preliminary labour market test needs, Irish immigration law also envisages a list of 
ineligible categories of occupations for employment permits. 
Furthermore, Southern European States such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain combine this limitation with a further one – namely, the adoption of annual 
quotas of admission of migrant workers2. Quota systems often target unskilled 
workers, and are also ideally based on labour market shortages and employers’ de-
mands for third-country national workers. In Italy, the quota system - based on the 
yearly decreto flussi - constitutes the main source of regulation of labour migration.  
The described labour migration schemes consistently incorporate some form of as-
sessment of the situation of the national labour market.3 The unavailability of national or 
EU workers in certain sectors is often established by ministerial decision, in consulta-
tion with advisory public bodies and/or social parties and on the grounds of data on un-
employment and job vacancies. Moreover, labour market needs tests generally imply an 
obligation for prospective employers to advertise job offers in national public employ-
ment systems as well as in the European Employment Service (“EURES”) portal. An-
nual quotas are also usually determined by national governments, according to proce-
dures that entail various degrees of consultation of social partners and stakeholders. 
 
1
 See for instance CHALOFF, “The Impact of EU Directives on the Labour Migration Framework in 
EU Countries”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 180, OECD Publishing 
(2016), available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlwxbzpwh33-en>, pp. 12 – 13. 
2
 Ibid. pp. 11 – 12. 
3
 Ibid. pp. 11 – 15. 
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Against this background, a crucial question concerns the effects of such de-
mand-based systems of admission on third-country national workers. In particular, 
whenever these systems underestimate or misrepresent the needs of national labour 
markets and employers’ demands, they inevitably restrict opportunities for legal 
immigration and employment of third-country nationals - pushing them into unreg-
ulated and informal employment. A perverse effect of this phenomenon, then, is the 
creation of significant barriers to third-country national workers’ enjoyment of 
basic socio-economic and labour rights. First, workers with an irregular migration 
status are not necessarily recognized with such rights - especially not in a condition 
of equality with regularly resident ones. Second, even those countries which do 
recognize these socio-economic and labour rights to migrants in an irregular status 
usually do not envisage protections against expulsion for those who claim these 
rights before domestic courts. In other words, while such workers are entitled to 
access justice in order to obtain a recognition and enforcement of their rights, im-
migration laws will still apply to them and they might face expulsion as a conse-
quence of exposing their irregular status.  
This paper analyses demand-based labour migration regimes and their negative 
effects on migrant workers’4 enjoyment of socio-economic and labour rights, with a 
special focus on their right to receive wages. It aims to answer the question of 
which normative and judicial sources are currently capable of ensuring the most ef-
fective protection of such rights, and the most equitable balance of the interests in-
volved in this matter.  
To do so, this paper critically compares the domestic jurisdictions of Ireland 
and Italy. In line with the general trend within the European Union, these countries 
have adopted demand-based labour migration regimes. Moreover, they have both 
envisaged regularization schemes as a partial corrective to their closure towards 
unskilled workers. The degree of protection of irregular migrant workers respec-
tively provided in these jurisdictions, however, varies significantly both in quality 
and in intensity. 
Therefore, this paper will first pay a closer look at the Irish and Italian labour 
migration schemes - with a special focus on the limitations to the entry and resi-
dence of unskilled third-country national workers and on the negative effects of 
 
4
 For the purpose of this chapter and unless otherwise specified, the term “migrant workers” should 
be understood as referring to third-country national workers. 
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these restrictions on migrant workers’ socio-economic rights. Second, it will ana-
lyse regularization programmes adopted in these countries as an ex post remedy to 
the restrictions imposed by labour migration schemes, highlighting their limited 
scope and effectiveness. Third, it will turn to enquire on the degree of recognition 
of migrant workers’ socio-economic rights within international and EU law - and 
on whether those in an irregular status are included within the scope of application 
of the main legal sources in this field. Fourth, this paper will analyse Irish and Ital-
ian approaches to the recognition of irregular migrant workers’ rights through the 
example of the right to receive wages. Lastly, the paper will draw some final con-
clusions on the most effective ways to ensure a fair balance between the State in-
terest to control labour migration fluxes and migrant workers’ right to be free from 
labour exploitation and employers’ abuse. 
2. – Limitations to Legal Routes of Labour Migration in the Irish and 
Italian Jurisdictions 
Ireland and Italy are no exception to the general European trend of imposing 
preliminary labour market needs test as a precondition for issuing employment 
permits to third-country nationals. The Irish system clearly aims to encourage the 
immigration of skilled workers5. In line with EU standards in this field (and par-
ticularly with the so-called EU Blue Card Directive)6, high-skilled professions are 
identified with highly paid ones. Under the Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 
2014, workers in any profession with an annual salary of more than 60,000 euros or 
highly qualified workers with an annual salary above 30,000 euros may obtain a 
Critical Skills Employment Permit. For this purpose, employers are not obliged to 
previously verify the availability of EU or Irish citizens for the post and therefore a 
labour market needs test is not required. Because the rationale of the permit is to 
encourage the permanent settlement in Ireland of highly skilled workers, holders 
will not need to apply for the renewal of the permit. Rather, after its expiration 
 
5
 For a complete overview of Irish labour migration law, see GUSCIUTE, QUINN and BARRETT, De-
termining Labour and Skills Shortages and the Need for Labour Migration in Ireland, European Migra-
tion Network, November 2015, available at: <https://www.esri.ie/publications/determining-labour-and-
skills-shortages-and-the-need-for-non-eea-labour-migration-in-ireland/>. 
6
 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country na-
tionals, OJ L 168/24 of 30 June 2009. On this topic, see Ch. IX by ROSANÒ, p. 197 ff. 
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(normally, 2 years) they will be issued with an authorization to reside and work 
permanently in the country.  
In principle, it is not possible for a third-country national to enter Ireland in order 
to perform employment with a yearly remuneration inferior to 30,000 Euros. For un-
skilled work remunerated above this threshold, a General Employment Permit can be 
issued under certain conditions. First, the employer must advertise the job vacancy 
through a variety of channels, to ensure that no suitably skilled Irish or EEA citizens 
are available to cover the post. Second, the profession must not be included in the In-
eligible Categories of Employment list. It is therefore not possible for a non-EEA cit-
izen to enter Ireland in order to perform a profession included in the list. 
The Ineligible Categories of Employment list enshrines a crucial contradiction. In-
eligible professions include, among others, retail cashiers, “elementary agricultural oc-
cupations” such as farming and fishing, agricultural and fishing trades, and “elemen-
tary services occupations” such as waitressing, bartending and kitchen assistance. Care 
and domestic workers (listed as childminders, care workers, home carers, senior care 
workers, care escorts, housekeepers and caretakers) are also included in the list. 
Yet, since 2008 non-EEA employment has consistently risen precisely in those 
occupations qualified as ineligible for employment permits – particularly in the 
sectors of retail, restaurant and catering as well as of work carried out in private 
homes7. The strong presence of non-EEA citizens in these sectors of the Irish la-
bour market responds to a strong demand for cheap, accessible and flexible work-
ers from employers. It was noted with this respect that “disconnect between labour 
migration policy and employment demand has created an unregulated and exploita-
tive system”8. The denial to recognize this demand by Irish immigration law pushes 
migrant workers towards unregulated and informal work, denies them with basic 
socio-economic rights and significantly increases the risk of experiencing labour 
exploitation and employers’ abuse. 
It is not a coincidence that such phenomena have recently emerged in respect of 
categories of migrant workers considered ineligible for residence permits. Care work-
 
7
 Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, Workers on the Move: Past Lessons and Future Perspectives on Ire-
land’s Labour Migration, December 2015, p. 9, available at: <http://www.mrci.ie/resources/workers-on-
the-move-past-lessons-and-future-perspectives-on-irelands-labour-migration/>. 
8
 Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, Childcare in the Domestic Work Sector: Who’s Minding the Chil-
dren?, May 2015, available at: <http://www.mrci.ie/press-centre/new-research-tracks-growing-
exploitation-of-au-pairs-and-childminders-in-irish-homes/>. 
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ers and fishermen, in particular, have been pointed out as particularly at risk of labour 
exploitation, breaches of basic labour protections and in the latter case trafficking.  
The impossibility to enter Ireland legally in order to perform care and domestic 
work9 has been directly linked with the prevalence of informal and irregular work in 
this sector. The result of the inclusion of such professions in the list of ineligible oc-
cupations has been the recruitment of either undocumented migrants or of non-EEA 
students under the label of au pairs10. Indeed, a significant portion of the total number 
of undocumented migrants present in Ireland (estimated between 20,000 and 26,00011) 
is concentrated in the domestic work sector, particularly in elder care services12. 
The presence of undocumented migrant workers in the Irish fishing industry has 
also been cause for concern. Issues of labour exploitation and trafficking have 
emerged with reference to non-EEA fishermen on board of Irish trawlers - an oc-
cupation also ineligible for employment permits since 2006. An Emergency Task 
Force set up to face allegations of employers’ abuse acknowledged international 
reports of deceptive recruitment practices, low wages and detrimental working 
conditions13. 
Italian immigration law also conveys preference for certain categories of mi-
grant workers. Article 27 of the so-called Testo Unico Immigrazione14 (“Testo Uni-
co”) exempts certain categories from the general quota system. Such privileged 
professions include, among others, corporate executives, university lecturers and 
professors, intra-corporate transferees, but also less remunerated professions such 
as seamen, artists in private clubs, as well as domestic workers who have worked 
 
9
 Currently, the sole exception to the impossibility for non-EEA citizens to enter Ireland in order to 
perform care work concerns trained medical professionals, where the person who requires the care has a 
severe medical condition, or where the prospective worker can show that he or she has a long history of 
caring for the person requiring the care. 
10
 See Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, cit. supra note 8. 
11
 Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, Ireland is Home: An analysis of the current situation of undocu-
mented migrants in Ireland, November 2014, available at: <http://www.mrci.ie/our-work/justice-for-
undocumented/>. 
12
 Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, Migrant Workers in the Home Care Sector: Preparing for the El-
der Boom in Ireland, September 2015, available at: <http://www.mrci.ie/resources/publications/migrant-
workers-in-the-home-care-sector-preparing-for-the-elder-boom-in-ireland/>. 
13
 Report of the Government Task Force on Non-EEA Workers in the Irish Fishing Fleet, December 
2015, p. 14, available at: http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/atypical-scheme-fishing-crew. 
14
 Decreto Legislativo no. 286 of 25 July 1998, Testo Unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disci-
plina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero, G.U. no. 191 of 18 August 1998, S.O. 
no. 139. 
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for their employer for at least one year and follow him or her to Italy.  
For all other categories of workers, Italian law envisages a quota system where-
by each year the Government adopts a special decree (called decreto flussi) that de-
termines the maximum number of visas issued to third-country nationals for the 
purpose of dependent and autonomous work. Article 3(4) of the Testo Unico allows 
for a certain flexibility of this system, establishing that if necessary further decrees 
may be adopted on this point throughout the year.  
Differently than in Ireland, then, there is no marked preference for highly 
skilled or highly paid migrant workers in Italian immigration law. The decreto flus-
si generally concerns all categories of employment, both seasonal and non-
seasonal. In the past few years, however, the Italian quota system has failed to en-
visage any first entry visa for prospective migrant workers. Excluding autonomous 
workers, the decreto flussi for 201615 reserved these visas only to third-country na-
tionals who had completed vocational training courses pursuant Article 23 of the 
Testo Unico, to migrant workers of Italian descent and to those who had worked 
within the 2015 Expo in Milan. 
This trend has persisted since 2012, when the Italian Government ceased to es-
tablish quotas for non-seasonal dependent employment. The negative effects of this 
closure are particularly evident with respect to domestic and care workers. Until 
2011, a portion of the annual quotas was reserved to this category. This mechanism 
not only allowed migrant workers to enter the Italian territory in order to carry out 
domestic work there, but was also often taken advantage of by employers who 
wanted to regularize undocumented domestic workers16. The impossibility to do ei-
ther, however, has inevitably channelled migrant domestic workers into unregulat-
ed, informal work and into irregular status. A significant number of EU and non-
EU workers in Italy are employed informally. While the latest data relate almost 
700,000 foreign domestic workers officially employed in 2014, their actual number 
(including those irregularly employed) is estimated to be around 1 million and 665 
thousand. The vast majority of this group is made up by women from Eastern Eu-
 
15
 Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri of 14 December 2015, Programmazione transi-
toria dei flussi d'ingresso dei lavoratori non comunitari nel territorio dello Stato, per l'anno 2016, G.U. 
no. 26 of 2 February 2016. 
16
 PALUMBO, Trafficking and Labour Exploitation in Domestic Work and the Agricultural Sector in 
Italy, Global Governance Programme (TRAFFICKO) 2016, available at: 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/42406>. 
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rope and Asian countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka and India17. Whether 
they irregularly reside in Italy or they hold a residence permit but work informally 
without a contract, these domestic workers experience a precarious employment 
situation as well as an invisible status.  
The presence of significant numbers of irregular migrant workers in Ireland and 
Italy has not been acknowledged by law and institutions as a consequence of the 
described restrictions to the availability of legal entry routes for prospective work-
ers. Nonetheless, their problematic character has been implicitly recognized and 
addressed through targeted regularisation programmes. The next paragraph will 
critically analyse such programmes as they are implemented in Ireland and Italy, 
highlighting their effectiveness and shortcomings from the point of view of migrant 
workers’ socio-economic rights.  
3. – The Imperfect Remedy of Regularization Programmes 
The contradiction between the structural demand for migrant workers and the 
many limitations to their legal entry has given rise to regularization schemes both 
in Ireland and in Italy. The latter has established repeated mass regularizations for 
all undocumented workers (although domestic and care workers have been a par-
ticular concern in this context)18. The approach of the former, on the other hand, has 
been to target specific categories of migrant workers that emerge as particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation at a given moment in addition to provide a more general 
procedure to all workers who pursue regularization. 
As to Ireland, in February 2016 a regularization scheme specifically established 
for non-EEA fishermen was envisaged as a response to allegations of abuse and 
human trafficking in this sector. The Atypical Working Scheme for non-EEA 
crewmembers targeted those already working in Ireland. The application required 
support from an employer (i.e., the holder of a licensed sea-fishing boat), as well as 
a 12-month written contract of employment. This scheme was capped at a maxi-
mum of 500 regularized workers, and it was initially bound to expire in mid-May 
2016. After that deadline, only applications from persons outside of Ireland would 
be accepted. The Atypical Working Scheme, however, had an extremely low take-
 
17
 Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2015, December 2015, pp. 287-288. 
18
 See also LAZARIDIS, International Migration to Europe: from Subjects to Abjects, Basingstoke, 
2015, p. 140. 
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up rate, to the point that its deadline was extended. Many employers proved to be 
resistant to initiate the regularization process and dismissed workers who asked 
them to support their application19. 
In addition to the Atypical Working Scheme, a broader route to the acquisition 
of a residence and work permits for irregular residents consists in the Reactivation 
Employment Permit. Non-EEA nationals who no longer hold an employment per-
mit “through no fault of their own” or because of exploitation in the workplace 
may obtain such a permit provided that they have a job offer20. Undocumented do-
mestic workers and carers, however, are specifically excluded from said permit and 
currently have no way to achieve a regular status in Ireland.  
In Italy, on the other hand, mass regularization schemes have frequently privi-
leged domestic workers. For instance, this category has been the only one to be al-
lowed to access regularization even in case of part-time work21. Moreover, in 2009 
the Italian Government created a special regularization programme devoted to do-
mestic and care workers exclusively. This programme was presented as a counter-
measure to the economic crisis and as a support to families residing in Italy (re-
gardless of citizenship)22. As in the smaller-scale case of fishermen in Ireland, the 
actual number of applications was significantly lower than what had been envis-
aged by the Government23. The high costs of the regularization process, its length 
and the difficulty for domestic workers to find an employer willing to initiate and 
 
19
 Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, MRCI welcomes extension of scheme for undocumented fishermen, 
19 May 2016, available at: <http://www.mrci.ie/press-centre/mrci-welcomes-extension-of-scheme-for-
undocumented-fishermen/>. 
20
 AMBROSINI, “Employers as ‘Care Managers’: Contracts, Emotions and Mutual Obligations within 
Italy’s Invisible Welfare System”, in MARCHETTI and TRIANDAFILLYDOU (eds.), Employers, Agencies 
and Immigration: Paying for Care, Farnham, 2015, p. 19 ff., p. 25; HEPWORTH, At the Edges of Citizen-
ship: Security and the Constitution of Non-Citizen Subjects, Farnham, 2015, p. 84; PALUMBO, “Demand 
in the Context of Trafficking in Human Beings in the Domestic Work Sector in Italy”, DemandAT Coun-
try Study No. 5, June 2016, 21 ff., available at: <http://research.icmpd.org/projects/trafficking-in-human-
beings/demandat/>. 
21
 See, for instance, Art. 5(2) of Decreto Legislativo no. 109 of 16 July 2012, Attuazione della direttiva 
2009/52/CE che introduce norme minime relative a sanzioni e a provvedimenti nei confronti di datori di 
lavoro che impiegano cittadini di Paesi terzi il cui soggiorno e' irregolare, G.U. no. 172 of 25 July 2012. 
22
 Art. 1 ter of Decreto-Legge no. 78 of 1 July 2009, Provvedimenti anticrisi, G.U. no. 150 of 1 July 
2009, then converted into Legge no. 102 of 3 August 2009, G.U. no. 179 of 4 August 2009, S.O. no. 140. 
23
 BONIZZONI, “Undocumented Domestic Workers in Italy: Surviving and Regularizing Strategies”, 
in TRIANDAFYLLIDOU (ed.), Irregular Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe: Who Cares?, Farnham, 
2013, p. 135 ff., p. 140. 
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support their application can be ascribed to the causes of this lower take-up. 
In the light of this brief analysis, regularization programmes for undocumented 
workers emerge as limited in both scope and effectiveness. In principle, such pro-
grammes might constitute a path for migrant workers in the informal economy to 
secure basic socio-economic and labour rights (related for instance to minimum 
wage, written employment contracts, established working hours and protection 
against unjustified dismissal). However, the Irish and Italian examples reveal the 
significant shortcomings of such programmes. First, they are limited in time. Ap-
plications may only be filed within a certain time frame (usually very short), and 
regularization schemes are implemented sporadically or without a predictable con-
tinuity. This feature responds to the State interest to avoid encouraging irregular 
immigration by fostering the expectation of regularization in all cases. On the other 
hand, it does create an inequality of treatment between undocumented workers who 
happen to be in the country at the right time, and those who are not.  
Another interesting feature of the discussed regularization schemes concerns 
the discrepancy between the expected number of applications, the actual take-up 
rate of such programmes and the number of undocumented workers estimated to 
reside in the country. Often, regularization programmes are under-utilized by un-
documented migrant workers. This has been the case, for instance, of the above-
mentioned Irish Atypical Working Scheme for fishermen, or of the 2014 regulari-
sation scheme for seasonal workers in Italy24, A possible explanation for this issue 
concerns the great control granted to employers by regularization programmes, 
both in Ireland and in Italy. An application for the Atypical Working Scheme had 
to be initiated by the employer, who was required to hire a solicitor in charge of 
submitting an employment contract to competent authorities together with all the 
necessary documentation. Any repatriation expense at the end of the contract 
would have to be equally sustained by the employer. Similarly, in Italy employers 
were required to initiate and consistently support the regularization process, and 
sustain substantial costs (for which repayment is often demanded to workers)25. The 
 
24
 On 2 April 2015, a decree by the Italian Prime Minister reduced the number of available quotas for 
seasonal workers of 2.000 units in comparison to the previous year, observing that the quota set in 2014 
had been underutilized by third-country national workers (Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Min-
istri of 2 April 2015, Programmazione transitoria dei flussi d'ingresso dei lavoratori non comunitari per 
lavoro stagionale nel territorio dello Stato, per l'anno 2015, G.U. no. 104 of 7 May 2015). 
25
 See AMBROSINI, cit. supra note 20, p. 25.  
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choice to entrust such strong responsibilities within regularisation programmes to 
employers suggests a paternalistic approach to the management of irregular migra-
tion fluxes. It has been rightly observed that this type of migration policies and 
laws have “fostered the conception that it is the employer who allows a migrant 
worker to ... stay in Italy”26. Therefore, the tight control of employers throughout 
the process of emersion from informal work can generate further vulnerability and 
employment precariousness for undocumented or irregular migrant workers, who 
risk to be subjected to various forms of blackmail and exploitation by their em-
ployers as a precondition for the latter’s continued support.   
These shortcomings raise the question of whether regularization programmes 
are actually the best tool to realize a fair balance between the State interest to mi-
gration control and undocumented migrant workers’ socio-economic rights. Irish 
and Italian migration law exemplify a broader European tendency to base labour 
migration schemes on supposed labour market demands which overlook employ-
ers’ pursuit of unskilled migrant workers. Thus, preferential routes are created for 
highly skilled (i.e., highly paid) workers, while unskilled ones are excluded - some-
times completely - from the possibility to immigrate legally for the purpose of em-
ployment. As a result, the latter are pushed into irregular status and informal em-
ployment relationships.  
Regularisation programmes such as the one described above aim to remedy this 
contradiction by allowing irregular or undocumented migrant workers to acquire a 
regular status with the collaboration of their employers - but do so in a limited way. 
The fiction of the undesirable worker in European labour migration regimes is then 
only half-defeated.  
While awareness of the contradictions and of the perverse effects of such a system 
is a crucial goal in itself, the described normative and policy choices pertain to State 
sovereignty. States are obviously free to design their labour migration policies accord-
ing to what they identify as necessary for their national economy and for the domestic 
labour market. There is obviously no positive State obligation under international or 
European law to admit an unlimited number of third-country national workers on the 
national territory, nor to grant a regular residence status to all those who pursue it.  
In the light of these observations, the remaining part of this chapter will explore 
whether and to what extent undocumented and irregular migrant workers are cur-
 
26
 See PALUMBO, cit. supra, note 20, p. 22. 
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rently able to enjoy socio-economic and labour rights regardless of their residence 
status. Especially within legal systems that push them into irregularity and informal 
employment, this question is crucial to remedy the precariousness and vulnerability 
to labour exploitation. The next paragraph, then, will analyse the standards of pro-
tection of migrant workers’ rights in international and European law - with a spe-
cial focus on those who are undocumented or in an irregular status. It will unveil 
how these systems are currently incapable of compensating for the lack of protec-
tion of these workers’ socio-economic rights at domestic level.  
4. – International and European Standards of Protection of Migrant 
Workers’ Socio-Economic Rights 
At present time, international and European sources in the field of human rights 
law can be split in two groups with reference to migrant workers’ socio-economic 
rights. A first group, mainly made up by soft-law sources and hard-law sources as-
sisted by non-judicial compliance mechanisms, envisages important protections of 
such rights, including for undocumented or irregularly resident workers. On the other 
hand, the majority of hard-law sources applicable to the European context focus on 
extreme instances of exploitation such as slavery, servitude and forced labour.  
As to the first group, the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (“Migrant Workers 
Convention”)27 envisages the widest protections for undocumented workers. The 
Convention draws a distinction between migrant workers who are documented or 
in a regular position and those who are not, but grants a number of socio-economic 
rights to the latter - such as the right to equal treatment with citizens of the host 
State as to working conditions, remuneration and social security and the right to 
unionize (Articles 25-27). The Migrant Workers Committee clarified that such 
right to equality of treatment also produces horizontal effects, applying to relation-
ships between migrant workers and employers and generating a positive State obli-
gation to provide appropriate sanctions for employers who breach it28. 
 
27
 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families (New York, 18 December 1990), entered into force on 1 July 2003. 
28
 Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Fami-
lies, General Comment No. 2 on the rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and members of 
their families, 28 August 2013, para. 64, CMW/C/GC/2. 
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However, precisely the inclusion of undocumented and irregular migrant work-
ers among the scope of this Convention has contributed to its low ratification rate 
among States of immigration - likely due to the fear of encouraging irregular im-
migration fluxes. In 2013, the Council of the European Union expressed the view 
that the Migrant Workers Convention draws an “insufficient distinction … between 
the economic and social rights of regular and irregular migrant workers”, deeming 
this “not in line with national and EU policies”29. Before the adoption of the Mi-
grant Workers Convention, a similarly low ratification rate characterized the 1975 
ILO Convention on Migrant Workers30 - whose Article 9(1) also established a right 
to equal treatment as to “remuneration, social security and other benefits” for 
workers with an irregular status. 
In the same line, the Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recently 
clarified that the right to just and favourable conditions of work under Article 7 of the 
International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)31 specif-
ically relates to all migrant workers regardless of status - thus also including undocu-
mented workers within its scope32. Differently than the abovementioned legal sources, 
ICESCR has been signed and ratified by the majority of States of the international 
community. However - while undoubtedly authoritative - General Comments by hu-
man rights treaty bodies are not legally binding33, and therefore States Parties might al-
so choose to depart from the Committee’s interpretation of Article 7 ICESCR. 
 
29
 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of Gov-
ernments of the Member States meeting within the Council on the 2013 UN High-Level Dialogue on Mi-
gration and Development and on broadening the development-migration nexus, 19 July 2013, para 13, 
available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012415%202013%20INIT>. 
For an analysis of the low ratification rate of the Migrant Workers Convention, see DESMOND, “The Tri-
angle that could Square the Circle? The UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the EU and the Universal Periodic Review”, Euro-
pean Journal of Migration and Law, 2015, p. 39 ff.  
30
 Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Op-
portunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Geneva, 24 June 1975), entered into force on 9 December 
1978. Italy is one of the few countries of immigration which has ratified the Convention.  
31
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 16 December 1966), 
entered into force on 3 January 1976. 
32
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 23 (2016) on the right 
to just and favourable conditions of work, 27 April 2016, para. 42 (let. e), E/C.12/GC/23. 
33
 KELLER and GROVER, “General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their Legitima-
cy”, in KELLER and ULFSTEIN (eds.), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, Cambridge, 
2012, p. 116 ff., pp. 129 -130. 
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Moreover, domestic workers who are undocumented or in an irregular status 
have been identified as a particularly vulnerable category to labour exploitation by 
the General Recommendation No. 26 of the Committee for the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women34 and the ILO Domestic Workers Convention35 - which 
applies to any person engaged in domestic work within an employment relation-
ship. The latter source too has been so far ratified by a very low number of States, 
although Italy and Ireland are both parties to it. 
In the Council of Europe context, Article 19 of the European Social Charter36 
reserves the right to equal treatment with nationals of the host State in relation to 
working conditions and remuneration, taxes, access to justice and so forth exclu-
sively to migrant workers with a regular status. Article 18(1) and (3), however, en-
visages an obligation for States Parties to “apply existing regulations in a spirit of 
liberality” and to liberalize regulations on the employment of foreign workers in 
order to ensure the right to engage in a gainful occupation in the territory of other 
Parties. Interestingly, the European Committee for Social Rights (“ECSR”) has 
found domestic labour migration systems granting priority to EEA workers to be 
incompatible with such provisions. This assessment has also involved Italian and 
Irish laws on the matter37. However, this interpretation may hardly produce a signif-
icant impact on the rights of undocumented workers - much less foster opportuni-
ties for legal labour migration. First, the Conclusions of the ECSR are not directly 
enforceable in the domestic jurisdictions of State Parties, and the latter are general-
ly not compelled to comply with them. Second, and most importantly, the Charter 
has an extremely restricted scope of application when it comes to non-EEA work-
ers, because it only applies to migrant workers who are citizens of a State Party and 
move to the territory of another State Party38.  
Moving on to the second group of legal sources, important protections for undoc-
umented workers have been established both within the Council of Europe and Euro-
 
34
 Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 
26 on women migrant workers, para. 22, 5 December 2008, CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R. 
35
 Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers (Geneva, 16 June 2011), entered into 
force on 5 September 2013. 
36
 European Social Charter (revised) (Strasbourg, 3 May 1996), entered into force on 1 July 1999. 
37
 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 2012, Italy, Art. 18(1), 2012/def/ITA/18/1/EN; 
Conclusions 2012, Italy, Art. 18(3), 2012/def/ITA/18/3/EN; Conclusions 2012, Ireland, Art. 18(1), 
2012/def/IRL/18/1/EN; Conclusions 2012, Ireland, Art. 18(3), 2012/def/IRL/18/3/EN. 
38
 See para. 19 of the Preamble to the European Social Charter. 
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pean Union law. As to the former, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
has extracted positive State obligations to protect undocumented migrants against se-
rious forms of labour exploitation from Article 4 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”). In the judgment of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia39, the 
ECtHR clarified that the positive obligation to set up an effective system of protec-
tion against trafficking and forced labour does not simply involve criminal law, but 
also labour migration law. This case concerned a young Russian woman who had 
been subjected to trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Here, the ECtHR 
found Cyprus in breach of Article 4 ECHR specifically because it had put in place a 
visa regime for cabaret artists that did not ensure effective protection against traffick-
ing to workers. By doing so, this judgment revealed the existence of a link between 
precarious migration status and vulnerability to exploitation40. 
The judgments of Siliadin v. France41, C.N. and V. v. France42, and C.N. v. the 
United Kingdom43 directly concerned labour exploitation. These cases concerned 
third-country national women brought into the Union territory at a very young age 
and in some instances while still minors. They were forced to perform unpaid do-
mestic work by employers who exploited their vulnerability, stemming from their 
undocumented status and their related risk of expulsion from the host State. In this 
context, the ECtHR identified a positive obligation under Article 4 ECHR to put up 
an effective legal framework to contrast slavery, servitude and forced labour. 
Therefore, the respondent States were found in breach of Article 4 ECHR due to 
their failure to qualify these conducts as criminal offences in their domestic law44. 
Moreover, the C.N. judgment also specified the existence of a procedural obliga-
tion to conduct effective and thorough investigations in this field45. 
By clarifying these principles, the ECtHR created an important human rights 
framework for the protection not only of young girls subjected to servitude and 
 
39
 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Application No. 25965/04, Judgment of 7 January 2010. 
40
 MULLALLY and MURPHY, “Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK: Enacting Exclusions, Exemp-
tions and Rights”, in MULLALLY (Ed.) Care, Migration and Human Rights: Law and Practice, Abingdon, 
2015, p. 59 ff. 
41
 Siliadin v. France, Application No. 73316/01, Judgment of 26 July 2005. 
42
 C.N. and V. v. France, Application No. 4239/08, Judgment of 11 October 2012. 
43
 C.N. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 4239/08, Judgment of 13 November 2012. 
44
 Siliadin v. France, cit. supra note 41, paras. 130-149; C.N. and V. v. France, cit. supra note 42, 
paras. 104-108; C.N. v. the United Kingdom, cit. supra note 43, paras. 70-82. 
45
 C.N. v. the United Kingdom, cit. supra note 43, paras. 60-82. 
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forced labour but more broadly of all migrants - included undocumented ones - 
against labour exploitation. Undoubtedly, the intervention of the ECtHR into hori-
zontal relationships between employers and employees, and the establishment of 
positive State obligations indirectly aimed the significant vulnerability stemming 
from undocumented status is a significant development. For these reasons, this case 
law has been qualified as a step towards a steadier application of the ECHR to em-
ployment relationships46.  
At the same time, the extreme character of the exploitation suffered by the ap-
plicants in the judgments at issue suggest that its relevance pertains more to the 
field of civil rights than to that of socio-economic rights. While the two realms 
cannot be neatly distinguished, it should not be taken for granted that the same pos-
itive obligations established by the ECtHR with respect to individuals subjected to 
domestic servitude might also apply to more common forms of labour exploitation, 
let alone to breaches of labour rights.  
At EU level, Directive 2009/50 (“Employers’ Sanctions Directive”)47 establish-
es minimum standards on measures against employers of third-country national 
workers with an irregular status. According to Paragraph 2 of its Preamble, the aim 
of the Employers’ Sanctions Directive is to eliminate “a key pull factor for illegal 
immigration into the EU”, namely “the possibility of obtaining work in the EU 
without the required legal status”. To fulfil this aim, the Directive establishes a 
range of obligations for employers of third-country national workers (e.g., to verify 
the residence status of prospective employees, or to notify authorities of the com-
mencement of an employment relationship)48 and for Member States (e.g. to ensure 
that effective labour inspections are carried out in this area49, and that effective 
mechanisms are in place to allow illegally employed workers to lodge complaints 
against their employers)50. The Employers’ Sanctions Directive was implemented 
 
46
 MANTOUVALOU, “Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An Intellectual 
Justification for an integrated Approach to Interpretation”, Human Rights Law Review, 2013, p. 529 ff., 
pp. 534-535. See also MANTOUVALOU, “Servitude and Forced Labour in the 21st Century: the Human 
Rights of Domestic Workers”, Industrial Law Journal, 2006, p. 395 ff. 
47
 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing 
for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country 
nationals, OJ L 168/24 of 30 June 2009.  
48
 Ibid., Art. 4. 
49
 Ibid., Art. 14. 
50
 Ibid., Art. 13. 
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very unevenly by EU Member States, and in some cases it actually worsened the 
situation of undocumented workers51. In Italy, for instance, legislative decree no. 
109/2012 unlawfully restricted the definition of “particularly exploitative working 
conditions” adopted by the Directive, in presence of which Article 13(4) establish-
es an obligation for Member States to grant residence permits to exploited workers 
under certain circumstances52. According to the Directive, this condition is fulfilled 
whenever there is a striking disproportion of working conditions in comparison 
with the terms of employment of legally employed workers53. Legislative decree 
no. 109, on the other hand, provides this possibility in a much more restricted num-
ber of situations of exploitation. Only three cases are indeed envisaged by its Arti-
cle 22(12 bis), namely the illegal employment of more than three workers, the ille-
gal employment of at least one minor, and the exposure of workers to situations of 
grave danger as to working conditions. This discrepancy between the Employers’ 
Sanction Directive and the Italian implementing legislation was highlighted, to-
gether with other issues, in a complaint to the European Commission submitted in 
June 2015 by the Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (“ASGI”).54  
The existing protections of the rights of migrant workers in an irregular or un-
documented status at supranational level - and their degree of implementation at 
domestic level - suggest a strong resistance of States to accept significant limita-
tions of sovereignty in this field. Particularly in relation to labour rights and socio-
economic rights, the majority of States of immigration have appeared very reluc-
tant to assume positive obligations beyond the protection of migrant workers clear-
ly identifiable as victims. Thus, the fear of encouraging the illegal entry of third-
country nationals for the purpose of work by recognising them with basic rights 
steered many States away from ratifying key conventions and treaties in this field.  
This lack of legal commitment constitutes a further source of vulnerability to ex-
ploitation for undocumented and irregular workers, which aggravates the effects of 
 
51
 Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Employers’ Sanc-
tions: Impacts on Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Rights in Four EU Countries, April 2015, available 
at: <http://picum.org/picum.org/uploads/publication/EmployerSanctions_Final.pdf>. 
52
 In particular, this provision establishes an obligation for Member States to define in their national 
law the conditions under which said residence permits might be granted on a case-by-case basis and for 
the duration of relevant national proceedings. 
53
 Art. 2(i) of Directive 2009/52, cit. supra note 47. 
54
 A synthesis of the complaint is available at: <http://www.asgi.it/english/sanctions-against-
employers-of-illegally-staying-third-country-nationals/>. 
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the discussed restrictions to legal labour migration routes despite a significant de-
mand for third-country national workers. 
This tendency has been mirrored by a focus of international and European law - 
including human rights law - on the most extreme instances of labour exploitation, 
consisting in breaches of civil rights such as the right to be free from slavery, servi-
tude and forced labour under Article 4 ECHR. Such a feature especially character-
izes binding sources of international and European law.  
As a result, the recognition of basic socio-economic rights for undocumented or 
irregular migrant workers is more likely to derive from judicial interpretations of 
domestic legislation carried out by national courts, rather than from general stand-
ards established at supranational level. In fact, both in Ireland and in Italy domestic 
courts have in some instances elaborated interesting interpretations that have fos-
tered a stronger protection of undocumented or migrant workers’ rights than what 
is currently afforded by the weak standards established by international and Euro-
pean law. The next paragraph will illustrate a significant example of this phenome-
non, concerning the recognition of labour rights to undocumented or irregular mi-
grant workers in the domestic jurisdictions of Ireland and Italy. Through this ex-
ample, the next paragraph will analyse to what extent domestic courts have at least 
in part remedied the current lack of international commitment of their respective 
States to ensuring the respect of all migrant workers’ socio-economic rights.  
5. – Labour Rights for Illegally Employed Migrants: Judicial Solutions 
from Italian and Irish Courts 
Ireland and Italy adopt a fundamentally divergent approach to the employment 
of third-country nationals in breach of domestic immigration law. In line with other 
common law countries such as the United Kingdom, Irish law provides that in case 
of employment of a worker without an employment permit, both the employer and 
the employee commit an offence55. On the other hand, Article 22(12) of the Italian 
 
55
 Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014, S2. For a general review of different approaches 
adopted at international, regional and domestic level with respect to the protection of labour rights of mi-
grant workers employed in breach of immigration laws, see DEWHURST, “The Right of Irregular Immi-
grants to Back Pay: The Spectrum of Protection in International, Regional, and National Legal Systems”, 
in COSTELLO and FREEDLAND (eds.), Migrants at Work: Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law, 
Oxford, 2014, p. 216 ff. 
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Testo Unico exclusively targets employers, stating that those who employ workers 
who do not hold a valid residence permit are punished with imprisonment and the 
payment of a fine.  
Regardless of the legislative choice to criminalize the conduct of migrants who 
engage in dependent work without a residence and/or work permit, a common issue 
that has arisen in both the Irish and the Italian jurisdiction stems from the principle 
whereby an employment contract concluded in breach of the law cannot be en-
forced by a judicial authority. A rigid application of such a principle would prevent 
undocumented migrant workers from enjoying even the most basic labour rights, 
such as the right to protection against unfair dismissal, the right to daily and weekly 
rest, or the right to receive minimum wage. Italian and Irish courts have been pre-
sented with this issue. Despite the opposite approaches of their respective norma-
tive frameworks in relations to the responsibility of migrant workers as to their par-
ticipation to illegal employment contracts, it is interesting to note that such courts 
are converging towards similar solutions.  
In Italy, the Corte di Cassazione56 has interpreted Article 22(12) of the Testo 
Unico as compatible with employers’ obligation to pay pension contributions as 
well as wages to undocumented workers. In fact, such an obligation is still in place, 
and can be enforced by competent courts even when the employment contract is il-
legal. The Court grounded this interpretation on Article 2126(2) of the Civil Code, 
which grants dependent workers with the right to receive compensation whenever 
they have been employed in breach of norms established with the aim to protect 
employees. It considered that Article 22 of the Testo Unico also aims to ensure that 
migrant workers enjoy adequate living and working conditions, and thus to protect 
them. As such, this provision must be included within the scope of Article 2126(2) 
of the Civil Code, and illegal contracts constitute a legitimate ground for migrant 
workers to pursue pension contribution and wages not paid by employers.  
Due to its focus on the right to receive wages, this case law might appear of 
limited relevance for the recognition of other socio-economic rights to migrant 
workers. However, this feature does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to 
 
56
 Corte di Cassazione Civile (Sezione Lavoro), G.M. v. Uniriscossioni S.P.A. ed Istituto Nazionale 
della Previdenza Sociale, 26 March 2010, No. 7380; Corte di Cassazione Civile (Sezione Lavoro), R.G. 
v. Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, 5 November 2010, No. 22559; Corte di Cassazione Civile 
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the expansion of the principles established therein to other socio-economic rights. 
First, the Cassazione itself noted that the right to wages envisaged by Article 
2126(2) of the Civil Code logically encompasses also the right to receive pension 
contributions. Therefore, it concluded that the employer in this case also had an ob-
ligation to pay said contributions to social security services for illegally employed 
workers57. Moreover, the principles established by the Cassazione in this context 
are of a sufficiently general nature to be potentially applied to other labour rights. It 
is particularly noteworthy that this court justified its conclusions stating that “al-
lowing employers who breach the law on the employment of third-country nation-
als to avoid paying retributions and wages would alter the basic rules of market and 
competition …, enjoying clearly more favourable conditions than those who re-
spect the law”58. This principle may also be applied, for instance, to breaches of 
Decreto Legislativo No. 66/2003 on working time59 (undoubtedly an area where 
wide margins of profit are available to employers who fail to respect the law).  
While the solution elaborated by Italian courts appears to be quite straightforward, 
in Ireland the matter was complicated by the normative choice of considering undocu-
mented migrants who work without an employment contract as criminal offenders. 
In the Irish context, the illegality of an employment contract concluded with a 
worker who does not hold an employment permit was established through judicial 
interpretation on the grounds of Section 2 of the Employment Permits Act. One 
case in particular marked an interesting evolution of Irish law and jurisprudence on 
this matter. On 31 August 2012, the High Court of Ireland assessed the case of a 
Pakistani undocumented worker (Mr Younis) who had been recruited by his second 
cousin (Mr Hussein) to work as a chef at his restaurant60. As ascertained by the 
 
57
 Judgment No. 7380/2010, cit. supra note 56, para. 3 of Legal Grounds (author’s translation). 
58
 Ibid. This principle was further reinstated by the Cassazione in judgments Nos. 22559/2010 and 
18540/2015 (cit. supra note 56). 
59
 Decreto Legislativo no. 66 of 8 April 2003, Attuazione delle direttive 93/104/CE e 2000/34/CE 
concernenti taluni aspetti dell'organizzazione dell'orario di lavoro, G.U. no. 87 of 14 April 2003, S.O. 
no. 61. As clarified by its title, the decree implemented Directive 104/93/EC and its subsequent amend-
ment Directive 34/2000/EC in the Italian order (Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 con-
cerning certain aspects of the organization of working time, OJ L 307 of 13 December 1993, and Di-
rective 2000/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 2000 amending Council 
Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time to cover sectors and 
activities excluded from that Directive, OJ L 195 of 1 August 2000). 
60
 High Court (Ireland), Hussein v. The Labour Court & Anor, Judgment of 31 August 2012, availa-
ble at: <http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2012/H364.html>. 
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Rights Commissioner and by the Labour Court in lower degrees of jurisdiction, Mr 
Younis had been exploited by Mr Hussein. He was required to work seven days a 
week with no holidays, and he only received “pocket money in cash” as pay61. His 
position had never been regularized nor formalized. While the Labour Court had 
found Mr Hussein in breach of several labour laws - in particular the Terms of Em-
ployment (Information) Act 1994, the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 and 
the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 - the latter refused to pay the compensation 
awarded to Mr Younis. Before the High Court, he argued that Mr Younis could not 
invoke the mentioned employment legislation because the contract of employment 
was fundamentally illegal in absence of an employment permit.  
The High Court upheld this view. It observed that an extensive and non-
formalistic interpretation of the law was impossible in this case. At the time of the 
judgment, Section 2(4) of the Employment Permits Act allowed employers to de-
fend criminal proceedings brought against them for employing undocumented mi-
grants by stating that they had taken “all reasonable steps to secure compliance” 
with the Act itself. The same possibility was not granted to employees. The High 
Court, then, necessarily had to deduce that as far as employees were concerned, the 
offence of working without an employment permit was absolute. Consequently, 
any reasons for failure to comply with the law was irrelevant, and the employment 
contract irremediably void62.  
Nonetheless, the High Court was dissatisfied with merely dismissing Mr 
Younis’ claim. While it believed this result to be “inescapable on the application of 
established legal principles”, it also observed that “there must be some concern that 
this legislation will produce (and, perhaps, has produced) consequences which 
were not foreseen or envisaged”63. In particular: 
“it may not have been intended by the Oireachtas that undocumented migrant workers - 
not least a vulnerable migrant such as Mr. Younis - should be effectively deprived of the 
benefit of all employment legislation by virtue of his illegal status, even though he or she 
may not be responsible for or even realise the nature of the illegality”64. 
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 Ibid., para. 2. 
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 Ibid., paras. 13-16. 
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 Ibid., para. 23. 
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Therefore, in an unprecedented move, the High Court decided to transmit a 
copy of its decision to Irish institutional bodies - including the Minister for Jobs, 
Enterprise and Innovation - in order to encourage reflection on the effects of the 
legislation in place65.  
In response, the Irish Parliament included employees within the scope of the 
exception provided by Section 2(4). The current Employment Permits (Amend-
ment) Act 2014, indeed, allows employees to bring civil actions against employers 
whenever they can prove that they took all steps that are reasonably open to them 
to ensure compliance with the requirement of holding an employment permit. This 
solution, however, is unsatisfactory. The general principle of illegality of the em-
ployment contract still denies access to justice to those workers who are unable to 
demonstrate that they took “all reasonable steps” to comply with the law.  
Against this complex background, the Irish Supreme Court weighed in on the 
issue with a significant obiter dictum. On 25 June 2015, the Supreme Court reject-
ed an application by Mr Hussein where he maintained that the High Court had 
erred in law66. Although it was not necessary in this context to examine the issue of 
the illegality of the contract, the Supreme Court meaningfully observed that tradi-
tional judicial principles whereby such an illegality constitutes a ground for not en-
forcing an employment contract “may have to be reviewed or nuanced in the light 
of the modern regulatory environment, and applied with the principle of propor-
tionality in mind”67. Moreover, the Court reinforced this view by distinguishing the 
case where the illegality of a contract stems from “something which was inherently 
immoral or inherently against the public interests” from that of “an inherently law-
ful subject matter”68 such as an employment relationship. The Supreme Court hint-
ed that the latter case could in some instances give rise to civil claims of labour 
rights, without referring to the “reasonable steps” rule. 
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 MURPHY, “Access to Justice for Undocumented Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe: The Con-
sequences of Constructed Illegality”, in MULLALLY, cit. supra note 40, p. 110 ff., p. 122. 
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 Supreme Court (Ireland), Hussein v. The Labour Court, Judgment of 25 June 2015, available at: 
<http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2015/S58.html>. 
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6. – Concluding Remarks 
The convergence of Italian and Irish courts on the principle whereby migrants 
who are illegally employed should not be prevented from enforcing their labour 
rights because of their irregular residence prompts several observations of a more 
general character. The examined case law suggests the extremely positive effect of 
extensive judicial interpretations carried out by domestic courts on undocumented 
and irregular migrant workers’ labour rights. Ultimately, these courts were able to 
establish a fair balance between the state interest to prevent and suppress the illegal 
employment of migrants and the need to protect the latter from labour exploitation. 
The cases examined in this chapter reveal the importance of coordinating labour 
law and immigration law. In many instances, domestic law generates vulnerability 
for migrant workers not because of single provisions, but due to the interaction of 
norms pertaining to traditionally separated realms. Thus, a right theoretically rec-
ognized to all migrant workers by labour law might be de facto impossible to enjoy 
for those who do not hold a residence permit because of immigration laws that 
criminalize the employment of irregular migrants. A normative and judicial aware-
ness of this matter is therefore crucial to ensure the effectiveness of domestic 
norms that aim to protect all migrant workers regardless of their residence status.  
On a more general level, the cases examined in this paper suggest that an exten-
sive interpretation of immigration law by domestic courts is currently capable of 
guaranteeing a stronger protection of migrant workers’ rights in comparison to what 
is currently afforded by international and EU law - including human rights law.  
It is meaningful - but not surprising - that international and European law did 
not play any role in the reasoning of either Irish or Italian courts. This paper has 
highlighted that undocumented workers’ socio-economic rights are mostly entrust-
ed to sources that are not supported by strong compliance mechanisms, or that are 
rarely ratified by States of immigration. The strongest supranational standards of 
protection currently available to this group pertain to civil rights such as the right to 
be free from trafficking, slavery, servitude and forced labour. In situations where 
undocumented workers cannot be clearly qualified as helpless victims, instead, 
States have appeared more reluctant to accept significant limitations of sovereignty 
- and particularly keen to retain as much control as possible over the management 
of labour migration. This phenomenon has been reinforced by the lack of further 
ECtHR judgments on the issue of positive State obligations as to their labour mi-
gration regimes after the Rantsev judgment. 
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Carefully targeted regularization programmes are still the corrective tool of 
choice for legislators of European States to remedy migrant workers’ vulnerability 
generated by their irregular migration status. At the same time, domestic courts 
have been challenging this system by ensuring undocumented workers’ access to 
basic labour rights vis-à-vis restrictive provisions of immigration law.  
While these developments are remarkable, the recognition of undocumented 
and irregular migrant workers’ labour rights within hard-law sources of interna-
tional and European law remains a goal to be pursued. The provision of universal 
obligations for States of immigration in this realm (at least at regional level) is not 
simply convenient from migrant workers’ point of view. In addition to fostering 
homogeneous levels of protection of migrant workers against labour exploitation, 
the availability of common supranational standards would ensure that no employer 
or State could benefit from this exploitation - and thus guarantee fair competition 
also from a strictly economic perspective. 
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1. – Introduction 
International migration has been incorporated in several key internationally 
adopted documents, including the Universal and Transformative 2030 Agenda for 
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Sustainable Development1 (hereinafter the Agenda) and the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda (AAAA)2. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change3 also includes im-
portant references to displacement due to climate change, stating that well-
managed migration has the potential to increase the resilience of climate-vulnerable 
populations. In addition to that, the UN General Assembly has adopted a Resolu-
tion, namely the Declaration of the second High-Level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development4, by which Member States recognize that international 
migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of 
countries of origin, transit and destination.  
International migration is a worldwide phenomenon and it is caused in particu-
lar by three main drivers: the places where decent job opportunities exist are not 
always where people live, and even when jobs may be available, the income differ-
ences prevailing in different countries provide the strongest incentives to mobility. 
Income differentials coincide quite closely with demographic trends, which are the 
other key driver of migration. The third driver of mobility is the pressure on people 
to escape from situations of conflict, repression, or, increasingly, the consequences 
of climate change. 
The recognition of migration as a condition for development by the United Nations 
is an important indicator of a new awareness of the problem at international level.  
The question remains how to reconcile the restrictions that may accompany the 
granting of access of migrants to labour markets with the principle of equal treatment 
and non-discrimination. Such restrictions can address multiple facets of the migration 
process: limits on time, limits on mobility and limits on family reunification.  
Many of the issues raised by migration are eminently technical and need to be 
addressed in the context of overall labour market policies. 
The first effort must be to dismiss the notion that by virtue of the major disad-
vantages which migrants may face in their countries of origin, it is acceptable for 
them to be subjected to lesser disadvantages and injustice in the countries to which 
 
1
 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, 25 
September 2015.  
2
 Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 
UN Doc. A/RES/69/313, 27 July 2015. 
3
 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November 
to 13 December 2015, UN doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. 
4
 Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, UN Doc. 
A/68/L.5, 1 October 2013. 
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they go to seek work. 
It is important to consider that, as far as international law is concerned, instru-
ments to facilitate labour migration, in order to foster development, dates back to 
the Fifties. It is the case of Convention 97 (Migration for Employment Convention, 
1949)5 and 143 (Migrant workers, supplementary provisions, 1975)6 of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO), followed by the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and members of Their Families, 
adopted by the UN in 1990.  
The scope of this paper is to outline the international legal instruments, and in 
particular those introduced by the International Labour Organization, which can be 
assumed as a lighthouse for the defence of migrant workers’ rights, with the special 
intent to find out why these instruments struggle to be implemented effectively.  
The analysis will focus on three particular aspects. The first, and more general, 
part will concentrate on the ILO’s praxis as far as labour migrations is concerned. 
A special focus will be given to the effective implementation of ILO’s binding and 
non-binding instruments. The intent is to understand why both Conventions and 
Recommendations struggle to be put into practice by States, despite the copious 
production of such legal instruments by the ILO.  
In the wake of these considerations, second and third parts will move to particu-
larly problematic areas, namely the employment of refugees and the phenomenon 
of forced labour. The two areas, among other things, appear to influence each oth-
er. In particular, the precarious situation of these refugees may render them vulner-
able to discriminatory practices which can lead to exploitation and the denial of 
fundamental principles and rights at work, even to forced labour.  
2. – Migrant Workers in the Light of the ILO’s Legal Instruments and 
Praxis 
This paragraph analyses ILO’s juridical instruments which are directed to the 
protection of migrant workers. In particular, the focus is to analyse if and how they 
 
5
 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (Geneva, 1 July 1949), entered into force on 22 
January 1952. 
6
 Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Oppor-
tunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Geneva, 24 June 1975), entered into force on 9 December 
1978. 
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are fully implemented. In doing so, a brief comment on ILO’s internal structure and 
on its legislative procedure is required. 
The mandate of the ILO is the progressive improvement of working conditions 
among its members, which today number 183, thus nearly universal membership. 
What makes the ILO distinct from other international organizations is its tripartite 
structure, which includes workers’ and employers’ organizations in all activities of 
the organization on an equal footing with Member States. The Governing Body 
(GB) is the executive council of the ILO, it has a tripartite structure, and it holds 
three sessions each year in March, June and November, in Geneva. The tasks of the 
GB include setting the programme and budget, the preparation of the agenda of the 
annual International Labour Conference, the follow-up to decisions taken at the 
ILC and the election of the Director-General7. The GB is composed of 28 govern-
ment members: employers’ members and 14 workers’ members are elected at the 
ILC every three years, although ten seats are reserved for countries of chief indus-
trial importance. 
In putting its mandate into practice the ILO primarily relies on normative regu-
lation, in the form of legally binding Conventions and non-binding Recommenda-
tions, adopted through majority vote by the annual International Labour Confer-
ence (ILC), the legislative organ of the ILO.  
Up to today 189 Conventions and 201 Recommendations have been adopted, 
although the pace at which these standards are adopted has slowed considerably 
since the 1990s. The supervision of these instruments rests on two important com-
mittees of the ILO: the independent Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) and the Committee on the Applica-
tion of Standards of the ILC8. 
It is worth noting that the ILO’s governing bodies has identified in total eight 
ILO Conventions as fundamental to the rights of people at work and hence applica-
ble to all workers. In particular, ILO Conventions Nos. 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 
138 and 182 covering freedom of association and collective bargaining, child la-
bour, forced and compulsory labour, discrimination on respect to employment and 
 
7
 JOHNSTON, The International Labor Organization. Its work for social and economic progress, Lon-
don, 2007. 
8
 See THOMANN, Steps to Compliance with International Labour Standards. The International La-
bour Organization (ILO) and the Abolition of Forced Labour, Heidelberg, 2011. 
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occupation should be recalled. In effect, the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work stresses at Article 2 that all ILO Members, even if 
they have not ratified the Convention in question, have an obligation arising from 
the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to real-
ize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concern-
ing the fundamental rights. In addition to that, the 1989 Directive on Safety and 
Health at Work defines “worker” as “any person employed by an employer” with-
out restricting it to regular workers. 
2.1. – A Step Further on Migrant Workers’ Rights Defence 
There are three main migrants’ rights – as highlighted by the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights in its Report on Fundamental Rights of migrants in 
an irregular situation in the European Union9 – which are central to ensuring fair 
employment conditions for immigrants in an irregular situation.  
The first one relates to avoid withheld or unfair remuneration and the possibility 
of claiming fair payment. Article 9(1) of the ILO Convention No. 143 (1975) states 
that: “Without prejudice to measures […to ensure] that migrant workers enter na-
tional territory … in conformity with the relevant laws and regulations, the migrant 
worker shall, in cases in which these laws and regulations have not been respected 
and in which his position cannot be regularised, enjoy equality of treatment for 
himself and his family in respect of rights arising out of past employment as re-
gards remuneration, social security and other benefits”.  
However, seeking justice by reporting an incident of underpayment or withheld 
pay is neither simple nor common. One of the main obstacles to obtain unpaid wages 
is the difficulty in proving a work relationship, in particular the lack of an employ-
ment contract. In other cases, the dispute is on the actual number of hours worked. 
The second fundamental right is the access to compensation for work accidents. 
On this point, Article 27 of the ILO Convention No. 121 on Employment Injury 
Benefits10 affirms that: “Each Member shall within its territory assure to non-
nationals equality of treatment with its own nationals as regards employment injury 
 
9
 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Report on Fundamental Rights of migrants in an irregular 
situation in the European Union, November 2011. 
10
 Convention concerning benefits in the case of employment benefits (Geneva, 8 July 1964), entered 
into force on 28 July 1967. 
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benefits”. This also applies to migrants in an irregular situation depending on the 
definition of an employee according to national law.  
Last but not least, there is the right of access to justice: a number of obstacles 
make it difficult for migrant workers in an irregular situation to claim their rights in 
court. This difficulty may increase the migrants’ dependency on employers and 
diminish the likelihood that they will denounce incidents of abuse or other labour 
law violations. Problems for access to justice may be fear of detection; security of 
residence; low rights awareness; evidence requirements. In this context, it clearly 
appears how much important could be the role of trade unions, which has been rec-
ognised by ILO in its Convention on Freedom of Association No. 87. The Conven-
tion also confirms that the right to join trade unions is applicable to migrant work-
ers in an irregular situation. 
The 1949 Convention concerning Migration for Employment covers recruit-
ment and working conditions’ standards for migrant workers. It establishes the 
principle of equal treatment of migrant workers and nationals with regard to laws, 
regulations and administrative practices that concern living and working condi-
tions, remuneration, social security, employment taxes and access to justice.  
The 1975 Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the 
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers was the 
first multilateral attempt to address irregular migration and to call for sanctions 
against traffickers of human beings. It emphasized that Member States are obliged 
to respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers, including irregular mi-
grants. It also provided that lawfully present migrant workers and their families 
should not only be entitled to equal treatment but also to equality of opportunity, 
e.g. equal access to employment and occupation, trade union and cultural rights and 
individual and collective freedoms. 
The effort of the International Labour Organization to defend migrant workers’ 
rights moved a step further in 2006 with the creation of the ILO Multilateral 
Framework on Labour Migration11. It contains 15 principles for promoting the 
rights and welfare of labour migrants and their families, providing “guidelines for a 
rights-based approach to labour migration”. The principles include, among others, 
the opportunity to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, eq-
 
11
 ILO, Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration. Non-binding principles and guidelines for a 
right-based approach to labour migration, Geneva, 2006. 
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uity, security and human dignity as well as the recognition of fundamental rights at 
work, an income to enable people to meet their basic economic, social and family 
needs and responsibilities and an adequate level of social protection. The Multilat-
eral Framework has been helpful in informing the development of national policies 
on labour migration, often acting as a reference point.  
While it has played an important role in setting standards, its non-binding nature 
restricts considerably its influence, because it means that governments can select which 
principles and recommended policies they wish to apply to migrant workers. In addi-
tion to that, the impact of the Framework is weakened by the fact that there is no robust 
monitoring mechanism to evaluate how these principles are being enforced. 
In 2011, the ILO promoted the Convention concerning Decent Work for Do-
mestic Workers, which entered into force in 2013. It was the first multilateral in-
strument to establish global labour standards for domestic workers, guaranteeing 
them the same basic rights as other workers. The Convention establishes that do-
mestic workers, regardless of their migration status, have the same basic labour 
rights as those recognized for other workers: reasonable hours of work, a limit on 
payment in-kind, clear information on the terms and conditions of employment, as 
well as respect for fundamental principles and rights at work, including freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining. 
In November 2013, only one month after the Declaration of the High-level Dia-
logue on International Migration and Development (HLD), the ILO issued the Re-
port of the discussion of the Tripartite Technical Meeting on Labour Migration. It 
focuses on the challenges and opportunities for the ILO in the follow-up to the 
HLD and post-2015 development debate, in particular the effective protection of 
migrant workers. Certain migrant workers’ protection gaps have been identified 
with regard to recruitment, equal treatment for temporary migrant workers, mi-
grants in an irregular situation, access to social protection and portability of social 
security benefits, among others. 
On the occasion of the International Labour Conference, in 2014, the ILO, 
which is also the Chair of the Global Migration Group, announced its new objec-
tive for the protection of migrant workers’ rights, namely a new Agenda on Fair 
Migration12. The objective of ILO is to construct an agenda which not only respects 
 
12
 ILO, Fair Migration. Setting an ILO Agenda. Report of the Director-General, International Labour 
Conference 103rd Session, 2014. 
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the fundamental rights of migrant workers but also offers them real opportunities 
for decent work. The ILO brings to this debate its right-based approach grounded 
in universal values of equal treatment and non-discrimination. Migrant workers 
should enjoy equal pay for work of equal value and they should be able to exercise 
their fundamental rights, including trade union rights. 
In setting an agenda for fair migration, the ILO pointed out that migrant work-
ers might be affected differently in relation to various conditions. In particular, it 
matters a great deal whether migration is undertaken in a permanent or temporary 
basis. The ILO’s Migration for Employment Recommendation13 contained in its 
annex a model bilateral agreement distinguishing clearly between temporary and 
permanent migration and prescribing additional rights for settlers. 
 Another important point is whether the migrant is in a regular or irregular sit-
uation. In fact, migration which takes place outside regular channels leaves the 
workers concerned vulnerable to abuse and exploitation and, where human smug-
glers are involved, those dangers become all the more acute. Even if there is wide 
consensus that migration should be regular, this consensus is more difficult to 
achieve when large stocks of undocumented workers are already active in labour 
markets, estimated at 11 million in the United States in 201114 and 1.9-3.8 million 
in the European Union in 200815. 
Whether the migrant is granted or denied any or all of the rights, then, is a crucial 
aspect. Governments determine the national legal framework for labour migration. 
Many conclude bilateral agreements, and some are making migration one dimension 
of regional integration processes. They also have the opportunity for cooperation in 
the multilateral system to improve the governance of migration globally.  
In fact, it has been noted that migration is increasingly taking place through 
schemes providing for temporary or circular movement of workers or for the 
movement of workers with specific skills. Such schemes raise important questions 
about the provisions required to ensure decent treatment of the workers concerned 
and equitable consideration of the interests of sending and receiving countries.  
 
13
 ILO, Recommendation concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949), Geneva, 32nd ILC 
Session, 1 July 1949. 
14
 Pew Research Centre, A Nation of Immigrants: A Portrait of the 40 Million, Including 11 Million 
Unauthorized, 29 January 2013. 
15
 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental rights of migrants in an irregular situation in 
the European Union: Comparative Report, Vienna, 2011. 
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The ILO is undertaking a mapping exercise to better understand and evaluate 
the content of bilateral arrangements and has so far covered 160 agreements in Eu-
rope and Asia. In fact, the work being undertaken to collect and analyse the many 
agreements already concluded by Member States to regulate the movement of 
workers between them should be the basis for increased cooperation in this area to 
promote fair migration practices.  
2.2. – ILO’s Compliance on Its Binding and Non-Binding Instruments 
The application of international labour standards is subject to a complex supervi-
sory system, as established by the ILO’s Constitution. It includes a regular reporting 
system supervised by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR), as well as special supervisory procedures dealing 
with complaints alleging infringements of Conventions or cases relating to violations 
of freedom of association rights16. The CEACR is in charge of examining the applica-
tion of ratified Conventions on the basis of reports that governments – under Article 
22 of ILO’s Constitution – are required to issue17. In assessing whether States have 
complied with their obligations the CEACR makes either observations or direct re-
quests: while the former relate to serious cases of non-compliance the latter concern 
either minor cases or technical issues in need of clarification18.  
Apart from the regular reporting and monitoring system, then, there is a special 
three-part supervision procedure: Article 24 allows local, national or international 
industrial workers’ or employers’ organizations to make a so-called representation 
in which it may be claimed that a given Member State has failed to apply a ratified 
Convention. 
If the Government fails to implement the standards within the time limit speci-
fied in the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, according to Article 33 
the GB “may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and 
 
16
 WISSKIRCHEN and HESS, Employers’ Handbook on ILO Standards-Related Activities, Geneva, 
2001. 
17
 Three different types of reporting obligations exist under the Constitution: Arts. 19, 22, and 35. 
Art. 22 reports are due on ratified Conventions and provide information on the implementation and appli-
cation of ratified instruments. 
18
 After the number of reports on ratified Conventions arose significantly, in 1926 the ILC estab-
lished both the CEACR and the Conference Committee to take joint charge of the supervision of stand-
ards. 
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expedient to secure compliance therewith”. Thus, Article 33 is the basis for the im-
position of sanctions within the special supervisory procedure against States not 
implementing the recommendations of Commissions of Inquiry set up under article 
26. After the GB has made a proposal, the ILC must approve and recommend the 
measures under Article 33 in the form of a resolution; the actual implementation of 
these measures is, however, left to the Member States.  
A final supervisory body is the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), a 
tripartite body that receives and reviews complaints alleging violations of the rights 
of freedom of association and to collective bargaining. The CFA was created to 
support the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission (FFCC) – set up on the ba-
sis of an agreement between the ILO and the UN Economic and Social Council in 
1950. However, since the FFCC required consent of the concerned government, the 
procedure was hardly used and instead the CFA became more active. The CFA 
comprises nine members drawn from the three groups of the GB. Governments, 
relevant workers’ or employers’ associations, or international employers’ and 
workers’ organizations with ILO consultative status may trigger the Freedom of 
Association procedure. It is not necessary that the State concerned has ratified the 
relevant Conventions, Nos. 87 and 98. If the case is accepted, the government con-
cerned is asked to provide further information and the Committee will examine the 
documentary evidence. A final or interim report by the CFA, including its recom-
mendations and conclusions, is then submitted to the GB.  
Despite ILO’s efforts to verify the correct implementation of labour standards, 
the ILO is currently facing a situation, in which its constituents find it increasingly 
hard to agree upon new standards. In particular, States ratify new standards adopted 
at a slower pace than before. The declining adoption rate of international labour 
standards may be due to diverging interests and a lack of agreement among its het-
erogeneous members – including employers’ and workers’ organizations.  
Looking at the ratification status, to this day19, 49 ILO Member States out of 185 
had ratified ILO Convention No. 97; 23 Member States had ratified Convention No. 
143; and 10 Member States had ratified Convention No. 189. In total, two of ILO’s 
185 Member States – Italy and the Philippines – had ratified all three instruments, 
representing less than one per cent of ILO member States and hosting less than three 
 
19
 All data about ILO’s Conventions ratifications are available at: 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11001:0::NO>. 
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per cent of all international migrants worldwide (5.9 million) in 2013.  
In addition to the aforementioned ILO’s Conventions, it is worth noting that in 
1990 the UN General Assembly introduced the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of Their Families20, 
which is to be considered as the third and most comprehensive international treaty 
on migrant rights. It established international definitions for categories of migrant 
workers and formalized the responsibility of States in upholding the rights of mi-
grant workers and members of their families. However, as highlighted by the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights – in charge of monitoring the 
implementation of the Convention and working to further its ratification – none of 
the States Parties to the 1990 Convention were major migrant receiving countries. 
It clearly represents an important obstacle to the implementation of the Convention, 
in consideration of the fact that only six of these countries hosted more than one 
million international migrants. Even if over the past years the status of ratifications 
improved slightly, the objectives of the Convention are far from being reached: as 
of the end of 2013, 47 Member States (out of a total of 193 United Nations Mem-
ber States) had ratified the Convention. They collectively hosted 17 million inter-
national migrants in 2013, about seven per cent of the global migrant population. 
Overall, 87 countries had ratified at least one of the four instruments regarding mi-
grant workers. Together they hosted 32 per cent of the world migrant population in 
2010, or 75.8 million in absolute figures21. 
3. – Refugees and Other Displaced Persons: Problems of Employment 
Of the 17.4 million recognized refugees and registered asylum seekers, and 
millions of forcibly displaced persons, only a very small minority gain access to la-
bour markets in the formal economy, opportunities for decent work and satisfactory 
conditions of employment and rights protection in the workplace.  
In 2015, more than 244 million international migrants were estimated to live 
outside their countries of origin for more than 12 months22. Of these, the ILO esti-
 
20
 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families (New York, 18 December 1990), entered into force on 1 July 2003. 
21
 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Map of ratifications of the Inter-
national Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/StatRatCMW.pdf>.  
22
 UNDESA, “Trends in International Migration”, Population Facts No. 2015/4, UN Department of 
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mates that over 150 million (about 62 per cent) are migrant workers23. Globally, 
almost 61 million people are forcibly displaced by conflict, violence and human 
rights violations, overwhelmingly in emerging economies (UNHCR (2015)). By 
mid-2015, an estimated 15.1 million of this total were refugees. The top five coun-
tries of origin – the Syrian Arabic Republic, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and 
South Sudan – account for 10 million refugees, while the top five hosting countries 
in absolute numbers – Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Ethiopia – accommodate 6.1 million refugees. 
Access to work may be prohibited or restricted by law and those that do manage 
to find work do so, in many instances, in the informal economy – the main labour 
market in many of the refugee-impacted countries. The precarious situation of 
these populations renders them vulnerable to discriminatory practices which can 
lead to exploitation and the denial of fundamental principles and rights at work. 
The failure to uphold fundamental principles and rights at work can result in situa-
tions of forced labour, bonded labour, child labour and sexual exploitation. 
In situations where the displacement of refugees is protracted, unacceptable 
forms of work are rising in magnitude. For example, in Jordan, Lebanon and Tur-
key, the incidence of child labour among the Syrian refugee population has in-
creased dramatically in the last few years, reversing gains made in addressing the 
phenomenon among the national population24.  
Discussion about this enormous problem have taken place within the ILO dur-
ing a side event organized at the 14th Session of the International Labour Confer-
ence (ILC) in June 2015 and during the 325th and 326th Sessions of the Governing 
Body in November 2015 and March 2016 respectively. In this context, the Govern-
ing Body at its 326th Session agreed to convene a tripartite technical meeting on 
the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market. It 
was aimed at: discussing the adoption of a set of guiding principles to inform poli-
cy measures on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the 
labour market based on relevant ILO standards and other related human rights in-
struments, as well as good practices where these exist; recommending ways to dis-
 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015. 
23
 ILO, ILO global estimates on migrant workers: Results and methodology, Geneva, 2015. 
24
 ILO, UNICEF, Save the Children and Ministry of Labour, Children living and working on the 
streets of Lebanon: Profile and Magnitude, February 2015. 
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seminate and give practical effect to such ILO guidance, including to inform na-
tional and multilateral responses and forums; preparing the ILO and its constituents 
to contribute to international events addressing global concern about refugees and 
forced displacement, in particular the UN General Assembly Summit addressing 
large movements of refugees and migrants and the US Summit on the refugees cri-
sis both to be held in September 2016. 
A related feature is that globally, the majority of refugees, forcibly displaced 
persons, IDPs and returnees, now live in urban and rural areas usually among their 
host communities, not in refugees’ camps. As displacement becomes increasingly 
protracted, cities may offer better economic prospects than camps and rural areas. 
But access to urban labour markets is usually constrained by unclear legal status 
and degree of enjoyment of economic and social rights. Competition in the highly 
crowded informal economy, where most forcibly displaced persons search for 
work, results in unfair competition for unauthorized and unprotected jobs. 
The ILO has a mandate to protect the interests of all workers “when employed 
in countries other than their own” including refugees25. In its 2016 General Survey 
concerning the ILO’s migrant worker instruments, the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations stated that: “Refugees and dis-
placed persons, where they are employed as workers outside their own countries, 
are covered by the instruments”26. Against this backdrop, the ILO is challenged to 
further define, enhance and implement its contribution both to the overall interna-
tional effort to assist refugees and other forcibly displaced persons and through its 
own distinctive expertise and services to member States to support them in facing 
these challenges. 
3.1. – Difference of Treatment in Labour Context Between Refugees and Dis-
placed Persons 
In the context of forced migrations, a distinction must be introduced between 
refugees and displaced persons in general. A refugee recognized under the provi-
sions of the 1951 Refugee Convention27, in fact, may also benefit from certain la-
 
25
 ILO, Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Preamble. 
26
 ILO, Promoting Fair Migration, Geneva, 105th ILC Session, 2016. 
27
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951), entered into force on 22 
April 1954 (“Refugee Convention”). 
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bour rights spelled out in Article 17 to 19 of this Convention (access to employ-
ment), Articles 15 and 24 (labour rights), and Article 15 (right of association 
through trade unions). Article 17 of the Refugee Convention extends to refugees 
the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the 
same circumstances as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment. 
The same Article specifies also that “restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the 
employment of aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be 
applied to a refugee who was already exempt from them at the date of entry into 
force of this Convention for the Contracting State concerned” or to a refugee who 
has completed three years’ residence in the country. The same conditions are re-
served to a refugee who has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of 
residence or who has one ore more children possessing the nationality of the coun-
try of residence.  
As far as self-employment is concerned, then, Article 18 requires Contracting 
Parties to accord to a refugee a treatment not less favourable than the one accorded 
to aliens generally in the same circumstances, while Article 19 requires the same 
conditions of Articles 18 for a refugee engaged in liberal professions.  
Refugees are “privileged” under these articles over other categories of forcibly dis-
placed persons, even though many countries constrain or limit the application of these 
rights. In fact, even those with refugee status work mainly in the informal economy be-
cause of labour market constraints and legal impediments to their access to work28, 
while for migrants without refugee status, those with temporary protection, and other 
forcibly displaced persons, their only option may be to work informally. 
From the perspective of the ILO and its mandate, access to labour markets for ref-
ugees and other forcibly displaced persons is the turnkey to these developmental objec-
tives alongside managing the wider socio-economic impacts of labour market access.  
3.2. – Problems and Good Practices Related to the Employment of Refugees in 
Host Countries 
In response to the current situation, the ILO is providing technical support to 
Member States in supporting both refugees and national workers. Some examples 
 
28
 According to the ILO-FAFO study “Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market”, 
2015, around 99 per cent of the sample of Syrian refugee workers were employed in the informal econo-
my, compared with 50 per cent of Jordanian workers in the sample. 
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are: pioneering assessments of the impact of the growing number of refugees inside 
Lebanon and Jordan, as well as a survey of their employment status; joint ILO-
UNHCR collaboration in Egypt and Zambia focused on providing integrated value 
chain development projects for refugees; further joint ILO-UNHCR collaboration 
with the tripartite partners in the garment sector in Jordan is piloting the initial cre-
ation of up to 2,000 jobs for Syrian refugees underpinned by the Better Work pro-
gramme; and the Local Economic Recovery approach to provide jobs and income 
opportunities for host communities and refugees, returnees and IDPs. 
In addition to that, an ILO’s Flagship Programme on Jobs for Peace and Resili-
ence (JPR)29 has been created to work in conflict-affected and disaster-prone coun-
tries to prevent, resist, adapt to and recover from conflicts and slow onset disasters 
with potentially important dividends on peace and resilience. The Programme 
combines large-scale and employment-centred interventions with skills and voca-
tional training, entrepreneurship development and awareness raising of fundamen-
tal principles and rights at work in fragile settings, with a specific focus on youth as 
the primary beneficiary group. It also offers a selected package of technical inputs 
as entry points in fragile settings, consisting of Employment Intensive Investment 
Programmes (EIIP) complemented by skills and enterprise development initiatives 
to create an enabling policy environment for social-economic recovery. 
Even though the implementation of the Refugee Convention has been combined 
with a great effort of the ILO for the protection of migrant workers’ rights, many prob-
lems persist in the creation of decent work conditions for refugees. The difficulty of 
solving these problems is due to many concurrent factors, such as the fact that refugee-
hosting States are not all signatories to the 1951 Convention or some have made reser-
vation to Articles 17 to 19 affording refugees the right to engage in different kinds of 
employment; furthermore, very few States have undertaken legislative or administra-
tive reform to improve access to labour markets for refugees and forcibly displaced 
persons. In addition to that, access to labour market is rarely provided with the clarity 
envisaged in international law; rather, it is mediated by political and economic consid-
erations. Generally, refugee and forced migration issues fall under the remit of interior 
or immigration ministries with varying degrees of centralization and decentralization 
of functions such as status determination, and renewal of permits and visas. 
 
29
 The ILO’s Flagship Programme is one of the ILO’s five flagship programmes, designed to en-
hance the efficiency and impact of its development cooperation with constituents on a global scale.  
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In the case of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons, the right and access 
to work are further conditioned by their overall status. The fact that few countries 
display a systematic correlation between the legal and normative provisions for sta-
tus determination and protection, on the one hand, and right to work on the other, is 
a major constraint. 
It is worth noting, however, that many countries, as reported by the ILO in 
201630, are implementing a series of good practices in recent years, also in coopera-
tion with international organizations.  
In February 2016, the Turkish Government adopted the Regulation on Work 
Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, allowing Syrian refugees in 
possession of their temporary identity cards and residing in Turkey for six months, 
to apply for work permits. In Turkey, the ILO is supporting vocational training and 
language courses delivered to refugees by public education centres to ease their ac-
cess into the Turkish labour market. 
Jordan is also engaged in labour market reform with respect to refugees’ access to 
its labour markets and has developed a pioneering strategy, the Jordan Compact. Fur-
thermore, the ILO, in collaboration with the UNHCR, is piloting through its Better 
Work programme in Jordan the creation of jobs in the garment manufacturing sector 
which particularly targets women refugees, including through skills training. 
The Federal Employment Agency of Germany make refugees and asylum seek-
ers eligible for Type II unemployment benefits which are designed to secure a live-
lihood by screening their competences and offering individualized services with in-
tensive counselling and language courses. 
Some States, such as Ecuador, in partnership with the UNHCR and civil society 
organizations, have taken positive measures to facilitate inclusion in the labour 
market through small enterprise schemes, skills upgrading and training pro-
grammes and self-reliance programmes. 
The ILO is also publishing a Joint ILO-UNHCR Guide to Market-based Liveli-
hoods Intervention for Refugees31 providing guidance on entrepreneurship, voca-
 
30
 ILO, The access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market. Back-
ground paper of the ILO guiding principles for discussion at the ILO tripartite technical meeting on the 
access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market, Geneva, 5-7 July 2016. 
31
 ILO, UNHCR, Responding to the Global Refugee Crisis: How market assessments can enhance 
the impact of livelihood interventions for refugees – An intervention model for joint efforts of UNHCR 
and ILO to integrate refugees into the labour market of host countries, 2016. 
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tional training and financial education to enable refugees to set up micro-
enterprises or small income-generating activities to improve livelihoods and self-
reliance. The tourist industry in Sweden, for example, has helped fast-tracking ac-
cess by validating or upgrading skills of qualified asylum seekers or refugees. 
The EU has developed a clear legal framework that seeks to promote greater re-
gion-wide consistency on access of refugees and asylum seekers to the labour mar-
ket that is applied in 25 of its 28 Member States, through the Refugee Qualification 
(Directive 2011/95/EU) and Reception Conditions Directives (Directive 
2013/33/UE). Article 26(1) of the Refugee Qualification Directive states that: 
“Member States shall authorize beneficiaries of international protection to engage 
in employed or self-employed activities subject to the rules generally applicable to 
the profession and to the public service, immediately after protection has been 
granted”. Furthermore, Article 15(1) of the Reception Conditions Directive high-
lights that “States shall ensure that applicants have access to the labour market no 
later than 9 months from the date when the application for international protection 
was lodged if a first instance decision by the competent authority has not been tak-
en and the delay cannot be attributed to the applicant”. 
In the African region, a Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP) was devel-
oped by the African Union Commission together with the ILO, the International 
Organization for Migration (“IOM”) and the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Africa (“UNECA”).  
4. – Forced Labour 
The analysis of migrant workers’ condition and the protection of their rights 
will move now to the complex topic of forced labour, a condition that particularly 
affects persons in a vulnerable situation, among which migrant workers are the 
most eligible target. 
The ILO produced its last Global Estimate of Forced Labour in 201232, which 
revealed figures of 21 million victims of forced labour all over the world, of which 
11.4 million are women and girls and 9.5 million are men and boys.  
Almost 19 million persons are exploited by private individuals or enterprises 
and over 2 million by States or rebel groups. Of those exploited by individuals or 
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enterprises, 4.5 million are victims of forced sexual exploitation.  
Indeed, forced labour in the private economy generates US $ 150 billion in ille-
gal profit per year and domestic work, agriculture, construction, manufacturing and 
entertainment are among the sectors most concerned33. 
The ILO introduced two main Conventions on forced labour. The Forced La-
bour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)34 defines forced labour for the purposes of interna-
tional law as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the men-
ace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntari-
ly” (Article 2(1)). As evinced by the aforementioned article, the ILO’s definition 
comprises two basic elements: the work or service is exacted under the menace of 
penalty and it is undertaken involuntarily. 
The Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)35, then, specifies 
that forced labour can never be used for the purpose of economic development or 
as a means of political education, discrimination, labour discipline, or punishment 
for having participated in strikes (Article 1).  
In 1999, the ILO also introduced the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
(No. 182)36. The Convention clarifies that child labour amounts to forced labour not 
only when children are forced, as individuals in their own right, by a third party to 
work under the menace of a penalty, but also when a child’s work is included with-
in the forced labour provided by the family as a whole. 
The work of the ILO supervisory bodies over 75 years has served to clarify both 
of these elements. The penalty does not need to be in the form of penal sanctions, 
but may also take the form of a loss of rights and privileges. Moreover, the menace 
of a penalty can take multiple different forms. There can also be a subtle form of 
menace, sometimes of a psychological nature. Situation examined by the ILO, and 
reported in its Global Report37, have included threats to denounce victims to the po-
 
33
 The ILO’s usual method of deriving global estimates is to aggregate national estimates into re-
gional and then global figures. This direct aggregation method is often preceded by preliminary steps to 
harmonize differences in national concepts and definitions, and to impute for possible missing data. 
34
 ILO, Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (N.29), Geneva, 14th ILC Session, 28 
June 1930. 
35
 ILO, Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, Geneva, 40th ILC Ses-
sion, 25 June 1957. 
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 ILO, Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
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lice or immigration authorities when their employment status is illegal, or denunci-
ation to village elders in the case of girls forced to prostitute themselves in distant 
cities. Other penalties can be of a financial nature, including economic penalties 
linked to debts, the non-payment of wages, or the loss of wages accompanied by 
threats of dismissal if workers refuse to do overtime beyond the scope of their con-
tract or of national law. Employers sometimes also require workers to hand over 
their identity papers, and may use the threat of confiscation of these documents in 
order to exact forced labour. 
As regards freedom of choice, the ILO’s report refers that there may be many 
subtle forms of coercion. Many victims enter forced labour situations initially of 
their own accord, albeit through fraud and deception, only to discover later that 
they are not free to withdraw their labour. They are subsequently unable to leave 
their work owing to legal, physical or psychological coercion. 
The ILO Report on forced labour evidenced also that older forms of coercion 
and compulsion are transmuting into newer ones. In order to move forward effec-
tively, salient features of much contemporary forced labour need to be understood. 
In 2005, ILO identified three main new trends: forced labour is most frequently ex-
acted by private agents rather than directly by the State; induced indebtedness is a 
key instrument of coercion; precarious legal status of millions of irregular migrants 
makes them particularly vulnerable to coercion. 
Besides these new features of forced labour practice, effective protection of mi-
grant workers is made more difficult by a serious legislative gap. On this point, the 
ILO highlighted as the main problem the fact that, with very few exceptions, forced 
labour is not defined in any detail, making it difficult for law enforcement agents to 
identify and prosecute the offence. While the vast majority of ILO Member States 
have ratified one or both of the ILO’s Conventions on forced labour, many have 
not provided for the specific offence of forced labour in their criminal law, alt-
hough many have included it in their labour law. The law may also be couched in 
very general terms rather than by identifying the various ways in which forced la-
bour may be exacted by private actors. In consequence of this, there have been very 
few prosecutions for forced labour anywhere in the world.  
For the purposes of this article, it is necessary to move briefly to the UN Con-
vention on Human Trafficking, which includes forced labour in the main purposes 
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of exploitation. Indeed, the report of the Expert Group on Trafficking in Human 
Beings, convened by the European Union in 2003, has identified forced labour ex-
ploitation as the crucial element of the Trafficking Protocol38.  
Clearly, the Trafficking Protocol functions as a complementary legislative in-
strument to the ILO’s Conventions on forced labour. However, it is worth noting 
that by no means all the forced labour practices to which even migrant workers are 
subjected in destination countries are necessarily a result of trafficking. And not 
only migrants are the victims of forced labour in the destination countries. 
In addition to that, while the Trafficking Protocol draws certain distinctions be-
tween trafficking for sexual exploitation and trafficking for forced labour or ser-
vices, this should not be taken to imply that coercive sexual exploitation does not 
constitute forced labour. Indeed, the ILO supervisory bodies have regularly dealt 
with forced prostitution and sexual exploitation under Convention No. 29. 
As far as modern-slavery is concerned, then, the ILO clarifies that it is one form 
of forced labour. In particular, “slavery-like practices” clearly encompass situations 
where individuals or social groups are forced to work for others39. There is an evident 
overlap between forced labour situations and slavery-like practices. Debt bondage, 
for example, is a particularly prominent feature of contemporary forced labour situa-
tions. This practice, which is most common in South Asia, involves the taking of a 
loan or wage advance by a worker from an employer or labour recruiter, in return for 
which the worker pledges his or her labour and sometimes that of family members in 
order to repay the loan. The terms of the loan or work, however, may be such that the 
worker is trapped for years without being able to pay back the loan40.  
4.1. – Law Enforcement Against Forced Labour 
At its 103rd Session in June 2014, the International Labour Conference voted 
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 European Commission, Report of the Expert Group on Trafficking in Human Beings, Brussels, 22 
December 2004, p. 53.  
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 Slavery is defined in the Slavery Convention (Geneva, 25 September 1926), entered into force on 
9 March 1927. 
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force on 30 April 1957, as “the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal ser-
vices or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as rea-
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overwhelmingly in favour of adopting a new Protocol to the Forced Labour Con-
vention, 1930 (No. 29)41, as well as a Recommendation that supplements both the 
Protocol and Convention No. 2942. The Protocol establishes the obligations to pre-
vent forced labour, protect victims and provide them with access to remedies and 
emphasizes the link between forced labour and trafficking in persons. In line with 
Convention No. 29, the Protocol also reaffirms the importance of prosecuting the 
perpetrators of forced labour and ending their impunity. A special focus on preven-
tion is intended to implement measures that strengthen the role of labour inspec-
tions and workers’ and employers’ organizations. 
In addition to the Protocol, then, the ILO introduced the Forced Labour Rec-
ommendation, 2014 (No. 203). The Recommendation, which must be read in con-
junction with the Protocol, functions as a non-binding practical guidance concern-
ing measures to strengthen national law and policy on forced labour in the areas of 
prevention, protection of victims and ensuring their access to justice and remedies, 
enforcement and international cooperation. 
However, the potential of the Protocol, which entered into force on 9 November 
2016, is put to a hard test by the fact that it obtained only ten ratifications so far43. 
Article 1(1) of the Protocol sets out its central requirement: in giving effect to 
its obligations under Convention No. 29 to suppress forced or compulsory labour, 
each Member must take effective measuresto prevent and eliminate its use, to 
provide to victim protection and access to appropriate and effective remedies, such 
as compensation, and to sanction the perpetrators of forced or compulsory labour.  
The development of a comprehensive national strategy on forced labour and an 
appropriate institutional framework for its implementation can strengthen the im-
pact of measures taken against forced labour. The Protocol, at Article 1(2), encour-
ages such policy coherence by requiring Members to develop a national policy and 
plan of action on forced labour.  
The Protocol requires also consultation and exchange of information between 
representatives of governments, employers and workers as well as engagement 
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 Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (Geneva, 11 June 2014), entered into 
force on 6 November 2016. 
42
 ILO, Recommendation on supplementary measures for the effective suppression of forced labour, 
Geneva, 103rd ILC Session, 11 June 2014. 
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with other key stakeholders, in order to ensure the effectiveness of measures. Un-
der the Protocol, the national policy and plan of action must be developed in con-
sultation with employers’ and workers’ organizations.  
More generally, measures taken to apply the provisions of the Protocol and 
Convention No. 29 are to be determined by national laws or regulations or by the 
competent authority, after consultation with organizations of employers and work-
ers concerned (Article 6).  
Finally, the national policy and plan of action must involve systematic action by 
the competent authorities – taken, as appropriate, in coordination with employers’ 
and workers’ organization, as well as with other groups concerned, which could in-
clude, for example, other civil society organizations.  
The Protocol places particular emphasis on the effective enforcement of crimi-
nal law, which can deter forced labour violations, but other types of legislation are 
also relevant to prevention. It requires Member States to undertake efforts to ensure 
that the coverage and enforcement of such legislation, including labour law as ap-
propriate, apply to all workers and sectors of the economy44 – so that certain vul-
nerable groups are not left unprotected. Relatedly, the Protocol also requires Mem-
bers to undertake efforts to strengthen labour inspection services and other services 
responsible for the implementation of this legislation.  
While the provision is broadly worded to encompass all legislation relevant to 
the prevention of forced or compulsory labour and the relevant services, labour law 
and labour inspection are highlighted, reflecting the important roles they play in 
combating forced labour.  
For example, forced labour cases may involve several simultaneous violations 
of labour law relating to wages, hours of work, occupational safety and health or 
other areas. By taking immediate action to address and correct such violations, la-
bour inspectors can prevent exploitative situations from degenerating further into 
forced labour. 
Certain workers, including migrant workers, may be particularly vulnerable to 
abuses committed during the recruitment process that can result in forced labour 
situations. Such abuses may include debt process linked to repayment of recruit-
ment fees, illegal wage deductions, retention of passports, threats if workers want 
to leave their employers and deception about the nature and conditions of work. 
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Ensuring fair and transparent recruitment and placement practices are key in pre-
venting forced labour. So, the Protocol establishes that measures to prevent forced 
labour must include protecting persons, particularly migrant workers, from possible 
abusive and fraudulent practices during the recruitment and placement process.  
The importance of effective preventive measures is central to the Recommenda-
tion No. 203, which provides a list of actions to be implemented, such as orienta-
tion and information for migrants before departure and upon arrival and the intro-
duction of employment and labour migration policies. In addition to that, the Rec-
ommendation encourages the cooperation of victims for the identification and pun-
ishment of perpetrators while not conditioning the provision of protective measures 
on such cooperation. It also affirms the need to provide accommodation, health 
care, material assistance and social and economic assistance, as well as the im-
portance to protect the privacy and identity of victims and their safety along with 
that of family members and witnesses.  
Despite the important provisions introduced by the Recommendation, it is 
worth noticing that since Recommendations are non-legally binding by definition 
they do not create any legal effect at all. Furthermore, in some situations it might 
be difficult to establish if a worker is a victim of forced labour, since the bounda-
ries between poor working conditions and forced labour often are fluid and blurred. 
The difficulties countries encounter in implementation may be related to the speci-
ficity of international labour standards as human rights. In fact, fundamental labour 
rights, including the abolition of forced labour, belong in contrast to many other 
rights set forth in ILO standards, primarily to the realm of civil and political rights 
and, to a lesser extent to that of economic and social rights.  
4.2. – Forced Labour and Business 
In recent years, a special attention has been paid to corporate social responsibil-
ity as an important instrument to monitor forced labour. This awareness is strictly 
linked to relevant figures concerning labour exploitation in private sector – as out-
lined above.  
In particular, it is worth mentioning the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”) endorsed by the UN Human Rights Coun-
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cil in June 201145. These Principles are founded with the understanding that all 
business enterprises, regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership or struc-
ture, are required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights. 
The UNGPs have set the stage for meaningful development in business and human 
rights policies by clearly defining, for the first time, the roles and responsibilities of 
the State and companies, and the means of redress open to people who are victims 
of human rights violations. In doing so, they have placed rights firmly back onto 
the corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) agenda.  
The UNGPs are grounded on three general principles: first, States have a duty 
to protect human rights stemming from their international human rights law obliga-
tions; secondly, companies have a responsibility to respect human rights; and final-
ly, remedies for harms must be provided. 
The UNGPs identify three modes of business responsibility for human rights: 
first, causing human rights abuse or “adverse human rights impacts”; second, con-
tributing to adverse impacts on human rights; or third, a “direct linkage between 
the operations, products or services” of a business with adverse impacts on human 
rights through “business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those 
impacts”46. 
The UNGPs should be implemented with a special focus on the rights and 
needs of groups who are particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses linked to 
business practices. An essential starting point is for companies to map where vul-
nerable groups exist in the supply chain in order to understand how the business is 
impacting these people. The results of vulnerability mapping can then be used to 
establish the salient impacts on which the company needs to take action.  
In the light of these observations, UNGPs may be considered as a further in-
strument to contrast forced labour. Indeed, even if they are not focused on labour 
exploitation specifically, principles 18 through 21 elaborate essential components 
of human rights due diligence. In particular, UNGPs establish that business enter-
prises should pay special attention to any particular human rights impacts on indi-
viduals from groups or populations that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability 
 
45
 United Nations Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, New 
York/Geneva, 2011. 
46
 UNGPs, Principle 15. 
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or marginalization, and bear in mind the different risks that may be faced by wom-
en and men.  
For its part, the ILO has always paid particular attention to Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) as an important instrument to protect workers. The point of 
reference for the ILO on CSR is the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concern-
ing Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, which is the only international in-
strument addressed to enterprises which has been agreed to by governments, em-
ployers’ and workers’ organisations.  
Reliable statistical information about the economic sectors where forced labour 
is found remains difficult to establish. However, ILO estimates that, globally, only 
10% of all forced labour is exacted by the State or armed forces. This means that 
the overwhelming majority of forced labour is exacted by private agents. Of this 
majority, 22% is exacted for forced sexual exploitation, while 68% is exacted for 
the purpose of forced labour exploitation.  
Forced labour that results from human trafficking largely affects persons work-
ing at the margins of the formal economy, with irregular employment or migration 
status. However, it is increasingly evident that coercive recruitment and employ-
ment practices can affect migrant workers in other mainstream economic sectors as 
well, for example in health care, food processing, and contract cleaning, both in 
private and public sector employment.  
Some key steps have already been taken by enterprises and business actors of all 
kinds. Companies are adopting policy measures – for example, codes of conduct – 
that explicitly prohibit forced labour, while others have joined multi-stakeholder ini-
tiatives such as the UN Global Compact. These are important initiatives. However, 
there is growing international consensus that much more still needs to be done.  
More recently, the ILO addressed the problem of forced labour in business by 
publishing an Employers’ Handbook on Forced Labour, in collaboration with the 
International Organization of Employers47. The handbook reflects new ILO statis-
tics and researches on forced labour as well as the framework of action approved 
by the ILO Governing Body in 2014.  
In its Handbook, the ILO encourages many companies to undertake many im-
portant actions to prevent and combat forced labour. It is recommended, for example, 
 
47
 ILO, A Handbook for Employers and Business. Special Action Programme to Combat Forced La-
bour, Geneva, 2015. 
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that employers’ organizations play a central role in providing their members with in-
formation and advice on addressing forced labour and human trafficking. By virtue 
of their role in representing business, employers’ organizations can develop or partic-
ipate in programmes that seek to rehabilitate and reintegrate former victims of forced 
labour and human trafficking. They can lead job placement or apprenticeship pro-
grammes, and provide vocational training and skills development opportunities.  
The Handbook also identifies some tips for taking action against forced labour, 
such as establishing a clear and transparent company policy that sets out the 
measures to prevent forced labour. The ILO also requires companies to monitor 
their suppliers and sub-contractors and to build bridges with other stakeholders, in-
cluding workers’ organizations, law enforcement authorities, labour inspectorates 
and non-governmental organizations.
 
5. – Conclusions 
The recognition of migration as a condition for development by the UN Post-
2015 development Agenda is only the tip of the iceberg of a new awareness of the 
problem at international level. Even if the first legal instrument to facilitate labour 
migration dates back to the fifties, the above analysis outlined an important in-
crease of the UN production of treaties, in particular by the ILO, on this matter.  
As emerged in paragraph 2, however, many problems arise in relation with the 
effective implementation of these instruments. As far as binding Conventions are 
concerned, the ratification status is far from sufficient. Countries that have ratified 
are mostly sending countries, while respect for the rights of labour migrants is like-
ly to be more important in receiving countries.  
Additionally, the friction between institutional declarations and practical imple-
mentation of the dispositions, especially at local level, is one of the major obstacles.  
Although remittances are globally assumed as an important means of imple-
menting the development goals, economic migrants are diffusely perceived more as 
a problem than as a resource.  
Labour migration turned out to be a really complex phenomenon not only for the 
various characteristics it may assume, but also for the social and political implica-
tions which may concern it. First of all, migration falls within the domestic domain 
of the State. That is precisely why governments have the quite exclusive competence 
to determine the national legal framework for labour migration. In addition to that, 
the ratification status of the international law instruments on labour migration is far 
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to be sufficient. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted by the UN in 1990, for 
example, introduced many important provisions, but its effectiveness in upholding 
the rights of migrant workers has been constrained by slow ratification. 
The same problem has also emerged in relation to refugees’ rights protection, 
where refugee-hosting States are not all signatories to the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion and some have made reservation to Articles 17 to 19 affording refugees the 
right to engage in different kinds of employment. 
A critical consequence of the lack of agreements on international mobility, as 
emerged above, is that irregular migration is encouraged. In many countries, for 
example, migrants are entirely dependent on their employers because their resi-
dence permit are linked to a specific job. 
The condition of vulnerability that labour migration may produce contributes to 
the increase of labour exploitation cases, even to forced labour.  
In that respect the ILO has recently produced an important legal instrument, 
namely the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which unfortunately 
has been ratified only by ten countries to date. Besides binding instruments, the ILO 
produced also Recommendations, which, despite their non-binding status, are able to 
provide States an important guidance in addressing forced labour suppression. In ef-
fect, it is a matter of fact that in order to implement effectively international measures 
against forced labour, a change of States’ migration policies is needed.  
In the light of what said, it must be considered that ILO’s praxis in the context 
of migrant workers’ right defence has been really prolific in recent years, but a ma-
jor effort by Member States is required in order to implement these dispositions ef-
fectively and to guarantee law enforcement worldwide.  
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1. – Introduction and Context 
The adoption in January 2016 by the Danish Parliament of an amendment to the 
Aliens Act, known as the “Jewellery Law”1, providing for the search and seizure of 
 
*
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providing useful comments. However, errors and omissions in the article are the sole responsibility of the 
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 See Bill No. L87 presented by the Danish Government on 10 December 2015, and adopted by the 
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certain assets of asylum seekers that may serve as a contribution to the costs of 
their reception, raised several concerns especially as to its human rights implica-
tions2. The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), in fact, 
questioned the legality of the law, in particular as regards the introduction of the 
new police search and seizure powers which have been criticized to be “an affront 
to… dignity and an arbitrary interference with [the] right to privacy”3. 
This heavily debated law is to be situated within the initiatives undertaken by 
the Danish government to limit the attractiveness of Denmark as a country of desti-
nation for asylum seekers and migrants4. More broadly, the Jewellery Law consti-
tutes one of the reactions to the ongoing migratory flows affecting many Member 
States of the European Union (“EU”)5. As stressed by Groenendijk and Peers, simi-
lar rules exist in the legislation of several Member States, including Germany, the 
Netherlands or Sweden6. The domestic practice at the European level shows the ex-
 
Danish Parliament on 26 January 2016. The so called “Jewellery Law” was incorporated into Act No. 
102 of 3 February 2016, amending the Danish Aliens Act, whose original text is available at: 
<www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=164258>. For comments see IBEN JENSEN and 
VEDSTED-HANSEN, “The Danish ‘Jewellery Law’: When the signal hits the fan?”, European Immigration 
and Asylum Law and Policy, 4 March 2016, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-danish-
jewellery-law-when-the-signal-hits-the-fan/>. 
2
 See, e.g., HARTMANN and FEITH TAN, “The Danish Law on Seizing Asylum Seekers’ Assets”, 
EJIL: Talk!, 27 January 2016, available at: <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-danish-law-on-seizing-asylum-
seekers-assets/>. 
3
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Observations on the proposed 
amendments to the Danish Aliens legislation, L 87, 6 January 2016,” available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/5694ed3a4.html>. 
4
 A series of 34 proposals for legislative amendments and administrative initiatives was tabled by the 
Danish government on 13 November 2015 as part of the “Asylum Package”. These amendments include 
also the controversial possibility to postpone from one to three years access to family reunification for 
aliens with temporary protected status, a form of protection which is different from refugee status. As to 
the concerns raised by the changes to the Danish Aliens Act, see the Letter from the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, CommDH(2016)4, 15 January 2016, available at: 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CommDH(2016)4&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Si
te=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864&dir
ect=true>. 
5
 As highlighted by Eurostat, in the second quarter of 2016, the number of persons seeking asylum in 
the EU reached 305,700, marking an increase of 6 per cent compared with the first quarter of 2016. For 
an overall overview of migration and asylum statistics, see the tables and figures updated by Eurostat at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics>. 
6
 GROENENDIJK and PEERS, “Can Member States seize asylum-seekers’ assets?”, EU Law Analysis, 
24 January 2016, available at: <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2016/01/can-member-states-seize-
asylum-seekers.html>. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The “Asylum Payers” … 151 
 
 
istence of a series of national rules concerning the possibility to force asylum seek-
ers to contribute from their own assets and income to the cost of their reception.  
Despite triggering initial debates, the issue of the asylum seekers’ contribution 
to the expenses of their maintenance has remained partly unexplored, though con-
stituting a burning topic of the migration and development discourse. Host States 
claim, in fact, that the cost of reception of asylum seekers may have an impact on 
the state of national economy, particularly in time of crisis7. 
Generally, migration constitutes a development vehicle that could be greatly 
beneficial to countries of both origin and destination8. Nonetheless, the impact of 
the migratory pressure on the EU has been challenging the reception conditions of 
many Member States, especially in cases of forced migration of persons in need for 
protection9. The difficulties in distinguishing economic migrants from asylum 
seekers and other people in need for protection in a context of mixed migratory 
flows10 has resulted in the adoption of legislative measures aimed at discouraging 
any possible pull factor in countries of destination. 
Recognizing that host countries, as confirmed by the UNHCR, have to pay a 
high price for receiving asylum seekers11, it is pivotal to answer the question 
 
7
 For an economic analysis see in particular AIYAR et al., “Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic 
Challenges”, International Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/02, 1 January 2016, available 
at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1602.pdf>. 
8
 See UN General Assembly, Second Committee, 19th Meeting, 27 October 2010, GA/EF/3291. The 
link between migration and development has been especially explored by CHIMNI, “Development and 
Migration”, in ALEINIKOFF and CHETAIL (eds.), Migration and International Legal Norms, The Hague, 
2003, p. 255 ff. 
9
 International Organization for Migration (“IOM”), Glossary on Migration, Geneva, 2004, p. 25, re-
fers to forced migration as a 
“general term used to describe a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, 
including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. 
movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or 
environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).” 
10
 Mixed flows are generally defined by the IOM, cit. supra note 9, as “complex population movements 
including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants.” For references, see in particu-
lar, LINDE, “Mixed Migration - A Humanitarian Counterpoint”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2011, pp. 89-99. 
For further references see EL-ENANY, “The EU Asylum, Immigration and Border Control Regimes: Includ-
ing and Excluding the ‘Deserving Migrant’”, European Journal of Social Security, 2013, p. 171 ff. 
11
 UNHCR Standing Committee, “Social and economic impact of large refugee populations on host 
developing countries” UN Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.7, 6 January 1997, para. 28, available at: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-
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whether asylum seekers may be legitimately required to contribute to the cost of 
their reception. Accordingly, the nature and scope of a specific obligation in this 
regard needs to be properly investigated as well as its compatibility with EU law 
and the international legal framework. 
To this extent, the research will firstly review the most relevant domestic prac-
tice at the European level, highlighting the possible risks beyond construing asylum 
seekers as profiteering from the international refugee protection regime. The scope 
of the research will be limited to the European context, the latter being one of the 
regions which are most concerned with migratory flows that are even likely to hin-
der one of the essential values of the European cooperation, such as the free 
movement of persons12.   
Next, the research will examine the international legal framework and notably 
the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugee13 as to the possibility for States to 
impose on refugees and asylum seekers any obligation to contribute to the cost of 
their reception. The analysis will also consider States’ international duties to re-
spect the property of aliens and that aliens have the right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of their property under international human rights law.  
It will be argued that the tendency to impose an obligation for asylum seekers to 
contribute to the cost of their reception may undermine the exercise of the right to 
asylum and can also create discriminations on how property and possessions are 
protected, if treating asylum seekers radically different from other migrants and 
from national citizens. Furthermore, the paper will focus on the pertinent rules of 
the Common European Asylum System (“CEAS”),14 especially the Reception Di-
 
populations-host-developing-countries.html - _ga=1.194174126.26314193.1474381000>. 
12
 See, e.g., FIJNAUT, “The Refugee Crisis: The End of Schengen?”, European Journal of Crime 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2015, p. 313 ff. 
13
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951), entered into force on 22 
April 1954 (“Refugee Convention”), and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (New York, 31 
January 1967), entered into force on 4 October 1967. 
14
 The Common European Asylum System consists of the following binding acts: Council Regula-
tion 604/2013, OJ L 180/31, 29 June 2013 (“Dublin III Regulation”); Council Regulation 603/2010, OJ L 
180/1, 29 June 2013 (“Eurodac Regulation”); Directive 2011/95/EU, OJ L 337/9, 20 December 2011 
(“Qualification Directive”); Directive 2013/33/EU, OJ L 180/96, 29 June 2013 (“Reception Directive”); 
Directive 2013/32/EU, OJ L 180/249, 29 June 2013 (“Procedures Directive”); Council Directive 
2001/55/EC, OJ L212/12, 20 July 2001. For an interpretation of the CEAS as an integrated legal system, 
see extensively BATTJES and SPIJKERBOER, “The Systematic Nature of the Common European Asylum 
System”, in JULIEN-LAFERRIÈRE, LABAYLE and EDSTRÖM (eds.), The European Immigration and Asy-
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rective, to reach the conclusions on the implications of asylum seekers’ obligations 
to contribute to the costs of their reception. 
Ultimately, it will be suggested that a national rule allowing authorities to con-
fiscate all means of an asylum seeker above a fixed amount, is not thoroughly 
compatible with international and EU law, as it may violate the principle of propor-
tionality and can be detrimental to the effective exercise of the right to asylum.  
2. – The Practice Related to the Asylum Seekers’ Contribution to the 
Costs of their Reception in Europe 
A few European States have consolidated rules within their legislation concern-
ing asylum seekers’ contributions to the cost of their reception.  
The Danish Aliens Act, in fact, even before the recent amendment of January 
2016, envisaged that asylum seekers could be required to contribute to expenses 
associated with their stay for up to three months and the Danish police had the 
power to find documents that could be relevant for asylum claims. However, as has 
been underscored, this law was apparently never enforced15. Admittedly, the most 
appalling issue of the recent amendment to the Aliens Act is the possibility for the 
police to confiscate asylum seekers’ assets worth 10,000 Danish krones (more than 
1,340 Euro), such as cash or jewellery, with the exception of items of special sen-
timental value, such as wedding rings or medals. These seized assets will be used 
to pay the cost of reception, including accommodation or healthcare services. 
Apart from Denmark, similar practices are common to other EU Member States, 
including those with a long tradition in receiving refugees, such as Germany, where the 
Federal Law on the reception of asylum seekers (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz), pro-
vides that asylum seekers can be forced to contribute from their own assets and income 
to the cost of their reception16. Article 7 of this law exempts only 200 Euros and the 
goods necessary for exercising a profession or employment. However, as reported by 
 
lum Policy: Critical Assessment Five Years After the Amsterdam Treaty, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 263 ff., p. 
270, where it is argued that “the conception of European asylum legislation as an integrated system is in 
some quite important respects necessary to interpret its rules, including claims on protection relevant for 
international law”. For an updated commentary on the CEAS toolbox, see especially HAILBRONNER AND 
THYM, EU Immigration and Asylum Law. Commentary, 2nd edition, Baden-Baden, 2016. 
15
 HARTMANN and FEITH TAN, cit. supra note 2. 
16
 Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz - AsylbLG), 30 June 1993, available 
at: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylblg/BJNR107410993.html>. 
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Groenendijk and Peers17, the practice in Germany is rather diversified as the Federal 
Law allows for differentiated application in the Landers.  
In the Netherlands, asylum seekers are required to report whether they have 
own assets or income a part of which they may have to relinquish in order to con-
tribute to their own reception costs and the reception costs of their family18.  
In France, the recent reform of asylum legislation has profoundly modified the 
reception scheme and has included the possibility for asylum seekers to pay a fi-
nancial contribution for their accommodation, should the accommodated asylum 
seekers have monthly resources which are above the monthly rate of the Active 
Solidarity Income (“Revenu de Solidarité Active”)19. In addition, organizations 
managing reception facilities are entitled to require a deposit for the accommoda-
tion provided, which will be refunded, totally or partially, when asylum seekers 
leave the reception facility20.  
Still, in Hungary, the Asylum Act provides material reception conditions free of 
charge only to asylum seekers who are indigent, while the Asylum Authority may 
decide to order the applicant to pay for the full or partial costs of material condi-
tions and health care21. However, the level of resources is not established in the 
Asylum Act and applicants have to make a statement regarding their financial situ-
ation. Presently, this condition does not pose an obstacle to accessing reception 
conditions. Access to reception conditions can be reduced or withdrawn in case it 
can be proven that the applicant deceived the authorities regarding his or her finan-
cial situation, although the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (“ECRE”) 
underscores that there have not been reports that asylum seekers would not be able 
to access material reception conditions. 
A similar practice is common to other countries in Europe, which are not part of 
 
17
 GROENENDIJK and PEERS, cit. supra note 6. 
18
 See for further see the Country Report elaborated by the European Council on Refugees and Ex-
iles, available at: <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/netherlands> and consult the web site 
of the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (“COA”). 
19
 As of 1 April 2016 the total amount of the Active Solidary Income (“RSA”) is 524.68 Euro for a 
single adult. 
20
 Articles L.744-1 to L.744-10 Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile, as 
amended by the Law No. 2015-925 of 29 July 2015, in Official Journal of the French Republic, No. 174, 
30 July 2015, p. 12977. 
21
 Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum, available at: 
<http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=110729.259725>, at Sec. 26(2). See also the Country Report 
elaborated by ECRE, available at: <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary>. 
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the EU, such as Switzerland, whose legislation requires asylum seekers to report to 
the Swiss authorities their values from 1,000 Swiss francs (more than 2,700 Euros) 
in order to contribute to the cost of their asylum applications and the provision of 
social assistance, while refugees or beneficiaries of other forms of protection are 
required to pay a tax of 10 per cent on their income as a contribution to the recep-
tion costs for a ten-year period22. 
This set of domestic rules requiring asylum seekers to contribute to the cost of 
their reception reflects a consolidated European practice. Yet, a careful analysis 
through the lens of international and European law is necessary to understand 
whether access to reception conditions can be subject to the payment of a financial 
contribution or fee. 
3. – International Law and the Economic Treatment of Refugees and 
their Property 
Most of the domestic provisions concerning the reception of asylum seekers in 
Europe have been influenced by the process of harmonization that has been gener-
ated by EU law in the area of asylum23. This is the case, for instance, of the recent 
legislative reform in France, which was adopted in order to comply with the new 
CEAS legal toolbox24. The latter constitutes the legislative framework that must be 
taken into consideration to understand whether rules and practices on the seizure of 
asylum seekers’ assets and financial contributions to the cost of reception are ad-
missible and in line with EU law.  
Nonetheless, before delving into the analysis of EU law provisions, it is crucial to 
examine the international legal landscape and especially the Refugee Convention, 
 
22
 The most important norms for admission and handling of refugees are contained in the Asylum 
Act (Asylgesetz), 26 June 1998, as amended, Systematische Rechtssammlung [SR] 142.31, available at: 
<https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19995092/201510010000/142.31.pdf>, unofficial 
English translation is available at: <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995092/ 
201510010000/142.31.pdf>, and the Foreign Nationals Act (Bundesgesetz über die Ausländerinnen und 
Ausländer), 16 December 2005, SR 142.20, available at: <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-
compilation/20020232/201510010000/142.20.pdf>, unofficial English translation available at: 
<https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20020232/201510010000/142.20.pdf>. 
23
 For a critical discussion see in particular BHABHA, “European Harmonization of Asylum Policy: A 
Flawed Process”, Virginia Journal of International Law, 1994, p. 101 ff. For further references see also 
GUILD and MINDERHOUD (eds.), The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, Leiden, 2012.  
24
 See supra note 14. 
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which, as stated by the Court of Justice of the EU, constitutes  “the cornerstone of the 
international legal regime for the protection of refugees”25, and, pursuant to Article 
78(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”), the whole EU policy on 
international protection “must be in accordance” with the Refugee Convention and 
other relevant treaties, specifically in the field of human rights26. 
International law offers a diversified set of rules likely to regulate the economic 
treatment of refugees. In particular, the simultaneous application of the Refugee 
Convention’s regime and international human rights instruments confirms that 
States must treat asylum seekers and their property according to the principle of 
non-discrimination. The two bodies of law will be subsequently analysed.  
3.1. – The Refugee Convention 
The Refugee Convention enshrines a number of principles regulating the treat-
ment of refugees and their property. In particular, Article 13 and, more specifically, 
Article 29 on fiscal charges and Article 30 on transfer of assets are worth mention-
ing as they set the general framework concerning the economic treatment of refu-
gees.  
Article 13 establishes that: 
“The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible 
and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same cir-
cumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property and other rights 
pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and immovable 
property”. 
This provision echoes the general principle enshrined in Article 7(1) of the Ref-
ugee Convention which imposes the obligation to accord to refugees the same 
treatment which is accorded to aliens generally and introduces a standard of treat-
 
25
 Case C-175/08, Aydin Salahadin Abdulla, ECR, 2010, I-01493, para. 52. 
26
 Art. 78(1) TFEU reads as follows: 
“The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring interna-
tional protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must 
be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties”. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The “Asylum Payers” … 157 
 
 
ment based on the principle of non-discrimination27. More specifically, Article 13 
requires States to respect asylum seekers’ property rights on the same ground as for 
other foreigners, not only on tangible property but also on securities, money, bank 
accounts, with the exception of artistic and industrial property, which is regulated 
in Article 1428. 
As regards property rights, Article 7(1) incorporates, as stressed by Hathaway, 
the duty to comply with international aliens law, including the obligation to provide 
adequate compensation for any denial of property rights, which renders any confis-
catory regime specifically applied against refugees contrary to the Refugee Con-
vention29. From this perspective, the practice of Kenya and Uganda aimed at seiz-
ing refugees’ vehicles without compensation is an example of a practice that can be 
considered in breach of international law30.  
Still, as regards the economic treatment of refugees, Article 29 establishes the 
general rule that States Parties shall not impose on refugees charges or taxes 
“other or higher than those which are or may be levied on their nationals in simi-
lar situations”31. Article 30 confirms the right of refugees to transfer all and any 
type of assets which they have brought to the territory of the hosting State to an-
other country in case of resettlement32. In the light of the drafting history of the 
Refugee Convention, it is clear that Article 29 reiterates the general principle of 
equal treatment between nationals and refugees as to the obligations stemming 
 
27
 UNHCR, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, Geneva, 1990, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/53e1dd114.html>, p. 47. 
28
 Ibid. p. 199. 
29
 HATHAWAY, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge, 2005, p. 523. For fur-
ther references to the rights of aliens, see generally NASCIMBENE, Il trattamento dello straniero nel diritto 
internazionale ed europeo, Milan, 1984. 
30
 HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 29, p. 523. 
31
 Art. 29(1), Refugee Convention. 
32
 Art. 30(1), Refugee Convention, which reads as follows: 
“1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit refugees to 
transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to another country where they have been 
admitted for the purposes of resettlement. 
2. A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the application of refugees for 
permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which are necessary for their resettlement in 
another country to which they have been admitted.” 
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from tax legislation33, this corresponds to provisions included in previous refugee 
law instruments, such as the 1933 Convention34. Therefore, as explained by Hath-
away, Article 29 follows a standard clause in tax treaties, according to which 
when a tax is imposed on nationals and aliens in the same circumstances, it must 
be in the same form, and the relative formalities should not result more onerous 
for foreigners than for nationals35.  
Contrariwise, Article 30 constitutes a novelty in the Refugee Convention, as it 
does not echo any former provision of the previous refugee instruments; it stems 
from a Belgian proposal within the Ad Hoc Committee36. As noted by Grahl-Madsen 
in his commentary, the provision sets forth a mandatory obligation which does not 
allow any discretion of the national authorities as to the transfer of the assets37. It is 
worth noting that a proposal to restrict the right of transfer to assets brought as a ref-
ugee was rejected by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries38, thus the obligation refers 
also to assets brought by asylum seekers before the refugee status was determined. It 
follows from the analysis of Article 30 that under international refugee law the prop-
erty of refugees is protected from any unlawful and undue seizure by the authorities 
of the host State, even before the refugee status is determined.  
In sum, international refugee law requires that refugees and other aliens are 
subjected to similar treatment, though it is clear that other aliens may not be enti-
tled to the reception conditions which asylum seekers receive. From this perspec-
tive, it is also significant to stress that the Danish government has compared the po-
sition of refugees to that of Danish citizens claiming for social assistance. Accord-
ingly, Denmark has been applying the same logic of the domestic Active Social 
Policy Act, according to which social assistance will not be provided to those indi-
viduals who have assets likely to cover their economic needs over the amount of 
10,000 Danish krones per person and that are necessary to maintain a basic stand-
ard of living39.  
 
33
 UNHCR, cit. supra note 27, p. 199. 
34
 Art. 13 of the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees (Geneva, 28 October 
1933), entered into force on 22 April 1954. 
35
 HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 29, p. 531. 
36
 UN Doc. E/AC.32/L.24. 
37
 GRAHL-MADSEN, Commentary of the Refugee Convention 1951 (Articles 2-11, 13-37), UNHCR, 
1963, republished in October 1997, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4785ee9d2.html>. 
38
 UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.13, p. 7. 
39
 Bekendtgørelse af lov om aktiv socialpolitik, LBK No. 468, 20 May 2016, available at: 
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Nevertheless, despite such measure can be legitimate, a more cautious approach 
is necessary while equating asylum seekers and citizens applying for social assis-
tance. It must be stressed, in fact, that the Refugee Convention enshrines a number 
of secondary rights specifically linked with the reception of refugees, which States 
Parties are obliged to grant in order not to make the international system of refugee 
protection nugatory. Such rights, including the right to housing, work, education, 
primarily reflect the humanitarian nature of the international system of refugee pro-
tection and the need to facilitate the integration of refugees in the host society. Any 
seizure of asylum seekers’ assets, if arbitrary, risks turning this legal regime into a 
discriminatory system likely to affect the relevance of the principle of equal treat-
ment. To this extent, this body of law complements the main provisions enshrined 
under international human rights law40, which will be shortly examined in the fol-
lowing subparagraph. 
3.2. – International Human Rights Law  
Apart from the specific legal regime established by the Refugee Convention, 
the right to property is enshrined as a human right in a few other international in-
struments, such as the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers41 
at the universal level, while at the regional level the right to property is included in 
the American Convention on Human Rights,42 the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights,43 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,44 and, although not 
enshrined in the original text of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), such right features in the 1952 Additional Protocol I.  
The latter instrument plays a pivotal role, owing to the concerns that the issue 
 
<https://www.retsinformation.dk/pdfPrint.aspx?id=180043>. 
40
 As to the interplay between international refugee law and international human rights law, see gen-
erally CHETAIL, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights?: An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations be-
tween Refugee Law and Human Rights Law”, in RUBIO-MARÍN (ed), Human Rights and Immigration, 
Oxford, 2014, p. 19 ff. 
41
 Art. 15 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (New York, 18 December 1990), entered into force on 1 July 2003. 
42
 Art. 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 22 November 1969), entered into 
force on 18 July 1978. 
43
 Art. 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul, 27 June 1981), entered into 
force on 21 October 1986. 
44
 Art. 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C364/1, 18 December 
2000. 
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of seizing asylum seekers’ assets has raised especially in Europe. Article 1(1) of 
the latter Protocol reads, in fact, as follows:  
“1. Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his posses-
sions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject 
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
2. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State 
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties”. 
Without delving into an extensive analysis on the interpretation of the right to 
property under the ECHR regime45, it is worth mentioning that the provision above 
confirms that the right in subject is not absolute. The fact that the Refugee Conven-
tion and international human rights instruments, such as the ECHR impose a duty 
to respect foreign nationals and their property according to the principle of non-
discrimination does not imply, in fact, that restrictions to property are not allowed 
in any case.  
In a consistent case law, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in-
terpreted the right to property as comprising three distinct rules as key components 
of such right, namely the general principle of peaceful enjoyment of property, the 
deprivation of property under certain conditions and State control over the use of 
property according to the general interest46. Admittedly, pursuant to these intercon-
nected rules any interference with the right to property must be interpreted in the 
light of the fair balance between the fundamental rights of individuals and the pub-
lic needs47 and any restriction to the right to property must serve a legitimate aim, 
including the adoption of measures of economic reform or measures designed to 
achieve greater social justice48. From this perspective, it follows that such a fair 
balance will not have been struck where the individual property owner is made to 
 
45
 For a more extensive analysis, see especially COLACINO, La protezione del diritto di proprietà nel 
sistema della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Roma, 2007. 
46
 See Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Application No. 7151/75 (A/52), Application No. 7152/75 
(A/52), Judgment of 23 September 1982. For a general reference see especially COBAN, Protection of 
Property Rights Within the European Convention on Human Rights, Aldershot, 2002. 
47
 Sporrong, cit. supra note 46, para. 69. 
48
 James and Others v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8793/79, Judgment of 21 February 1986. 
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bear “an individual and excessive burden”49. A possible restriction to the right to 
property for reasons related to public economy may be justified but it is hard to ac-
cept that the cost of reception conditions can constitute an important public need 
which can justify the seizure of asylum seekers’ personal assets. Similar re-
strictions can, in fact, result disproportionate through the lens of international law. 
Although less affected by asylum applications, unlike Germany, Hungary, 
Sweden, Austria and Italy50, Denmark is certainly one of the highest spenders on 
the reception of asylum seekers and this has clear economic consequences. None-
theless, refugees are not to be considered exclusively as a social and economic bur-
den for the host society. As highlighted by the UNHCR, while it is recognized that 
there may be some negative aspects to the impact of a refugee influx on the eco-
nomic life of a host country, the economic impact of refugees on host areas is not 
necessarily negative, as an economic stimulus may be generated, inter alia, through 
the local purchase of food, non-food items, shelter materials by agencies supplying 
relief items, disbursements made by aid workers, the assets brought by refugees 
themselves, as well as employment and income accrued to local population, direct-
ly or indirectly, through assistance projects for refugee areas51.  
Such considerations do not aim to deny the heavy price that host societies have 
to pay in receiving asylum seekers, but they intend to clarify that international law 
sets forth a system whose primary scope is to protect people in need for protection, 
emphasizing how a satisfactory solution of the problem cannot be achieved by im-
posing undue or disproportionate obligations upon asylum seekers, without consid-
ering instead international co-operation among States52, also at the regional level 
and more specifically within the EU. In this regard, an effective system of respon-
sibility-sharing based on solidarity mechanisms, which include the relocation of 
asylum seekers across the EU, is under discussion in the light of the recast process 
of the Dublin Regulation on the State responsible for an asylum application53. 
 
49
 Sporrong, cit. supra note 46, para. 73. 
50
 See statistics on the number of (non-EU) asylum seekers in the EU and EFTA Member States, 
2014 and 2015 (thousands of first time applicants), available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/>. 
51
 UNHCR Standing Committee, cit. supra note 11, para. 6. 
52
 Preamble of the Refugee Convention. 
53
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or 
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Without discussing in greater detail the ongoing proposals, it is worth highlighting 
that an effective system of relocation of asylum seekers must address the different 
needs for protection in the reception of asylum seekers, such as family reunification 
and the best interest of the child54. 
4. – Asylum Seekers’ Financial Contributions to the Costs of their 
Reception under EU Law 
The international legal framework does not specifically address the issue of the 
possible asylum seekers’ obligation to contribute to their own maintenance, as the 
Refugee Convention and international human rights rules merely establish a not 
less favourable standard of treatment than that accorded to aliens generally in the 
same circumstance. 
Nonethless, within EU law a more detailed set of rules enshrined in the Recep-
tion Directive55 complements the international legal framework as to the reception 
and treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. Despite the fact that Article 78(1) 
TFEU enshrines the EU commitment to develop a policy on international protec-
tion which must be consistent with the Refugee Convention and other relevant trea-
ties, including the ECHR, the CEAS has evolved as an autonomous body of law 
with specific rules. It is therefore crucial to explore the regime established by the 
Reception Directive in order to see whether an obligation for asylum seekers to 
contribute to the costs of their reception is allowed under EU law and whether it is 
compatible or raises tensions with the international legal framework. 
The current Reception Directive, which replaces former Directive 2003/9,56 
 
a stateless person (recast), [COM(2016) 270 final/2], 21 August 2016; see also [COM(2016) 270 final/1], 
4 May 2016. For specific references on the recast process of the Dublin Regulation, see MAIANI, “The 
Reform of the Dublin III Regulation”, Study commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Depart-
ment for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, 28 June 2016, 
available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2016)571360>. 
54
 See, in this regard, NICOLOSI, “Emerging Challenges of the Emerging Challenges of the Tempo-
rary Relocation Measures under EU Asylum Law”, European Law Review, 2016, p. 338 ff. On the latter 
issue, see the contribution by GUALCO in this Volume, p. 175 ff. 
55
 For a recent commentary on the Reception Directive, see inter alia, PEERS et al., EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): Second Revised Edition, Vol. 3 – EU Asylum Law, Bos-
ton/Leiden, 2015, p. 497 ff. See also HAILBRONNER and THYM, “Legal Framework for EU Asylum Poli-
cy”, in ID. (eds.), cit. supra note 14, p. 1023 ff. 
56
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the recep-
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deals with access to reception conditions for asylum seekers while they wait for the 
examination of their claim and ensures access to housing, food, healthcare and em-
ployment as well as medical and psychological care. This legislative instrument is 
necessary for a common asylum policy in order to harmonize rules on reception 
conditions and offer equivalent standards of treatment across the EU, as stated in 
the 2009 Stockholm Programme57.  
The relevant provisions on material reception conditions are enshrined in Arti-
cle 17 which establishes the obligation for Member States to provide “adequate 
standards of living” for applicants. 
Nonetheless, this provision allows some leeway to Member States because all 
or some of the reception conditions can be made available to those asylum appli-
cants who do not have sufficient means necessary to have adequate standards of 
living58. Secondly and more importantly, Article 17(4) allows Member States to 
“require applicants to cover or contribute to the cost of the material reception con-
ditions and of the health care”, provided that the applicants have sufficient re-
sources, for example if they have been working for a reasonable period of time. As 
explained in detail by Groenendijk and Peers through the analysis of the travaux 
préparatoires59, such provisions on financial contributions by asylum seekers were 
also contained in former Directive 2003/9 and in the Commission’s proposal for 
the original Directive, which carried a specific provision on financial contributions 
that asylum seekers may be asked to pay whether provided with material reception 
conditions60. Nonetheless, the Commission pointed out that decisions on applicants’ 
contribution should be taken “individually, objectively and impartially” and rea-
 
tion of asylum seekers, OJ L 31, 6 February 2003, p. 18. 
57
 The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ C 
115, 4 May 2010, para. 6.2, expressly states that:  
“it is crucial that individuals, regardless of the Member State in which their application for asy-
lum is lodged, are offered an equivalent level of treatment as regards reception conditions, and the 
same level as regards procedural arrangements and status determination.” 
58
 Reception Directive, Art. 17 (3). 
59
 GROENENDIJK and PEERS, cit. supra note 6. For a more extensive analysis of the Directive and its 
legislative history see also SLINGENBERG, The Reception of Asylum Seekers under International Law, 
Oxford, 2014, p. 57. 
60
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum standards on the 
reception of applicants for asylum in Member States, 3 April 2001, [COM(2001) 181 final], Art. 19. 
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sons must be given in order to make possible their review61. 
The proposal confirmed that the provision on financial contributions was draft-
ed in order to meet the Council’s concerns as to the requirement of “inadequate” 
resources of asylum seekers. During the negotiations several Member States insist-
ed that reference should be made to the general principle of the real need of the ap-
plicant62, and as explained by Groenendijk and Peers, the proposal regarded the 
asylum seekers’ income, implying that all the income above a certain threshold 
could be seized by a Member State63. The legislative history of the Reception Di-
rective illustrates the difficulty to accommodate Member States’ suggestions until 
the final draft was accepted with the reference in Article 17(4) to access to the la-
bour market for a reasonable period of time as a condition to ask asylum seekers to 
contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions.  
Compared to former Directive 2003/9, the 2013 recast Reception Directive in-
cludes among the grounds for reducing or withdrawing material reception condi-
tions, which the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) has considered exhaustive64, 
the circumstance that the applicant has concealed financial resources65. In this re-
gard, it must be stressed that, as emphasized by ECRE, the possibility to complete-
ly withdraw reception conditions must be taken carefully and a narrow approach 
must be followed, in order to ensure that applicants have sufficient resources for an 
adequate standard of living66. 
Overall, from the proposals elaborated during the negotiations for the Reception 
Directive adopted in 2003 and its later recast process, some relevant considerations 
clearly emerged. First, although the issue of financial contributions has been re-
peatedly discussed during the negotiations, no reference can be tracked as to the 
seizure of asylum seekers’ assets and this also reflects, as mentioned before, the 
 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 See Council Document 11320/01 ASILE 39, 30 July 2001, p. 33. 
63
 GROENENDIJK and PEERS, cit. supra note 6. 
64
 In Case C-179/11, Cimade and Gisti, 27 September 2012, para. 57, the Court stated that “only in 
cases listed in Article 16 of Directive 2003/9 [corresponding to Article 20 of recast Directive 
2013/33/EU] may the reception conditions … be reduced or withdrawn”. For a comparison between for-
mer Directive 2003/9 and current Directive 2013/33, see especially SLINGENBERG, cit. supra note 59, pp. 
80-84.   
65
 Reception Directive, Art. 20(3). 
66
 See ECRE, Information Note on Directive 2013/33/EU, July 2015, available at: 
<http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Information_Note_Reception-2015.pdf>, p. 32. 
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practice of most European States with the exception of the recent Danish “Jewel-
lery Law”.   
Secondly, based on the Reception Directive, Member States are allowed to ask 
asylum seekers a financial contribution for the cost of their reception, provided that 
a preliminary test is made of whether applicants possess sufficient resources to 
have a standard of living for their health and to enable their subsistence, as set forth 
in Article 17(3) of the Reception Directive. It is worth stressing that such test must 
be considered in the light of the system of guarantees that the Directive establishes 
in favour of asylum seekers, which the European Court of Human Rights (“EC-
tHR”) in its landmark decision in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, defined as a vul-
nerable group67.  
Before delving into the construction of the test in subject, which will be dealt 
with in the following section, it must be reiterated that the Directive establishes 
minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers. Thus, despite the fact that 
Member States may follow a minimalist approach while implementing the Di-
rective’s provisions, the adoption of less favourable standards than those estab-
lished by the Directive would not be compatible with EU law68. Accordingly, the 
possible seizure of asylum seekers’ assets regulated by domestic rules would in-
fringe EU law insofar as it will introduce other conditions than those set out in the 
Directive. In this regard, a relevant case law issued by the CJEU confirms that 
many areas of asylum and migration are not governed by Member States’ discre-
tion but by a corpus of uniform EU rules. In its judgment in Ben Alaya, for in-
stance, the Court pointed out that although Directives may allow Member States to 
exercise a measure of discretion, such discretion relates only to the conditions laid 
down in the relevant Directive69. 
However, it must be reminded that asylum and migration in EU law are also 
regulated by the principle of flexible or differentiated integration, according to 
 
67
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011. For 
comments see CLAYTON, “Asylum Seekers in Europe: M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece”, Human Rights 
Law Review, 2011, p. 739 ff. The major findings of the ruling in M.S.S. have been echoed by the CJEU 
in its decision in Case C-411/10, N.S., ECR 2011, I-13905, paras. 88-90. 
68
 The Reception Directive, Recital 28, establishes that “Member States should have the power to in-
troduce or maintain more favourable provisions for third-country nationals and stateless persons who ask 
for international protection from a Member State”. 
69
 Case C-491/13, Ali Ben Alaya, 10 September 2014; see also Case C-575/12, Air Baltic Corpora-
tion AS v. Valsts robežsardze, 4 September 2014; Case C-84/12, Koushkaki, 19 December 2013. 
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which a Member State opts to move forward at different speeds and/or towards dif-
ferent objectives70. This is, for instance, the case of Denmark that is not bound by 
the Reception Directive, because of its opt-out from the EU policies in the area of 
freedom, security and justice71. Although the principle of flexible integration has 
certainly allowed some progress in many areas of the EU polity, including asylum 
and migration, it has nonetheless fragmented or limited the outreach of EU law, de-
termining situations in which Member States can exercise their discretionary power 
regardless of standards set by the EU legislation. 
5. – Testing Asylum Seekers’ Resources in order to Ensure Dignified 
Standards of Living  
The Reception Directive, as it has been argued, establishes a legal framework 
which aims to ensure dignified standards of living for asylum applicants within the 
EU72. Pursuant to Article 3, the scope of the Directive is, in fact, to provide material 
support for applicants in the territory of a Member State. Such support may be sub-
ject to the condition that asylum seekers do not have sufficient means to have a 
standard of living adequate for their health and to enable their subsistence73.  
A test is therefore necessary in order for Member States to determine the level 
of material support that must be provided to asylum applicants and consider wheth-
er they have sufficient resources for a dignified standard of living. The exhaustion 
of this test is a precondition for Member States to consider the possibility to require 
applicants to contribute to the cost of their material reception. 
Unfortunately, as it has been stressed, the determination of the material recep-
 
70
 For references, see in particular ANDERSEN and SITTER, “Differentiated Integration: what is It and 
How Much can the EU Accommodate?” Journal of European Integration, 2006, p. 313 ff. 
71
 For a recent discussion see WIND and ADAMO, “Is Green Better than Blue? The Danish JHA Opt-
out and the Unilateral Attempt to Attract Highly Skilled Labour”, European Journal of Migration and 
Law, 2015, p. 329 ff. It must be stressed that Ireland has also opted out, while the UK has opted in and is 
still bound by former Directive 2003/9. 
72
 See in this regard more extensively TSOURDI, “Reception Conditions for Asylum Seekers in the 
EU: Towards the Prevalence of Human Dignity”, Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Law, 2015, p. 9 ff., and, more recently, ID., “EU Reception Conditions: A Dignified Standard of Living 
for Asylum Seekers?”, in CHETAIL, DE BRUYCKER and MAIANI (eds.), Reforming the Common Europe-
an Asylum System: The New European Refugee, Leiden, 2016, p. 271 ff. 
73
 See Reception Directive, Art. 17(3). 
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tion conditions is an area with wide divergences at the national level74, owing to the 
fact that the Reception Directive allows Member States to follow a minimalist ap-
proach to the Directive’s provisions which has been counterbalanced by the most 
recent case law issued by the Court of Justice. 
5.1. – The Court of Justice’s Guidelines  
The EU Court of Justice has been paying increasing attention to construing the 
most delicate provisions of the CEAS and ensuring uniform interpretation through-
out the EU. After obtaining jurisdiction over migration and asylum questions in 
2005, in fact, the role of the Court of Justice has been notably expanded in the area 
of asylum, with references for preliminary rulings seeking guidance with the inter-
pretation of the EU asylum legislation75.  
As regards the material reception conditions, the CJEU had the opportunity to 
provide useful guidelines that Member States must take into account when consid-
ering whether the resources of asylum seekers are sufficient to have dignified liv-
ing standards. Two recent cases are seminal in this regard. In its judgment in Ci-
made and Gisti the Court of Justice stressed that the asylum seekers may not be de-
prived even for a temporary period of time after the making of the application for 
asylum and before being actually transferred to the responsible Member State of 
the protection of the minimum standards laid down by the Reception Directive76. 
This line of reasoning has been more recently echoed in Saciri, in which the 
Court had the opportunity to point out that the minimum standards laid down by 
the Reception Directive will normally suffice to ensure dignified standards of liv-
ing across all Member States77. Still, the Court stressed that, “although the amount 
 
74
 While referring to a number of Reports from international human rights organisms, including the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, and civil society organizations, TSOURDI, cit. 
supra note 72, p. 19, highlights how many asylum seekers in some Member States face a real lack of re-
ception conditions. 
75
 For references see GARLICK, “International Protection in Court: The Asylum Jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice of the EU and UNHCR”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2015, p. 107 ff.; BOUTRUCHE 
ZAREVAC, “The Court of Justice of the EU and the Common European Asylum System: Entering the 
Third Phase of Harmonisation?”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 2010, p. 53 ff.. See 
also COLLIN, “Recent developments in asylum and immigration law before the Court of Justice”, ERA 
Forum, 2009, p. 581 ff. 
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 Cimade and Gisti, cit. supra note 64, para. 56. 
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of the financial aid granted is to be determined by each Member State, it must be 
sufficient to ensure a dignified standard of living and adequate for the health of ap-
plicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence”78. The Court set out a number of 
guarantees aimed at ensuring that particular attention is given to people with spe-
cial needs: the resources made available must be necessary, for instance, to guaran-
tee family unity and the best interest of the child, which therefore includes the pos-
sibility that children can be housed with their parents79. Moreover, the allowance 
received must be also adequate to obtain housing, even in the private market80. 
Overall, the Court provided national authorities with yardsticks necessary to 
gauge the level of material support that must be available to asylum applicants in 
order to ensure dignified standard of living. The approach followed by the Court of 
Justice therefore diverges from that of certain Member States aimed at inspecting 
asylum seekers’ resources in order to find the surplus necessary to contribute to the 
cost of their reception. This protective approach is even strengthened by the fact 
that in Saciri the Court made clear that no derogation from the mentioned mini-
mum standards set out in the Reception Directive can be justified on the basis of 
the saturation of the reception networks81. 
Another point which is worth mentioning in this context is the emphasis that the 
Court of Justice paid to the value of human dignity, as enshrined in Article 1 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which was recalled in the two mentioned 
leading cases concerning the Reception Directive, namely Cimade/Gisti and Saciri. 
The argument developed by the Court on the relevance of human dignity in recep-
tion conditions emphasizes that the CEAS in general is not only devised to offer an 
appropriate status of protection to third country nationals but also to guarantee ade-
quate living standards and the enjoyment of fundamental rights82. 
Considering the arguments developed by the Court of Justice, it would be diffi-
cult to frame the issue of the costs of reception within the paradigm based on the 
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 Ibid., para. 40. 
79
 Ibid., para. 41. 
80
 Ibid., para. 42. 
81
 Ibid., para. 50. 
82
 In this regard, see TSOURDI, cit. supra note 72, which highlighted the “effet utile” of the provision 
on human dignity, as a parameter which incorporates positive obligations of socio-economic nature, nec-
essary to ensure the enjoyment of basic fundamental rights. For a broader analysis, see also JONES, “Hu-
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of Justice”, Liverpool Law Review, 2012, p. 281 ff.  
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migration-development nexus. If disconnected from the purposes suggested by the 
Court, the test on asylum seekers’ resources can serve the wrongful aim of denying 
access to material support based on the simple verification that an applicant has a 
limited amount of cash and valuables. The tenet of the legal regime designed by the 
Reception Directive allows, in fact, possible derogations on the basis of the exist-
ence of continuous income or funding, for instance, as clearly mentioned by Article 
17(4), if applicants have been working for a reasonable period of time83. Accord-
ingly, compliance with the principle of proportionality requires that Member States 
implement the Reception Directive, taking into consideration the personal situation 
of asylum applicants and establishing a correct balance with genuine objectives of 
general interest. Domestic decisions concerning asylum applicants’ contribution to 
the cost of their reception must be fair and respect general principles of EU law84.  
From this perspective, two orders of considerations are necessary: on the one 
hand, the test on asylum seekers’ resources cannot be applied in order to determine 
the amount an applicant must contribute to the cost of the reception, without dis-
torting the legitimate aim to ensure that asylum seekers have adequate living stand-
ards. Member States must be able to demonstrate that any legislative measure is 
applied with the intent of ensuring the highest level of protection for asylum seek-
ers. On the other hand, and taking into account the relevance of the principle of 
proportionality, it seems that any measure aimed at seizing asylum seekers’ assets 
results disproportionate, provided that a specific legal framework establishes less 
restrictive measures could achieve the same objective, such as limiting or curtailing 
access to specific benefits85. 
5.2. – The Amendments Suggested by the Proposal to Recast the Reception 
Directive 
The debate on the controversial asylum seekers’ obligation to contribute to the 
cost of their reception has been certainly influencing the ongoing further recast 
process of the CEAS legal toolbox, including the Reception Directive, which the 
 
83
 See Reception Directive, Art. 17(4). 
84
 See, e.g., the CJEU’s judgment in Case C-141/12, YS, 17 July 2014. For a broader examination of 
the principle of proportionality in asylum procedures, see especially RENEMAN, EU asylum procedures 
and the right to an effective remedy, Oxford, 2014. 
85
 GROENENDIJK and PEERS, cit. supra note 6. 
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European Commission recently triggered86. 
Unlike other EU asylum law instruments, such as the Qualification and the Pro-
cedure Directives, which will be transformed into Regulations, the European 
Commission did not consider “feasible or desirable to fully harmonise Member 
States’ reception conditions” through a Regulation, as there are still significant dif-
ferences in Member States’ social and economic conditions87. 
The amendments concerning the general rules on material reception conditions 
include a provision which requires the observance of the principle of proportionali-
ty “when assessing the resources of an applicant, when requiring an applicant to 
cover or contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions or when asking 
an applicant for a refund…”. The provision also establishes that Member States 
take into account “the individual circumstances of the applicant and the need to re-
spect his or her dignity or personal integrity, including the applicant’s special re-
ception needs”. Moreover, it is established that “Member States shall in all circum-
stances ensure that the applicant is provided with a standard of living which guar-
antees his or her subsistence and protects his or her physical and mental health”88. 
This amendment constitutes a major breakthrough, as it seems to incorporate 
the Court of Justice’s major findings as to the material receptions conditions from a 
twofold perspective. Firstly, the proposal explicitly mentions the principle of pro-
portionality as a benchmark that Member States must abide by, when assessing the 
resources of an applicant. Secondly, the proposal makes a clear reference to the 
need to respect the dignity or personal integrity of the applicant, and requires to 
 
86
 See European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Towards 
a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, 
[COM(2016) 197 final], 6 July 2016 and the following proposals tabled by the Commission on 13 July 
2016: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a common pro-
cedure in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, [COM(2016) 367 final]; Proposal for a Regula-
tion of the European Parliament and Council on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals 
or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted and amending 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, [COM(2016) 466]; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), 
[COM(2016) 465 final]. These proposals complement that concerning the recast of Dublin Regulation, 
see supra note 53. 
87
 COM(2016) 465, cit. supra note 86, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6.   
88
 Ibid., Art. 16 (5). 
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take into account the individual behaviour and the particular circumstances of asy-
lum seekers. 
Nevertheless, it must be also highlighted that such breakthrough is counterbal-
anced by the inclusion of a series of amendments that restrict reception conditions. 
In this regard, draft Article 17(a) raises some concerns and results inherently con-
tradictory as far as it provides, on the one hand, that “Member States shall ensure a 
dignified standard of living for all applicants”, while, on the other hand, it excludes 
asylum seekers who are not in the Member State designated as responsible by the 
Dublin Regulation from reception conditions89. As emphasized by ECRE, this limi-
tation “contradicts the principle of entitlement to reception conditions as a corollary 
of asylum seeker status”, as elaborated in Cimade and Gisti, in relation to which 
the Court clarified that reception conditions are made available to a person as long 
as he or she is an asylum seeker with a right to remain on the territory, and that asy-
lum seekers are an indivisible class of persons90. 
It is not possible to predict the impact of the suggested amendments, owing to the 
ongoing negotiation process. However, it is recommended that the recast Directive 
will entirely incorporate the principles set by the Court of Justice in its relevant case 
law and solve the internal contradiction that could alter the scope of the Directive.  
This would disclose the potential of new Article 16 as a necessary step forward 
against the risks existing beyond the political tendency to construe asylum seekers 
as profiteering from international protection and to depart from the migration-
development nexus which distorts the humanitarian component of asylum seekers’ 
reception. 
6. – Conclusions  
As highlighted in the foregoing analysis, access to reception condition for asy-
lum seekers constitutes one of the most problematic issues for countries of destina-
tion, especially within the EU. The Jewellery Law adopted in Denmark and the 
practice existing in other European States reflect the increasing shift to consider 
asylum seekers exclusively as an economic burden for host societies. This also ex-
plains the tendency to carve out specific obligations for asylum seekers to contrib-
 
89
 Ibid., Art. 17(a) and Art. 19. 
90
 See ECRE, Comments on the Commission Proposal to recast the Reception Conditions Directive 
COM(2016) 465, October 2016, p. 6. 
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ute to the costs of their reception. 
In an attempt to review the legality of such measures, this analysis has focused 
on the international legal framework and the CEAS toolbox in order to contextual-
ize the relevant domestic practice at the European level. 
As an established rule of international law, aliens, including refugees and asy-
lum seekers, must be treated in full respect for the principle of non-discrimination, 
especially in cases of limitations to the right to enjoyment of property91. From this 
perspective, the seizure of asylum seekers’ assets as a contribution to the cost of 
their reception may potentially infringe international law in that it disproportionate-
ly targets a specific part of the population and the most vulnerable group of aliens, 
namely refugees and asylum seekers.  
From a different point of view, EU law has specifically and exhaustively estab-
lished the conditions under which the reduction or possible withdrawal of material 
reception conditions is possible. The Court of Justice of the EU has clarified in a 
consistent case law that minimum reception conditions serve the primary scope of 
ensuring that applicants have access to adequate living standards92. It would be con-
trary to the spirit of offering appropriate status to any third-country national requir-
ing international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement, as stated in Article 78 TFEU, to arbitrarily deny, limit or withdraw 
access to reception conditions. 
Apart from determining an infringement of the rules enshrined in the Reception 
Directive, the risk of discriminatory treatment, owing to disproportionate restrictions 
to access to material reception conditions, may expose States to legal actions before 
relevant human rights adjudicators, including the European Court of Human Rights, 
for a disproportionate interference with the fundamental right to property. 
Ultimately, even though domestic provisions concerning the possible asylum 
seekers’ contribution to the cost of their reception may play the symbolic role of a 
deterrent against any pull factor, they risk construing asylum seekers as profiteer-
ing from the international refugee protection regime. As a consequence, such a leg-
islative tendency may undermine the exercise of the right to asylum, which is to be 
understood, as recently maintained by the Supreme Court of Ireland, as “an auton-
 
91
 In this regard see also JENNINGS and WATTS (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, Volume 1 
Peace, 9th edition, Oxford, 2008, p. 912. 
92
 See Cimade and Gisti case, cit. supra note 64; and Saciri case, cit. supra note 77.  
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omous right to a status, refugee status, which is a fundamental right”93. 
Still, the added value of these measures might be also questioned from an eco-
nomic perspective for at least two reasons which will facilitate the reach of a con-
clusion as to the migration-development nexus. First, the political logic beyond the 
adoption of measures concerning the asylum seekers’ contributions to their own 
maintenance seems to ignore the fact that refugees will more than likely use their 
own assets within the host State, as there is no reason to expect that a refugee will 
prefer to depend on the social assistance provided by the host State. Second, the 
economic advantage that can be generated by the measures aimed at seizing asylum 
seekers’ assets would be minimal compared to the enormous costs that States face 
in order to maintain an efficient asylum system with adequate reception facilities.   
As confirmed by the UNHCR, host countries have to pay a high price for receiving 
asylum seekers94. However, the “negative” impact of migratory flows urges States, es-
pecially in Europe, to mitigate, to the extent possible, such impact by establishing 
mechanisms of regional and international cooperation. At a very critical time for the 
sustainability of the CEAS, in fact, the tendency to establish an obligation for asylum 
seekers to contribute to the cost of their reception will not erase the flaws of the CEAS, 
it will rather reiterate the grim picture originally emerging from the developing EU 
asylum policy, in which, according to Colin Harvey “[t]he asylum seeker is routinely 
constructed as a threat to the area of freedom, security and justice”95.  
 
93
 Supreme Court of Ireland (Ireland), T.D. v Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2014] 
IESC 29, 10 April 2014, para. 143. 
94
 UNHCR Standing Committee, cit. supra note 11. 
95
 HARVEY, Seeking Asylum in the UK: Problems and Prospects, London, 2000, p. 331.   
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1. – Introduction 
In recent years1, irregular migration - especially by the Mediterranean Sea - has be-
come a huge phenomenon that all European States have the duty to deal with2. What 
has been defined as a “migration crisis”3 consists in mass influx of people fleeing their 
countries and seeking for protection in Europe. Several elements interfere with the ac-
tual capacity of the EU and its Member States to cope with this issue.  
First, the migration management entails overwhelming costs4, leading to the 
perception that irregular migration is a mere burden for the destination country. 
The mass influx of migrants is indeed perceived as having negative implications 
(for instance in terms of jobs’ losses and the increase of criminality5), and lacking 
any social and/or economic advantage. 
Second, the migration crisis represents an actual challenge to the European 
States’ commitment to protect human rights under the European Convention of 
Human Rights and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Moving from these remarks, the aim of the present investigation is twofold: the 
paper will firstly explain the potential benefits that the destination countries could 
descend from migration. Secondly, the paper will highlight the criticisms of the 
current Common European Asylum System (“CEAS”)6 and assess the positive and 
 
1
 See the recent Monthly Report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (“FRA”), Monthly data 
collection on the current migration situation in the EU, July 2016. See also FRA, FRA Annual Report, 
Asylum and migration into the EU in 2015, 2016, available at: 
<http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/fundamental-rights-report-2016>. 
2
 See the Statement adopted at the Special Meeting of the European Council on 23 April 2015, where 
that of migrants seeking for protection crossing the Mediterranean Sea has been described as a “humani-
tarian emergency”. Furthermore, see TINO and CAUDRON, “Flux migratoires et politique commune dans 
l’Union européenne”, federalismi.it, 10/2013, p.1 ff. 
3
 See the report of the UK Home Affairs Committee, “Mass Migration” (3 August 2016) HC paper 
No. 24, available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/24/2402.html>. 
4
 On the necessity to rethink the implementation of the Refugee Convention to help States in under-
standing and enjoying the benefits of migration, see HATHAWAY, “A Global Solution to a Global Refugee 
Crisis”, European Papers, 2016, p. 93 ff. 
5
 RATHA, MOHAPATRA and SCHEJA, “Impact of Migration on Economic and Social Development. A 
review of Evidence and Emerging Issues”, Policy Research Working Paper 5558, The World Bank De-
velopment Prospectus Group Migration and Remittance Unit & Poverty Reduction And Economic Man-
agement Network, February 2011, p. 1 ff., p. 11. 
6
 The Common European Asylum System has been created since 1999 and it currently comprises the 
following acts: the European Parliament and Council Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common 
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negative implications of the recent proposals for its reform. 
In order to both disclose the positive implications of migration in the host coun-
tries and highlight the shortcomings of the current European asylum system, the 
present paper will specifically tackle the category of unaccompanied minors seek-
ing protection in Europe.  
2. – Coping with an “Enhanced Vulnerability”: the Case of 
Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Minors  
The choice to specifically focus on unaccompanied minors is grounded on sev-
eral reasons. First of all, the percentage of minors asking for asylum within the Eu-
ropean Union is increasing: in 2015, 7% of all asylum applications in the European 
Union were lodged by unaccompanied children7. 
Secondly, when the asylum seekers are unaccompanied minors, the struggle in 
balancing the States’ control over the entry of non-nationals with refugees’ funda-
mental rights increases, as long as States are bound by additional rules imposing 
them to take into account minors’ best interest8. 
The need to respect both the vulnerability of minors and the non-refoulement 
principle lies on the observation that children are “twice weak”: on the one side, 
notwithstanding their refugee status, minors should receive protection by interna-
 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, OJ 2013, L 180/60 (“Revised Asylum 
Procedure Directive”); the European Parliament and Council Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 lay-
ing down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, OJ 2013, L 
180/96 (“Revised Reception Conditions Directive”); the European Parliament and Council Directive 
2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or state-
less persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ 2011, L 337/248 (“Re-
vised Qualification Directive”); the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 
26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person,  OJ 2013, L 180/108 (“Revised Dublin Regulation”); the European 
Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of “Euro-
dac” for the comparison of fingerprints, OJ 2013, L 180/78 (“Revised Eurodac Regulation”). 
7
 See European Asylum Support Office (“EASO”), Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the 
European Union 2015, July 2016, p. 109. 
8
 See Arts. 3, 12 and 22, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (New York, 20 
November 1989), entered into force on 2 September 1990. On this topic see also European Parliament, 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, EU Framework of Law for Children’s Rights, 2012, PE462.445. 
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tional and national law because of their vulnerable age, which prevents them from 
being autonomous and independent9. On the other side, they should receive protec-
tion because they are asylum seekers10.  
In this regard it has been argued that asylum seeking children “should be treated 
as children first and migrants second”11, meaning that it is necessary to take into 
prior consideration the significant vulnerability of the claimants. 
As a consequence, the State being responsible for an asylum application has to 
deal with some additional issues, such as the necessity to i) provide a representative 
taking the side of the minor’s claim; ii) take into account the minor’s point of view 
and - notwithstanding her/his age assessment - consider his/her experience as a rel-
evant element in the asylum procedure; iii) assess the possibility of reunifying the 
minor with his/her relatives; iv) ponder the concrete impact that the eventual depor-
tation of the minor will have on his/her life; v) opt for the child’s detention only as 
a last resort measure and only by adopting additional safeguards12. 
Moving from these latter remarks, specific rules focusing on asylum seeking 
minors have been and shall be created in order to implement the respect of their 
rights and promote their integration within the host country13.  
 
9
 European Court of Human Rights, Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 
April 2011, para. 87, where the Court stressed that States have a positive obligation to protect and pro-
vide care for extremely vulnerable individuals, such as unaccompanied minors, regardless of their status 
as illegal migrants, nationality or statelessness. The particular vulnerability of unaccompanied children is 
emphasized also by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, 2005, 
CRC/GC/2005/6, paras. 23 and 24.  
10
 Art. 3(1), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. On this topic HODGKIN and 
NEWELL, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Publi-
cations, 2007, pp. 1-229. 
11
 See WARREN and YORK, “How children become ‘failed asylum-seekers’”, Kent Law Clinic, Uni-
versity of Kent, March 2014. 
12
 KTISTAKIS, Protecting Migrants under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Social Charter. A handbook for legal practitioners, Council of Europe Publishing, 2013, p. 37. See, 
European Court of Human Rights, Rahimi v. Greece, cit. supra note 9, para. 109; Mubilanzila Mayeka 
and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Application No. 13178/03, Judgment of 12 October 2006. 
13
 As pointed out by WHITTAKER, Asylum seekers and refugees in the contemporary world, Abing-
don/New York, 2006, p. 40, the achievement of an effective integration involves several issues, such as 
language, family reunion, accommodation, health care and education. On this topic, see also SPENCER 
and HUGHES, “Fundamental rights for irregular migrants: legal entitlements to healthcare and school edu-
cation across the EU28”, European Human Rights Law Review, 2015, p. 604 ff., p. 608; SMYTH, “Is the 
Right of the Child to Liberty Safeguarded in the Common European Asylum System?”, European Journal 
of Migration and Law, 2013, p. 111 ff. 
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Against this backdrop, the situation of unaccompanied asylum seeking minors 
seems to be a good case study to assess the adequacy of the system implemented 
within the European Union. As it will be explained in the following sections, on the 
one side, States can attain further social and economic advantages when accommo-
dating migrant minors. On the other side, the failure of the CEAS - both in terms of 
efficiency and respect of fundamental rights - is particularly striking with regard to 
minors’ applications. 
3. – Accommodating Migrants and Promoting the Development of the 
Host Country: Two Birds with One Stone? 
Before entering the analysis of the current CEAS and its foreseen amendment, 
it has to be clarified whether the several concerns raised by destination countries 
could be justified. 
To answer this question, it is essential to assess whether the presumption that ir-
regular migration has only negative effects on host countries can be rebutted. 
Therefore, the arguments usually invoked by Member States must be tackled.   
Among them, the increase of criminality is one of the most exploited considera-
tions. Despite the absence of a proven relationship between the number of irregular 
migrants and the number of crimes, the general trend within the European political 
debate is to argue that irregular migrants have to be considered as a threat for inter-
nal security. 
At this regard, it is first of all essential to understand the nature of the link be-
tween migration and criminality. On the one side, it should be stressed that irregu-
lar migration in itself does not impact on criminality: the large majority of migrants 
crossing the European borders every day are seeking a decent future for themselves 
and their families, not to start criminal activities. However, on the other side, it has 
to be observed that the significant vulnerability of irregular migrants exposes them 
to the risk of being exploited by and eventually absorbed into criminal networks. In 
other words, criminality could indirectly take advantage of irregular migration. 
Dealing with two sides of a same coin, a strong capacity of accommodating 
asylum seekers, from their very first arrival until the assessment of their claim, is 
therefore essential to ensure the respect of migrants’ human rights, but also to pre-
vent migrants from being targeted within criminal activities. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 Elena Gualco 
 
 
Another refrain issue connected to migration flows deals with the social impact of 
migration on the destination countries: in particular, migrants’ needs for health14 and 
social services are perceived as burdens by the host States. In this respect, the risk that 
the migrants’ assistance would eventually affect EU citizens’ rights is a shared belief15.  
Furthermore, migrants are usually accused of jeopardizing the balance of the 
national labour market, essentially because they are willing to bear undeclared 
work and lower employment rates16. 
Against this backdrop, however, both the economic17 and social sustainability of 
refugees flow could be demonstrated. Focusing on the social development of the 
destination country, at least two points shall be recalled. 
First of all, although in the short term migrants’ employment seems to have a 
negative effect on the labour market, in the medium and long term, migrants’ work-
ing force appears to be an essential component within the labour market. Given that 
migrants accept low-skilled jobs (that usually the natives are no longer inclined to 
carry out), not only they fill the “gap” of the labour market, but they could give 
their contribution to the public finance, by paying taxes and social security obliga-
tions. The achievement of such a goal, however, requires the State to provide a rap-
id and effective accommodation of migrants. Otherwise, as already underlined, 
both the undeclared work and the related migrants exploitation would prevail18. 
A second benefit connected to migration has a long-term effect on the destina-
tion State, being nevertheless of a fundamental importance. In fact, as underlined 
by the European Commission itself19, migration is the key to fight the actual chal-
lenge towards the ageing of the EU population and its demographic decrease.    
As to migrant minors’, the improvement of their conditions and their effective 
 
14
 The right to accede to healthcare has been recognised as a component of the human dignity: see 
European Committee on Social Rights, International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. 
France, Complaint No. 14/2003, Decision of 3 November 2004. 
15
 See TINO and CAUDRON, cit. supra note 2. 
16
 AIYAR et al., International Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note. The Refugee Surge in Europe: Eco-
nomic Challenges, January 2016, p. 4; BELL, “Irregular Migrants: Beyond the Limits of Solidarity?”, in ROSS 
and BORGMANN-PREBIL (eds.), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union, 2010, Oxford, p. 151 ff. 
17
 DULLIEN, Paying the Price: the cost of Europe’s refugee crisis, European Council on Foreign Re-
lations, April 2016. 
18
 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - “A European Agenda on Migra-
tion”, 13 May 2015, [COM(2015) 240 final], p. 9. 
19
 Ibid., p. 14. 
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integration within the host community definitely has a long-term positive impact on 
the development of both the host and the sending countries. Focusing on the for-
mer, minors’ integration leads to an additional benefit. The burden a State takes on 
to ensure unaccompanied minors an adequate education20 is usually compensated 
when minors become workers: unlike adult migrants, who spent a significant peri-
od of their life in another country, minors are expected to grow up and live in the 
country where they found asylum. As a consequence, under the destination country 
perspective, giving minors an adequate education means investing in their potenti-
alities as future workers. This being the case, migrant minors will not only repay 
the costs of their education, but also provide additional financial incomes for the 
State which granted them asylum.  
Notwithstanding the important contribution that migrants - and minors among 
them - could bring to the financial, social and cultural development of European 
societies, its effective accomplishment depends on States’ capacity to ensure mi-
grants’ integration since their arrival. Otherwise, not only irregular migration 
would constitute a mere economic and social cost for the destination State, but it 
could also lead to the further negative consequences (e.g. the exploitation by crimi-
nal networks) already outlined.   
4. – The Protection of Asylum Seeking Minors in Europe: an Overview 
The previous paragraph has clarified that the creation of adequate mechanisms 
to accommodate unaccompanied children seeking for protection in Europe is of 
paramount importance first to ensure Member States’ compliance with the respect 
of fundamental rights, second to let them benefit from the social and economic 
benefits of migration.  
 
20
 The right to education is guaranteed both by Art. 17 of the European Social Charter and Art. 2, 
Protocol No. 1 ECHR. With regard to the former provision, despites the wording of the appendix of the 
ESC(r) which limits its application to migrants lawfully resident within a contracting State, the European 
Committee of Social Rights (COHRE v. Italy, Complaint No. 58/2009, Decision of 25 June 2010, para. 
33) has clarified that “the part of population which does not fulfil the definition of the appendix cannot be 
deprived of their rights linked to life and dignity under the ESC(r)”. With those words, KTISTAKIS, cit. 
supra note 12, p. 59. Therefore, the protection foreseen by Art. 17 of the European Social Charter applies 
to all migrants, whether regular or not, under the age of 18 years old. In this regard, see also SPENCER and 
HUGHES, cit. supra note 13, p. 612; DE GROOF and LAWERS (eds.), No person shall be denied the right to 
education. The influence of the European Convention of human rights in the right to education and rights 
in education, Oisterwijk, 2004, pp. 29-33. 
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Entering the analysis of the European legal framework21, the protection of asy-
lum seeking minors is tackled by both the Council of Europe22 and the European 
Union. These two international organisations share the common attempt to imple-
ment the living conditions of unaccompanied minors, although necessarily follow-
ing different approaches. 
4.1. – The Protection of Unaccompanied Minors Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights  
When focusing on the Council of Europe, the preliminary observation has to be 
made that the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) does not include 
a specific provision on asylum seekers23. It is not surprising that, at the time when 
the Convention was created, the European States did not perceive migration flows 
as a relevant topic under a fundamental rights perspective. Nevertheless, the neces-
sity to protect migrants’ fundamental rights has progressively become an issue that 
the European States have to face and the ECHR has to deal with.  
Hence, as in other fields of law, the intervention of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has been of a paramount importance to let the protection of refugees 
and asylum seekers become effective under the ECHR.  
In addition to the recognition of the non-refoulement principle24, the European 
Court of Human rights has specified that other articles, namely Articles 3, 4 and 8 
ECHR, can be triggered within asylum related cases.  
 
21
 On migration law under the ECHR and the EU, see FRA, Handbook on European law relating to 
asylum, borders and immigration, 2014, available at: <http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-
borders>. 
22
 See TONELLI, “Irregular migration and human rights: a Council of Europe perspective”, in BOGUSZ 
et al. (eds.), Irregular migration and human rights: theoretical, European and international perspectives, 
Leiden/Boston, 2004, p. 301 ff. 
23
 KTISTAKIS, cit. supra note 12, p. 17. 
24
 Saadi v. Italy (Grand Chamber), Application No. 37201/06, Judgment of 28 February 2008, para. 
127; Chahal v. the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), Application No. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 No-
vember 1996, para. 79. At this regard, see also the Guidelines on human rights protection in the context 
of accelerated asylum procedures, established by the Committee of Ministers on 1 July 2009 at the 
1062nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has also 
recognized the existence of an indirect non-refoulement principle, prohibiting any transfer to States in 
turn susceptible of transferring the person to a third country where he/she is at risk (M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011). On this judgment see MORENO-
LAX, “Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece”, European Journal of Migration 
and Law, 2012, p 1 ff. 
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Article 3 ECHR, covering the prohibition of torture, has been applied in several 
cases25, where the European Court of Human Rights has stressed first of all its ab-
solute nature and secondly that the right enshrined by Article 3 is a fundamental 
value of each democratic society26.  
Insofar as Article 4 of the ECHR foresees the prohibition of slavery and forced la-
bour, the European Court of Human Rights has recognized its applicability anytime 
where the exploitation of migrants leads to human trafficking or forced labour27.  
As to Article 8 ECHR, the right to respect private and family life has received a 
broad and enhanced interpretation by the European Court which usually applies Ar-
ticle 8 to protect the irregular migrants’ residence right against the unlawful re-
moval to a third country28.  
The activism of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of migration 
law is absolutely beneficial under several points of view. First, it stresses that – re-
gardless of the uniformity and efficiency of the CEAS - European States have the 
duty to protect asylum seekers’ rights under the European Convention of Human 
Rights. Secondly, its case law is extremely helpful in clarifying the ambiguities of 
the current CEAS: given the broad discretion that Member States currently have, 
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights can set common - although 
minimal - levels of protection. 
Notwithstanding the merits of the European Court of Human Rights case law, 
 
25
 See, Mahmundi and others v. Greece, Application No. 14902/10, Judgment of 24 October 2012. 
With regard to unaccompanied asylum seeking minors, see Rahimi v. Greece, cit. supra note 9, where the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled on the detention and lack of care of a 15 years old unaccompa-
nied minor, who, after entering Greece, was first put in detention for two days and then left lo live in the 
streets. Hence, short periods of detention do not exclude the applicability of Art. 3 ECHR. See also Mo-
hammad v Greece, Application No. 70586/11, Judgment of 11 December 2014. Finally, Sh. D. and oth-
ers v. Greece and others, Application No. 14165/16, now pending before the European Court of Human 
Rights. On this topic, see GOODWIN-GILL and MCADAM, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford, 
2007, pp. 310-323. 
26
 See HAILBRONNER (ed.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law. Commentary on EU regulations and 
directives, München/Oxford, 2010, pp. 15-18. 
27
 See European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Prohibition of slavery and forced labour, 2nd Ed., Council of Europe/European Court of Human 
Rights, 2014. 
28
 BELL, cit. supra note 16, pp. 151-165. Within the national case law, see the enhancement of the 
right to family life by the UK Upper Tribunal in the case The Queen on the application of ZAT, IAJ, 
KAM, AAM, MAT, MAJ and LAM v the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgment of 22 
February 2016, JR/15401/2015.  
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however, the achievements made can only prevent the migration crisis from exac-
erbating, but it is not up to the ECHR to provide a long term and an ad hoc mecha-
nism to accommodate asylum applications and protect migrants’ human rights. 
Hence, it follows from this latter remark that the best (and the only!) body holding 
the competence to elaborate adequate reception mechanisms for unaccompanied 
asylum seeking minors is the European Union. 
4.2. – The European Union: the Quest to Accommodate and Protect Unaccom-
panied Asylum Seeking Minors 
In 1999, the European Union has been given the competence to fight against ir-
regular migration as well as to protect the rights of migrants in relation to exploita-
tion and trafficking29. The EU action in this field has progressively improved, 
thanks to the adoption of both directives and regulations which form the CEAS30. 
Furthermore, at the constitutional level of the European Union, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights31 offers a direct protection to asylum seekers. In its Article 18, 
the Charter foresees that “[t]he right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect 
for the rules of the Geneva Convention … and in accordance with the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union …”, 
while Article 19 of the Charter re-affirms the principle of non-refoulement.  
With respect to the fundamental rights of minors, further articles acquire relevance.  
First, Article 14 of the Charter states that everyone has the right to education: in 
this regard, it is important to recall that this right is likely to be jeopardized anytime a 
child is put in a form of detention. Furthermore, Article 21 of the Charter is devoted to 
prohibit any discrimination on grounds of - inter alia - age; whereas Article 24 specifi-
cally refers to minors: this latter provision enounces the “best interest of child” princi-
 
29
 See Arts. 79 and 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). On this 
topic, see ACOSTA ARCARAZO and GEDDES, “The Development, Application and Implications of an EU 
Rule of Law in the Area of Migration Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2013, p. 179 ff.; 
BALDACCINI, GUILD and TONER (eds.), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asy-
lum Law and Policy, Oxford, 2007; HAILBRONNER, Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy of the Eu-
ropean Union, The Hague, 2000; GEDDES, Immigration and European Integration. Towards fortress Eu-
rope?, Manchester, 2000, pp. 110-130. 
30
 On this topic see, ex multis, GUILD and MINDERHOUD, The First Decade of EU Migration and Asy-
lum Law, Leiden, 2012. 
31
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 202, 7 June 2016. 
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ple and stresses the duty to provide minors with protection and care32.  
As a latter observation concerning the Charter, it has to be underlined that, after 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the relevance of the Charter has expo-
nentially grown33. Not only Article 6 TEU34 now states that the Charter has the 
same value as the Treaties, which makes the former legally binding35, but the EU 
Court of Justice seems particularly devoted in enhancing its role36. In a recent deci-
sion concerning the migration field, for instance, the Court of Justice has excluded 
that Protocol No. 30 of the Treaty of Lisbon - which, as it is known, limits the ap-
plication in the United Kingdom and Poland of the social rights covered by the 
Charter - is suitable to affect the implementation of the EU asylum law37. 
5. – Rethinking the Common European Asylum System to Provide an 
Effective Response to the Migration Challenge 
The observations highlighted in the previous sections explain why reception 
procedures are essential tools to shift from the negative implications of migration 
to its positive effects. In this perspective, it is therefore essential to tackle the cur-
rent rules within the Common European Asylum System to assess whether they 
foresee adequate mechanisms, not only to accommodate but also to progressively 
integrate migrant minors arriving in the European Union.  
 
 
32
 In connection to the duty of care and protection, Art. 32 of the Charter, which prohibits child la-
bour, can be recalled.   
33
 See PEERS et al. (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary), Volume 3: EU 
Asylum Law, 2nd Rev. Ed., 2015, pp. 27-63. 
34
 Treaty on the European Union, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, p. 13. 
35
 See PEERS et al., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, Oxford, 2014. 
36
 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, 26 February 2013; case C-399/11, Melloni, 26 February 2013. 
In this connection, see APPANAH, “Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme: entre cohérence et légitimation. A propos des arrêts Åklagaren c/ 
Hans Åkerberg Fransson et Stefano Melloni c/ Ministerio Fiscal rendus par la Cour de justice le 23 fé-
vrier 2013”, Revue générale de droit international public, 2014, p. 333 ff.; HANCOX, “The meaning of 
‘implementing’ EU law under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Ǻkerberg Fransson”, Common Market Law 
Review, 2013, p. 1411 ff.; SARMIENTO, “Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national 
courts and the new framework of fundamental rights protection in Europe”, Common Market Law Re-
view, 2013, p. 1267 ff. 
37
 See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., ECR, 2011, p. I-13905.  
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5.1. – The Current Deficiencies of the CEAS and the Struggle to Ensure the 
Protection of Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Minors 
Notwithstanding its purposes, the current Common European Asylum System 
has proven to be inadequate in providing an efficient and uniform accommodation 
of asylum seekers, in particular when the asylum requests come from unaccompa-
nied minors. As a matter of fact, since the Dublin regulation and the directives con-
stituting the Common European Asylum System have been adopted, a number of 
practical deficiencies have progressively emerged38. 
Therefore, in its Communication “Towards a reform of the Common European 
Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe”39, the European Commis-
sion has expressed the need to rethink the European Union asylum rules in the light 
of an improved solidarity among Member States40. As a general observation, it has 
to be underlined that the current reception mechanism seems more devoted to toss-
ing back States’ responsibility and accommodating national prerogatives, rather 
than to achieving unaccompanied minors’ best interest and fundamental rights41.  
With regard to the several issues arising from its application, the rules on the al-
location of responsibility constitute a first example. The rationale behind Article 8 
of the so-called Dublin III regulation42 is twofold. First, these rules stimulate Mem-
ber States’ commitment to protect their external borders. By assuming that a State 
should be responsible for managing the irregular entry into its territory, the State’s 
failure to protect its borders triggers the obligation to address migrants’ claims43. 
 
38
 In this respect, see NASCIMBENE, “Refugees, the European Union and the ‘Dublin System’. The 
Reasons for a Crisis”, European Papers, 2016, p. 101 ff. 
39
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of the 6 April 
2016 - “Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Eu-
rope, [COM(2016) 197 final]. 
40
 See MUNARI, “The Perfect Storm on EU Asylum Law: The Need to Rethink the Dublin Regime”, 
Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2016, p. 517 ff.; FAVILLI, “L’Unione europea e la difficile attua-
zione del principio di solidarietà nella gestione dell’‘emergenza’ immigrazione”, Quaderni Costituziona-
li, 2015, p. 785 ff.; MITSILEGAS, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System”, Com-
parative Migration Studies, 2014, p. 181 ff.; BELL, cit. supra note 16. 
41
 In this regard, an opposite opinion seems to be supported by the German Federal Administrative Court, 
according to which “the provisions on responsibility for unaccompanied minors in Article 6 of the Dublin II 
Regulation are protective of the individual, as they not only govern relationships between Member States but 
(also) serve to protect fundamental rights” (Judgment of 16 November 2015, 1 C 4.15). 
42
 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013, cit. supra note 6. 
43
 See DEN HEIJER, RIJPMA and SPIJKERBOER, “Coercion, prohibition, and the great expectations: the con-
tinuing failure of the Common European Asylum System”, Common Market Law Review, p. 607 ff., p. 615. 
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Second, the allocation of responsibility rules have been designed to address migra-
tion claims following a uniform and consistent approach: the “first lodged rule” in 
particular has been conceived to prevent overlaps or gaps in processing asylum ap-
plications. However, when triggered towards vulnerable people, such as minors, 
the first lodged rule usually clashes with the obligation to ensure minors’ best in-
terest and take into account their vulnerability44.  
In this connection, the Court of Justice of the European Union highlighted that 
secondary movements clearly facilitate children disappearance or smuggling. Ac-
cordingly, it stated that the best interest of the child implies that a minor’s transfer 
to another Member State shall in principle be avoided every time it would expose 
the child to an unreasonable risk of being subjected to a degrading treatment45. Fur-
thermore, ruling upon Article 6 of the so-called Dublin II regulation46, the Court 
specified that, if the minor submits two or more asylum requests, this provision 
should be interpreted in the sense that “the Member State in which that minor is 
present after having lodged an asylum application there is to be designated the 
‘Member State responsible’”47.   
A second criticism of the current Common European Asylum System is linked 
to the identification procedure and the age assessment.  
At this regard, it has first of all to be recalled that the European Court of Human 
 
44
 With specific regard to unaccompanied minors, see PEERS, “The Dublin Regulation: Is the End 
Night? Where Should Unaccompanied Children Apply for Asylum?”, EU Law Analysis, 21 January 
2016, available at: <http//www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.it>.  
45
 See Case C-4/11, Kaveh Puid, 14 November 2013, para. 36:  
 
“where the Member States cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum proce-
dure and in the conditions for the reception of asylum seekers in the Member State initially identi-
fied as responsible in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 343/2003 … the Member State which is determining the Member State responsible is required 
not to transfer the asylum seeker to the Member State initially identified as responsible and, subject 
to the exercise of the right itself to examine the application, to continue to examine the criteria set 
out in that chapter, in order to establish whether another Member State can be identified as respon-
sible in accordance with one of those criteria or, if it cannot, under Article 13 of the Regulation”. 
 
46
 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ 2003, L 50, p. 1. Its Art. 6 is now Art. 8 of the Dub-
lin III regulation, No. 604/2013, cit. supra note 6. 
47
 Case C-648/11, M.A. and Others, 6 June 2013, para. 66. 
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Rights has declared the illegitimacy of the so-called pushback operations and the 
related identification procedures carried out on board48. Accordingly, both the iden-
tification procedures and the age assessment must be performed within the territory 
of a Member State. 
Secondly, insofar age assessment is the first step to follow in order to under-
stand whether the asylum seeker is entitled to receive additional care, the methods 
implied to assess the claimants’ age have to be fair and accurate. Notwithstanding 
the obligation to give applicants the benefit of the doubt49, the techniques applied 
within the Member States vary significantly and they are usually inaccurate50. Fur-
thermore, Article 25 of the Asylum Procedure Directive51 allows Members States to 
accomplish medical examinations for the purpose of the age assessment, whenever, 
“following general statements or other relevant indications, Member States have 
doubts concerning the applicant’s age to assessments”. In this respect, it has to be 
stressed that, first of all, medical examination should be always avoided since it 
certainly affects minors’ well-being. Secondly, that the huge discretion given to 
Member States towards the suitability of the medical examination exacerbates the 
imbalances within the CEAS.  
A third shortcoming issuing from the “concrete application” of the CEAS is re-
lated to a further phase of the asylum application: the appointment of a guardian. 
Given the absence of any deadline for such an assignment52, not only Member 
States follow different time schedules, but most of them deal with significant de-
lays in assigning legal representatives. As a consequence, and allegedly pursuing 
the aim of keeping children safe from traffickers53, Member States usually put un-
 
48
 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012. On 
this issue, see BORELLI and STANFORD, “Troubled Waters in the Mare Nostrum: Interception and Push-
Backs of Migrants in the Mediterranean and the European Convention on Human Rights”, Review of In-
ternational Law and Politics, 2014, p. 29 ff. 
49
 See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Detriment of the Doubt: Age Assessment of Unac-
companied Asylum-Seeking Children, AIDA Legal Briefing No. 5, December 2015. 
50
 See FELTZ, Age assessment for unaccompanied minors. When European countries denied children 
their childhood, Doctors of the Word – Médecins du monde International Network, 28 August 2015. See 
also, European Court of Human Rights, Mohammad v Greece, cit. supra note 25. 
51
 Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013, cit. supra note 6. 
52
 Art. 31 of the Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 cit. supra note 6, merely stresses that such an 
appointment must be completed “as soon as possible” after the granting of international protection. 
53
 See, PEERS et al. (eds.), cit. supra note 33, p. 250. 
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accompanied minors in various forms of detention54. 
Hence, stressing the necessity to improve the solidarity among Member States 
and trying to avoid the breakdown of the CEAS, in its recent proposals the Europe-
an Commission has addressed most of the criticisms concerning the situation of 
asylum seeking minors. 
5.2. – Reforming the CEAS to Foster the Best Interest of the Child: a (Possible) 
Step Forward 
Between May and July 2016, six different proposals, tackling each normative 
instrument of the CEAS, have been presented. Within the three proposals adopted 
in May 201655, the proposal focusing on the recast of the Dublin III regulation56 
pursues the improvement of minors’ guarantees. As regard the proposals of July 
2016, two approaches are suggested. First, the Commission highlights the necessity 
to amend the reception condition directive, promoting a recast of such a normative 
instrument57. Secondly, the European Commission goes further, by suggesting the 
adoption of two new regulations58, replacing respectively the Asylum Procedure Di-
 
54
 See IM v. France, Application No. 9152/09, Judgment of 2 May 2012, where the European Court 
of Human Rights noticed that asylum seekers in detention have to cope with significant obstacles in suc-
cessfully pursuing their claims. 
55
 On 4 May 2016 the Commission has adopted the following Proposals: the Proposal for a Regula-
tion of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), [COM(2016) 270 final]; the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the European Union Agency 
for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, [COM(2016) 271 final]; Proposal for a Regula-
tion of the European Parliament and the Council on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person], for iden-
tifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison 
with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement pur-
poses (recast), [COM(2016) 272 final]. 
56
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), 
cit. supra note 55. 
57
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for 
the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), of the 13 July 2016, [COM(2016) 465 fi-
nal]. 
58
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for the qual-
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rective59 and the Qualification Directive60. 
Notwithstanding the various concerns that also this foreseen reform entails61, 
the recent initiatives have at least the merit of supporting the adoption of two regu-
lations instead of recasting the current directives. Regulations appear to be the right 
normative instrument to be employed in the field of migration and asylum law in-
sofar as their direct and general application62 within Member States would achieve 
the degree of consistency that has always been lacking. Therefore, as regards the 
choice of the legal instrument to be adopted, the Commission proposals have to be 
welcomed as they would eventually impose common rules on Member States and 
potentially remove the broad discretion that Members States currently rely on.  
Entering the analysis of the provisions on asylum seeking children, the suggest-
ed reform aims at introducing several changes.  
A first major amendment focuses on the establishment of strict deadlines: as al-
ready stressed, the inadequacy of the current CEAS is definitely connected with the 
lack of a time schedule pending on Member States when dealing with asylum seek-
ers. Instead of a general reference to the Member States’ duty to accommodate un-
accompanied minors’ claims, the new proposals insert a five days deadline cover-
ing the appointment of both a legal representative when an asylum application is 
made63, and a guardian when the international protection is granted64.  
Although the deadline in allocating guardians has the beneficial effect of imposing 
 
ification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the pro-
tection granted and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the sta-
tus of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, of the 13 July 2016, [COM(2016) 466 final]; 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common proce-
dure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, of the 13 July 2016, 
[COM(2016) 467 final]. 
59
 Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013, cit. supra note 6. 
60
 Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011, cit. supra note 6. 
61
 See infra Section 6. 
62
 See Art. 288 TFEU. 
63
 Art. 22(1), Proposal for a regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection 
in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, cit. supra note 58, and Art. 23, Proposal for a directive 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), cit. supra note 
57. 
64
 Art. 36, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, 
cit. supra note 58. 
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on Member States an obligation to act efficiently towards the protection of minors 
from the moment in which the asylum claim is made, a critical issue still needs to be 
solved. To accomplish their duty, guardians need not to be overwhelmed by the num-
ber of charges they are required to deal with at the same time. In this respect, even if 
Article 22 of the Proposal for a procedures regulation stresses the necessity that each 
guardian shall be responsible for a reasonable number of minors65, the concept of rea-
sonableness may vary among Member States, due to the huge gap in terms of number 
of applications66. 
As a further amendment, the right of children to be heard and informed is tack-
led under two points of view. 
First of all, the Commission proposal for a procedures regulation stresses the 
right of each child to be personally interviewed67, unless such an opportunity does 
not comply with his/her best interest. Considering that Article 14 of the Directive 
2013/32 leaves to Member States the discretion to determine in national legislation 
the cases in which a minor shall be given the opportunity of a personal interview, it 
seems that the provision suggested in the proposal for an Asylum Procedure Regu-
lation68 would both increase minors’ guarantees and implement the consistency 
within the Member States’ approach.      
Minors’ right to be informed is also tackled by Article 5 of the proposed recast 
of Directive 2013/3369. According to the new version of Article 5, the European 
Union Agency for Asylum will develop a standard template reporting all the essen-
tial information about the application process which should be written in a lan-
guage understandable for the applicant. To accommodate minors, the second para-
 
65Art. 22, Proposal for a regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection in 
the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, cit. supra note 58, stating, in its para. 5, that “the respon-
sible authorities shall not place a guardian in charge of a disproportionate number of unaccompanied mi-
nors at the same time, which would render him or her unable to perform his or her tasks effectively”. 
Secondly, in its para. 6, Art. 22 recalls that “the guardian shall inform the unaccompanied minor about 
the meaning and possible consequences of the personal interview and, where appropriate, about how to 
prepare himself or herself for the personal interview”. 
66
 See European Council of Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission Proposal for 
an Asylum Procedures Regulation, [COM(2016) 467], November 2016, p. 26. 
67
 Art. 21, Proposal for a regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection in 
the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, cit. supra note 58. 
68
 Ibid.. 
69
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for 
the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), cit. supra note 57. 
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graph of Article 5 foresees the possibility to adapt the template to their special 
needs, as well as to supply the information orally. 
Even though this latter provision would require a proactive approach by Member 
States, it seems that the creation of a standard template could be considered an essen-
tial achievement, in terms of both uniformity and adequacy of the reception process.   
Within the recast of the Dublin III Regulation70, the Proposal faces the element 
having mostly affected the efficiency and the quality of the asylum decisions so far: 
the allocation of responsibility rule.  
In this regard, the proposal envisages new rules for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining the applications lodged by unaccompanied minors. 
According to the new version of Article 8, as a special guarantee for minors, their 
transfer to the responsible Member State (or to the Member State of allocation) 
should be subordinated to the assessment of the child’s best interest. In order to 
guide such an assessment, Article 8 specifies that the Member State where the mi-
nor is supposed to be transferred has to meet the requirements foreseen in other 
provisions of the CEAS71. 
Finally, the new version of Article 10(4) gives the responsibility upon the asy-
lum claim and the child’s protection to the Member State where the minor has first 
lodged his/her application, unless it is demonstrated that the best interest of the mi-
nor would be infringed. This new wording, however, does not seem to comply with 
the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in M.A.72, where the 
Court specified that “as a rule, unaccompanied minors should not be transferred to 
another Member State”73. Insofar as the suggested provision foresees a presumption 
against the applicant, i.e. the asylum seeking minor, it seems that its implementa-
tion would indeed jeopardize the rationale behind the decision of the Court of Jus-
 
70
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), 
cit. supra note 55. 
71
 Specifically, Art. 14, Directive 2013/33/EU, cit. supra note 6, which protects minors’ right to 
schooling and education, and Art. 24, which foresees special provisions for unaccompanied asylum seek-
ing children. Furthermore, Art. 25, Directive 2013/32/EU, cit. supra note 6, recognizes specific guaran-
tees for unaccompanied minors. 
72
 Case C-648/11, M.A. and Others, cit. supra note 47. 
73
 Ibid., para. 55. 
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tice of the European Union74.  
6. – New Proposals, Old Problems: Will an Adequate Asylum System 
Ever See the Light? 
As already underlined, the recent proposals try to address the several dysfunc-
tions preventing the CEAS from being an adequate system of accommodation of 
asylum seeking minors. Some of the issues that have emerged within the applica-
tion of the current CEAS, however, still need to be solved. In addition to the im-
provements that have been highlighted in the previous section, the Commission 
proposals raise several concerns regarding specific topics which have either not 
been tackled75, or not properly addressed. 
Focusing on the latter case, the proposal for the adoption of a Regulation on the 
asylum procedures restricts the Members States’ possibility to apply both the ac-
celerate examination76 and the border procedure77 when dealing with unaccompa-
nied minors. Following the suggestions of the majority of stakeholders, the draft 
subordinates the applicability of the accelerate examination and the border proce-
dure to the requirement of providing minors with an adequate support78. Although 
both procedures are considered to have a backup function, they cannot provide the 
necessary guarantees to accommodate the vulnerability of minors. Under this point 
of view, a better approach would have been to exclude from the field of application 
of both borders and accelerate procedures minors’ claims, instead of leaving to 
Member States the discretion on how to trigger such mechanisms79.  
Furthermore, even though the Proposals admit the possibility of detaining chil-
 
74
 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE comments for a Commission proposal for a 
Dublin IV Regulation, [COM (2016)270], October 2016, pp. 10-13. 
75
 Such as the possibility to trigger, at least with regard to unaccompanied minors, the mechanisms 
foreseen by the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving tempo-
rary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of 
efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L 
212, 7 August 2001, p. 12. 
76
 Art. 40, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection in 
the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, cit. supra note 58. 
77
 Ibid., Art. 41. 
78
 Ibid., Art. 19(2). 
79
 See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the proposal for an Asylum 
Procedures Regulation, cit. supra note 66, pp. 49 – 51. 
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dren to protect them from trafficking or to give the national authorities enough time 
to carry out the asylum procedures, it seems that the only consistent approach with 
the best interest of the child principle would have be to permanently prohibit mi-
nors’ detention80. 
A final aspect which has not been addressed properly concerns the age assessment 
and the medical examination. Apart from the obvious consideration that the fairness of 
this technique impacts on the overall asylum procedure, the Commission Proposal pre-
sents several weaknesses. First of all, the Proposal introduces the principle of mutual 
recognition towards the age assessment without taking into due account that the as-
sessment procedures vary significantly within Member States81. Secondly, the Proposal 
omits to reinforce the idea that medical examination should be employed only as a last 
resort measure: not only medical age assessment techniques are not scientifically relia-
ble82, but they do also frustrate minors’ psychological well-being. 
The analysis carried out in the present paper shows two main issues: on the one 
hand, the inadequacy of the current Common European Asylum System, on the 
other hand, the need to “build up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap 
the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration”83.  
The purpose highlighted by the European Commission can be achieved only if 
two specific conditions are met. First, the implementation of strong collaboration 
mechanisms between Member States to ensure the uniform accommodation of mi-
grants and to avoid the risk to overwhelm border States’ reception capacity84. Sec-
ond, the introduction of uniform asylum rules to foster the protection of migrants’ 
fundamental rights: as the case of minors clearly demonstrates, the lack of con-
sistency is likely to entail poor quality asylum decisions85. 
As a further step towards the achievement of a fair and efficient EU asylum sys-
tem, the recent proposals have to be appreciated insofar as the amendments and the 
innovations suggested by the European Commission appear to bring some im-
provements.  
 
80
 Ibid., p. 50. 
81
 Art. 24(6), Proposal for a regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection 
in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, cit. supra note 58. 
82
 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the proposal for an Asylum Pro-
cedures Regulation, cit. supra note 65, pp. 26-27. 
83
 “A European Agenda on Migration”, cit. supra note 18, p. 2. 
84
 DEN HEIJER, RIJPMA and SPIJKERBOER, cit. supra note 43, pp. 623-642. 
85
 WARREN and YORK, cit. supra note 11. 
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Nevertheless, at least with regard to unaccompanied asylum seeking children, it 
seems that the Proposals still underestimate the impact of some core issues, which - 
if not fruitfully addressed - will definitely undermine the goal sought by the Euro-
pean Commission. 
 
 

BRUNO, PALOMBINO, AMOROSO (eds.) Migration and Development: Some Reflections on Current Legal Questions, 
Rome, CNR Edizioni, 2016, ISBN 978 88 8080 230 3, pp. 197-217. 
IX.  
SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW, 
SOMETHING BALANCED, SOMETHING BLUE: THE 
EU BLUE CARD DIRECTIVE, BRAIN DRAIN, AND 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU  
AND THE SENDING COUNTRIES 
 
Alessandro Rosanò* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The EU Blue Card Directive. – 3. The Main Flaws of the EU 
Blue Card Directive and the Revision Proposal Presented by the Commission. – 4. Focus-
ing on the Development of Sending Countries: Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement. – 5. 
Conclusions. 
 
 
1. – Introduction 
Coined in the sixties to refer to the migration of British nationals to the United 
States, the term “brain drain” has been used since then to describe the migration of 
skilled manpower either from developing countries to developed ones or from the 
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former to more developed ones1. 
Many authors have dealt with this topic2 and it has been underlined that devel-
oping countries must face a number of negative effects spreading from brain drain 
as they incur costs of training and maintaining the emigrants during their unproduc-
tive years while rich countries benefit from their skills: thus, there is a loss of re-
sources that makes rich countries richer and poor countries poorer3. 
On the other hand, this phenomenon has been seen by others in terms of free 
movement of one factor of production, meaning that skilled manpower decides to 
go where it is more likely to be properly used and earn more money. That would 
have a positive effect on developing countries as their unemployment rate would 
drop and the welfare of non-emigrants would be maximized4. 
Other authors have focused on free choices made by any individuals: they leave 
simply because they are allowed to do so and they want to do so, and they cannot 
be deprived of such a freedom5. 
However, at the international level, brain drain has been constantly seen as an 
issue, as it is confirmed – for instance – by the Plan of Action of the World Popula-
tion Conference held in Bucharest in 1974. At Paragraph 57, one can read that  
 
1
 Over time, the usage of the term “brain drain” has been criticized and it has been proposed that 
new, more neutral terms be used, such as “brain exchange”, “transfer of talent”, or “reverse transfer of 
technology”. For the same reason, the movers should be referred to as “professional transients” (for some 
references, see SALT and FINDLAY, “International Migration of Highly-Skilled Manpower: Theoretical 
and Developmental Issues”, in APPLEYARD (ed.), The Impact of International Migration on Developing 
Countries, Paris, 1989, p. 160 ff., MUNDENDE, “The Brain Drain and Developing Countries”, in 
APPLEYARD (ed.), ibid., p. 183 ff.). 
2
 For an overview, see ADAMS, The Brain Drain, New York, 1968; KANNAPPAN, “The Brain Drain 
and Developing Countries”, International Labour Review, 1968, p. 1 ff.; BALDWIN, “Brain Drain or 
Overflow?”, Foreign Affairs, 1970, p. 358 ff.; BHAGWATI, “The Brain Drain”, International Social Sci-
ence Journal, 1976, p. 691 ff., BRANDI, “La storia del brain drain”, Studi emigrazione, 2004, p. 775 ff.; 
ID., “Le migrazioni delle alte professionalità tra mobilità internazionale e brain drain”, Affari sociali in-
ternazionali, 2006, p. 69 ff.; BOERI et al. (eds.), Brain Drain and Brain Gain: The Global Competition to 
Attract High-Skilled Migrants, Oxford, 2012. 
3
 See WATANABE, “The Brain Drain from Developing to Developed Countries”, International Labour 
Review, 1969, p. 401 ff.; WARD, “European Migratory Labor: A Myth of Development”, Monthly Re-
view, 1975, p. 24 ff. 
4
 On the topic, see GRUBEL and SCOTT, “The International Flow of Human Capital”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 1966, p. 268 ff.; ID., The Brain Drain: Determinants, Measurements and Welfare Effects, 
Waterloo, 1977. 
5
 ZAHLAN, “The Brain Drain Controversy”, in International Population Conference, Leige, 1977, pp. 
319-327. 
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“since the outflow of qualified personnel from developing to developed countries seri-
ously hampers the development of the former, there is an urgent need to formulate national 
and international policies to avoid the ‘brain drain’ and obviate its adverse effects, includ-
ing the possibility of devising programmes for large-scale communication of appropriate 
technological knowledge mainly from developed countries to the extent it can be properly 
adjusted and appropriately absorbed”6.  
Suggested policies concerned, on the public-sector side, the implementation of 
educational and manpower planning, investments in scientific and technical pro-
grammes, and the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to 
regulate migration and protect both migrants and the interests of sending countries. 
On the private-sector side, it was stressed that foreign investors should employ and 
train local personnel while also using local research facilities7. 
The topic has become paramount since the last twenty years to say the least for 
the European Union (“EU”), too. Since the beginning of the nineties it has been 
highlighted that the decline in birth rate in Western Europe would generate short-
ages of well-trained workers, making selective immigration a necessity rather than 
a choice8. EU institutions have struggled to find solutions that both meet the needs 
of the European labour market and preserve the economic and social environment 
of sending countries. 
For instance, the European Council meeting, which took place in Tampere in 
October 1999, underlined the need to ensure fair treatment of third-country nation-
als legally residing on the territory of the Member States as well as the need for a 
more efficient management of migration flows and the need for approximation of 
national legislations regarding the conditions for admission and residence of third-
country nationals. In that regard, it was said that both the economic and demo-
graphic developments within the EU and the situation in the countries of origin 
should have been taken into account9. 
In the Hague Programme, the European Council focused on legal migration as 
 
6
 World Population Plan of Action from the United Nations World Population Conference, Bucha-
rest, 19-30 August 1974, para. 57. 
7
 Ibid., paras. 58 and 62. 
8
 See for instance RITZEN and VAN DALEN, “The Economic Consequences of Selective Immigration 
Policies”, in ZIMMERMANN (ed.), Migration and Economic Development, Berlin/Heidelberg, 1992, p. 260 
ff. 
9
 European Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council”, Tampere, 15-16 Oc-
tober 1999, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm>. 
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an instrument to enhance the knowledge-based economy in Europe, advance eco-
nomic development, and establish partnerships with third countries. Thus, the Eu-
ropean Commission was invited to present a policy plan on legal migration which 
should have regarded, inter alia, admission procedures capable of responding to 
demands for migration labour in the labour market. At the same time, it was 
acknowledged the importance of developing policies which link migration, devel-
opment cooperation and humanitarian assistance in partnership, and dialogue with 
countries and regions of origin10. 
Migration and development were key issues in the Stockholm Programme, too. 
In fact, the European Council underlined the need to take further steps to maximize 
the positive and minimize the negative effects of migration on development: mean-
ing that efforts should have been made to promote concerted mobility and migra-
tion with countries of origin, and to promote the development of working opportu-
nities and improved livelihood options in third countries in order to minimize the 
brain drain. Also, a reference to the connection between climate change, migration, 
and development was made11. 
Finally, in the Conclusions of the Ypres European Council, the priority was set 
to better manage migration in all its aspects, especially by addressing shortages of 
specific skills and attracting talent. The European Council called for a comprehen-
sive approach in order to optimize the benefits of legal migration while tackling il-
legal migration at the same time12. 
This leads to taking into account the framework of the EU External Migration Poli-
cy, which is the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (“GAMM”) developed by 
the European Commission in order to address these matters in a balanced manner. Ac-
cording to the Commission, an adaptable workforce with the necessary skills which 
can cope with the demographic and economic changes must be secured. At the same 
time, migrants must be integrated into the labour market. That is why four thematic 
priorities, which were labeled as four pillars, were identified: legal migration and mo-
 
10 European Council, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union”, The Hague, 13 December 2004, available at: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:053:0001:0014:EN:PDF>. 
11
 European Council, “The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protect-
ing Citizens”, Stockholm, 15-17 July 2009, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XG0504(01)&from=EN>. 
12
 European Council, “Conclusions of the European Council”, Ypres, 26-27 June 2014, available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2014/06/26-27/>. 
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bility; irregular migration and trafficking of human beings; international protection and 
asylum policy; and maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility. 
For what concerns the first and the fourth pillar, the Commission underlined how good 
governance of migration can bring developmental benefits to sending countries as well 
as to receiving countries, as it can foster foreign direct investment and trade links, es-
pecially due to the role played by diaspora communities. So, migration may contribute 
to the development of sending countries. However, brain drain must be counteracted 
and brain circulation must be promoted.  
In regards to setting the operational priorities for the first pillar, the European 
Commission stressed the need to offer employers wide opportunities to find the 
best individuals for vacancies on the global labour market and offer employment 
possibilities for talented people from around the globe. For what concerns the 
fourth pillar, it was considered that “downsides, such as brain drain, social costs 
and dependence on foreign labour markets, also need to be tackled jointly in part-
nerships” in order to facilitate circular migration and support capacity-building in 
partner countries. With regard to this kind of issues, many pieces of legislation – 
such as the Directives on seasonal workers13 and on intra-corporate transferees14, 
the Single Permit Directive15 and the Directives on researchers16 and students17 – 
 
13
 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal work-
ers, OJ L 94, 28 March 2014, p. 375. 
14
 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on the condi-
tions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ 
L 157, 27 May 2014, p. 1. 
15
 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a 
single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the terri-
tory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a 
Member State, OJ L 343, 23 December 2011, p. 1. 
16
 Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-
country nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ L 289, 3 November 2005, p. 15. 
17
 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-
country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupils exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary ser-
vice, OJ L 375, 23 December 2004, p. 12. On the Directives that concern third-country nationals and the 
EU labour market, see TREVISANUT, “Le condizioni d’ingresso e la tutela dei migranti nell'ordinamento 
dell'Unione europea”, in CALIGIURI, CATALDI, and NAPOLETANO (eds.), La tutela dei diritti umani in Eu-
ropa: tra sovranità statale e ordinamenti sovranazionali, Padova, 2010, p. 337 ff. For an historical over-
view on EU law and labour migration, see RYAN, “The European Union and Labour Migration: Regulat-
ing Admission or Treatment?”, in BALDACCINI, GUILD, and TONER (eds.), Whose Freedom, Security and 
Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, Oxford/Portland, 2007, p. 489 ff. 
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have been identified as necessary to tackle them. Among these legal tools, one 
should consider the EU Blue Card Directive which was defined as “the first direct 
EU response to shortages of highly skilled workers”18. 
So, this paper provides an analysis of the EU Blue Card Directive (par. 2) and 
the revision proposal presented by the Juncker Commission (par. 3), assessing 
whether they can offer proper solutions that take into account the needs of both the 
EU and the sending countries. As far as the fight against brain drain is concerned, 
the paper focuses on Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement (par. 4) as a provision 
that seems to counteract the idea that the needs of the EU labour market shall al-
ways prevail. The final paragraph (par. 5) stresses that the EU Member States 
should do more in this regard and seeks to identify a legal basis in the EU Treaties 
that would make it possible to reform the EU Blue Card Directive in a sense con-
sistent with the objective of reduction and eradication of poverty. 
2. – The EU Blue Card Directive 
The so-called EU Blue Card Directive was adopted in 2009 in order to enhance 
a knowledge-based economy and advance the economic development of Europe 
while at the same time facing labour market shortages, demographic needs, and 
growing international competition to innovate. It should be regarded as an instru-
ment whose purpose is to make migration work for development19.  
 
18
 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility”, [COM(2011) 743 final], 18 November 2011, available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=celex%3A52011DC0743>. One should remember 
that some general statements regarding this matter can be found in the EU Treaties. In fact, pursuant to 
Art. 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), the EU shall contribute to peace, security, the sus-
tainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, erad-
ication of poverty, and the protection of human rights; pursuant to Art. 79(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), the European Parliament and the Council shall adopt 
measures with regard to the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by Member 
States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunification, 
and the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including 
the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States. 
19
 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155, 18 June 2009, p. 17. See 
generally PETRACCI, “Migrazione per ricerca scientifica ed alte qualifiche verso procedure differenziate”, 
Il lavoro nella giurisprudenza, 2009, p. 1109 ff.; SCHIAVONE, “Carta Blu UE e sanzioni per l’impiego di 
clandestini”, Lavoro e previdenza oggi, 2009, p. 1062 ff.; GÜMÜS, “EU Blue Card Directive: The Right 
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Pursuant to Article 1, the Directive sets out the conditions of entry and resi-
dence for more than three months in the territory of the Member States of third-
country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, and of their fam-
ily members, and the conditions for their entry and residence in Member States 
other than the first Member State20. 
Article 2 provides some fundamental definitions, most of all with regard to the 
concepts of third-country national, highly qualified employment, higher profes-
sional qualifications, and higher education qualification. While the first notion is 
quite an easy one to define – as a third-country national simply is a person who is 
not a citizen of the Union21 – the others prove more difficult.  
Highly qualified employment refers to the employment of a person, who in the 
Member State concerned, exercises genuine and effective work for, or under the di-
rection of, someone else, is paid, and has the required adequate and specific com-
petence, as proven by higher professional qualifications. 
Under the heading of higher professional qualifications fall any qualifications at-
tested by evidence of higher education qualifications or attested by at least five years of 
professional experience of a level comparable to higher education qualifications. 
Higher education qualification refers to any diploma, certificate, or other evi-
dence of formal qualifications issued by a competent authority attesting the suc-
cessful completion of a post-secondary higher education programme, provided that 
the studies needed to acquire it lasted at least three years. 
 
Step in the Right Direction?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2010, p. 435 ff.; ROSENTHAL, “La 
direttiva europea sui lavoratori altamente qualificati: elementi di cittadinanza sociale o di cittadinanza 
mercantile?”, in TRIGGIANI (ed.), Le nuove frontiere della cittadinanza europea, Bari, 2011, p. 425 ff. 
20
 Pursuant to Art. 3(4), the Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of the Member States to 
issue residence permits other than an EU Blue Card, provided that such residence permits shall not confer 
the right of residence in the other Member States as provided for in the Directive.  
21
 However, one should be aware that pursuant to Art. 3(2), the Directive shall not apply with regard 
to third-country nationals who are beneficiaries of temporary protection or international protection, bene-
ficiaries of protection in accordance with national law, international obligations, or practice of Member 
States, researchers within the meaning of Directive 2005/71/EC, family members of Union citizens, 
third-country nationals who enjoy long-term resident status in a Member State in accordance with Di-
rective 2003/109/EC, third-country nationals who enter a Member State under commitments contained in 
an international agreement facilitating the entry and temporary stay of certain categories of trade and in-
vestment-related natural persons, seasonal workers, third-country nationals whose expulsion has been 
suspended for reasons of fact or law, and third-country nationals who are covered by Directive 96/71/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers 
in the framework of the provision of services. 
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In order to obtain an EU Blue Card, the applicant needs to meet the criteria set out 
under Article 5: more specifically, they have to present a valid work contract or a bind-
ing job offer for highly qualified employment of at least one year in a Member State, 
documents attesting fulfillment of the national conditions regarding the exercise by 
Union citizens of the regulated profession specified in the work contract or binding job 
offer or, in the case of unregulated professions, documents attesting the relevant higher 
professional qualifications, a valid travel document, and evidence of having or having 
applied for a sickness insurance. Also, the applicant must not be considered to pose a 
threat to public policy, public security, or public health. Finally, under Article 5(3), the 
gross annual salary resulting from the monthly or annual salary specified in the work 
contract or binding job offer must not be inferior to at least 1.5 times the average gross 
annual salary in the Member State concerned. 
Pursuant to Article 7(2) and (4), the standard period of validity of the EU Blue 
Card is comprised between one and four years and during that period, the holder is 
entitled to enter, re-enter, and stay in the territory of the Member State issuing the 
EU Blue Card and to the rights recognized in the Directive.  
As provided under Article 8, an application can be refused by the Member 
States whenever the applicant does not meet the conditions set out in Article 5, the 
documents presented have been fraudulently acquired, or falsified or tampered with 
or the employer has been sanctioned for undeclared work or illegal employment. 
Under the same provision, at Paragraphs 2 and 4, the Member States may assess 
the situation of their labour market in order to verify whether a vacancy can be 
filled by national or EU workforce and they can reject an application in order to en-
sure ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified workers in the 
countries of origin. 
For what concerns the rights recognized to the EU Blue Card holder, Article 12 
provides that for the first two years of legal employment in the concerned Member 
State, access to the labour market is restricted to the exercise of paid employment 
activities which meet the conditions for admission set out in Article 5 and changes 
in employer is subject to the authorization in writing of the competent national au-
thorities. After the first two years, the Member States may grant equal treatment 
with nationals as regards access to highly qualified employment. 
In the event of temporary unemployment, the EU Blue Card is withdrawn when 
the period of unemployment exceeds three consecutive months or when it occurs 
more than once during the period of validity of an EU Blue Card. During that peri-
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od, the EU Blue Card holder can seek and take up employment under the condi-
tions set out in Article 12 and is allowed to stay in the Member State until the nec-
essary authorization has been granted or denied (Article 13). 
EU Blue Card holders enjoy equal treatment with nationals of the Member State 
issuing the Blue Card with regards to working conditions, freedom of association 
and affiliation, education and vocational training, recognition of diplomas, certifi-
cates and other professional qualifications, social security, pensions, access to and 
supply of goods and services made available to the public, including procedures for 
obtaining housing, as well as information and counseling services afforded by em-
ployment offices, and free access to the entire territory of the Member State con-
cerned, within the limits provided for by national law (Article 14).  
Family reunification is possible under Article 15: residence permits for family 
members are granted within six months from the date on which the application was 
lodged at the latest, and the duration of validity of the residence permits of family 
members is the same as that of the residence permits issued to the EU Blue Card 
holder insofar as the period of validity of their travel documents allows it22. 
As provided under Articles 16 and 17, an EU Blue Card holder can cumulate 
periods of residence in different Member States in order to meet the criteria regard-
ing the long-term resident status and the issuance of a long-term residence permit23. 
After eighteen months of legal residence in the first Member State as an EU 
Blue Card holder, the person in question and his or her family members may move 
to another Member State for the purpose of highly qualified employment, provided 
that the EU Blue Card holder or his employer presents an application for an EU 
Blue Card to the competent national authorities within one month after entering the 
territory of the second Member State (Article 18). The member of his family may 
accompany or join him, provided that they submit an application for a residence 
permit within one month after their entry (Article 19). 
 
22
 See Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, in OJ L 229, 30 April 2004, p. 158. 
23
 See Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, in OJ L 16, 23 January 2004, p. 44, and Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country na-
tionals, in OJ L 157, 15 June 2002, p. 1.  
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For what concerns data analysis, on the one hand, pursuant to Article 20, the 
Member States must communicate to the Commission statistics on the volumes of 
third-country nationals who have been granted an EU Blue Card, volumes of third-
country nationals whose EU Blue Card has been renewed or withdrawn, and vol-
umes of admitted family members24. On the other hand, pursuant to Article 21, eve-
ry three years, the Commission must report to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of the Directive in the Member States. 
The Member States were supposed to transpose the Directive by 19 June 2011 
(Article 23)25. 
3. – The Main Flaws of the EU Blue Card Directive and the Revision 
Proposal Presented by the Commission 
The EU Blue Card Directive soon showed its flaws. As it has been underlined 
by the European Commission, only 31% of highly-educated migrants to OECD 
countries chose the EU as a destination26 and in its first two years of application, 
only 16,000 Blue Cards were issued and 13,000 were issued by Germany only27: so, 
its scope has been really limited28. It does not provide sufficient rights to potential 
 
24
 Data regarding the impact of the implementation of the Directive in terms of brain drain and brain 
waste should be transmitted by the Member States to the Commission in accordance with Regulation 
(EC) No. 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statis-
tics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 311/76 on the 
compilation of statistics on foreign workers, OJ L 199, 31 July 2007, p. 23 (see para. 22 of the Whereas). 
25
 Truth be told, only four Member States (the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Spain, and Estonia) im-
plemented the Directive on time and the Commission had to bring infringement proceedings against all 
the others, which were all closed by 2013. On the implementation of the EU Blue Card Directive, see 
GRÜTTERS and STRIK (eds.), The Blue Card Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues, and Implementa-
tion in Selected Member States, Oisterwijk, 2013. 
26
 See European Commission, “Delivering the European Agenda on Migration: Commission presents 
Action Plan on Integration and reforms ‘Blue Card’ scheme for highly skilled workers from outside the 
EU”, 7 June 2016, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2041_en.htm>. 
27 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions - “A Europe-
an Agenda on Migration”, [COM(2015) 240 final], 13 May 2015, p. 15, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf> 
28
 See Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament, “Exploring New Avenues for 
Legislation for Labour Migration to the European Union – Study for the LIBE Committee”, 2015, pp. 69-70, 
available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536452/IPOL_STU(2015)536452_EN.pdf>. 
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beneficiaries and their family, it does not seem to add anything to highly-qualified 
national migration schemes29, and it does not apply to entrepreneurs and service 
providers, who are more likely to create innovative business30.  
From a more general point of view, the Directive only sets minimum standards and 
leaves much leeway to Member States through “may-clauses” and references to na-
tional legislation31. That applies particularly with regard, inter alia, to brain drain and 
negative effects which may impact sending countries as a consequence of the enforce-
ment of the Directive. As stated above, under Article 8(4), the Member States may re-
ject an application for an EU Blue Card in order to ensure ethical recruitment in sectors 
suffering from a lack of qualified workers in the countries of origin. As it is easy to un-
derstand, a provision as such does not obligate the Member States to do anything in 
order to help sending countries. On the contrary, given that the mechanism to attract 
foreign workers has not worked properly so far, it is highly unlikely that the Member 
States take the needs of the sending countries into account, putting aside their own. 
Thus, it seems easy to understand why no Member State has entered into an agreement 
with a third country regarding this matter and only Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, 
Luxembourg, and Malta have transposed the option to reject an application in order to 
ensure ethical recruitment in such sectors, but no rejections on these grounds have been 
reported32. This may result in serious harm to the sending countries’ long-term eco-
nomic growth, increase brain drain, and make it more difficult for sending countries to 
 
29
 Ibid. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden have their 
own national schemes. 
30
 Ibid. As underlined in DESIDERIO and DOMÈNECH, “Migrant Entrepreneurship in OECD Countries. 
Part II”, in OECD, Migrant Entrepreneurship in OECD Countries, 12 July 2011, p. 145, “[m]igrants con-
tribute actively to the creation of new firms in the OECD. In relative terms, migrants are more entrepre-
neurial than natives in most OECD countries. In Belgium and in Spain, the proportion of individuals that 
became self-employed in 2007-08 was almost the double the proportion of natives. In the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and the Czech Republic, as well migrants are more likely to start a new 
business. In Austria, Germany, Greece, and Italy, migrants are almost as entrepreneurial as natives”. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 European Commission, Communication from the European Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and res-
idence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (‘EU Blue Card’), 
[COM(2014) 287 final], 22 May 2014, p. 5, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/com/com_com(2014)0287_/com_com(
2014)0287_en.pdf>. 
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improve their innovation capital33. 
In light of the above, one should consider the statement made by Jean-Claude 
Juncker when he was campaigning as a candidate for the President of the European 
Commission: 
“I want to promote a new European policy on legal migration. Such a policy could help us 
to address shortages of specific skills and attract talent to better cope with the demographic 
challenges of the European Union. I want Europe to become at least as attractive as the favour-
ite migration destinations such as Australia, Canada and the USA. As a first step, I intend to re-
view the ‘Blue Card’ legislation and its unsatisfactory state of implementation”34.  
As a matter of fact, some amendments and modifications are needed, most of 
all in order to correct the above-mentioned flaws and introduce a mechanism that 
could grant access to the whole EU labour market, and not only to that of a single 
Member State. So, in September 2015, the Commission anticipated a reform of the 
EU-Blue-Card legal scheme35 and, on 7 June 2016, a proposal for the revision of the 
EU Blue Card Directive was presented36.  
For what concerns Article 2, two general definitions have been added: those re-
garding higher professional skills and business activity. The former refers to skills 
attested by at least three years of professional experience of a level comparable to 
higher education qualifications and which is relevant in the profession or sector 
specified in the work contract or binding job offer. The latter means a temporary 
activity related to the business interests of the employer, such as attending internal 
 
33
 KANCS and CIAIAN, “The Impact of the EU Blue Card Policy on Economic Growth in the African 
Sending Countries”, South African Journal of Economics, 2010, p. 225 ff., p. 226. 
34 JUNCKER, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change. Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission”, 15 July 2014, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines_en.pdf>. 
35
 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, and 
the Council: Managing the refugee crisis: immediate operational, budgetary, and legal measures under 
the European Agenda on Migration, [COM(2015) 490 final/2], 29 September 2009, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-
implementation-package/docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_crisis_en.pdf>. 
36
 European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly skilled em-
ployment”, COM(2016) 378 final, 7 June 2016, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160607/directive_conditions_entry_residence_third-
country_nationals_highly_skilled_employment_en.pdf>. 
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and external business meetings, attending conferences and seminars, negotiating 
business deals, undertaking sales or marketing activities, performing internal or cli-
ent audits, exploring business opportunities, or attending and receiving training. 
The main difference between former Article 3 and the new one is that, under 
the latter, the Member States shall not issue any other permit than an EU Blue Card 
to third-country nationals for the purpose of highly skilled employment37. 
Focusing on the criteria for admission, the duration of the work contract or the 
binding job offer is reduced from twelve months to six and the salary threshold 
shall be between 1.0 and 1.4 times (and not 1.5 anymore). 
Pursuant to Article 8(2), the Member States shall set a standard period of validi-
ty for the EU Blue Card, which shall be at least 24 months. If the work contract co-
vers a shorter period, the EU Blue Card shall be issued at least for the duration of 
the work contract plus three months. Where an EU Blue Card is renewed, its period 
of validity shall be at least 24 months. 
Under the newly-introduced Article 12, Member States may decide to provide for 
recognition procedures for employers, providing clear and transparent information to 
them about, inter alia, the conditions and criteria for approval, the period of validity of 
the recognition and the consequences of non-compliance with the conditions – includ-
ing possible withdrawal and non-renewal – as well as any sanction applicable. 
For what concerns labour market access, EU Blue Card holders shall have full 
access to highly skilled employment in the Member State concerned. Member States 
may require that a change of employer or other changes affecting the fulfillment of 
the criteria for admission are communicated in accordance with procedures laid 
down by national law, but the communication procedure shall not suspend the right 
of the EU Blue Card holder to pursue the employment. Also, EU Blue Card holders 
may engage in self-employed activity in parallel to the activity in highly skilled em-
ployment (Article 13). Temporary unemployment does not affect the right of resi-
dence as an EU Blue Card holder but it cannot last for more than three months or oc-
cur more than once during the validity of the EU Blue Card (Article 14). 
The provisions regarding equal treatment, family members, and EU long-term 
residence for EU Blue Card holders (Articles 15, 16, 17, and 18) largely corre-
spond to those under Directive 2009/50/EC but a new provision regarding business 
 
37
 So, it seems that the EU is seeking to overcome national schemes in order to better harmonize this 
field of law. 
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activity in a second Member State has been added. It provides that a third-country 
national who holds a valid EU Blue Card is entitled to enter and stay in another 
Member State for the purpose of carrying out a business activity for up to 90 days 
in any 180-day period. The second Member State shall not require any authoriza-
tion for exercising the business activity other than the EU Blue Card issued by the 
first Member State (Article 19). 
After twelve months of legal residence in the first Member State as an EU Blue 
Card holder, the third-country national shall be entitled to enter a second Member 
State for the purpose of highly skilled employment on the basis of the EU Blue 
Card and a valid travel document (Article 20). The members of the family shall be 
authorized to accompany them and to enter and stay in the second Member State 
based on the valid residence permits obtained as family members of an EU Blue 
Card holder in the first Member State (Article 21). 
The provisions regarding ethical recruitment (Article 9), the statistics that 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission (Article 24), and reporting 
by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (Article 25) have 
been confirmed. 
4. – Focusing on the Development of Sending Countries: Article 13 of 
the Cotonou Agreement 
It is quite clear that the EU is focused on its internal economic and demographic is-
sues rather than on those of other countries. In fact, the revision proposal aims at mak-
ing the EU labour market more attractive to non-EU citizens by providing them more 
rights and opportunities than it has been so far under the EU Blue Card Directive. The 
imbalance that this kind of approach may determine in the sending countries is not tak-
en into any account as the provision regarding ethical recruitment has not been 
changed at all, still being a may-clause. Thus, one may wonder whether the needs of 
the EU labour market shall always prevail or if another approach is possible. 
As a matter of fact, one may consider the so-called Cotonou Agreement38 in or-
der to provide an answer. Signed on 23 June 2000, the Cotonou Agreement is a 
 
38
 Partnership Agreement 2000/483/EC between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 
signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, OJ L 317, 15 December 2000, p. 3. The Convention entered into 
force in April 2003 and was revised in 2005 and 2010. 
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treaty made between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of 
States (“ACP”) created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975. It is the successor 
of the Lomé Convention and it deals with a number of topics such as development, 
trade, international investments, human rights, and governance. In the Preamble as 
well as in Article 1(1), the Contracting Parties have affirmed their commitment to 
eradicate poverty, achieve sustainable development, and integrate the ACP Coun-
tries into the world economy39. 
Under Article 13(1), the Parties reaffirm their obligations and commitments in 
international law to respect human rights and eliminate all forms of discrimination. 
Protection of migrants and prevention of illegal migration are taken into account in 
order to make it possible for migration to work for development fairly, without 
prejudice to the fundamental rights of every human being. This provision might be 
read together with the one under Paragraph 2, where four objectives have been set: 
a) fair treatment of third-country nationals who reside legally on the Contracting 
Parties territories; b) integration policy aiming at granting them rights and obliga-
tions comparable to those of national citizens; c) enhancement of non-
discrimination in economic, social, and cultural life; and d) implementation of 
measures against racism and xenophobia. Thus, notwithstanding the demographic 
and economic nature of the issues at stake, it is made clear that any initiatives that 
might be taken shall be consistent with general principles which are not merely 
economic in nature since their purpose is to defend migrants as human beings. On 
the other hand, Paragraph 3 is focused on migrants as workers as it provides that 
the treatment accorded by EU Member States to workers of ACP countries shall be 
free from any discrimination based on nationality with regards to working condi-
tions, remuneration and dismissal, and the same shall be done by ACP countries 
with regard to EU workers. 
Going back to the first Paragraph, it is also stated that migration shall be the 
subject of in-depth dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership. This 
 
39
 On the Cotonou Agreement, see ARTS, “ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou Agree-
ment”, Common Market Law Review, 2003, p. 95 ff.; CORDINI, “Accordi di cooperazione e vincoli di 
democratizzazione dell’Unione europea: le convenzioni di cooperazione e di associazione da Lomé a Co-
tonou”, Il diritto dell'economia, 2004, p. 7 ff.; DEL VESCOVO, “Aiuto comunitario allo sviluppo nel qua-
dro dell'Accordo di Cotonou”, La comunità internazionale, 2005, p. 51 ff.; DEVISSCHER, “Legal Migra-
tion in the Relationship between the European Union and ACP Countries: The Absence of a True Global 
Approach Continues”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2011, p. 53 ff. 
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seems to refer to a political dialogue that should be regarded as a holistic policy-
making and agenda-setting tool through which it might be possible to work out le-
gal solutions to the standing problems. That is confirmed by the establishment of 
the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly whose duties are, inter alia, to promote 
democratic processes through dialogue and consultation and to raise public aware-
ness of development issues (Article 17). As far as the topic tackled in this paper is 
concerned, it is worth remembering a Resolution that was adopted by the Assembly 
in December 2015 in which they deplored “the tendency to prioritize the fight 
against irregular migration, while giving insufficient attention to legal routes for 
those on the move and migrating by reaping the mutual benefits of circular migra-
tion”. Then, the Assembly called for  
“a better framework for legal migration and mobility – including circular and tempo-
rary migration schemes – and for better information, protection, and pre-departure training, 
and the establishment of further safe and legal migration channels and humanitarian corri-
dors by issuing more visas, in particular humanitarian visas, to migrants from countries be-
set by conflicts or humanitarian crises, and by facilitating family reunification and legal 
migration channels for workers”40.  
For what concerns the development of ACP countries, Article 13(4) is the most 
important one. It states that: 
“The Parties consider that strategies aiming at reducing poverty, improving living and 
working conditions, creating employment and developing training contribute in the long term to 
normalising migratory flows. The Parties will take account, in the framework of development 
strategies and national and regional programming, of structural constraints associated with mi-
gratory flows with the purpose of supporting the economic and social development of the re-
gions from which migrants originate and of reducing poverty. The Community shall support, 
through national and regional Cooperation programmes, the training of ACP nationals in their 
country of origin, in another ACP country or in a Member State of the European Union. As re-
gards training in a Member State, the Parties shall ensure that such action is geared towards the 
vocational integration of ACP nationals in their countries of origin. The Parties shall develop 
cooperation programmes to facilitate the access of students from ACP States to education, in 
particular through the use of new communication technologies”. 
 
40
 ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, “Resolution on Migration, Human Rights, and Humani-
tarian Refugees”, 7-9 December 2015, para. 18, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/2015_acp2/pdf/ap101.984en.pdf>. 
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It is quite easy to understand that the Parties are referring to brain drain and the 
need to overcome that issue, without mentioning them41. Thus, since they have the 
proper means to do so, the EU Member States shall support the training of ACP na-
tionals which could take place either in their country of origin, in another ACP 
country, or in an EU Member State. Nevertheless, the focus is set on the country of 
origin and its need for manpower in order to support its own development: not only 
the country of origin is mentioned as the first possible place where the training 
could take place, but also training in a Member State should be aimed at facilitating 
the re-installation of ACP nationals in the labour market of the sending countries. 
Also, it is quite interesting how the role played by new communication technolo-
gies is stressed: in fact, they should work as means that ensure to students from 
ACP countries a European education without obliging them to leave their coun-
tries. That would then reduce the risk that, when they are in Europe, they decide to 
stay and not go back, depriving their countries of fundamental assets. 
With regard to the provision of Article 13(4), one may think of the ACP Science 
and Technology Programme (“ACP S&T”) which is an ACP-EU cooperation pro-
gramme funded by the EU and implemented by the ACP Secretariat whose aim is to 
promote innovation and develop appropriate technologies to fight and eradicate pov-
erty in ACP countries. By tackling issues such as energy shortages, climate change, 
and food insecurity, the ACP S&T seeks to overcome the scientific and technological 
divide between ACP countries and the rest of the world, strengthen the scientific 
knowledge in those countries, and support growth and socio-economic development42. 
One may also consider the EDULINK II Programme, which is funded by the 
EU and supports higher education in ACP countries both with regard to the man-
agement sector and the strictly academic field43. 
 
41
 Two references to brain drain can be found in the Agreement. Pursuant to Art. 80, “[w]ith a view 
to reversing the brain drain from the ACP States, the Community shall assist ACP States which so re-
quest to facilitate the return of qualified ACP nationals resident in developed countries through appropri-
ate re-installation incentives”. The joint declaration on Art. 13 reads as follows: “The Parties agree to 
strengthen and deepen their dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, building their approach on 
the following three pillars of a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration: Migration and De-
velopment, including issues relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances; Legal migration including 
admission, mobility and movement of skills and services; and Illegal migration, including smuggling and 
trafficking of human beings and border management, as well as readmission”. 
42
 See <http://www.acp-hestr.eu/acp-st-about-contact>. 
43
 See <http://www.acp-hestr.eu/edulink-about-contact>. 
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5. – Conclusions 
Sometimes, even EU law and politics experts are forgetful of a significant 
statement that was made in the so-called Schuman Declaration. In the words of the 
former French Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
“This production [i.e., the coal and steel production] will be offered to the world as a 
whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living stand-
ards and to promoting peaceful achievements. With increased resources Europe will be 
able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the 
African continent”44.  
As paternalistic as it sounds, this statement was and still is the expression of a 
sense of awareness regarding the role played by Europe in promoting an alternative 
way of development which should have concerned not only the European conti-
nent, but the world as a whole, starting from the poorest regions. A peculiar form 
of responsibility was and still is intertwined in those words and the EU and its 
Member States should remember that45.  
As stated above, according to the traditional literature on the topic, brain drain 
as an exodus of human capital is a curse for developing countries and must be 
countered, while according to some more recent analyses46 brain drain would be 
offset by brain-drain-induced brain gain. In fact, brain drain implies that skilled in-
dividuals leave developing countries in order to earn higher wages in developed (or 
more developed) countries. That would lead to more investments in education in 
developing countries which would result in a rise in welfare and growth. As fasci-
nating as it sounds, this idea has been criticized for a number of reasons, most of all 
 
44
 See <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en>. 
45
 Of course, the Schuman Declaration is not a legally binding document, but one cannot deny its tru-
ly political nature as the document that made it possible for the European integration process to start. 
Therefore, although it does not pose legal obligations, it should still be regarded as the expression of the 
basic values of the EU as a political entity. So, every achievement should try to be as consistent as possi-
ble with those values in order not to betray the dreams and will of our founding fathers. On this point, see 
also the contribution by GATTA in this Volume, p. 13 ff. 
46
 MOUNTFORD, “Can a Brain Drain Be Good for Growth in the Source Economy?”, Journal of De-
velopment Economics, 1997, p. 287 ff.; VIDAL, “The Effect of Emigration on Human Capital For-
mation”, Journal of Population Economics, 1998, p. 589 ff.; STARK, “Rethinking the Brain Drain”, World 
Development, 2004, p. 15 ff. 
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because in a brain-drain-induced scenario, both skilled and unskilled workers47 are 
more likely to migrate and less likely to stay in order to obtain higher wages: thus, 
that would mean a situation where public and private expenditures on education in-
crease but States can count on less incomes from taxes, resulting in a negative im-
pact on welfare and growth48. 
Also, it has been denied that this kind of situation leads to a scenario where 
knowledge flows from one country to another, as the cross-border mobility of 
knowledge is larger within countries than between regions located in different areas 
of the world49. 
Finally, one should be aware that these analyses seem entirely to shift the bur-
den of brain drain on developing countries, relieving developed countries of any re-
sponsibility. It has been observed that different kinds of measures might be imple-
mented in order to deal with this problem. While for some – preventive or restric-
tive measures – it would be up to developing countries to adopt them, for others 
developed countries should face their responsibilities. For instance, they could en-
courage temporary rather than permanent settlement (restorative measures), or they 
could repay the costs incurred by sending States in training and educating the mi-
grants, or tax the migrants in order to support the sending States (compensatory 
measures)50. 
The purpose of making migration work for development, reconciling Europe’s 
economic and demographic needs with the developmental needs of third countries, 
 
47
 Migration of low and semi-skilled workers has not been tackled in this paper. However, one must 
be aware that this phenomenon has a greater impact on poverty reduction in developing countries than 
emigration of professionals, most of all for three reasons. First of all, these workers come from lower in-
come communities, who benefit more directly from migration. Secondly, their withdrawal from home-
country labour markets opens more opportunities for replacement workers at home. Finally, these mi-
grants tend to remit more per person than high-skill professionals (see KATSELI et al., Policies for Migra-
tion and Development: A European Perspective, Paris, 2006, p. 13). 
48
 See for instance SCHIFF, “Brain Gain: Claims about its Size and Impact on Welfare and Growth 
Are Greatly Exaggerated”, in ÖZDEN and SCHIFF (eds.), International Migration, Remittances & the 
Brain Drain, Houndmills/New York, 2006, p. 201 ff., pp. 220-221. So, all things considered, it seems 
that remittances are the only positive outcome spreading out of brain drain. This does not seem to be 
enough as it does not let developing countries to overcome their situation of dependency from developed 
countries. Remittances do not compensate the loss of human capital since developing countries cannot 
count on the abilities and working force of highly skilled individuals. 
49
 KANCS and CIAIAN, cit. supra note 33, p. 241. 
50
 See MUNDENDE, cit. supra note 1, p. 188-189 and D'OLIVEIRA E SOUSA, “The Brain Drain Issue in 
International Negotiations”, in APPLEYARD (ed.), cit. supra note 1, pp. 203-205. 
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has not yet been achieved. While the security dimension has largely been discussed 
and tackled51, the issues regarding migration and development have only been con-
sidered from a policy-making point of view and serious measures have lacked. As a 
general rule, they are not legally binding and where they are, they are mainly in the 
interest of the EU and its Member States52. 
The needs of the sending countries labour markets are hardly taken into account 
under both the EU Blue Card Directive and the revision proposal. In fact, the pro-
vision concerning ethical recruitment has not been modified as in both cases it pro-
vides that the Member States may reject an application for an EU Blue Card in or-
der to ensure ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified work-
ers in the countries of origin. Therefore, it does not pose any obligations on the 
Member States to consider the effects that brain drain may have on sending coun-
tries since it provides that the Member States may reject the applications on 
grounds of ethical recruitment: which basically means that they are free not to do 
that and stay focused only on the needs of their national labour markets. 
Under Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU shall support the training of 
ACP nationals through national and regional cooperation programmes which means 
that the EU is under the obligation of providing such training and cooperation pro-
grammes in order to face the brain-drain-related issues and compensate the negative 
effects spreading from such a situation. A measure as such should be regarded as be-
ing compensatory in nature and positively assessed as it obligates the EU to take 
steps – and responsibility – in order to solve the brain-drain-related issues. 
Thus, for what concerns the EU Blue Card mechanism and the revision pro-
posal, a provision as such would have been useless as it would have simply repro-
duced an obligation that already binds the EU under the Cotonou Agreement. Nev-
 
51
 See MARIN and SPENA, “The Criminalization of Migration and European (Dis)Integration, Euro-
pean Journal of Migration and Law, 2016, pp. 147-156. 
52
 Nevertheless, one should remember that some States have entered into bilateral agreements whose 
purpose is to attract highly-qualified workers. For instance, France signed some agreements on concerted 
management of migratory flows and labour migration with Senegal, Gabon, Congo, Benin, Tunisia, Mau-
ritius, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Russia, while the Netherlands signed an agreement 
with India. Also, agreements on facilitated access to the labour market by qualified and unqualified work 
force were concluded by Poland with Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, and by Slovenia 
with Bosnia-Herzegovina (see European Migration Network Study, “Attracting Highly Qualified and 
Qualified Third-Country Nationals”, 2013, p. 50, available at 
<http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/redeuropeamigracion/Estudios_monograficos/EMN_Synthesis_Rep
ort_Attracting_Highly_Qualified_EN.pdf>). 
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ertheless, the Member States should be bound to do something, too. Thus, the pro-
vision regarding ethical recruitment should be rephrased in order to obligate the 
Member States to take into account the ongoing labour market situation in the 
countries of origin. In this regard, a proper legal basis to do so may be found in Ar-
ticle 208 TFEU since it provides that Union development cooperation shall have as 
its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. 
Since a may-clause may hamper the EU initiatives in the field and the Member 
States must facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks as provided for in Arti-
cle 4(3) TEU, Article 8(4) of the EU Blue Card Directive could be rephrased in or-
der to actually obligate the Member States to reject an application for an EU Blue 
Card to ensure ethical recruitment in the countries of origin. 
All things considered and provided that it is very difficult to find a balance be-
tween the needs of the EU and its Member States, the needs of the developing 
countries and migrants’ personal choices, the best solution seems to be the one that 
relies on temporary recruitment of personnel in the sending countries which should 
be associated to training programmes and skill-replenishment programmes that 
should take place in those countries. That would facilitate the mobility of 
knowledge and skills in a way that could be consistent with the interests of all the 
actors considered. 
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1. – Introduction 
The global political agenda of over a decade has been focused on the link between 
migration and development1. Countries and international organizations increasingly 
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look at migration as a phenomenon capable of having a substantial positive impact on 
development. This is the “development-focused” approach proposed by the World 
Bank and United Nations Dialogue, according to which migration is seen as a means to 
promote development objectives in the interests of the countries of origin2.  
In the framework of recent external relations of the European Union (“EU”), the 
perspective is quite different: the link between development and migration resulted in a 
sort of “instrumentalisation of development cooperation”3, as a way to better control 
immigration and alleviate migratory pressure on EU Member States of arrival or desti-
nation. Development cooperation and financial aid to third States are used by the EU to 
control and reduce migration pressures in the long term, with “positive actions” – I 
might say – despite the EU and its Member States are showing in this regard more at-
tention to the close link between development and “not-migration”. Development aid, 
assistance and economic incentives or other benefits are surely useful to address the 
 
Migration”, IOM Migration Research Series, Geneva, 2014, available at: 
<http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs50_20may2014.pdf>. 
2
 UN, “High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development”, 14-15 September 2006, 
available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hld>. See OMELANIUK, “Making the Connec-
tions between Migration and Development”, in OMELANIUK (ed.), Global Perspectives on Migration and 
Development: GFMD Puerto Vallarta and beyond, Dordrecht, 2012, p. 1 ff. 
3
 This is the expression used by HOLLAND, “The EU and the Global Development Agenda”, in CARBONE 
(ed.), Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy, London/New York, 2013, p. 21 ff. On the Migration–
Development nexus in general, see CASO, “Migrazioni e sviluppo: la politica europea”, ISPI Policy Brief No. 
58, July 2007, available at: <http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/pb_58_2007.pdf>; CHETAIL (ed.), “La dia-
lectique migration et développement dans la politique de l’Union européenne à l’égard des pays tiers: para-
digmes et paradoxes du dialogue Nord-Sud”, in MAES, FOBLETS and DE BRUYCKER (eds.), External Dimen-
sions of European Migration and Asylum Law and Policy, Bruxelles, 2011, p. 551 ff.; CHOU, “EU and the Mi-
gration–Development Nexus: What Prospects for EU-wide Policies?”, University of Oxford COMPAS, Work-
ing Paper 37, 2006, available at: <http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-paper.shtml>; NYBERG-
SORENSEN, VAN HEAR and ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, “The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy 
Options”, International Migration, 2002, p. 40 ff.; PASTORE, “’More Development for Less Migration’ or ‘Bet-
ter Migration for more Development’? Shifting Priorities in the European Debate”, MigraCtion Europa: Peri-
odical analysis bulletin on migration policies in Europe, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Special Issue, 
December 2003, available at: <http://www.cespi.it/PASTORE/MigSpecial3.PDF>; ID., “Cooperation with 
Sending and Transit Countries: Beyond Sticks and Carrots?”, Policy brief for the Dutch Presidency Conference 
on Asylum, Migration and Frontiers, September 2004, available at: 
<http://www.cespi.it/PASTORE/pastore_083104.pdf>; ID., “Europe, Migration and Development. Critical 
Remarks on an Emerging Policy Field”, August 2007, available at: <http://www.cespi.it/PDF/Pastore-
MigrationandDevelopment.pdf>; RESLOW, “Migration and Development? An Assessment of Recent EU Initia-
tives”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2010, p. 3 ff.; ZANFRINI, “Migration and Development: 
Old and New Ambivalences of the European Approach”, Paper Ismu, December 2015, available at: 
<http://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Zanfrini_paper_eng_dic_2015.pdf>.  
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root causes of forced migration in developing or less-developed countries, or to open 
legal channels of migration4. Actions “at the source” of migration flows often consist-
ing in the promotion of economic, social and political development of the countries of 
origin, and financial aid to the latter, should result in a corresponding reduction, if not 
elimination, of migration influx towards Europe5.  
The EU institutions want to “optimize” the migration and development nexus, 
so that the synergy between international (legal) migration and (economic, social 
and political) development of third countries of origin of migrants yields positive, 
reciprocal effects. The promotion of a real economic, political and social develop-
ment in the countries of origin and transit of migrants through cooperation and 
practical action is the only way to reduce “at the source” international migration6. 
In this regard, the European Council of Seville (21 and 22 June 2002) underlined 
that the intensification of economic cooperation, developing trade, development as-
sistance and conflict prevention are all means to promote economic prosperity in 
the countries concerned and thereby to reduce the underlying causes of migration 
flows7. Although the proposal to explicitly attach development aid to the willing-
ness of third States to cooperate in the control of migration was formally rejected, 
 
4
 VOGLER and ROTTE, “The Effects of Development on Migration: Theoretical Issues and New Em-
pirical Evidence”, Journal of Population Economics, 2000, p. 485 ff. 
5
 Such an approach is criticized by GENT, “The Root Causes of Migration: Criticising the Approach 
and Finding a Way Forward”, Working Paper No.11, 2002, Sussex Centre for Migration Research, avail-
able at: <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=mwp11.pdf&site=252>; 
YOUKHANA, BRAUN and BORGEMEISTER, “Addressing the Root Causes of Forced Migration”, available 
at: <http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefnews/AnnualReport_14-15_Lead_Article.pdf>. 
6
 NASCIMBENE, “L’approccio globale nella gestione dell’immigrazione: la politica della UE alla luce 
dell’attuazione del Programma dell’Aja”, Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 2008, p. 433 ff.; NIESSEN, “In-
ternational Migration and Relations with Third Countries: The European Union”, Migration Policy 
Group, May 2004, available at: <http://www.migpolgroup.com/wpkln/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/144.EU_InternationalMigrationandRelationswiththirdcountries_2004.pdf>; 
PAPAGIANNI, Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law, Leiden/Boston, 2006; REES and 
SMITH (eds.), International Relations of the European Union, London, 2008; TRAUNER, “Migration Poli-
cy: an Ambiguous EU Role in Specifying and Spreading International Refugee Protection Norms”, in 
FALKNER and MULLER (eds.), EU Policies in a Global Perspective: Shaping Or Taking International Re-
gimes?, Abingdon/New York, 2013, p. 149 ff.; VAN SELM, “Immigration and Asylum or Foreign Policy: 
the EU’s Approach to Migrants and Their Countries of Origin”, in LAVENEX and UCARER (eds.), Migra-
tion and the Externalities of European Integration, Lanham, 2002, p. 143 ff. 
7
 Migration issues are part of overall political and economic relations with a series of key partners. 
Closer cooperation is sought with non-EU countries that share interests with and are ready to make mutu-
al commitments with the EU and its Member States. 
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the final conclusions of the Seville European Council confirmed a certain degree of 
“conditionality”. The EU Member States opted for an increase of “complementari-
ty” and integration of the EU external relations with other policies8, connecting in 
particular association agreements and cooperation policies for migration manage-
ment9. They agreed that all future EU association and cooperation agreements 
would included a clause on joint management of migratory flows and compulsory 
readmission in cases of illegal immigration. 
The link between development and migration is explicitly and more clearly un-
derlined in the main instruments of external migration policy recently adopted by 
the EU, i.e. the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (“GAMM”)10, the Eu-
ropean Agenda on Migration11 and the new “Partnership Framework with Third 
Countries”12. According to one of the four thematic priorities of the GAMM, the 
EU aims at maximizing the positive impact of migration and mobility on develop-
ment, specifically empowering peoples’ contribute to sustainable development in 
countries of origin, transit and destination, in the framework of a more “migrant-
centred” action.  
Migration management is also a major priority of a series of regional initiatives, 
such as Partnerships on Migration and Mobility (so-called processes, such as the 
Rabat, the Prague and the Khartoum ones) and other mechanisms of cooperation 
with its proper funds to support Africa, East Europe or Middle East Third Coun-
 
8
 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 3 De-
cember 2002 – “Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union’s Relations with Third Countries”, 
[COM (2002) 703 final], p. 24. 
9
 On the subject ADEPOJU, VAN NOORLOOS and ZOOMERS, “Europe’s Migration Agreements with 
Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: A Critical Review”, International Migration, 2009, p. 42 
ff.; RYAN and MITSILEGAS (eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control. Legal Challenges, Lei-
den/Boston, 2010. 
10
 That is the overarching framework launched in 2005 relating to the EU external migration and asy-
lum policy. A more strategic phase started in 2011 in order to make the GAMM even more integrated 
with EU external actions and development cooperation with third countries. 
11
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions – “A European Agenda on Migra-
tion”, [COM(2015) 240 final], 13 May 2015, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1481069754834&uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0240>. 
12
 Communication from the Commission on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third 
countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 7 June 2016, [COM(2016) 385 final], available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1481069853235&uri=CELEX:52016DC0385>. 
See further para. 7. 
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tries13. In addition, the EU also offers financial and structural support to countries in 
conflict and with high numbers of displacement and refugees14. 
In the following paragraphs I examine the recent “migration clauses” provided 
in the EU development cooperation agreements or framework partnership and then 
the specific instruments of EU external migration policy. The first aim is to under-
stand if the migration-development nexus is recently turned into a link between 
more development of third States and less migration towards the EU Member 
States, expressed in some provisions of the EU international agreement with coun-
tries of origin and transit of migration flows, and in recent praxis. If so, the second 
question to solve regards the consistency of such clauses and praxis aimed at pursu-
ing migration policy objectives with the specific objectives of development coop-
eration policy and the respective EU Treaties provisions. 
2. – The Evolution of EU Development Cooperation 
The main object of EU development policy is poverty eradication or reduction 
and achievement of internationally agreed development goals, i.e. Millennium De-
velopment Goals (“MDGs”) and Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) in or-
der to support sustainable development.  This policy has progressively expanded so 
much, that nowadays the European Union is considered the main player in the 
world in development aid supporting needy third countries15. 
 
13
 See the Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC 
and repealing Decisions No. 573/2007/EC and No. 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil and Council Decision 2007/435/EC, OJ L 150/168, 20 May 2014. Among its four specific objectives the 
AMIF aims at supporting legal migration to the Member States in accordance with their economic and social 
needs and promoting the effective integration of Third-country nationals, and enhancing fair and effective re-
turn strategies with a view to countering illegal immigration. D’ALFONSO, “EU Funds for Asylum, Migration 
and Borders”, European Parliamentary Research Service, 11 February 2014, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130663/LDM_BRI(2014)130663_REV1
_EN.pdf>. 
14
 For example, since the beginning of the conflict in Syria the European Union and its member 
states have provided more than €6 billion in humanitarian aid and financial assistance. In particular, the 
EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis – the “Madad Fund” – provides for a more co-
herent, faster and integrated response to the crisis by merging various EU financial instruments and con-
tributions from Member States into one single flexible and quick mechanism with a target volume of € 1 
billion expected to be reached by the end of 2016. Further information available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/syria/madad/index_en.htm>. 
15
 See the financial support to third States that the EU provides in the context of the associations 
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Development cooperation policy is one of the fundamental dimensions of the 
Union’s external action and has a dual legal standing: a) the Treaty on European 
Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, entered into force in 200916; b) de-
velopment cooperation agreements or, more recently, “global cooperation frame-
work agreements”17 with developing countries, which is different from partnership 
or association, typically concluded with countries in the framework of the EU 
“neighbourhood” policy18, the Mediterranean region and Eastern Europe. 
Over time, the EU development cooperation has evolved from the traditional 
treaty-based policy approach, requiring that all EU policies contribute to develop-
ment objectives, to a more complex “global cooperation” framework. Because of 
the need to maximize its impact so as to address the root causes of migration, ex-
ternal relations between the Union, its Member States and third States take the 
form of a global partnership and cooperation framework, which would not be re-
ducible to one simple aspect of development cooperation. The agreements conclud-
ed with less-developed third countries, in recent practice, have evolved considera-
 
mainly through the European Development Fund, according to the Regulation (EU) No. 233/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for devel-
opment cooperation for the period 2014-2020, OJ L 77/44, 15 March 2014; the Commission Decision of 
24 November 2014, [C(2014) 8589 final], on the adoption of an individual measure in favour of intra-
ACP cooperation to be financed from the European Development Fund Bridging Facility; and the Deci-
sion (EU) No. 2015/334 of the Council of 2 March 2015 amending the Internal Agreement between the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the 
Council, on the financing of European Union aid under the multiannual financial framework for the peri-
od 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of finan-
cial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union applies, OJ L 58/75, 3 March 2015. 
16
 Art. 21 of the TEU refers twice to the promotion of “sustainable development” as one of the objec-
tives of the EU international relations and external action: the first time in letter d), specifically related to 
developing countries and poverty eradication, and also in letter f).  
17
 See infra. With reference to a specific Framework Agreement, BIONDI, “The Externalization of the 
EU’s Southern Border in Light of the EU/Libya Framework Agreement. A Lawful Alternative or a Neo-
Refoulement Strategy?”, Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law, 2012, p. 144 ff. 
18
 See Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014, establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, OJ L 77/27, 15 March 2014. On the EU 
neighbourhood policy instruments and prospects before this regulation entered into force, FERRERO-
WALDNER, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument”, Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review, 2006, p. 139 ff., and STANCOVA, “Integrating the EU Migration Policy into 
the EU Neighbourhood Policy: the Origins and Prospects”, ECPR fifth Pan-European Conference in Por-
to, 24-26 June 2010, available at: <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/virtualpaperroom/139.pdf>. 
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bly from a basic system of social assistance to the present comprehensive and de-
tailed agreements. In their implementation, much less asymmetric – in other terms, 
more balanced – relationships are established and, not only the developing country, 
but all the Contracting Parties obtain mutual benefits.  
Because of this, contrary to what is traditionally expected, some doubt arose 
whether obligations provided in these framework agreements continue to be bind-
ing even once development targets are met and even if the third State can no longer 
be considered in need of aid from the EU. An example of this situation is the “co-
operation agreement on partnership and development”, concluded between the EC 
and India in 1994. Due to the multiplicity of sectors concerned, one could have as-
sumed that it had a substantially different nature from the typical development co-
operation treaty. Nonetheless, it was classified by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (“CJEU”) as a development cooperation agreement for all purposes19. 
Many provisions of such agreements have an “interlocutory” character, con-
cerning the commitment of the parties to undertake a “constant” dialogue on issues 
such as, for example, the promotion of human and social development, inclusive 
economic growth and environmental sustainability, capacity building for greater 
integration into the world economy and the international trading system, reforms of 
the public sectors, or implementation of international principles and guarantee of 
the aid’s effectiveness. Two great themes emerge from the various preambles: the 
common intent to preserve the inclusive nature of the mutual relations of Contract-
ing Parties and respect for democratic principles and human rights20. 
First, therefore, the Parties of such agreements express an intention to derive 
mutual benefits, highlighting areas of interest and shared values21, which is also the 
cooperation in the field of migration and development. Second, the same Parties 
 
19
 That agreement was concluded for five years and automatically renewed from year to year except 
the possibility of denunciation, in accordance with its Art. 29. 
20
 See VILLANI, “Il diritto allo sviluppo: diritto umano e dei popoli”, in VILLANI (a cura di), A tutti i 
membri della famiglia umana. Per il 60° anniversario della Dichiarazione universale, Milano, 2008, p. 
123 ff., and in particular p. 136 ff. about the “principle of conditionality”, according to which the effec-
tiveness of development assistance or cooperation agreements concluded by the EC, was conditional on 
respect for human rights. 
21
 Such an agreement deals with concerns, for example, related to the promotion of economic and so-
cial progress for the benefit of their populations and the eradication of poverty, and to the achievement of 
the MDGs, the promotion of sustainable development and the fight against climate change, increased co-
operation in the field of Justice and security cooperation in favour of migration and development, the ap-
plication of minimum social standards and trade. 
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include areas of cooperation echoing a number of commitments aimed at ensuring 
international peace and security. In this perspective, questions of common concern 
of the Parties are the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, weapons of mass destruction and illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons. The CJEU itself considered possible and legitimate 
to include the fight against proliferation of small arms and light weapons among 
the instruments for pursuing objectives of development cooperation policy22. 
This “treaty-making way” reflects the current EU approach to development co-
operation policy. Often in recent “framework” or “global” agreements the objective 
of contributing to the development of the third State is less explicit in comparison 
to the “classic” development cooperation agreements. The multidimensional objec-
tives of development cooperation, as provided in the pre-Lisbon EC Treaty, were 
evident: not only sustainable economic and social development of those countries, 
their gradual integration into the global economy and the eradication of poverty, 
but also development, consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and protec-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as respect of the EC (now 
the EU) commitments within the framework of the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations23. 
Through its development cooperation policies, the European Commission has 
tried to improve the dialogue and strengthen partnerships on migration with third 
Countries through three types of policies and interventions: a) planned interven-
tions in the framework of the cooperation programmes with third countries directly 
related to migration; b) other actions falling within the general framework of relief 
and reconstruction; c) the EU policy on development cooperation and general de-
velopment programmes, suitable to reduce migratory pressures indirectly by virtue 
of poverty reduction and the promotion of sustainable growth and development. As 
regards the latter category – development cooperation policies and programmes 
adopted by the EU – according to the European Commission, the EC development 
 
22
 Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council, ECR, 2008, p. I-3651. 
23
 On the external relations of the EC, see CANNIZZARO, “Le relazioni esterne della Comunità: verso 
un nuovo paradigma unitario”, il Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 2007, p. 223 ff. With reference to the EU, 
see DANIELE (a cura di), Le relazioni esterne dell’Unione europea nel nuovo Millennio, Milano, 2001; 
HILL and SMITH (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, 2011, II ed.; 
KEUKELEIRE and MACNAUGHTAN, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, New York, 2008; MARSH 
and MACKENSTEIN, The International Relations of the European Union, Harlow, 2005. 
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cooperation policy has already contributed to the reduction of migration by elimi-
nating some root causes at the origin of migration flows and thus shortening the du-
ration of the “migration peaks”24. 
While, in accordance with Article 21 TEU, development cooperation agree-
ments must pursue the objectives referred to in that provision, the predominant 
purpose of such agreements continues to be development cooperation, which can-
not be reduced to the mere grant of financial assistance. The Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreements (“PCAs”) are indeed agreements with the predominant purpose 
of development cooperation and confirm the multifaceted dimension of develop-
ment cooperation with third States. The Council points out the profound changes in 
the nature of the agreements nowadays negotiated by the European Union with 
third countries, which now establish more extensive forms of cooperation and en-
visage effective implementation in the various sectors concerned. Following the 
same line of reasoning, the Council maintains that the recitals and provisions relat-
ing to the observance of human rights, of democratic principles and of the rule of 
law, and concerning the possible suspension of the agreement owing to the failure 
to respect such rights or principles, also serve to indicate that PCAs are not a meas-
ure that can be reduced to development cooperation policy. 
Development cooperation is defined so broadly at EU level, that it is perhaps 
more difficult to show that, alongside the large number of sectors it can encompass, 
there remains an objective or there is more than one objective both distinct from 
those pursued by development cooperation and inseparably linked to the measure 
in question. Development cooperation, as now defined by EU law, is a multi-
faceted policy. Within the meaning of the European Consensus on Development, 
the essential objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty 
 
24
 See BENEDETTI, “EU Policy and Law Concerning Migration – Critical Examination”, in DEVETAK 
and SIRBU (eds.), EU Migration Policy and its Reflection in Third Countries: Belarus, Moldova, Russia, 
Ukraine, Institute for Ethnic and Regional Studies, Maribor, 2012, p. 108 ff., available at: 
<http://www.project-bridge.eu/datoteke/Actions2012/BRIDGE-EU MIGRATION POLICY.pdf>; 
BOSWELL, “The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy”, International Affairs, 
2003, p. 619 ff.; CALOZ-TSCHOPP and DASEN (eds.), Globalization, Migration and Human Rights: A New 
Paradigm for Research and Citizenship, Bruxelles, 2007; CARDWELL, EU External Relations and Sys-
tems of Governance. The CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Migration, London/New York, 
2009; CARRERA, DEN HERTOG and PARKIN, “EU Migration Policy in the Wake of the Arab Spring. What 
Prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?”, MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15, August 
2012, available at: <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/MEDPRO TR 15 EU Migration Policy in wake of 
Arab Spring.pdf>. 
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in the context of sustainable development, the latter including good governance, 
human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects25.  
As correctly explained by the Council, the European Union’s practice in its rela-
tions with less developed countries has evolved significantly and has progressed from 
being a mere system of financial assistance to the establishment of comprehensive and 
more elaborate agreements in which reference to “mutual” advantages is not mere dip-
lomatic language, and the relationship put in place is much less lopsided and is, thus, 
more balanced26. It is, however, for that reason that, while I can certainly acknowledge 
the multi-faceted nature of development cooperation, I find it, by contrast, more diffi-
cult to regard the legal basis for development cooperation alone as sufficient, when so 
many and varied areas are covered by the same agreement.  
It is nonetheless necessary to examine whether, among the numerous and di-
verse areas envisaged by the PCA, its provisions concerning transport, the envi-
ronment and the readmission of nationals of third States contribute – within the 
meaning of the case law of the Court – “to the objectives of economic and social 
development” of development cooperation policy and have the principal objec-
tive of implementing that policy or whether, on the contrary, they prescribe in con-
crete terms the implementation of cooperation in those specific areas with the result 
that they constitute, in reality, distinct objectives which are neither secondary nor 
indirect in relation to the objectives of development cooperation. In my opinion, 
the clauses relating to migration and in particular those regarding readmission have 
typical (and exclusive) purposes of migration policy27, purposes quite distinct from 
the ones of development policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
25
 BROBER and HOLDGAARD, “Demarcating the Union’s Development Cooperation Policy after Lis-
bon: Commission v. Council (Philippines PCFA)”, Common Market Law Review, 2015, p. 547 ff. 
26
 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 23 January 2014, Case C-377/12, Commis-
sion v. Council, para. 43. 
27
 About the evolution of the EU migration policy after the Lisbon Treaty see ADINOLFI, “La politica 
dell’immigrazione dell’Unione europea dopo il Trattato di Lisbona”, Rivista di diritto pubblico europeo, 
2011, p. 13 ff.; AZOULAI and DE VRIES (eds.), Migration and EU Law and Policy, Oxford, 2014. 
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3. – The “Broad Notion” of Development Cooperation Including 
Migration Validated by the EU Court of Justice 
Recently, the CJEU has ruled on the correct legal basis of a PCA, including 
provisions on readmission, transport and environmental protection28. It observed 
that it does not contain a reference, in its title, to development29. That has given the 
impression of the establishment of a comprehensive cooperation structure not sub-
ject to limitation, since a “framework agreement” is at issue30. In this regard, the 
EU Council argued that “external relations between the Union, its Member States 
and third States take the form of a global partnership and cooperation which would 
not be reducible to simple aspect of development cooperation”31. Such cooperation 
and partnership would make it impossible to distinguish in the ensuing treaties a 
main prevailing sector out of one or more sectors which are accessories32.  
 
28
 EU Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), Case C-377/12, Commission v. Council, Judgment of 
11 June 2014, paras. 37, 42, 43, 47, 49, and 59. That specific case regards the Framework Agreement on 
Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and 
the Republic of the Philippines, on the other part (“EU-Philippines PCA”). 
29
 Art. 29 of the EU-Philippines PCA, which falls within the title on economic and development co-
operation and other sectors, is exclusively concerned with development cooperation. Pursuant to that arti-
cle, the primary goal of such cooperation is “to encourage sustainable development that will contribute to 
the reduction of poverty and to the attainment of internationally agreed development goals”. The Parties 
undertake to engage in regular dialogue on that topic with regard, inter alia, to the promotion of human 
and social development, the attainment of sustained inclusive economic growth, the promotion of envi-
ronmental sustainability, the enhancement of capacities to integrate into the world economy and the in-
ternational trading system, the promotion of public sector reform and compliance with the international 
principles governing the delivery and effectiveness of aid.  
30
 Made up of 58 articles, the EU-Philippines PCA is divided into eight titles concerning, respective-
ly, its nature and scope, political dialogue and cooperation, trade and investment, justice and security co-
operation, cooperation on migration and maritime labour, economic and development cooperation and 
other sectors, the institutional framework, and, lastly, the final provisions. 
31
 Opinion Mengozzi, cit. supra note 26, para. 18. 
32
 Ibid., para. 43. Whilst acknowledging the multidimensional nature of development cooperation, 
Mengozzi pointed out difficulty in finding enough legal basis for development cooperation when so 
many different sectors are under the same agreement. The current practice is marked, as stated by the Eu-
ropean Commission, by much confusion. For example, the Council Decision of 24 July 2006 on the con-
clusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in so far as the provisions of this Protocol fall within the 
scope of Arts. 179 and 181a of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ 2006 L 262, p. 24, 
was adopted on the basis of Arts. 179 and 181a of the EC Treaty. The Council decision of 21 December 
2011 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of certain provisions 
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of 
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The CJEU has not merely confirmed its pre-Lisbon case law33, but has also re-
framed the principle, that the EU development policy after the Lisbon Treaty is not 
limited to measures directly aimed at the eradication of poverty under Article 208 
TFEU, but also pursues the objectives referred to in Article 21(2) TEU, such as the 
one, set out in letter d), of fostering the sustainable economic, social and environ-
mental development of developing countries34.  
One of the key questions regards Article 26 of the PCA under review, that is 
part of Title V, headed “Cooperation on Migration and Development”. Arti-
cle 26(1) reaffirms the importance of the management of migratory flows and the 
Parties’ intention to establish a mechanism for dialogue and consultation in all mi-
gration-related issues, which must inter alia be included in national development 
strategies. Cooperation in that field is based, under Article 26(2) of the PCA, on the 
push-pull factors of migration, the development and implementation of national 
legislation and practices with regard to protection and the rights of migrants, the 
development and implementation of legislation and national practices regarding in-
ternational protection, admission rules and the rights and status of persons admit-
ted, the establishment of a policy to prevent the presence on their territory of a na-
tional of the other party who does not fulfil or no longer fulfils the conditions of 
entry, stay or residence on the territory of the party concerned, the fight against the 
smuggling and trafficking in human beings, the return of persons under humane 
and dignified conditions, issues of mutual interest in the field of visas and security 
of travel documents and of border management and, finally “migration and devel-
opment issues”35.  
 
the one part, and the Republic of Iraq, of the other part, OJ 2012 L 204, p. 18, was adopted on the basis of 
Arts. 79(3), 91, 100, 192(1), 194, 207 and 209 TFEU in conjunction with Art. 218(5) TFEU. The Council 
decision of 14 May 2012 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Framework Agreement on Part-
nership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Mon-
golia, of the other part, OJ 2012 L 134, p. 4, was adopted on the basis only of Arts. 79(3), 207 and 209 
TFEU in conjunction with Art. 218(5) TFEU. The Council Decision of the same day on the signing, on 
behalf of the Union, of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation be-
tween the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
of the other part, OJ 2012 L 137, p. 1, was, for its part, adopted on the basis only of Arts. 79(3), 91, 100, 
207 and 209 TFEU in conjunction with Art. 218(5) TFEU. 
33
 In particular, Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, ECR, 1996, p. I-6177. 
34
 See BARTOLONI, “La cooperazione allo sviluppo dell’Unione europea con Paesi terzi: da politica 
contro la povertà a cooperazione globale?”, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2014, p. 663 ff. 
35
 Emphasis added. 
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Article 26(3) of the PCA imposes on each of the contracting parties the obliga-
tion to readmit their own nationals who are in a situation of illegal entry, stay or 
residence on the territory of one of the other parties. That readmission must be car-
ried out upon request of the contracting party concerned “without undue delay once 
nationality has been established and due process … carried out”36. As regards the 
relationship of those topics to development cooperation, the CJEU has stated that 
provisions relating to readmission of nationals of the Contracting Parties of a 
“Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation” fall within development 
cooperation policy if they do not contain obligations so extensive, that they may be 
considered to constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation 
– that are neither secondary nor indirect in relation to the latter objectives – and so 
as to contribute to furthering pursuit of the objectives referred to in Arti-
cles 21(2)(d) TEU and 208(1) TFEU37.   
The CJEU adopts a “broad notion of development cooperation” (as defined in 
the above cited European Consensus) into which migration and in particular the 
fight against illegal migration – together with transport and environmental protec-
tion – are integrated. Conversely, in a previous judgment the same Court had af-
firmed that an objective concerning the fight against terrorism and international 
crime falls outside the framework of the development cooperation policy. It has 
noted that, as far as financial and technical assistance are concerned, support for the 
national institutions of developing countries does not constitute an end in itself, but 
an instrument for strengthening their capacity to administer development policies 
and projects in the fields stated, which do not include the fight against terrorism 
and international crime38.  
 
36
 Provision is also made for the making available of the necessary documents and for communica-
tion between the competent authorities of the requesting State and the requested State. Reference is also 
made to the case where a person is deprived of their identity document. Finally, Art. 26(4) of the EU-
Philippines PCA shows that the parties have agreed to conclude a readmission agreement as soon as pos-
sible, which must at least include a provision on the readmission of nationals of other countries con-
cerned by the PCA and of stateless persons. 
37
 According to the CJEU, “the fact that a development cooperation agreement contains clauses con-
cerning various specific matters cannot alter the characterisation of the agreement, which must be deter-
mined having regard to its essential object and not in terms of individual clauses, provided that those 
clauses do not impose such extensive obligations concerning the specific matters referred to that those 
obligations in fact constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation” (para. 39). 
38
 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Case C-403/05, European Parliament v. Commission, ECR, 2007, p. I-
9045, paras. 61 and 68. 
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The Court of justice – rather hastily, in my opinion – has included readmission 
among the areas covered by the broad notion of development cooperation. This in-
sertion is justified, according to the Court, because “migration, including the fight 
against illegal immigration, transport and the environment are integrated into de-
velopment policy as defined in the European consensus” and these are part of the 
series of activities pertaining to development and aimed at implementing the 
MDGs and take account of economic, social and environmental aspects of poverty 
eradication in the context of sustainable development39. 
While it seems a priori possible to consider that a measure which is intended to 
combat illegal immigration also contributes to the attainment of development ob-
jectives, it remains doubtful whether such a link can be established with regard to 
the aforesaid readmission clauses. In my view, it is not as self-evident as the Court 
made it out, that the provisions relating to readmission of citizens of the Contract-
ing Parties “contribute to the achievement of the objectives of development coop-
eration” and “do not contain obligations of a reach to believe that they constitute 
objectives distinct from those of development cooperation, which are neither sec-
ondary nor indirect compared them”40. The implicit motivation for such a position 
is probably to be found in the awareness that development cooperation is often the 
incentive, the leverage used by the EU and its Member States to obtain commit-
ment to the conclusion of readmission agreements by third States. The CJEU thus 
legitimizes this questionable practice.  
4. – The Insertion of Migration Clauses in the EU Agreements with 
Third Countries 
In order to better explain the practice I criticize, it is useful to examine in detail 
the various types of so-called “migration clauses” provided in many of the EU 
partnership, cooperation or association agreements. As noted above, the European 
Union has decided to systematically include discussions about the migration-
development nexus, where appropriate, in the negotiation of its agreements with 
third States41. Following the Tampere European Council42, in particular, the “mixed 
 
39
 Case C-377/12, Commission v. Council, cit. supra note 28, para. 48 ff. 
40
 Ibid., paras 55 and 59. 
41
 CELLAMARE, “A proposito del partenariato per la mobilità tra Tunisia e UE”, Sud in Europa, May 
2014, p. 5 ff.; HAMOOD, “EU-Libya Cooperation on Migration: A Raw Deal for Refugees and Mi-
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agreements” – that is, concluded by the EC/EU and its Member States (within the 
framework of their respective competences) with third States – of partnership and 
cooperation have already included standard clauses providing a reciprocal obliga-
tion of collaboration and cooperation for prevention and control of illegal immigra-
tion next to the readmission of irregulars43.  
According to the conclusions of the above mentioned Seville European Coun-
cil, the European Commission referred in particular to Article 13 of the “Cotonou 
agreement” with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (“ACP”) countries44 as a full 
and fair “model-clause”, a source of inspiration for the provisions on migration to 
be included in each subsequent agreement negotiated by the EC and now by EU 
with any third State. Article 13 is the first example of “migration clause”, that is 
more of a “readmission clause”45 as it contains specific provisions on cooperation 
on migration issues, with regard to reciprocal obligations of joint management of 
migration flows, prevention and fight against illegal migration, next to compulsory 
readmission of irregulars46. For example, in Article 13(4), EU-ACP partnership 
 
grants?”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 2008, p. 19 ff.; IPPOLITO and TREVISANUT (eds.), Migration in the 
Mediterranean: Mechanisms of International Cooperation, Cambridge, 2015; MALAKOOTI, “Mixed Mi-
gration into Libya: Mapping Migration Routes from Africa to Europe and Drivers of Migration in Post-
Revolution Libya”, Migration Policy Practice, 2013, p. 18 ff. 
42
 It was at Tampere that the European Council met in special session in October 1999 to give a kick-
start to the EU’s justice and home affairs (“JHA”) policies. The main themes covered by the EU Tampere 
summit were a common EU asylum and migration policy, a genuine European area of justice, a Union-
wide fight against crime and a stronger external action. The objective of the latter is to stop drugs, 
smuggled and stolen goods, and illegal immigrants entering the European Union, by cooperating with 
neighbouring countries and countries of transit and origin. 
43
 In this regard, CHERUBINI, “La cooperazione fra Unione europea e paesi del Nordafrica nella lotta 
all’immigrazione irregolare”, in ANGHELONE and UNGARI (a cura di), Atlante geopolitico del Mediterra-
neo, Rome, 2014, p. 15 ff., pp. 22-24. 
44
 The Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Cotonou Agreement”) was signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2001, edited for 
the first time in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 and amended for the second time in Ouagadougou, Burki-
na Faso, on 22 June 2010 (Decision 2010/648/EU of 14 May 2010). 
45
 The so-called “readmission clause” involves the mutual commitment of the Contracting Parties to 
readmit “without further formalities” its nationals to its territory in case of their illegal stay in the territo-
ry of the other Part.  
46
 The dialogue on migration between the EU and the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (EU-
ACP) pays special attention to strengthening the operational aspects of the application of Art. 13 of the 
Cotonou Agreement. As regards bilateral cooperation, a political dialogue on migration was initiated with 
a series of strategic countries, which has, for example, created the “EU migration missions”, based on 
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agreement, the Parties consider that strategies for poverty reduction, the improve-
ment of living and working conditions, job creation, education and training con-
tribute in the long term to normalising migratory flows47. The Parties are aware of 
the need to address structural issues associated with migration, namely poverty and 
poor economic and social development of the regions of origin of migrants. Their 
efforts in the area of development cooperation and national and regional pro-
grammes should therefore aim to reduce the first and the second, knowing that the 
normalization of migratory flows would be an “indirect” benefit. 
More explicit clauses referring to the priority given to the objective of contain-
ment and control of migration flows are instead provided in the association agree-
ments later concluded by the EU within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership48. They are inserted under the chapter relating to “Dialogue and cooper-
ation in the social field” – other than the one about “Cooperation for the prevention 
and control of illegal immigration” – but significantly the reduction of migratory 
pressure, “in particular by improving living conditions, creating jobs and income-
generating activities and developing training in the areas of origin of migrants” is 
the first in the list of the priority objectives of cooperation49. 
Provisions regarding cooperation on migration are generally focused on multi-
ple aspects that are interconnected: the “push and pull factors” of migration, devel-
 
Arts. 8 and 13 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
47
 PILLITU, La tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e dei principi democratici della Comunità e dell’Unione 
europea con gli Stati ACP, Turin, 2003. 
48
 CASSARINO (ed.), Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Area, Middle East Institute, Special edition Viewpoint, 2010, available at: 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/sep/eu-unbalanced-reciprocities-middle-east-institute.pdf>; MARTIN, 
“‘A Radically Changing Political Landscape in the Southern Mediterranean’? The Dialogue for Migration, 
Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean Countries”, 2011, available at: 
<http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-136-southern-med.pdf>; VILLANI, “La responsabilità dell’Unione eu-
ropea nell’area mediterranea”, Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2009, p. 551 ff.; ZAPATA-BARRERO, “The Ex-
ternal Dimension of Migration Policy in the Mediterranean Region: Premises for Normative Debate”, Revista 
del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, No. 2 / 2013, available at: <http://dcpis.upf.edu/~ricard-
zapata/~ricard-zapata/External dimension migration policy_2_2013.pdf>. 
49
 See, for example, Art. 65(a) of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association be-
tween the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, of the other part (concluded by Decision 2004/635/EC of 21 April 2004) and Art. 65 of the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Mem-
ber States, on the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, on the other part (concluded by Decision 
2006/356/EC of 14 February 2006).  
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opment and application of laws and practices concerning the protection and rights 
of migrants, the development and application of national laws and practices relat-
ing to international protection of migrants admission rules, the rights and status of 
persons admitted, the definition of a policy combating illegal immigration or illegal 
stay of citizens of one Contracting Party into the territory of the other, the fight 
against trafficking in human beings, the return in terms of respect for human digni-
ty, the issues of mutual interest regarding visas and travel document security and 
border management, and also the synergies between migration and development.  
Such different types of “migration clauses” inserted in recent EU international 
agreements50 and relating to management of migratory flows, contrast to smuggling of 
persons and readmission of third-country nationals51, define a new form of conditional-
ity52. Certainly, migration can have a positive impact on development and poverty re-
duction as well as, on the other hand, the development (of a State) determines the most 
 
50
 It may be useful to compare the above cited clauses with the ones referred to “Cooperation on mi-
gration, asylum and border management” under the title regarding “Freedom, security and justice”, pro-
vided in the recent EU association agreements concluded in the framework of the Eastern Partnership, as 
a specific dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Examples of this kind of provisions are in-
serted in the association agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, 
and Ukraine, on the other part, OJ L 161/3, 29 May 2014; in the Association Agreement between the Eu-
ropean Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, on the one part, 
and Georgia, on the other part, OJ L 261/4, 30 August 2014; and in the Association Agreement between 
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, on the one 
part, and the Republic of Moldova, on the other part, OJ L 260/4, 30 August 2014. For a detailed analysis 
of the different “migration clauses” provided in several agreements of association, cooperation or part-
nership concluded by EU with third countries, see GUIDI, “L’Unione europea alla ricerca della sinergia 
‘ottimale’ tra migrazione e sviluppo nell’ambito della cooperazione internazionale”, in CHERUBINI (ed.), 
Le migrazioni in Europa. UE, Stati terzi e Migration Outsourcing, Rome, 2015, p. 23 ff., paras. 10, 14 
and 15. 
51
 The readmission consists in procedures under which non-EU nationals apprehended in an irregular 
situation are readmitted to the State of origin or transit. For this purpose the EU generally conclude ad 
hoc agreements with third countries. See OTTAVIANO, “Gli accordi di riammissione dell’UE” in 
CHERUBINI (ed.), cit. supra note 50, p. 97 ff.; and LILIENKAMP and SALIBA, “EU Readmission Agree-
ments Facilitating the Return of Irregular Migrants”, EPRS, April 2015, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/554212/EPRS_BRI(2015)554212_EN.pdf>. 
52
 As regards the “traditional” clause providing human rights conditionality, see CHERUBINI, “I valori 
dell’Unione europea nella politica di cooperazione allo sviluppo”, in SCISO, BARATTA and MORVIDUCCI 
(eds.), I valori dell’Unione europea e l’azione esterna, Turin, 2016, p. 120 ff.; HORNG, “The Human 
Rights Clause in the European Union’s External Trade and Development Agreements”, European Law Journal, 
2003, p. 677 ff.; LEINO, “European Universalism? – The EU and Human Rights Conditionality”, Yearbook of 
European Law, 2005, p. 329 ff.; UBEDA DE TORRES, “La evolución de la condicionalidad política en el seno de 
la Unión Europea”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 2009, p. 49 ff. 
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effective long-term solution to irregular and forced migration (as expressed by the 
nexus between migration and development). Some of the provisions relating to migra-
tion could contribute to the objectives of development cooperation by focusing rather 
on the protection of migrants, by considering how to ensure equal treatment and the in-
tegration of non-nationals in a lawful situation or even how authorization to reside 
might be granted for compassionate and humanitarian reasons. Such clauses on coop-
eration in the field of migration management by virtue of their potential positive effects 
are certainly in line with the human right to development. 
To some extent I can also agree that, in substance, the fight against smuggling – 
as well as the contrast to all forms of organised crime – can contribute to achieve 
some purposes of political and legal development (i.e. internal security, legality, 
rule of law) of the third State53. Current EU external actions in this field, under Re-
gional Protection Programmes (“RPPs”) or Regional Development and Protection 
Programmes (“RDPPs”), focus on capacity building to tackle criminal smuggling 
and human trafficking networks within Third Countries of origin and transit54. As 
pointed out by the European Parliament, the Union and its Member States must be 
selective in their support for third-countries’ law enforcement agencies, taking into 
 
53
 The fight against illegal immigration, while constituting an objective of international cooperation jus-
tified by transnational security, seems to contribute very little in itself to the development of the third coun-
try of origin or transit of migrants. It can be useful insofar as it is an instrument to combat organized crime 
and, therefore, indirectly the safeguard or the enforcement of legality, public order and public security. 
54
 EISELE, The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policy: Different Legal Positions of Third-
Country Nationals in the EU: A Comparative Perspective, Leiden/Boston, 2014; GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, 
“Outsourcing Migration Management: EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigra-
tion Policy”, DIIS Working Paper No. 2006/1, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006, available 
at: <http://www.diis.dk/en/research/outsourcing-migration-management>; ID., “Extraterritorial Migration 
Control and the Reach of Human Rights”, in CHETAIL and BAULOZ (eds.), Research Handbook on Inter-
national Law and Migration, Cheltenham, 2014, p. 113 ff.; GEDDES, “Migration as Foreign Policy? The 
External Dimension of EU Action on Migration and Asylum”, SIEPS Report n. 2, Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies, 2009, available at: <http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/528-2009-
2rapport.pdf>; GUIRAUDON (ed.), The External Dimension of Immigration and Asylum Policies in Eu-
rope, Oxford, 2007; GUIRAUDON and LAHAV (eds.), Immigration Policy in Europe: The Politics of Con-
trol, Abingdon/New York, 2013; MARTENCZUK, “Migration Policy and EU External Relations”, in 
AZOULAI and DE VRIES (eds.), Migration and EU Law and Policy, Oxford, 2014, p. 69 ff.; PEERS, “Ir-
regular Immigration and EU External Relations”, in BOUGSZ et al. (eds.), Irregular Immigration and Hu-
man Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives, Leiden/Boston, 2004, p. 193 ff.; 
TARAN, “EU Migration Policy, International Law and External Relations: Are Interests Defining Stand-
ards?”, in MAES, FOBLETS and DE BRUYCKER (eds.), External Dimensions of European Migration and 
Asylum Law and Policy, Bruxelles, 2011, p. 501 ff. 
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account the record of those agencies in breaching the human rights of migrants55. 
On the contrary, it seems really difficult to me to acknowledge a “genuine link” be-
tween the objectives pursued by development cooperation and readmission clauses, or, 
in other terms, to consider that the obligation to readmit its own nationals (who are in a 
situation of illegal entry, stay or residence on the territory of one of the other parties) 
truly contributes to sustainable development of the third State56. According to the 
CJEU jurisprudence, a measure falls under development cooperation policy if it con-
tributes to the objectives of economic and social development, while does not fall with-
in the scope of EU competence attached to such cooperation a measure that, even if 
contributing to economic and social development of some developing countries, has 
the primary purpose of implementing another Union policy57. 
Provisions on readmission depart from the development cooperation’s first con-
cern – steady progress in development in the third country – to fulfil one of the EU 
policy objectives and to serve its own interests (i.e. the commitment by the con-
tracting third country to take back its own nationals who are illegally resident in the 
EU Member States territories). Readmission clauses are focused on EU external 
migration policy interests: the rationale is the safeguard of the Union and its Mem-
ber States from the deficiencies of the contracting third State with regard to man-
agement of migratory flows. 
Such clauses inserted in various types of EU partnership agreements constitute 
important leverage for the Council to obtain from the contracting third Parties 
something in return, which it would find difficult to obtain by other means (i.e. out 
 
55
 RIJPMA and CREMONA, “The Extra-Territorialisation of EU Migration Policies and the Rule of 
Law”, European University Institute Working Papers, Law 2007/01, available at: 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6690/LAW_2007_01.pdf?sequence=1>. 
56
 The European Commission considers that such clauses deal with readmission as an aspect of develop-
ment cooperation, the fight against illegal immigration being an objective of that cooperation. In any event, 
they are no more than a declaration of the intention to conclude, in the future, a readmission agreement and 
merely restates the basic principles of international law, whereas readmission agreements concluded by the Eu-
ropean Union go much further by putting those principles into concrete terms and by laying down detailed 
rules on the readmission procedure, the scope, means of evidence, etc. (Opinion Mengozzi, cit. supra note 26, 
para. 15). On the other side, European Parliament notes that readmission agreements are one of various instru-
ments under the GAMM, next to regional dialogues, bilateral dialogues, mobility partnerships, common agen-
das for migration and mobility, visa facilitation agreements, visa exemption agreements, RPPs and RDPPs 
(resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to 
migration, (2015/2095(INI)), para. 92, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0102+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>). 
57
 Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council, cit. supra note 22, paras. 66-72. 
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with the scope of cooperation – in this case development cooperation – offered by 
the EU)58. In my opinion, the insertion of such clauses in particular in development 
cooperation agreements provides a kind of conditionality that is contrary to the 
core spirit of Article 208 TFUE, as the development agreements implementation is 
subordinated to an obligation conflicting with the purpose of third countries sus-
tainable development. 
Moreover, as readmission is embodied in a sort of denial of migration (i.e. 
forced return in the countries of origin or departure) in ways that sometimes create 
doubts about the violation of some human rights of migrants, it may also give rise 
to a conflict of norms between readmission clauses and provisions on the protec-
tion of human rights. Therefore, in order to maintain compatibility between obliga-
tions provided the same agreement, readmission should be properly applied by 
granting that human rights of migrants are respected. It is inadmissible to imply 
that States are authorized to derogate from human rights protection when holding 
behaviours in compliance with their obligation to readmit. 
5. – The Focus of the EU Migration Policy in its External Dimension 
Recently, the crisis in the North Africa and the Middle East has produced a grow-
ing flow of forced migration, including across the Mediterranean and other routes 
towards Europe. Subject to unprecedented external migratory pressure driven by 
conflict, instability and poverty, the EU has taken since 2013 a series of internal and 
external actions to tackle this long-term situation, one of them being gradual integra-
tion of the development policy instruments into migration policy. In response to the 
protracted crisis situation, enhanced investments and more targeted development co-
operation with countries of origin or transit mainly sound as measures addressed to 
reducing the so-called “push factor” of unwanted immigration59.  
 
58
 Opinion Mengozzi, case C-377/12, cit. supra note 26, para. 70. In his opinion, “it must be held that 
the readmission clause … although it contains legal obligations, does not have the effect of making re-
admission an objective distinct from that pursued by the PCA but, on the contrary, constitutes in the spe-
cific context of the negotiation of the development cooperation agreements an objective which is not au-
tonomous, and is thus of a secondary or indirect nature” (para. 72). 
59
 The European Commission stresses the key role of development cooperation in tackling issues 
such as poverty, insecurity or unemployment – the main root causes of irregular migration and forced 
displacement – in the European Agenda on Migration, together with the fight against smugglers and hu-
man traffickers. 
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In the 2014 “Rome Declaration”60, the European Commission has identified as 
the first of three priority areas for cooperation the strengthening of the link between 
migration and development (the other two being prevention/contrast of illegal im-
migration and international protection)61. A firm political commitment to undertake 
a regional dialogue on migration and mobility, in order to address the root causes 
of massive (including irregular) migratory flows in a global, shared, deepened and 
“balanced” way was reiterated by the EU, its Member States and the countries of 
the Horn of Africa. There are various ways in which the EU attempts to achieve 
this goal62. 
The 2015 European Agenda on Migration addresses the root causes of irregular 
migration and forced displacement, and calls for a “comprehensive approach” 
aimed at preventing further loss of lives at sea and reinforcing overall cooperation 
with the key third countries of origin and transit63. In the extraordinary European 
Council of Brussels (23 April 2015) the Member States have committed themselves 
to increase EU support to African countries of origin or transit (among others, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Mali, Niger) in monitoring terrestrial migration routes and 
border controls64. In this context, it was also reiterated the need to start “regional 
protection and development programs”65 for North Africa and the Horn of Africa.  
Such measures are not expression of humanitarian impetus; rather, they are in-
 
60
 Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration 
Route Initiative), Rome, 28 November 2014, available at: <http://italia2014.eu/media/3785/declaration-
of-the-ministerial-conference-of-the-khartoum-process.pdf>. 
61
 See the Remarks by Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative on Foreign and Security Policy, 
and Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship on the confer-
ences for the Rabat Process and the Khartoum Process, European Commission Statement 14/2251, Rome, 
28 November 2014, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-2251_en.htm>. 
62
 For a more detailed examination see GUIDI, cit. supra note 50. 
63
 NASCIMBENE and DI PASCALE, “The Arab Spring and the Extraordinary Influx of People who Ar-
rived in Italy from North Africa”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2011, p. 341 ff. 
64
 The commitment to intensify under the Rabat process and Khartoum political cooperation and dia-
logue with those countries, and with the African Union, on all issues related to illegal migration was also 
assumed.  
65
 Development cooperation and regional protection programmes aim at strengthening the capacity of 
reception of refugees and displaced persons, applicants for international protection, from its neighbours. 
For example, consider that, despite the considerable increase in pressure to the European Union, about 
four million Syrians have taken refuge in neighbouring countries (UNHCR has recorded 2.2 million in 
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, while Turkey reports have welcomed 1.7 million). 
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strumental to the prevention of irregular migration66. The EU response to the mass 
influx of immigrants and protection-seekers consists, on one side, in increasing 
controls at the EU Member States external borders67 and, on the other side, in sup-
porting the stabilization and development of third countries, as well as their capaci-
ty-building for better migration and border management, the latter traditionally 
considered as official development assistance (“ODA”)68. 
6. – Policy Coherence for Development… or for Migration 
Management? 
Despite the declared comprehensive understanding of maximizing the positive 
impact of migration on development, the measures described above – that I define 
“negative” as they constitute a disincentive to any type of migration69 – do not seem 
the right way to manage migration as a development enabler in line with the UN 
Post-2015 Development Agenda and the specific Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) 10.7 targeted to “facilitate safe, regular and responsible migration”70. 
 
66
 For a broad reflection on the “neglected” humanitarian needs, see DE VITTOR, “I risultati del Consiglio 
europeo straordinario sull’emergenza umanitaria nel Mediterraneo: repressione del traffico di migranti o con-
trasto all’immigrazione irregolare?”, SIDIBlog, 27 April 2015, available at: 
<http://www.sidiblog.org/2015/04/27/i-risultati-del-consiglio-europeo-straordinario-sullemergenza-umanitaria-
nel-mediterraneo-repressione-del-traffico-di-migranti-o-contrasto-allimmigrazione-irregolare>, and 
LUTTERBECK, “Policing Migration in the Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Politics, 2006, p. 59 ff. 
67
 CECCORULLI, “‘Securitizing’ Migration Crises: The European Union, North Africa and Transat-
lantic Regional Cooperation”, in FIORAMONTI (ed.), Regions and Crises: New Challenges for Contempo-
rary Regionalisms, Basingstoke, 2012, p. 126 ff.; MARINAI, “La cooperazione tra Stati nelle diverse fasi 
della lotta all’immigrazione irregolare”, in CALAMIA, DI FILIPPO and GESTRI (eds.), Immigrazione, diritto 
e diritti: profili internazionalistici ed europei, Padua, 2012, p. 543 ff.; RYAN and MITSILEGAS (eds.), Ex-
traterritorial Immigration Control. Legal Challenges, Leiden/Boston, 2010. 
68
 “Official development assistance” is a term coined by the Development Assistance Commit-
tee (“DAC”) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) to meas-
ure aid. ODA is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded (further information avail-
able at: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>). The EU and its Member States have provided more 
than half of the total ODA reported in 2015 by members of the OECD-DAC. 
69
 A key EU internal action in this area is the reinforcement of the Frontex and its standards for bor-
der management, and EU coordination of coast guards (that is the new European border and coast guards, 
from mid-October 2016), while paying less attention to humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants 
across the region. 
70
 International Organization for Migration (“IOM”), “A New Global Partnership for Development: Fac-
toring in the Contribution of Migration”, 2014, available at: <http://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-ndeg50-
new-global-partnership-development>; IOM, World Bank and European Commission, “Final Conclusions of 
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Rooted in Article 208 TFEU, the commitment for all EU policies – migration poli-
cy included – to build synergies with EU development objectives, the so-called “Policy 
Coherence for Development” (“PCD”)71, is part of the European Consensus on Devel-
opment72, as well as the 2011 Agenda for Change. Under the terms of the European 
consensus, the attainment of the MDGs requires the implementation of “many devel-
opment activities … including migration and development”; an in-depth political dia-
logue will take place on “the fight against illegal migration”. The objective is “to make 
migration a positive factor for development”, which must constitute “the most effective 
long-term response to forced and illegal migration”. The European Commission is also 
called, inter alia, to include migration and refugee issues in country and regional strat-
egies and partnerships with interested countries73.  
Over time, the notion of development cooperation adopted by the EU institu-
tions and Member States has changed and has come to include different objectives, 
in particular the ones of the external dimension of the EU migration policy74. EU 
policy documents display a progressive but clear transformation of the conceptual-
ization of the link between recently rather focused on avoiding a negative impact of 
migration policies on development and migration. While in the beginning they 
were maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility – the classic 
 
the Conference on Migration and Development”, Brussels, 15-16 March 2006, available at: 
<http://www.migrationdevelopment.org/fileadmin/data/conference/conclusions/Conclusions_FINAL_EN_01.p
df>. 
71
 See SIITONEN, “Theorising Politics Behind Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)”, European 
Journal of Development Research, 2016, p. 1 ff. 
72
 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Develop-
ment Policy – “The European Consensus”, OJ 2006 C 46, p. 1. 
73
 Ibid., paras. 12, 17, 38, 40, and 110. LAVENEX and KUNZ, “The Migration–Development Nexus in 
EU External Relations”, Journal of European Integration, 2008, p. 439 ff. 
74
 See BALDACCINI, “The External Dimension of the EU’s Asylum and Immigration Policies: Old 
Concerns and New Approaches”, in BALDACCINI, GUILD and TONER (eds.), Whose Freedom, Security and 
Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, Oxford, 2007, p. 378 ff.; BETTS and MILNER, “The 
Externalisation of EU Asylum Policy: The Position of African States”, Centre on Migration, Policy and 
Society, Working Paper No. 36, Oxford, 2006, available at: <https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/WP-
2006-036-Betts-Milner_EU_Asylum_Policy_Africa.pdf>; CHOLEWINSKI, The External Dimension of EU 
Immigration Policy, in MAES, FOBLETS and DE BRUYCKER (eds.), External Dimensions of European Mi-
gration and Asylum Law and Policy, Bruxelles, 2011, p. 485 ff.; DEN HEIJER, “Europe Beyond Its Bor-
ders: Refugee and Human Rights Protection in Extraterritorial Immigration Control”, in RYAN and 
MITSILEGAS (eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control. Legal Challenges, Leiden/Boston, 2010, p. 169 
ff.; GEIGER and PÉCOUD (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management, New York, 2010. 
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PCD approach, still highlighted in GAMM – the discourse has, and has slipped to-
wards “instrumentalization” of development cooperation for migration manage-
ment purposes, leveraging aid to “encourage” better cooperation on return and re-
admission75. 
Development cooperation, together with the implementation of readmission 
agreements concluded by the EU or by the Member States with third countries, is 
conceived as a means to facilitate the return of “irregular economic migrants” and 
not for its proper purpose, i.e. poverty reduction and the contribution to the devel-
opment of third countries. The European Commission and the High Representative 
are expressly “invited” to use all means, including development cooperation [sic], 
for facilitating the readmission of irregulars in the countries of origin and transit, in 
close cooperation with the International Organization for Migration76. 
A new “more for more” approach, attaching development aid to migration con-
trol, emerges in recent praxis. More financial aid continues to be paid by the EU to 
third States that are more willing to control and prevent illegal migration flows77.  In 
other words, poor countries that want to receive more development aid or other “fa-
cilities” are “forced” to cooperate in these activities. In my opinion, it must be reject-
ed in any case an approach based on such a nexus between migration management 
and development aid, in the sense of directing major aid towards third countries of 
origin or transit of the main migration flows, that have appeared willing to cooperate 
to control migration and to conclude readmission agreements78. Even if these objec-
 
75
 Concerning the use of development cooperation as leverage to improve cooperation on migration issues, 
the European Commission affirms that efforts are made “to ensure that the use of conditionality in the migra-
tion dialogue does not negatively impact development cooperation” in its 2015 EU report on Policy Coherence 
for Development, 3 August 2015, [SWD(2015) 159 final], available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/policy-coherence-for-development-2015-eu-report_en.pdf>. 
76
 Conclusions of the extraordinary European Council (see supra note 64-65 and accompanying text), 
para. 3(f), (g), (k) and (l). 
77
 After the Valletta summit, held in November 2015 between the EU, African countries, internation-
al and regional institutions, for example, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the 
root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa was established. See APAP, “European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Southern Neighbourhood-Migration Issues”, European Parliamentary Research 
Service (EPRS), December 2015, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/573888/EPRS_BRI(2015)573888_EN.pdf>. 
78
 Proposals in such a sense came from a couple of Member States. Therefore it has to be rejected the 
proposal to include in the agreements between the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries, both 
bilateral and multilateral level, conditionality clauses under which the provision of technical assistance or 
aid from the EU is made conditional upon to the respect of specific and verifiable commitments in the 
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tives are per se lawful and appropriate in the field of the migration policy external 
dimension, the instrumentalization of development aid to attain them is neither right-
ful nor consistent with the Treaties provision regarding the specific targets of EU 
policy on development cooperation. Such a distortion of the migration-development 
nexus into a link between more development and less migration is wrong and 
doomed to fail79: it is not capable to meet the objectives of none of the two EU poli-
cies, because it contaminates their respective areas and tools.   
7. – The “New Partnership Framework” with Third Countries under 
the European Agenda on Migration 
A tool of the external dimension of EU migration policy are the so-called “mi-
gration compacts”, provided in a proposal for establishing “a new Partnership 
Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration”80, 
communicated in June 2016, addressing the political, social, economic and envi-
ronmental factors which constitute the root causes of migration. The ultimate aim 
of this initiative, as it was explained, is to achieve a comprehensive partnership 
with third countries to better manage migration in full respect of humanitarian and 
human rights obligation.  
The idea of the new Partnership Framework is that the EU must use all means 
available to respond in a meaningful way to the actual humanitarian “crisis of refu-
gees and migrants”. Development and neighbourhood policy tools would be used 
 
prevention and fight against illegal immigration, terrorism and organized crime. Such a proposal was ad-
vanced by the EU Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, in an opinion of 27 July 2011 
regarding the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Un-
ion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with 
the Southern Mediterranean” of 8 March 2011, [COM(2011) 200 final]. 
79
 In the same vein, DE HAAS, “Turning the Tide? Why ‘Development Instead of Migration’ Policies 
are Bound to Fail”, Working Papers No. 2, 2006, International Migration Institute, available at: 
<https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/wp/wp-02-06.pdf>. 
80
 “Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Mi-
gration”, also called “migration compacts”, is a concrete proposal for reinforcing cooperation with Third Coun-
tries on better migration management, presented in the European Commission’s communication of 7 June 
2016, [COM(2016) 385 final], available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160607/communication_external_aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_compact_en.pdf>, 
endorsed by the European Council of 28 June 2016, EUCO 26/16, available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/6/47244643506_en.pdf>. 
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to “reinforce local capacity-building, including for border control, asylum, coun-
ter-smuggling and reintegration efforts”81. “Standing ready to provide greater sup-
port to those partner countries which make the greatest efforts, but without shying 
away from negative incentives, EU assistance and policies should be tailored to 
produce concrete results in stemming the flow of irregular migrants”82.  
The short-term objectives of the compacts are to save lives in the Mediterranean 
Sea, to increase the rate of returns to countries of origin and transit, and to enable 
migrants and refugees to stay close to home and to avoid taking dangerous jour-
neys. In the long term, the EU should continue to increase its efforts to address the 
root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and to provide capacity 
building to the host communities and relevant institutions. This Partnership 
Framework “should enhance support for those in need in their countries of origin 
and transit”, and “help develop safe and sustainable reception capacities and pro-
vide lasting prospects close to home for refugees and their families” in third coun-
tries affected by migratory pressure. Poverty eradication – the Treaty based objec-
tive of EU development policy – is not directly addressed.  
Although the legal form of the agreement is not yet known, each compact is 
conceived as a tailored country package, that will combine elements from different 
EU instruments and policies focused on achieving the same objective83. As for de-
velopment policy, the Commission stresses that more coherence with migration 
policy is needed to ensure that “development assistance helps partner countries 
manage migration more effectively and also incentivises them to effectively coop-
erate on readmission of irregular migrants”84. Thus, even migration compacts will 
probably include several elements of conditionality depending on partner country 
cooperation on readmission and return, effective incentives and leverage created in 
synergy with other EU policies, in particular trade and development.  
As clearly stated in the 2016 communication, the European Commission calls 
 
81
 Ibid., p. 2, emphasis added.  
82
 Ibid., emphasis added. 
83
 The European Council is expecting the conclusion of a series of migration compacts with a limited 
number of priority countries (first Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, followed by Eritrea, Soma-
lia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan) be-
fore the end of 2016. However the first compacts will most probably be established with Jordan, as nego-
tiations are already concluded (see press release, IP/16/2570, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2570_en.htm>) and Lebanon (the ongoing negotiations are well advanced). 
84
 COM(2016) 385 final, cit. supra note 12, p. 9. 
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for the EU development policy to integrate core incentives to reward countries that 
fulfil their international obligation to readmit their nationals, cooperate to stop 
flows of irregular migration, and adequately host people fleeing persecution (and to 
punish those that do not, maybe). “Positive and negative incentives should be inte-
grated in the EU’s development policy”, rewarding those countries that fulfil their 
international obligation to readmit their own nationals, and those that cooperate in 
managing the flows of irregular migrants from third countries, as well as those tak-
ing action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. “Equally, 
there must be consequences for those who do not cooperate on readmission and re-
turn [sic]”85. It sounds like a threat. 
The EU migration compacts are departing from some of its long-standing prin-
ciples – such as poverty eradication as the main objective of development coopera-
tion – towards a new understanding of its overall external affairs goal, namely the 
protection of EU Member States’ interests. EU development aid – as well as trade 
preferences or visa facilitation agreement – is strongly subject to conditionality; it 
is a leverage to secure third-country commitments to positive outcomes in the field 
of return and readmission of irregular migrants. 
8. – Prospects Optimization: Addressing a “Sustainable” 
Development-Migration Nexus  
The recent EU approach, leading to the development aid serving migration-
control and readmission objectives, is neither consistent with EU development pol-
icy goals, nor with those of the PCD, as it turns the development-migration nexus 
into a link between two distinct and different targets: more development and less 
migration. If the EU global or “holistic” approach86 to external policies causes con-
fusion about the respective targets, it is preferable a “coordinated separation” of the 
EU legal instruments adopted in the framework of each one of the two policies. EU 
development policy should remain exclusively targeted on poverty alleviation or 
eradication and an overall – i.e. social, political and economic – sustainable devel-
opment of the poorer countries, even when the instruments of cooperation in this 
 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 This expression was used in the European Parliament resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation 
in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, cit. supra note 56. 
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area lead, at the same time, at tackling the root causes of migration87. Addressing 
the actual migration challenge without jeopardizing development policy achieve-
ments and objectives should be one of the key issues of the ongoing revision of the 
European Consensus on Development. 
The European Parliament (“EP”), together with the non-governmental organisa-
tions (“NGOs”) active in this field88, stresses that development aid should not be 
used for migration control purposes89. On one side, the EP has condemned the use 
of European Development Fund (“EDF”) and ODA for migration management and 
control in the absence of clear development objectives and has also expressed its 
concern that the financing of EU Trust Fund may be implemented to the detriment 
of development objectives90. On the other side, the EP emphasizes that the coopera-
tion with third countries in the GAMM framework should be focused on tackling 
the root causes and illegal migrant flows to Europe via existing policy instruments, 
such as regional and bilateral dialogue, mobility partnership and readmission 
agreements, among others91. It is worth remembering that one of the four thematic 
 
87
 MARTIN, “Migration and Development: Towards Sustainable Solutions”, Willamette Journal of In-
ternational Law and Dispute Resolution, 2007, p. 182 ff. 
88
 The Concord policy paper of December 2015 (available at: <http://concordeurope.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/SpotlightReport_Migration_2015.pdf>) provides an exhaustive evaluation of 
recent developments in EU migration policy relating to development cooperation. According to Concord, 
the emphasis on border control and security undermines the achievements of the EU’s global develop-
ment objectives. EU mobility partnership implementation shows that EU external migration policy is es-
sentially used to combat irregular migration. 
89
 In its resolution of 7 June 2016 on the EU 2015 Report on Policy Coherence for Development 
(2015/2317(INI), available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0246+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>), the European Parliament calls on the 
EU and the Member States not to report refugee costs as official development assistance (ODA) at the 
expense of the development programmes which tackle the root causes of migration. It acknowledges the 
need to strengthen the link between migration and development policies, but and opposes such a diver-
sion of development aid.  
90
 European Parliament, resolution of 13 September 2016 on the EU Trust Fund for Africa: implications 
for development and humanitarian aid.  There the Parliament also stressed that the use of EUTF funds allo-
cated from EDF and development policy budgetary instruments should fulfil ODA criteria, making sure that 
no development money is diverted to support security or for other purposes. The same line previously pre-
vailed when the proposal to devote 25% of the EDF for 2014-2020 to measures to combat the migration cri-
sis was rejected in adopting the European Parliament decision of 28 April 2016 on discharge in respect of 
the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2014, 
2015/2155(DEC), available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0150+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>. 
91
 The Foreign Affairs Committee, in its report on human rights and migration in Third Countries (20 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More Development of Third States and Less Migration Towards the EU … 247 
 
 
pillars of the GAMM addresses “the development impact of migration” and not the 
migration decrease by virtue of development. 
In my opinion, it is time to realize that there is a dual roadway connecting de-
velopment and migration, and lane invasions cause a high risk of accidents. Key 
targets in both directions of travel are safety and sustainability. Out of metaphor, 
the way to sustainable development of third countries does not go through con-
tainment of (irregular) migration and readmission, but through guarantees of sus-
tainable migration. That, I contend, is a safe, regular, responsible and well-
managed migration that allows a fair and equitable treatment of persons in the arri-
val States and circular returns in States of origin. Vice versa, the way to such a sus-
tainable migration – from the point of view of people or migrants, third countries 
and the EU Member States – goes through the third countries’ sustainable devel-
opment, consisting in true human, social, political and economical progress92, rather 
than migration control and border closure.  
Together with the EP, I believe that the Union must adopt a “win-win ap-
proach” to external cooperation on migration and development, i.e. an approach 
that is beneficial to the Union, to the third country in question and to the refugees 
and migrants in/from that third country93. From this point of view, EU cooperation 
with third countries should focus on adopting a long-term strategy to tackle the 
geo-political issues that affect the root causes of irregular migration flows, such as 
conflict, persecution, ethnic cleansing, generalized violence or other factors such as 
extreme poverty, climate change, natural disasters, lack of opportunities that forces 
people to flee to Europe into the hands of criminal smuggling networks.  
 
September 2016, 2015/2316(INI), available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A820160245
&language=EN>), has estimated that improvements in the coherence of the GAMM, and more rigorous 
integration of human rights monitoring and oversight mechanisms in all external agreements, are neces-
sary. It also stresses that aid should not be conditional on cooperation with regard to migration. This 
Committee and the Development Committee are now working on a joint report on the role of EU external 
action in addressing refugee and migrant movements (Draft report of 29 September 2016, 
2015/2342(INI), available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-589.425+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN>). 
92
 About the multifaceted right to development see VILLANI, “Il diritto allo sviluppo: diritto umano e 
dei popoli”, in VILLANI (a cura di), A tutti i membri della famiglia umana. Per il 60° anniversario della 
Dichiarazione universale, Milan, 2008, p. 123 ff. 
93
 European Parliament Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the 
need for a holistic EU approach to migration, cit. supra note 56, paras. 93-96, 100-103. 
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Moreover, the EU could help third countries to build up their asylum systems and 
integration strategies94, their assistance to refugees, and their capacity to tackle hu-
man trafficking and criminal smuggling into and through those countries. The EU 
and the Member States must put up the financial aid to third countries capacity-
building, such as by facilitating investment and education, strengthening and enforc-
ing asylum systems, supporting a better management of borders, and reinforcing le-
gal and judicial systems there. This way, at the same time, the EU and the Member 
States would help third countries to improve their degree of human, social, political 
and economic development, that is truly sustainable only if it is people-centred.  
 
 
 
 
94
 See ABBASS and IPPOLITO (eds.), Regional Approaches to the Protection of Asylum Seekers. An In-
ternational Legal Perspective, Abingdon/New York, 2016. 
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I. Should Europe be looking into Turkey’s Byzantine past to discover its own fu-
ture? (Francesca Galgano) 
This paper wishes to draw attention on Turkey’s Byzantine past, especially after the 
fall of Western Roman Empire. The Empire of “Romaei”, as the Byzantines used to call 
themselves, was Christian till XIV century, inheriting most of the Western Roman Em-
pire’s culture. Its society was multiethnic, where being a foreigner was considered as a re-
source, both in commerce and in the army. Its geographic position was a natural hinge be-
tween future Europe and Islam. Throughout centuries, Constantinople became a cultural 
melting pot, where it was possible to study Christian, Greek, Latin and pagan classics. 
Many Roman law codes were translated into Arabic (for Christian communities, fallen un-
der Islam) for consultation and application. The cultural and commercial exchange be-
tween Eastern and Western Mediterranean areas was the norm. A new European citizen-
ship should consider the lesson coming from this common past. 
 
 
II. The EU Development Policy and its Impact on Migration (Francesco Luigi Gatta) 
This paper addresses the EU’s migration and development policy by focusing in par-
ticular on the different strategies and actions put in place by the European institutions and 
the Member states in the recent period.  
In general terms, the positive effects of the interaction between these two policy areas 
have been acknowledged as a matter of interest at the international level, progressively 
gaining relevance in the political agenda of governments and international organisations. 
Migration, indeed, is recognised as a powerful development vehicle. Therefore, facilitating 
orderly, safe and responsible mobility of people represents an important goal that could 
lead to positive results in both the country of origin and destination.  
Among the various forms of cooperation launched in order to foster the potential posi-
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 Migration and Development: Some Reflections on Current Legal Issues 
 
 
tive synergy between migration and development, the initiatives taken in the European 
context appear to be particularly significant: the EU is the world’s largest aid donor and it 
can count on relevant diplomatic, financial and humanitarian resources, which have been 
used in a number of programmes and actions aimed at fostering dialogue and collaboration 
with relevant partner countries.  
The analysis of the EU’s migration and development policy is divided in two main 
parts: the first one presents the EU development policy in general, on the one hand clarify-
ing its origin and evolution and, on the other, highlighting the relevant guiding principles 
and the legal-institutional framework in which the EU has built and elaborated its action 
during the years.  
The second part specifically focuses on the various strategies and initiatives concretely 
put in place by the EU in order to improve the interaction between migration and develop-
ment and to enhance the coherence between these two elements. In this regard, in particu-
lar, specific attention is given to the practical measures adopted in order to tackle work-
related issues and peculiar phenomena (such as “remittances”, “diasporas”, “circular mi-
gration” and “brain drain”), which play a considerable role in the development process of 
countries of origin. 
 
 
III. Regular Migrants’ Integration between European Law and National Legal Or-
ders: a Key Condition for Individual and Social Development (Stefano Montaldo) 
The paper analyses the relationship between regular migrants’ integration and econom-
ic and social development, in light of EU migration law and policies. A specific attention is 
paid to integration conditions, which are aimed at providing migrants with the tools needed 
to be active in the economic and political life of the hosting Member State. Both EU sec-
ondary law and national legislations provide for various forms of integration conditionali-
ty. The failure to fulfill integration requirements imposed at national level may result in a 
restriction on the rights provided by EU law. However, such conditions must respect the 
general principles of the EU legal order, principle of equality and principle of proportional-
ity in primis. In fact, integration conditionality measures must favour social inclusion ra-
ther than selecting migrants deserving a chance. 
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IV. Migration and Development: the Case of People Displaced by Development 
and States’ Obligation to Respect Their Human Rights  (Laura Messina) 
A peculiar and rather disguised case of forced migration occurs when people are forci-
bly displaced as a result of development.  
The plight of at least 15 million people displaced every year to make way for develop-
ment projects of all kinds is a topic that remains rather neglected. Such projects include: 
the construction of dams and infrastructure; the urban renewal or “beautification” of cities; 
the preparation of mega-events; conservation projects; and activities of exploration and ex-
ploitation of natural resources. 
The conditions suffered by these people can be as dire as those of people displaced by 
conflicts, persecution, and natural disasters. People ousted from their home and land in the 
name of a supposedly greater economic good, face serious risks of impoverishment. They 
are deprived of their houses, their livelihood, and their community ties.  
From an international human rights law perspective, their situation is problematic. It 
raises concerns about respect for their human rights, specifically with regard to their right 
to property; right to respect for private and family life and respect for home; right to hous-
ing; and right to freedom of movement and choice of residence. Additionally, the authori-
tative recognition of a new general right “not to be arbitrarily displaced” has also been put 
forward, which extends to displacement caused by development projects. 
While these rights may all be legitimately restricted, and indeed development pursued 
in general public interest for the well being of the country is a legitimate justification for 
limiting individuals’ rights, the necessity and proportionality test is frequently material to 
assess whether human rights have been fully respected. The jurisprudence of human rights 
monitoring bodies and courts has given due weight to the exploration of all feasible alter-
natives to eviction and expropriation measures, to the resulting consequence of rendering 
individuals homeless or depriving them of their source of living, to the vulnerability of the 
people affected, to the respect of procedural safeguards, including people’s right to consul-
tation and participation in development process, as well as access to justice and remedy. 
The analysis of the topic through the lens of international human rights law demon-
strates how the human rights of displaced people are frequently disregarded in the pursuit 
of development. It equally proves that international human rights law provides protection 
against development-induced displacement. 
 
 
V. The Undesirable Worker Fiction: Demand-Based Labour Migration Schemes 
and Migrant Workers’ Socio-Economic Rights (Fulvia Staiano) 
The majority of EU Member States currently adopt labour migration schemes based on 
labour market demands for third-country national workers. These systems pursue the two-
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fold objective of restricting the admission of foreign workers to what is strictly necessary 
to comply with such demands, and to favour the employment of national or EU workers 
over that of non-citizens. National labour migration schemes adopted by EU Member 
States pursue these goals in a variety of ways, ranging from the imposition of a preliminary 
market needs test as a prerequisite to grant residence permits to third-country national 
workers to the adoption of quota systems, or to the barring of residence and work permits 
in certain sectors of the labour markets. A common feature of these legislative and policy 
choices is the existence of some form of assessment of the demand for foreign worker in 
the national labour market. This paper starts from the consideration that this assessment 
can often be flawed and inaccurate, with negative consequences on third-country national 
workers’ socio-economic rights. Through a critical analysis of the labour migration 
schemes adopted in Italy and Ireland, this chapter discusses how the underestimation and 
misrepresentation of employers’ demands carries a serious risk of pushing migrant workers 
in unregulated and informal sectors of the European labour market - thus jeopardising key 
socio-economic rights such as the right to receive wages. By comparing the interpretative 
approaches adopted by Italian and Irish courts, this chapter also enquires on which norma-
tive and judicial solutions are more capable of ensuring an effective protection of migrant 
workers’ rights in this field. 
 
 
VI. Limits to the Implementation of International Law Instruments on Labour Mi-
gration: a Focus on ILO’s Praxis (Beatrice Gornati) 
The recognition of migration as a condition for development by the United Nations is 
an important indicator of a new awareness of the problem at international level. However, 
it is important to consider that, as far as international law is concerned, instruments to fa-
cilitate labour migration, in order to foster development, date back to the fifties. The con-
tribution focuses on three particular aspects. The first part focuses on the ILO’s praxis as 
far as labour migration is concerned. A special attention is paid to the effective implemen-
tation of ILO’s binding and non-binding instruments. The intent is to understand why both 
Conventions and Recommendations struggle to be put into practice by States, despite the 
copious production of such legal instruments by the ILO. In the wake of these considera-
tions, second and third parts move to particularly problematic areas, namely the employ-
ment of refugees and the phenomenon of forced labour. The two areas, among other things, 
appear to influence each other. In particular, the precarious situation of these refugees may 
render them vulnerable to discriminatory practices which can lead to exploitation and the 
denial of fundamental principles and rights at work, even to forced labour. 
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VII. The “Asylum Payers”: Questioning the Asylum Seekers’ Obligation to Con-
tribute to the Costs of their Reception under International and European Law (Sal-
vatore Fabio Nicolosi) 
Migration is an important topic within the actual context of globalization, it can be rec-
ognized as a powerful - though challenging - development vehicle in both the country of 
origin and destination. Nonetheless, the ongoing migratory crisis in the Mediterranean has 
been dramatically impacting on many States of destination within the European Union. 
Although the need to receive asylum seekers is traditionally informed with reasons of hu-
manitarianism, the recent adoption of the Danish so called “Jewellery Law”, providing for 
the search and seizure of certain assets of asylum seekers that may serve as a contribution 
to the expenses for their maintenance, sheds light on its possible implications from a hu-
man rights perspective. Despite triggering initial debates, the issue remained partly unex-
plored, though constituting a burning topic of the migration and development discourse. 
Host States claim, in fact, that the cost of reception of asylum seekers may have an impact 
on the state of national economy, particularly in time of crisis. 
The research aims to answer the question whether the reception of asylum seekers may 
constitute an issue for the State of destination from a perspective of (economic) develop-
ment. It will therefore investigate the nature, scope and legality of the asylum seekers’ ob-
ligation to contribute in the costs of their reception under international and EU law. 
To this extent, the research will firstly review the most relevant domestic practice at 
the European level, highlighting the possible risks beyond construing asylum seekers as 
profiteering from the international refugee protection regime. Next, the research will exam-
ine the international and EU legal framework as to the possibility for States to impose on 
refugees and asylum seekers any obligation to contribute to the cost of their reception.  
Ulitmately, it will be argued that the tendency to impose an obligation for asylum 
seekers to contribute to the cost of their reception may undermine the exercise of the right 
to asylum and can also create discriminations by treating asylum seekers radically different 
from other migrants and from national citizens. It will be concluded that a careful test is 
necessary, especially under EU law, to ensure that asylum seekers have an adequate and 
dignified standard of living. 
 
VIII. Unaccompanied Minors Seeking for Protection in the European Union: Will a 
Fair and Adequate Asylum System Ever See the Light? (Elena Gualco) 
In recent years, migration has become a huge phenomenon that all European States 
have the duty to deal with. When asylum seekers are unaccompanied minors, the difficul-
ties in tempering the freedom of action of States with their human rights increase. Unac-
companied children are in fact weaker than other migrants because of their vulnerable age.  
Stressing the idea that unaccompanied minors’ fundamental rights can be effectively 
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protected only via the enhancement of solidarity within Members States, the paper investi-
gates the current rules of the Common European Asylum System to highlight their inade-
quacy in accommodating migrant minors as well as in respecting their human rights. Sec-
ondly, the paper focuses on the reforms that have been recently suggested to demonstrate 
that - despite being an slight improvement - the Commission proposals do not solve all the 
issues related to both the respect of asylum seeking minors’ fundamental rights, and mi-
nors’ successful integration in the host countries. 
 
 
IX. Something Old, Something New, Something Balanced, Something Blue: the EU 
Blue Card Directive, Brain drain, and the Economic Development of the EU and 
the Sending Countries (Alessandro Rosanò) 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the EU Blue Card Directive and 
its revision proposal presented by the Juncker Commission, assessing whether they can of-
fer proper solutions to the problems of labour shortages and brain drain, taking into ac-
count the needs of both the EU and sending countries. With regard to the fight against 
brain drain, the paper focuses on Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement as a provision that 
might counteract the idea that the needs of the EU labour market shall always prevail. In 
the final paragraph, the author seeks to identify a legal basis in the EU Treaties that would 
make it possible to reform the EU Blue Card Directive in a sense consistent with the objec-
tive of reduction and eradication of poverty. 
 
 
X. More Development of Third States and Less Migration towards the EU Member 
States: Is This a New Dual Aim of the EU Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ments? (Martina Guidi) 
The recent EU external policy and cooperation praxis seems to turn the development-
migration nexus into a link between two different targets: more development of Third 
States and less migration towards Europe. Is such an approach, leading to the development 
aid serving migration-control and readmission objectives, consistent with EU development 
cooperation goals and with the Policy Coherence for Development? Does the EU “global 
approach” cause confusion about the respective targets? In the author’s opinion, a “separa-
tion” of the EU legal instruments adopted in the framework of each one of the two policies 
would better guarantee consistency with the EU treaties, even if coherence is also neces-
sary as the instruments of development cooperation could tackle, at the same time, the root 
causes of migration. Anyhow, EU development agreements should remain exclusively tar-
geted on poverty alleviation or eradication and an overall sustainable (people-centred) de-
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velopment of the poorer countries. Addressing the actual migration challenge without 
jeopardizing development policy achievements and objectives should be one of the key is-
sues of the ongoing revision of the current EU legal instruments. 
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